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Hipias Menor
Este libro ha sido convertido a formato digital por una comunidad de voluntarios. Puedes encontrarlo gratis en Internet. Comprar la edición Kindle incluye la entrega inalámbrica.
21 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 391
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Plato
5,200 books8,840 followersPlato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
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June 16, 2025
diyalog, ilk bakışta 'dürüst olmak mı, yalan söylemek mi daha erdemlidir' gibi basit bir soruyla başlıyor gibi görünse de, aslında alt metninde bilgi, niyet ve ahlâk arasındaki ilişkiyi irdeliyor. platon’un ince mizahını ve sokrates’in karşısındakini şaşırtan sorgulama tarzını burada çok net hissediyoruz. hippias sürekli kendini övüp bilgili olduğunu göstermeye çalışırken, sokrates’in soruları onu yavaş yavaş köşeye sıkıştırıyor. ve bir noktadan sonra biz de okur olarak ikilemde kalıyoruz.
diyaloğun başında hippias, akhilleus’u odysseus’tan daha dürüst ve iyi biri olarak anlatıyor. ona göre akhilleus açık sözlü, odysseus ise hilekâr. ancak sokrates öyle sorular soruyor ki, bu net ayrım bir anda bulanıklaşıyor. yalan söylemek bilgi gerektirir mi? bir kişi yalanı bilerek mi söylerse daha erdemli olur, yoksa farkında olmadan mı? bu sorular karşısında hippias iyice sıkışıyor. tam bu noktada işin rengi bir anda değişiyor.. sokrates, bilerek hata yapan kişinin, farkında olmadan hata yapandan daha üstün olabileceğini öne sürüyor çünkü en azından ne yaptığını biliyor. bunu ilk duyduğumuzda gerçekten rahatsız oluyoruz, bilerek kötülük yapmak daha mı iyi yani? yine de platon’un asıl meselesi burada başlıyor çünkü bizi, bilgi sahibi birinin nasıl olup da yanlış bir şey yapabildiğini, bilginin her zaman ahlâki erdemle örtüşüp örtüşmediğini sorgulamaya davet ediyor.
bu diyaloğunda da sokrates’in amacı net bir sonuca ulaşmak değil, daha çok hippias’ın ve bizim kafamızdaki çelişkileri ortaya çıkarmak..
diyaloğun başında hippias, akhilleus’u odysseus’tan daha dürüst ve iyi biri olarak anlatıyor. ona göre akhilleus açık sözlü, odysseus ise hilekâr. ancak sokrates öyle sorular soruyor ki, bu net ayrım bir anda bulanıklaşıyor. yalan söylemek bilgi gerektirir mi? bir kişi yalanı bilerek mi söylerse daha erdemli olur, yoksa farkında olmadan mı? bu sorular karşısında hippias iyice sıkışıyor. tam bu noktada işin rengi bir anda değişiyor.. sokrates, bilerek hata yapan kişinin, farkında olmadan hata yapandan daha üstün olabileceğini öne sürüyor çünkü en azından ne yaptığını biliyor. bunu ilk duyduğumuzda gerçekten rahatsız oluyoruz, bilerek kötülük yapmak daha mı iyi yani? yine de platon’un asıl meselesi burada başlıyor çünkü bizi, bilgi sahibi birinin nasıl olup da yanlış bir şey yapabildiğini, bilginin her zaman ahlâki erdemle örtüşüp örtüşmediğini sorgulamaya davet ediyor.
bu diyaloğunda da sokrates’in amacı net bir sonuca ulaşmak değil, daha çok hippias’ın ve bizim kafamızdaki çelişkileri ortaya çıkarmak..
October 27, 2013
Socrates questions Hippias about whether its better for someone to be bad voluntarily, or to be bad involuntarily. Hippias takes the conventional view that intentional wrongdoing is worse than unintentional wrongdoing. Socrates argues against this position.
This is a pretty bad dialogue. The writing is much weaker than in other dialogues, and the arguments contain obvious equivocations and thus its easy to poke holes in them. Of course, Hippias doesn't do that. I think the way to appreciate this dialogue is to see Plato, the ironist, having a little joke. Socrates, who argues that it is better to be deliberately bad, make deliberately bad arguments to support his position. Hippias doesn't know any better, and he involuntarily makes bad arguments for his position. Thus, we see that Socrates, who is intentionally bad in his arguments, is a better dialectician than Hippias. So far as that goes, its pretty clever.
But I suspect Plato went the extra mile. Plato, the brilliant writer of dialogues, deliberately wrote this lame dialogue to further support, in an ironic way, the position that its better to be deliberately bad than to be unintentionally bad. This is phenomenally clever, but I still want to say that its just better to be good in the first place, and much better than drawing nice distinctions about which is the better turd.
This is a pretty bad dialogue. The writing is much weaker than in other dialogues, and the arguments contain obvious equivocations and thus its easy to poke holes in them. Of course, Hippias doesn't do that. I think the way to appreciate this dialogue is to see Plato, the ironist, having a little joke. Socrates, who argues that it is better to be deliberately bad, make deliberately bad arguments to support his position. Hippias doesn't know any better, and he involuntarily makes bad arguments for his position. Thus, we see that Socrates, who is intentionally bad in his arguments, is a better dialectician than Hippias. So far as that goes, its pretty clever.
But I suspect Plato went the extra mile. Plato, the brilliant writer of dialogues, deliberately wrote this lame dialogue to further support, in an ironic way, the position that its better to be deliberately bad than to be unintentionally bad. This is phenomenally clever, but I still want to say that its just better to be good in the first place, and much better than drawing nice distinctions about which is the better turd.
February 7, 2020
A Question of Lies
7 February 2020
There are a few things that are explored here, one of them being the question of whether somebody can do wrong willingly. This is one of those things that Plato has explored previously, in that bad people are only bad due to their ignorance (though this is not necessarily something that I would agree with). However, the question that is asked in this dialogue is who is the better liar – Achilles or Odysseus.
Well, that is an interesting question because nobody would expect Achillies to lie, particularly since most, if not all, of the time he is portrayed as a straight shooter. Well, there is one instance where he tells one thing to Odysseus, and another to Ajax, but Socrates refutes this because Achillies never actually carries out his threat. The thing was that Achillies said that he was going to leave the war and sail away, and in my mind, this isn’t a lie, but rather one of Achillies’ spats that he was throwing because he wasn’t getting his own way.
As for Odysseus, well, we all know that he is a perpetual liar, though one commentary that I read (or rather watched on Youtube) claims that he was actually set apart from the rest of the Greek warriors because he survived purely through cunning. The thing with the Greek warrior was that Achillies was intended to be portrayed as the best type of warrior, since he would stand against his enemies and fight them, well, as a proper warrior would.
Odysseus was different in that he used cunning to survive, and Paris was also different in that he was an archer, something that reeked of cowardice back in those days (which differentiated him from his brother Hector, who was a warrior in the same style of Achillies). The thing is that as we follow Odysseus in his journeys, both in Troy and elsewhere, we see that he is always looking for cunning ways to defeat his enemy, and the wooden horse is a case in point.
One interesting thing that Socrates points out is that to be an effective liar, one needs to be an expert in the subject that they are lying about. Well, that is sort of true, but I would say that an expert liar would need to have a godlike memory because once you start contradicting yourself, your craftily constructed lies start to unravel. In fact, I always seem to find myself looking for holes in things that people tell me, more likely out of force of habit than anything else.
Yet, the biggest question, one that isn’t necessarily answered here, is whether somebody who truly believes something to be true and claims that it is true, is actually lying? Take holocaust deniers for instance. We all know that the evidence points to the holocaust taking place, but there are too many people out there who believe otherwise. Or how about the moon landing? Is somebody who truly believes that the moon landing was faked a liar? Sure, these two types of people no doubt will reject evidence to the contrary, but does a sincere belief in a falsehood make somebody a liar?
In a way I guess this is something that Socrates may have been touching upon, because of the way that he is exploring the idea that a liar has to be an expert in the topic that they are lying about. Yet, it seems that ignorance plays a significant part as well – but is ignorance and lying the same thing? Also, if I was an expert in, well, say computers, why would I lie about the way a computer functions? Yet in a way there is also the case that there are people that play upon other people’s ignorance – the financial industry is rife with them.
This is an interesting concept though, because there are lies that we tell ourselves, there are lies that people tell so that they get out of trouble, and then there are lies that people tell to get people to support their ideas. Then, and Benjamin Disraeli famously said – there are also statistics (though that could also be a lie).
7 February 2020
There are a few things that are explored here, one of them being the question of whether somebody can do wrong willingly. This is one of those things that Plato has explored previously, in that bad people are only bad due to their ignorance (though this is not necessarily something that I would agree with). However, the question that is asked in this dialogue is who is the better liar – Achilles or Odysseus.
Well, that is an interesting question because nobody would expect Achillies to lie, particularly since most, if not all, of the time he is portrayed as a straight shooter. Well, there is one instance where he tells one thing to Odysseus, and another to Ajax, but Socrates refutes this because Achillies never actually carries out his threat. The thing was that Achillies said that he was going to leave the war and sail away, and in my mind, this isn’t a lie, but rather one of Achillies’ spats that he was throwing because he wasn’t getting his own way.
As for Odysseus, well, we all know that he is a perpetual liar, though one commentary that I read (or rather watched on Youtube) claims that he was actually set apart from the rest of the Greek warriors because he survived purely through cunning. The thing with the Greek warrior was that Achillies was intended to be portrayed as the best type of warrior, since he would stand against his enemies and fight them, well, as a proper warrior would.
Odysseus was different in that he used cunning to survive, and Paris was also different in that he was an archer, something that reeked of cowardice back in those days (which differentiated him from his brother Hector, who was a warrior in the same style of Achillies). The thing is that as we follow Odysseus in his journeys, both in Troy and elsewhere, we see that he is always looking for cunning ways to defeat his enemy, and the wooden horse is a case in point.
One interesting thing that Socrates points out is that to be an effective liar, one needs to be an expert in the subject that they are lying about. Well, that is sort of true, but I would say that an expert liar would need to have a godlike memory because once you start contradicting yourself, your craftily constructed lies start to unravel. In fact, I always seem to find myself looking for holes in things that people tell me, more likely out of force of habit than anything else.
Yet, the biggest question, one that isn’t necessarily answered here, is whether somebody who truly believes something to be true and claims that it is true, is actually lying? Take holocaust deniers for instance. We all know that the evidence points to the holocaust taking place, but there are too many people out there who believe otherwise. Or how about the moon landing? Is somebody who truly believes that the moon landing was faked a liar? Sure, these two types of people no doubt will reject evidence to the contrary, but does a sincere belief in a falsehood make somebody a liar?
In a way I guess this is something that Socrates may have been touching upon, because of the way that he is exploring the idea that a liar has to be an expert in the topic that they are lying about. Yet, it seems that ignorance plays a significant part as well – but is ignorance and lying the same thing? Also, if I was an expert in, well, say computers, why would I lie about the way a computer functions? Yet in a way there is also the case that there are people that play upon other people’s ignorance – the financial industry is rife with them.
This is an interesting concept though, because there are lies that we tell ourselves, there are lies that people tell so that they get out of trouble, and then there are lies that people tell to get people to support their ideas. Then, and Benjamin Disraeli famously said – there are also statistics (though that could also be a lie).
July 21, 2014
Another (very) short dialogue which concludes in aporia. I'm still left wondering exactly why I'm supposed to think someone who's using an oar wrong on purpose, and hence is a tit, is better or worse than someone who is using it wrong and is simply ignorant; they're both still using it wrong—maybe this is just my inner consequentialist striking out. Apparently Socrates and Hippias didn't seem to know either.
If you really wanted to define and draw out "worth" the way that Plato via Socrates and Hippias is using the term, it seems like the only way to really square it solidly (and here I'll show my own ignorance by not leaning on some metaphysical potentiality vs. actuality argument or alluding to Plato's own Forms) is by factoring in what it would take to correct the issue. With someone who knew how to do something and was doing it wrong on purpose, you would simply need to catch them doing it and correct them. With someone who was doing it wrong out of ignorance, you would presumably need to teach them how to do that thing. There is a higher input of effort needed in the latter case to correct the issue, and so it represents a scenario which costs the community more, in time and effort, regardless of the consequence of the action itself—this matter seems to turn the whole thing on its head. Instead of being context-regardless (a nonissue), it becomes intensely context-specific as a deceitful hedge-fund manager or head of government or CFO can do much more damage than a janitor lying about where he put the Windex. Two separate but closely-related issues, and a distinction that was untouched here.
If you really wanted to define and draw out "worth" the way that Plato via Socrates and Hippias is using the term, it seems like the only way to really square it solidly (and here I'll show my own ignorance by not leaning on some metaphysical potentiality vs. actuality argument or alluding to Plato's own Forms) is by factoring in what it would take to correct the issue. With someone who knew how to do something and was doing it wrong on purpose, you would simply need to catch them doing it and correct them. With someone who was doing it wrong out of ignorance, you would presumably need to teach them how to do that thing. There is a higher input of effort needed in the latter case to correct the issue, and so it represents a scenario which costs the community more, in time and effort, regardless of the consequence of the action itself—this matter seems to turn the whole thing on its head. Instead of being context-regardless (a nonissue), it becomes intensely context-specific as a deceitful hedge-fund manager or head of government or CFO can do much more damage than a janitor lying about where he put the Windex. Two separate but closely-related issues, and a distinction that was untouched here.
June 14, 2024
Extrañaba una banda a Sócrates ¿alguien me hace un fanfic Sócrates-Platón x encargo?
Pude 'sistematizar' lo que me gusta de los diálogos de Platón:
me gusta el método socrático, así que banco más los diálogos uno-Sócrates que cuando hay mucha gente opinando, al mismo tiempo no suelo coincidir con la cosmovisión, lo que explica que Apología y Fedón sean mis favs (me interesa pensarlos mas en relación a 'la trama de la muerte de Sócrates') Aunque no suela coincidir cuando me entero que hay un dialogo sobre un tema que me compete quiero saber qué pensaba Sócrates según Platón de eso porque me gusta ver el ✨️método✨️ en este sentido los 2 Hipias fueron muy divertidos, aunque la conclusión queda medio en la lona. Una amiga me dijo que este año iban a traducir una "pelea de gallos entre Sócrates y Hipias" (lo que x casualidad refería a estos diálogo) y me dió vibes a cuando Wos dijo chu chu chupame un huevo.
En el Hipias Mayor pude preveer uno de los argumentos de Sócrates así que me sentí ✨️inteligente✨️
Also, estoy segura de que Sócrates era ENTP
Pude 'sistematizar' lo que me gusta de los diálogos de Platón:
me gusta el método socrático, así que banco más los diálogos uno-Sócrates que cuando hay mucha gente opinando, al mismo tiempo no suelo coincidir con la cosmovisión, lo que explica que Apología y Fedón sean mis favs (me interesa pensarlos mas en relación a 'la trama de la muerte de Sócrates') Aunque no suela coincidir cuando me entero que hay un dialogo sobre un tema que me compete quiero saber qué pensaba Sócrates según Platón de eso porque me gusta ver el ✨️método✨️ en este sentido los 2 Hipias fueron muy divertidos, aunque la conclusión queda medio en la lona. Una amiga me dijo que este año iban a traducir una "pelea de gallos entre Sócrates y Hipias" (lo que x casualidad refería a estos diálogo) y me dió vibes a cuando Wos dijo chu chu chupame un huevo.
En el Hipias Mayor pude preveer uno de los argumentos de Sócrates así que me sentí ✨️inteligente✨️
Also, estoy segura de que Sócrates era ENTP
August 1, 2018
El único logro real de mi vida es haber traducido este diálogo del griego clásico así que voy a contarlo aca porque sí.
Read
January 19, 2021Recomendaría más la lectura de Hipias Mayor.
August 4, 2021
Also known at “Hippias Minor,” this isn’t one of the better Socratic dialogues, but it’s amusing and somewhat thought-provoking. It’s one of two dialogues which feature the exceedingly narcissistic Sophist, Hippias, as Socrates’ philosophical sparring partner. The crux of the matter is Hippias’ claim that Achilles is fundamentally truthful while Odysseus is a liar. Socrates takes issue, showing that both heroes tell both truths and lies over the course of Homer’s works.
When Hippias is challenged on his oversimplified classification scheme, the Sophist claims that Achilles’s falsehoods are involuntary, whereas Odysseus’s lies are committed on purpose. This brings the dialogue to the issue that will play out to its end. While Hippias claims that involuntary falsities make Achilles the more virtuous man, the Sophist is led through a series of examples showing that the person who does bad voluntarily is invariably the better man. To give one of the countless examples (not countless, but I’m too lazy to count them,) Socrates suggests that the musician who plays badly on purpose is considered the better musician than one who plays badly because it’s all he or she is capable of.
While most of the dialogue is about whether it’s better to be bad voluntarily or involuntarily, it doesn’t seem that’s really Socrates’ point. In the end, when Hippias last says he doesn’t agree with Socrates, Socrates says that he’s not sure he agrees with himself. Socrates’ point might be that Hippias is full of untested claims because Hippias thinks himself smarter than everyone else.
It’s true this isn’t among the best, but it’s worth reading for this one lesson: don’t be like Hippias.
When Hippias is challenged on his oversimplified classification scheme, the Sophist claims that Achilles’s falsehoods are involuntary, whereas Odysseus’s lies are committed on purpose. This brings the dialogue to the issue that will play out to its end. While Hippias claims that involuntary falsities make Achilles the more virtuous man, the Sophist is led through a series of examples showing that the person who does bad voluntarily is invariably the better man. To give one of the countless examples (not countless, but I’m too lazy to count them,) Socrates suggests that the musician who plays badly on purpose is considered the better musician than one who plays badly because it’s all he or she is capable of.
While most of the dialogue is about whether it’s better to be bad voluntarily or involuntarily, it doesn’t seem that’s really Socrates’ point. In the end, when Hippias last says he doesn’t agree with Socrates, Socrates says that he’s not sure he agrees with himself. Socrates’ point might be that Hippias is full of untested claims because Hippias thinks himself smarter than everyone else.
It’s true this isn’t among the best, but it’s worth reading for this one lesson: don’t be like Hippias.
February 26, 2020
On lying. Plato ties virtue to knowledge. Perhaps he also shows his ideal of the ordered soul conflicts with moral norms.
August 9, 2016
Socrates seems to be more interested in frustrating his sophist friend, rather then trying to make a point. He himself is not sure that he liked the conclusion he has made. The argument itself is a bit ambiguous, Socrates seems to be using the word 'good' in two senses; in sense of righteousness and in sense of 'being good at doing something' - shifting from one meaning to another meaning to reach conclusions that are contrary to any sense.
May 12, 2021
Diyalog felsefi bir metinden ziyade, kanaat önderleri ve bilginlere bir hiciv, onların görüşlerinin muhatabı olanlara ise bir uyarı niteliği taşır gibi durmakta. Mutabakat sağlanan öncül yargı, bir kimsenin ancak bir konuya vakıf olduğu noktada yalan söyleme kabiliyetine eriştiği üzerine olacaktır, konular hakkında doğrulara ulaşmış ve onları iletebilecek birisi, onları çarpıtabilir, bu durumda yalan söyleyebilen kimse, doğruyu söyleyebilen kimsedir. Duruma ve iradesine göre ne zaman, hangisini yaptığı onu ahlaki düzlemde bir diğer kimseden aşağı ya da yukarı koymaz; hatta onu daha iyi biri yapan özelliği, diğerine göre üstün gelen bilgisidir. Sonuçta herkes yalan da, doğru da söyleyebilir; sadece yalan söyleme kabiliyeti daha yüksek olan, iki söylemde de daha vakıftır diğerine göre.
Ancak Sokrates, bilerek yalan söyleyenin, bilmeyerek yalan söyleyen kişiden daha iyi olduğunu söylerken sadece kendi erdem kalesine saldırmakla kalmıyor, sunduğu tüm sanatlara yönelik analojilerde de iyilikten ziyade, ustalığı bir ana ölçüt olarak ele alıyor. Sunulan bu analojilerde “isteyerek yanlış yapan” durumlarda ise “yanlış” veya “hatalı” kavramları, anlatılan durum ile bir uyumsuzluk gösteriyor. “Örneğin istemediğimiz bir zaman mı bizi yanlış yöne götüren bir dümen mi yoksa istediğimiz zaman mı yanlış yöne götüren dümeni tercih ederiz?” sorusunda, ikinci ölçüt bir çelişki içermekte; ki bu çelişkiyi logosu ruh ve beden yönetiminin en üstüne yerleştiren Platon’un kendisi daha bir çok kez karşımıza çıkartacaktı. Neredeyse tüm Sokratik ve Platonik diyaloglarda bilinçli bir şekilde kimsenin kötülüğü tercih etmeyeceğini savunan Sokrates, bu diyalog içerisinde hem insanların bunu tercih edebileceğini, hem de bunu eyleme dökenlerin diğerlerinden daha iyi insanlar olacağını söyleyerek, felsefi söylemden ziyade bir satirde bulunmuş gözüküyor.
Ancak Sokrates, bilerek yalan söyleyenin, bilmeyerek yalan söyleyen kişiden daha iyi olduğunu söylerken sadece kendi erdem kalesine saldırmakla kalmıyor, sunduğu tüm sanatlara yönelik analojilerde de iyilikten ziyade, ustalığı bir ana ölçüt olarak ele alıyor. Sunulan bu analojilerde “isteyerek yanlış yapan” durumlarda ise “yanlış” veya “hatalı” kavramları, anlatılan durum ile bir uyumsuzluk gösteriyor. “Örneğin istemediğimiz bir zaman mı bizi yanlış yöne götüren bir dümen mi yoksa istediğimiz zaman mı yanlış yöne götüren dümeni tercih ederiz?” sorusunda, ikinci ölçüt bir çelişki içermekte; ki bu çelişkiyi logosu ruh ve beden yönetiminin en üstüne yerleştiren Platon’un kendisi daha bir çok kez karşımıza çıkartacaktı. Neredeyse tüm Sokratik ve Platonik diyaloglarda bilinçli bir şekilde kimsenin kötülüğü tercih etmeyeceğini savunan Sokrates, bu diyalog içerisinde hem insanların bunu tercih edebileceğini, hem de bunu eyleme dökenlerin diğerlerinden daha iyi insanlar olacağını söyleyerek, felsefi söylemden ziyade bir satirde bulunmuş gözüküyor.
October 21, 2023
Es mejor el que corre mal voluntariamente que el que lo hace involuntariamente porque ahí se define bien y mal como buena o mala habilidad. El que miente voluntariamente también es mejor que el que miente involuntariamente en el sentido de que tiene mejor habilidad, es más sabio, pero es peor moralmente ya que hace daño a otras personas voluntariamente. O acaso es también más ignorante porque está empleando su habilidad para el mal en vez de para el bien y no es realmente consciente de que lo que hace está mal. No creo pero yo no sé nada.
Me gusta este mundillo de la filosofía. Y más aún la clásica, porque yo puedo pensar profunda y racionalmente gracias a que muchos lo han hecho antes que yo. Pero aquí se supone que están los pilares del pensamiento moderno, y me parece bastante increíble. A ver si leo más cosas en vez de sólo videos de Youtube en los que lo explican, que también está muy bien ojo. He encontrado un club de filosofía en la TUM y van a comentar este diálogo, voy a hacer amigos frikis!
Me gusta este mundillo de la filosofía. Y más aún la clásica, porque yo puedo pensar profunda y racionalmente gracias a que muchos lo han hecho antes que yo. Pero aquí se supone que están los pilares del pensamiento moderno, y me parece bastante increíble. A ver si leo más cosas en vez de sólo videos de Youtube en los que lo explican, que también está muy bien ojo. He encontrado un club de filosofía en la TUM y van a comentar este diálogo, voy a hacer amigos frikis!
January 9, 2026
I was grinning and smiling looking at this conversation between Socrates and Hippias. Hippias was a great man, a man of art and creation, practicality, and wisdom. Here, we can see that Socrates tried to prove if a man who erred voluntarily was better than the man who erred involuntarily. Hippias was said otherwise with the main premise of who's better between Achilles and Odysseus. The main problem here in Hippias was, he had this justice that was performed by his own account, but yet he couldn’t explain his philosophical approach behind his reasoning.
Socrates method in rhetorical thinking was amazing, he made the example from body, intent, and knowledge. That’s the very basic of logical thinking. While Hippias was filled with moral reasoning, he got muted by his own incapability to convert his dilemma. Yeah, Hippias was kinda cooked there.
Socrates method in rhetorical thinking was amazing, he made the example from body, intent, and knowledge. That’s the very basic of logical thinking. While Hippias was filled with moral reasoning, he got muted by his own incapability to convert his dilemma. Yeah, Hippias was kinda cooked there.
March 29, 2021
En kort beskrivning av lögnernas filosofi, som i princip säger att den som kan mer om något per definition blir den skickligare lögnaren om ämnet. Spelagrumentationsfelet.
September 11, 2024
Невеликий діалог, де піднімається питання про природу брехні та ставиться цікаве питання: Хто гідніший - той, хто вчиняє проступки добровільно, чи той, хто мимоволі?
August 2, 2017
Este diálogo, nuevamente protagonizado y narrado por Sócrates, empieza con el final de una charla de Hipias acerca de Aquiles y Odiseo, los personajes de Homero. Hipias considera a Aquiles mejor porque es inteligente pero ingenuo y a Odiseo más astuto. Sócrates lo interroga acerca de esto preguntándole quién obra mejor: los ingenuos que hacen mal involuntariamente o los inteligentes que mienten o hacen mal de manera voluntaria. Concluyendo en casi todas las artes y saberes que los inteligentes que hacen mal voluntariamente son preferibles, Hipias no es capaz de asumir esto en cuanto a la bondad del hombre. Sócrates entones, quizás por el desprecio de Platón a Hipias, le dice que está bien que él dude pero que los sabios (entiendo sabios por sofistas, como el propio Hipias) deberían tener más claros estos conceptos, de modo que ayudaran a los demás a aclararse con ellos. Todo el diálogo destila una crítica a Hipias en particular por contradecirse y fallar en su argumentación y a los sofistas en general.
January 20, 2017
Like most of the Platonic dialogues, Hippias Minor is a story about Socrates following his divine mission. Socrates is out to prove that somebody claims to have knowledge in a given field is making that claim without actually processing it.
The fact that Paul Chan is using Plato, who is notably restrictive in his notion for how art should be, as a grounding for the freedom of art is very interesting and a worthy homage to the irony Socrates readily employs. Richard Fletcher's Socrates 420 is insightful and a helpful commentary on the dialogue.
Personally, I don't ascribe to Fletcher's conclusion but lean towards the purpose of the dialogue to show the dangers of sophistry with Plato out-sophisting the Sophist. But, like Parmenides, where Plato is highly self-critical, Plato is intellectually honest enough to question his own thought process and leaves Socrates hanging having just logically proved something he would rather have not.
The fact that Paul Chan is using Plato, who is notably restrictive in his notion for how art should be, as a grounding for the freedom of art is very interesting and a worthy homage to the irony Socrates readily employs. Richard Fletcher's Socrates 420 is insightful and a helpful commentary on the dialogue.
Personally, I don't ascribe to Fletcher's conclusion but lean towards the purpose of the dialogue to show the dangers of sophistry with Plato out-sophisting the Sophist. But, like Parmenides, where Plato is highly self-critical, Plato is intellectually honest enough to question his own thought process and leaves Socrates hanging having just logically proved something he would rather have not.
April 26, 2019
Really short dialogue with at least two major questionable transitions between meanings of used words which enabled Socrates to achieve aporia. But it is still really enjoyable to read and smile at the amount of irony used by philosopher in his statements uttered toward Hippias.
November 5, 2014
I really love the parts where Socrates explains why he does what he does. Sorta touching.
April 22, 2019
Sokrates znów imponuje swą błyskotliwością.
January 1, 2025
El Hipias Menor es un diálogo breve pero cargado de profundidad filosófica en el que Sócrates, a través de su característico método mayéutico, desafía las creencias de Hipias, un sofista conocido por su elocuencia y vasto conocimiento. La conversación comienza cuando Sócrates plantea una pregunta aparentemente sencilla pero profundamente compleja: ¿quién es más virtuoso, Aquiles, conocido por su honestidad y valentía, o Odiseo, famoso por su astucia y su capacidad para mentir? Hipias, fiel a la percepción popular, defiende a Aquiles como el modelo de virtud debido a su sinceridad y su rechazo a la falsedad. Sin embargo, Sócrates, con su inigualable capacidad para desentrañar las contradicciones en los argumentos de sus interlocutores, introduce una paradoja que da un giro inesperado al debate: quien miente intencionalmente lo hace con mayor habilidad, conocimiento y control que quien lo hace por ignorancia o error. Esta idea provoca una reflexión profunda sobre la relación entre el conocimiento, la intención y la virtud moral.
A lo largo del diálogo, Sócrates no solo cuestiona las bases de la moralidad, sino que también pone en tela de juicio conceptos aparentemente claros como la honestidad, la mentira y la virtud. Su argumento de que el mentiroso intencional podría ser mejor que el mentiroso involuntario revela una dimensión ética inesperada, sugiriendo que las acciones deben ser analizadas no solo por sus resultados, sino también por las intenciones y el conocimiento que las sustentan. Sócrates deja en evidencia que la virtud no es simplemente una cuestión de acción, sino que está profundamente ligada al entendimiento y la autodeterminación. Esto se conecta con una enseñanza central en la filosofía socrática: la virtud como conocimiento. Según Sócrates, solo quienes comprenden verdaderamente lo que es bueno y justo pueden actuar de manera virtuosa, incluso en situaciones que involucren decisiones difíciles, como mentir.
El diálogo también explora la importancia de la intención en el juicio moral. Al destacar que las acciones malas hechas con conocimiento pueden ser menos reprochables que las realizadas por ignorancia, Sócrates nos invita a repensar cómo evaluamos la moralidad de las acciones humanas. Esto lleva a una lección más amplia sobre la necesidad de ir más allá de las dicotomías simplistas, como bueno-malo o verdadero-falso, para comprender la complejidad de las decisiones humanas. En este sentido, Sócrates no busca ofrecer respuestas definitivas, sino abrir un espacio para la reflexión y el autocuestionamiento. Este enfoque también resalta la importancia de la humildad intelectual, ya que el reconocimiento de nuestra ignorancia es el primer paso hacia la verdadera sabiduría.
La ironía socrática, una herramienta fundamental en la mayéutica, es otra enseñanza clave del diálogo. Sócrates utiliza preguntas aparentemente ingenuas para desarmar las certezas de Hipias y exponer las inconsistencias en sus respuestas. Este proceso no solo humilla a Hipias, sino que también lo obliga a replantearse sus supuestos y a buscar un entendimiento más profundo. A través de este método, Sócrates enseña que el conocimiento no es simplemente acumulativo, como Hipias tiende a pensar, sino un proceso de descubrimiento que requiere cuestionar incluso las creencias más arraigadas.
Otra enseñanza oculta del Hipias Menor es la conexión entre el conocimiento y la superioridad moral. Al sugerir que mentir deliberadamente requiere un mayor dominio de sí mismo, Sócrates implícitamente argumenta que el saber puede conferir un grado de control y responsabilidad que la ignorancia no permite. Este punto resalta la idea de que la ignorancia no solo es un defecto intelectual, sino también un impedimento para actuar virtuosamente. Además, Sócrates muestra la importancia de precisar las definiciones en los debates filosóficos. Conceptos como "honestidad", "virtud" y "mentira" a menudo se utilizan de manera ambigua, y Sócrates insiste en que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente para evitar malentendidos y confusiones.
Finalmente, el diálogo subraya la complejidad inherente a la moralidad humana. Sócrates evita proporcionar respuestas fáciles o conclusiones claras, recordándonos que la ética es un campo donde las certezas absolutas son raras. Al dejar el debate abierto, Sócrates nos anima a continuar reflexionando sobre estas preguntas y a reconocer que el camino hacia la sabiduría es interminable.
En conjunto, el Hipias Menor no solo es un ejercicio intelectual, sino también una invitación a examinar nuestras creencias y a desarrollar una comprensión más rica y matizada de la moralidad, el conocimiento y la virtud. Este diálogo breve pero denso sigue siendo relevante, pues plantea cuestiones éticas que resuenan profundamente en el pensamiento contemporáneo, y que particularmente me dan una visión más amplia de lo que representa el estudio de esta rama filosófica que imparto como clase hasta la fecha.
A lo largo del diálogo, Sócrates no solo cuestiona las bases de la moralidad, sino que también pone en tela de juicio conceptos aparentemente claros como la honestidad, la mentira y la virtud. Su argumento de que el mentiroso intencional podría ser mejor que el mentiroso involuntario revela una dimensión ética inesperada, sugiriendo que las acciones deben ser analizadas no solo por sus resultados, sino también por las intenciones y el conocimiento que las sustentan. Sócrates deja en evidencia que la virtud no es simplemente una cuestión de acción, sino que está profundamente ligada al entendimiento y la autodeterminación. Esto se conecta con una enseñanza central en la filosofía socrática: la virtud como conocimiento. Según Sócrates, solo quienes comprenden verdaderamente lo que es bueno y justo pueden actuar de manera virtuosa, incluso en situaciones que involucren decisiones difíciles, como mentir.
El diálogo también explora la importancia de la intención en el juicio moral. Al destacar que las acciones malas hechas con conocimiento pueden ser menos reprochables que las realizadas por ignorancia, Sócrates nos invita a repensar cómo evaluamos la moralidad de las acciones humanas. Esto lleva a una lección más amplia sobre la necesidad de ir más allá de las dicotomías simplistas, como bueno-malo o verdadero-falso, para comprender la complejidad de las decisiones humanas. En este sentido, Sócrates no busca ofrecer respuestas definitivas, sino abrir un espacio para la reflexión y el autocuestionamiento. Este enfoque también resalta la importancia de la humildad intelectual, ya que el reconocimiento de nuestra ignorancia es el primer paso hacia la verdadera sabiduría.
La ironía socrática, una herramienta fundamental en la mayéutica, es otra enseñanza clave del diálogo. Sócrates utiliza preguntas aparentemente ingenuas para desarmar las certezas de Hipias y exponer las inconsistencias en sus respuestas. Este proceso no solo humilla a Hipias, sino que también lo obliga a replantearse sus supuestos y a buscar un entendimiento más profundo. A través de este método, Sócrates enseña que el conocimiento no es simplemente acumulativo, como Hipias tiende a pensar, sino un proceso de descubrimiento que requiere cuestionar incluso las creencias más arraigadas.
Otra enseñanza oculta del Hipias Menor es la conexión entre el conocimiento y la superioridad moral. Al sugerir que mentir deliberadamente requiere un mayor dominio de sí mismo, Sócrates implícitamente argumenta que el saber puede conferir un grado de control y responsabilidad que la ignorancia no permite. Este punto resalta la idea de que la ignorancia no solo es un defecto intelectual, sino también un impedimento para actuar virtuosamente. Además, Sócrates muestra la importancia de precisar las definiciones en los debates filosóficos. Conceptos como "honestidad", "virtud" y "mentira" a menudo se utilizan de manera ambigua, y Sócrates insiste en que deben ser analizados cuidadosamente para evitar malentendidos y confusiones.
Finalmente, el diálogo subraya la complejidad inherente a la moralidad humana. Sócrates evita proporcionar respuestas fáciles o conclusiones claras, recordándonos que la ética es un campo donde las certezas absolutas son raras. Al dejar el debate abierto, Sócrates nos anima a continuar reflexionando sobre estas preguntas y a reconocer que el camino hacia la sabiduría es interminable.
En conjunto, el Hipias Menor no solo es un ejercicio intelectual, sino también una invitación a examinar nuestras creencias y a desarrollar una comprensión más rica y matizada de la moralidad, el conocimiento y la virtud. Este diálogo breve pero denso sigue siendo relevante, pues plantea cuestiones éticas que resuenan profundamente en el pensamiento contemporáneo, y que particularmente me dan una visión más amplia de lo que representa el estudio de esta rama filosófica que imparto como clase hasta la fecha.
March 15, 2026
Hippias Minor depicts Socrates at his most trollish. Fresh off his recognition in Hippias Major that he himself knows nothing about "the fine," Socrates refuses to offer his opinion of whether the same Hippias gave a good speech on Homer but finds a workaround by using the Socratic method to make Hippias look like an idiot. The key question in the dialogue emerges from Hippias' claim that Homer depicts Achilles as a truthteller, the "best and bravest" man, while depicting Odysseus as a wily liar. Socrates highlights moments where Achilles also tells falsehoods, but Hippias raises the obvious objection: yes, but when he does it, it's unintentional, due to circumstances changing, whereas Odysseus deceives people intentionally. Socrates seizes on this, arguing that, in both cases, both Achilles and Odysseus have knowledge of the truth and both have the power to deceive. He then suggests that one with knowledge in any given field is better able to lie than one without, and it follows that a good liar will be one with the knowledge of the thing they're lying about, which would also mean that they would be a good truth-teller on the subject, and vice versa, so there's really not that much difference between the two men. From here, Socrates raises another question, which serves as the focal point of the dialogue: isn't the man who lies voluntarily better than the man who does so involuntarily? (i.e., isn't Odysseus better than Achilles?) After all, if a person has the knowledge to do the right thing if they wanted to, they are better than someone who doesn't even have that knowledge and so isn't able to do the right thing.
As in Hippias Major, Hippias is unable to muster much of a defense, succumbing to some obviously erroneous errors in reasoning (e.g., not distinguishing between different usages of words---"good" as in "effective" and "good" as in "virtuous"), and for his part, Socrates unself-consciously uses the kinds of logical tricks that, in later dialogues, he criticizes the sophists for using (including using an argument that he himself, as illustrated in other dialogues, doesn't believe in: that people can voluntarily commit injustice). By the time we get to the ending, where Socrates is encouraging Hippias to admit that people who voluntarily commit injustice while having knowledge of injustice are good while people who commit injustice involuntarily are bad, it's clear that this dialogue isn't teaching us anything about the nature of liars or goodness; instead, it's a lesson in the power of elenchus and in the intellectual fraudulence of sophists. To his credit, even when backed into a seemingly logical corner, Hippias refuses to agree with a claim that seems intuitively wrong, and Socrates himself agrees that it doesn't seem right, but Hippias' ethical qualms can't rescue him from his hubris and hypocrisy. As Socrates notes, with deep irony that soars miles over Hippias' head, "[A]s I said before, on these matters I wave back and forth and never believe the same thing. And it's not surprising at all that I or any other ordinary person should waver. But if you wise men are going to do it, too--that means something terrible for us, if we can't stop wavering even after we've put ourselves in your company" (376c).
Overall, I'd say this is a solid dialogue. For anyone who hasn't read an early Platonic dialogue or isn't familiar with the Socratic method, it's a clear, straightforward demonstration of what early Plato is about: attacking flawed assumptions in order to show people who think they're knowledgeable (especially those who make a career out of it) how little they actually know. However, there are others that do the same with more dramatic flair and greater philosophical depth, most notably Protagoras and Gorgias among those I've read.
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September 15, 2021EUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after Hippias has given such an exhibition? Why don't you either join us in praising some point or other in what he said, or else put something to the text, if it seems to you anything was not well said--especially since we who most claim to have a share in the practice of philosophy are now left to ourselves?
With these sentences, Hippias Minor begins. In true Platonic fashion, we enter blindly into a state of affairs begun before the dialogue's first line. Eudicus is hosting the great orator Hippias of Ellis as he gives a speech on what we can only assume is the subject of the virtues of characters in Homer. Why do we only enter after Hippias' great ovation? We weren't given such mercy in the Phaedrus, in Pythagoras, in the Symposium. Hass Plato simply decided to spare us, or maybe spare himself from having to write another bought of loathesome sophistry?
There is obvious humor in inviting the notoriously garrulous Grecian gadfly to speak here, but also tragedy. Lest we forget that Socrates was sentenced to death by Athens-- a city that considered Hippias of Ellis one of it's greatest--for saying too, too much! And what follows is Socrates engaging in one of the strangest dialogues with perhaps one of Plato's most loathed interlocutors. But the result is something I read as catharsis.
By the end of the dialogue, as usually happens with Socrates, up is down and right is left and no one knows very much of what they thought they knew entirely ten minutes ago. We see a fishy proof forged using absolutely nothing but logic qua logic, in an almost context-less, computer-like application. Simply put, this argument is: one who performs poorly on purpose is more excellent than one who performs poorly incidentally. The analogue given is of athletics--if an athlete loses a race on purpose, she must be a better runner than one who loses through fault of her own. Therefore, if one breaks a law on purpose, she must be more excellent than one who does so unintentionally. And one who gets away with lying, or evil, is better than one who doesn't.
The argument given falls apart very quickly--one can poke a hole through any step in this proof and the whole bloody thing will deflate before your eyes. But then, there's the irony...
Who do we know that broke laws willingly, argued for his crimes excellently, and yet was sentenced to death, and then died impeccably? Socrates! Doesn't seem like his accusers cared much for these new revelations with Hippias, either.
So it seems that the conclusion doesn't sit well with us, the readers, nor with Athens, and barely with Hippias (who's just trying not to look like a dope). Are we to assume that they do to Socrates, who reaches far different conclusions within The Republic, his longest dialogue on justice? I think it's safe to assume Plato is having a bitter laugh. The great philosopher and dramaturg is still young and coming to terms with the death of his mentor. And he did so here in a way that practiced his ironic sensibilities and gentle nuances later, giving both him and Socrates the true justice they both deserved.
March 12, 2020
I listened to an audio version of this from LibreVox, which I just learned about and seems like a great open source project.
I was curious about ancient views of Odysseus after learning from Professor Vandiver's Great Course lecture that he was seen by some during antiquity as a "bad guy." My own take on Odysseus was quite mixed. The episode where he lies about his identity to Laertes is perhaps the most upsetting, especially for me as a father. Odysseus is one who "gives and receives pain" indeed.
(I'm not sure what to take at face value in the Odyssey. Since Odysseus - not the narrator/bard - is the one recounting the more fantastic adventures, you have to wonder if he made the whole thing up. Perhaps he needed to explain why he lost all of his men and ships and shacked up with 2 other women for 10 years...)
Well, this curiosity lead me to the Lesser Hippias. I hadn't read Plato since I was a teen and then, a bit later, in college. When I first read Republic, I remember being amazed. When I read it again as an undergrad...well, less impressed. The sillier parts are in full effect here - ridiculous arguments by analogy and "word-thinking."
This doesn't really shed any light on the question of Odysseus character, but I suppose it is interesting in other ways:
1. The "wise" may not really know, what they think they know, especially if their knowledge is built on ridiculous analogies and "word-thinking."
2. Ultimately certain "knowledge" really comes down to "values." Is it better to be a liar or truthful? Some people will pick liar and some will pick truthful. I'm not sure that "logic" is really going to change anyone's mind, but I would rather not live among the liars. It's like Alisdair MacInyre argues in After Virtue - at a fundamental level you must have some set of shared values to engage in reasoned debate - the alternative is pure "emotivism."
I was curious about ancient views of Odysseus after learning from Professor Vandiver's Great Course lecture that he was seen by some during antiquity as a "bad guy." My own take on Odysseus was quite mixed. The episode where he lies about his identity to Laertes is perhaps the most upsetting, especially for me as a father. Odysseus is one who "gives and receives pain" indeed.
(I'm not sure what to take at face value in the Odyssey. Since Odysseus - not the narrator/bard - is the one recounting the more fantastic adventures, you have to wonder if he made the whole thing up. Perhaps he needed to explain why he lost all of his men and ships and shacked up with 2 other women for 10 years...)
Well, this curiosity lead me to the Lesser Hippias. I hadn't read Plato since I was a teen and then, a bit later, in college. When I first read Republic, I remember being amazed. When I read it again as an undergrad...well, less impressed. The sillier parts are in full effect here - ridiculous arguments by analogy and "word-thinking."
This doesn't really shed any light on the question of Odysseus character, but I suppose it is interesting in other ways:
1. The "wise" may not really know, what they think they know, especially if their knowledge is built on ridiculous analogies and "word-thinking."
2. Ultimately certain "knowledge" really comes down to "values." Is it better to be a liar or truthful? Some people will pick liar and some will pick truthful. I'm not sure that "logic" is really going to change anyone's mind, but I would rather not live among the liars. It's like Alisdair MacInyre argues in After Virtue - at a fundamental level you must have some set of shared values to engage in reasoned debate - the alternative is pure "emotivism."
July 27, 2025
És un diàleg una mica absurd. Aquí es presenta, vertaderament, la figura del sofista tal i com la concep Sòcrates/Plató: com a figura vanitosa que ensenya i cobra per ensenyar —les acusacions que rep Sòcrates—, i com a caràcter dogmàtic en tant que està completametn segur d’allò que sap i no contempla la possibilitat de l’ignorància o l’error. En aquest text dialèctic i amb forta presència de la Iliada, es du a terme un anàlisi de la figura de l’astut, que encarna Odisseu, en què queda demostrat que, a nivell epistèmic, és superior l’home que fa el mal voluntàriament que l’home que el fa per ignorància, en tant que el primer té disponible l’acció bona i la dolenta i el segon, actua atzarosament. Argument que acabarà en un absurd en postular Sòcrates que l’ànima més justa és aquella que coneix més el bé i el mal, i que per tant és l’home bo —entès com a just, per tant dotat de coneixement moral— l’únic que serà capaç de dur a terme el mal voluntàriament i que, així doncs, cada vegada que veiem el mal voluntari cal determinar que l’home que el du a terme és un bon home, en tant que té coneixement de causa. Això contradiu, evidentment, l’intel·lectualisme moral socràtic, segons el qual es concep la moral en exclusiva en la seva relació amb el coneixement, de manera que només aquell qui no coneix el bé —l’ignorant— pot fer el mal i que conèixer el bé és privar-se de la possibilitat de fer el mal. És un dilema de fàcil resolució si s’opera una diferència entre l’àmbit epistèmic i el moral, però això és precisament el que Sòcrates no vol fer perquè, recordem, la idea platònica de Bé és també el coneixement suprem.
“Es natural, Sócrates, que tenga esta confianza. En efecto, desde que he empezado a concurrir a Olimpia, nunca he encontrado a nadie superior a mí en nada.”
“Es natural, Sócrates, que tenga esta confianza. En efecto, desde que he empezado a concurrir a Olimpia, nunca he encontrado a nadie superior a mí en nada.”
October 17, 2024
En este diálogo usan a los héroes Aquiles y Odiseo, y tras una plática que Hipias da sobre el tema de Homero, Sócrates le cuestiona si de verdad cree que Aquiles es más simple y Odiseo es astuto y mentiroso.
Originalmente comentan que Aquiles es más valiente y Odiseo más astuto y por tanto mejor para mentir y mentiroso en general. Después Sócrates argumenta que Aquiles ha mentido porque desde un inicio no quería permanecer en la guerra y después amenaza con irse, pero no se va. A lo que Hipias contesta que en efecto ha mentido porque no ha hecho lo que ha dicho. Sin embargo, argumenta que ha mentido sin voluntad de mentir y que por el contrario Odiseo, cuando miente, ha mentido con la voluntad de mentir y para manipular.
Entonces Sócrates se pregunta qué es mejor, si hacer el mal voluntaria o involuntariamente. Y todo el argumento gira en torno a la idea de que una persona que hace el mal voluntariamente necesariamente debe de ser mejor, ya que ha elegido hacer el mal y que una persona que lo hace de manera involuntaria no tiene otra alternativa, porque no tienen la capacidad que tiene la otra persona de elegir entre el bien y el mal. La persona que lo hace de manera voluntaria, argumenta Sócrates, puede ser buena o puede ser mala y elige ser mala. Y la persona que lo hace de manera involuntaria simplemente lo hace porque no tiene alternativa, aparentemente. El diálogo no llega a una conclusión, pero es interesante ver cómo usa Sócrates su método para jugar intelectualmente, incluso con un hombre que aparentemente era conocido y famoso por ser muy sabio.
Originalmente comentan que Aquiles es más valiente y Odiseo más astuto y por tanto mejor para mentir y mentiroso en general. Después Sócrates argumenta que Aquiles ha mentido porque desde un inicio no quería permanecer en la guerra y después amenaza con irse, pero no se va. A lo que Hipias contesta que en efecto ha mentido porque no ha hecho lo que ha dicho. Sin embargo, argumenta que ha mentido sin voluntad de mentir y que por el contrario Odiseo, cuando miente, ha mentido con la voluntad de mentir y para manipular.
Entonces Sócrates se pregunta qué es mejor, si hacer el mal voluntaria o involuntariamente. Y todo el argumento gira en torno a la idea de que una persona que hace el mal voluntariamente necesariamente debe de ser mejor, ya que ha elegido hacer el mal y que una persona que lo hace de manera involuntaria no tiene otra alternativa, porque no tienen la capacidad que tiene la otra persona de elegir entre el bien y el mal. La persona que lo hace de manera voluntaria, argumenta Sócrates, puede ser buena o puede ser mala y elige ser mala. Y la persona que lo hace de manera involuntaria simplemente lo hace porque no tiene alternativa, aparentemente. El diálogo no llega a una conclusión, pero es interesante ver cómo usa Sócrates su método para jugar intelectualmente, incluso con un hombre que aparentemente era conocido y famoso por ser muy sabio.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 14, 2025
Lesser Hippias (Plato — read in 2012) came to me during the year the world was supposedly going to end — the so-called Mayan apocalypse. Instead of cosmic fireballs, I got another kind of brain-melting: Socrates dismantling Hippias in a far leaner but no less confounding dialogue.
If Hippias Major had tangled me in definitions of beauty, Lesser Hippias hit from a different angle, probing truth, falsehood, and moral worth.
The central, unsettling proposition? That the man who willingly tells falsehoods might actually be better than one who lies unwittingly — because intentional falsehood implies knowledge, skill, and agency. Try floating that at a dinner party and see how fast you’re accused of being a sophist yourself.
Hippias, the itinerant polymath, never quite grasps the trap Socrates is laying, which makes the exchange as darkly comic as it is philosophically treacherous. The dialogue’s brevity is deceptive: each turn of argument forces you to revisit the relationship between knowledge, virtue, and deception. It’s unsettling precisely because it flirts with moral paradox, undermining easy pieties about truthfulness.
Reading it in 2012, amidst global doomsday chatter, lent it an odd resonance. If the world were ending, did truth matter more, or less? Was the “better liar” an intellectual hero, or simply a dangerous rhetorician?
In the end, Lesser Hippias stands as one of those Platonic tests — not of memorising doctrines, but of surviving the vertigo of having your moral compass deliberately spun in circles.
If Hippias Major had tangled me in definitions of beauty, Lesser Hippias hit from a different angle, probing truth, falsehood, and moral worth.
The central, unsettling proposition? That the man who willingly tells falsehoods might actually be better than one who lies unwittingly — because intentional falsehood implies knowledge, skill, and agency. Try floating that at a dinner party and see how fast you’re accused of being a sophist yourself.
Hippias, the itinerant polymath, never quite grasps the trap Socrates is laying, which makes the exchange as darkly comic as it is philosophically treacherous. The dialogue’s brevity is deceptive: each turn of argument forces you to revisit the relationship between knowledge, virtue, and deception. It’s unsettling precisely because it flirts with moral paradox, undermining easy pieties about truthfulness.
Reading it in 2012, amidst global doomsday chatter, lent it an odd resonance. If the world were ending, did truth matter more, or less? Was the “better liar” an intellectual hero, or simply a dangerous rhetorician?
In the end, Lesser Hippias stands as one of those Platonic tests — not of memorising doctrines, but of surviving the vertigo of having your moral compass deliberately spun in circles.
January 10, 2026
I appreciate being able to see Hippias get two distinct dialogues, as I find them an interesting character. Here is a conceited man who is highly skilled in scientific matters and thinks the problems of philosophy can be dismissed with a mere waving of common-sense perceptions without taking any care of the linguistic mistakes they trip over, seeing such subtle distinctions as below them. I see embodied in them a sort of archetypal person, otherwise highly educated in STEM, who nevertheless holds philosophy in contempt, with the view that scientific advances render philosophy totally irrelevant; a type of person whom I have met many instances of in the modern world.
Socrates’ core claim that intentional evil is less bad than unintentional evil is a fascinating idea to ponder. They argue from basically two arguments.
The first is that to be able to choose to do what is bad implies they have the capacity to do good, whereas someone who does bad involuntarily does not and thus is closer to the good. I think Socrates’ mistake in this argument is failing to control for severity and randomness. Someone who is merely ignorant of good and bad may perform lots of both randomly in an overall neutral way and whats more be easily cured of their position with argumentation likewise and likewise someone who involuntarily mess up their job may cause great harm but many be expected to act well in other circumstances so all has to do to turn them into a wholly good person is remove them from their job. Voluntary badness tends to be more extreme and general.
The second argument is based on asking if it’s better to find an otherwise good athlete, tool, or body part to fail voluntarily or involuntarily; arguing that in these circumstances, finding something to fail voluntarily is better. I think the mistake they make here is that the sense of “good”-ness they use here is very specific and generalizes poorly. Good for whom? For the direct consequence, it makes no difference whether voluntary or involuntary. Socrates seems here to rely on the criterion of what is better to find oneself in possession of. And like sure, I would prefer to find myself in possession of a self that has done bad voluntarily than a self that spreads harm beyond my control; in the former case, I can stop at once and repent. But can a “good” person or I condition on the possibility of a past filled with “voluntarily” bad acts? Is it really me if I come up with such a hypothetical past? Cold someone who spent their life filled with “voluntarily” bad acts really change spontaneously with any likelihood? I am reminded, in no small part, of Newcomb’s paradox, where the whole core supposition of a predictor machine threatens the intuitive sense of “free” decision people have both internally and when characterizing things like rationality, leading to chaotically different interpretations based on subtle differences.
Overall, though, I find Socrates’ arguments in this dialogue more convincing than almost everyone else does, so that while I do not agree with Socrates’ exact claim that it is fundamentally better to do evil voluntarily, I can see how it can sometimes be so. I think many readers (as Hippias) take issue with this view because they equate good and bad with praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, but it’s on this point that I disagree; while they are often correlated, I do not think this is necessarily the case for many important senses of the terms “good” and “bad”. By way of example, these propositions are less counterintuitive than they look at first. Consider the notorious cases of Mr. Oft, who, by way of a brain tumor, was filled with uncontrollable pedophilic urges, or Vince Li, who, by way of untreated schizophrenia, was compelled to brutally cannibalize a bus goer. Few doubt that these people acted almost totally involuntarily, but at the same time, these people seem quite straightforwardly “bad people” of quite an extreme sort, both in the magnitude of the tragedy they bring about and their propensities. Here, then, is an illustration of people who are worse than most ordinary “voluntary” “bad” people, but for whom there is little point in simply condemning retributive and deterrent punishment and blame rather than psychosurgery and psychiatric treatment. Once these propositions can be assented to in an extreme case, I think it’s possible to find much, much less severe cases of this same sort of general phenomenon with some regularity.
Think about your own personal life. Would you rather number among your companions, coworkers, and family, people who have done evil in the past voluntarily, but still may repent and change, or people who, through no design of their own, are hexed by pedophilia, narcissism, intermittent explosive anger, psychopathy, or violent paranoid delusions? I think many people would find the former better and the latter worse.
Socrates’ core claim that intentional evil is less bad than unintentional evil is a fascinating idea to ponder. They argue from basically two arguments.
The first is that to be able to choose to do what is bad implies they have the capacity to do good, whereas someone who does bad involuntarily does not and thus is closer to the good. I think Socrates’ mistake in this argument is failing to control for severity and randomness. Someone who is merely ignorant of good and bad may perform lots of both randomly in an overall neutral way and whats more be easily cured of their position with argumentation likewise and likewise someone who involuntarily mess up their job may cause great harm but many be expected to act well in other circumstances so all has to do to turn them into a wholly good person is remove them from their job. Voluntary badness tends to be more extreme and general.
The second argument is based on asking if it’s better to find an otherwise good athlete, tool, or body part to fail voluntarily or involuntarily; arguing that in these circumstances, finding something to fail voluntarily is better. I think the mistake they make here is that the sense of “good”-ness they use here is very specific and generalizes poorly. Good for whom? For the direct consequence, it makes no difference whether voluntary or involuntary. Socrates seems here to rely on the criterion of what is better to find oneself in possession of. And like sure, I would prefer to find myself in possession of a self that has done bad voluntarily than a self that spreads harm beyond my control; in the former case, I can stop at once and repent. But can a “good” person or I condition on the possibility of a past filled with “voluntarily” bad acts? Is it really me if I come up with such a hypothetical past? Cold someone who spent their life filled with “voluntarily” bad acts really change spontaneously with any likelihood? I am reminded, in no small part, of Newcomb’s paradox, where the whole core supposition of a predictor machine threatens the intuitive sense of “free” decision people have both internally and when characterizing things like rationality, leading to chaotically different interpretations based on subtle differences.
Overall, though, I find Socrates’ arguments in this dialogue more convincing than almost everyone else does, so that while I do not agree with Socrates’ exact claim that it is fundamentally better to do evil voluntarily, I can see how it can sometimes be so. I think many readers (as Hippias) take issue with this view because they equate good and bad with praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, but it’s on this point that I disagree; while they are often correlated, I do not think this is necessarily the case for many important senses of the terms “good” and “bad”. By way of example, these propositions are less counterintuitive than they look at first. Consider the notorious cases of Mr. Oft, who, by way of a brain tumor, was filled with uncontrollable pedophilic urges, or Vince Li, who, by way of untreated schizophrenia, was compelled to brutally cannibalize a bus goer. Few doubt that these people acted almost totally involuntarily, but at the same time, these people seem quite straightforwardly “bad people” of quite an extreme sort, both in the magnitude of the tragedy they bring about and their propensities. Here, then, is an illustration of people who are worse than most ordinary “voluntary” “bad” people, but for whom there is little point in simply condemning retributive and deterrent punishment and blame rather than psychosurgery and psychiatric treatment. Once these propositions can be assented to in an extreme case, I think it’s possible to find much, much less severe cases of this same sort of general phenomenon with some regularity.
Think about your own personal life. Would you rather number among your companions, coworkers, and family, people who have done evil in the past voluntarily, but still may repent and change, or people who, through no design of their own, are hexed by pedophilia, narcissism, intermittent explosive anger, psychopathy, or violent paranoid delusions? I think many people would find the former better and the latter worse.
August 17, 2023
Un altro dialogo di Platone scritto (sembra) con l'intento di perculare i sofisti, Ippia in questo caso, col quale Platone sembra avercela per il suo carattere presuntuoso e oltremodo sicuro di sé.
Si cerca di dimostrare che chi compie il male volontariamente è migliore di chi lo compie involontariamente, ma persino lo studioso incaricato di tradurre e curare il dialogo non riesce a fare a meno di notare, tra le note, la fallacia - o il procedimento quantomeno discutibile - impiegato da Socrate\Platone per arrivare alla sua conclusione (c'è anche un rimando ad Aristotele relativo a questo, e credo proprio che il traduttore lo citi per dovere di completezza, altrimenti, entusiasta com'è del pensiero di Platone, non credo che lo avrebbe fatto. A me a questo punto, devo essere sincero, interesserebbe di più un'analisi critica indipendente del pensiero di Platone, e non le solite note di carattere incensatorio (comunque pochissime, a dire il vero) dei vari studiosi pagati per tradurre e commentare le varie opere. È un male che proprio sulle cose più importanti, le note degli studiosi tacciano. Ma è una mia opinione.)
Si cerca di dimostrare che chi compie il male volontariamente è migliore di chi lo compie involontariamente, ma persino lo studioso incaricato di tradurre e curare il dialogo non riesce a fare a meno di notare, tra le note, la fallacia - o il procedimento quantomeno discutibile - impiegato da Socrate\Platone per arrivare alla sua conclusione (c'è anche un rimando ad Aristotele relativo a questo, e credo proprio che il traduttore lo citi per dovere di completezza, altrimenti, entusiasta com'è del pensiero di Platone, non credo che lo avrebbe fatto. A me a questo punto, devo essere sincero, interesserebbe di più un'analisi critica indipendente del pensiero di Platone, e non le solite note di carattere incensatorio (comunque pochissime, a dire il vero) dei vari studiosi pagati per tradurre e commentare le varie opere. È un male che proprio sulle cose più importanti, le note degli studiosi tacciano. Ma è una mia opinione.)
January 21, 2026
Den mindre Hippias, del av skrifsamling bok 1 Platon utgiven av Atlantis år 2000. Genre filosofi. Text på 20 sidor dialog mellan Sokrates och Hippias (Samtida filosof, sofist). Dialog om medveten person jämfört med okunskapsfull person. Det är bättre att medvetet förlora än att omedvetet förlora. Eller att medvetet vinna jämfört med att omedvetet vinna. Det är bättre att ha kunskap eller egenskaper än att inte ha det. Den som har mest kunskaper kan göra mest fel eller mest rätt (Det är samma person). Det vill säga onskefulla personer är kapabla personer. Med makt kommer stort ansvar. Den mest goda personen har även kapacitet för ondska. En personlig reflektion är hur ofrivilliga lögner ska hanteras. Exempelvis utifrån otillräcklig kunskap. Eller känslouttryck kan vara sanna när de uttalas men förändras till nästa situation.
”Alltså är det den gode mannens sak att begå orätt med vilja, den ondes att göra det mot sin vilja, eftersom den gode har en god själ… Så den som med vilja begår fel och gör skamliga och orättfärdiga saker, Hippias, den mannen är, om han nu finns, ingen annan än den gode.”
”Alltså är det den gode mannens sak att begå orätt med vilja, den ondes att göra det mot sin vilja, eftersom den gode har en god själ… Så den som med vilja begår fel och gör skamliga och orättfärdiga saker, Hippias, den mannen är, om han nu finns, ingen annan än den gode.”
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