What do you think?
The Peloponnesian War #3
The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition
Why did the Peace of Nicias fail to reconcile Athens and Sparta? In the third volume of his landmark four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War, Donald Kagan examines the years between the signing of the peace treaty and the destruction of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 413 B.C. The principal figure in the narrative is the Athenian politician and general Nicias, whose policies shaped the treaty and whose military strategies played a major role in the attack against Sicily.
400 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1981
About the author
Donald Kagan
128 books245 followersDonald Kagan (May 1, 1932 – August 6, 2021) was a Lithuanian-born American historian and classicist at Yale University specializing in ancient Greece. He formerly taught in the Department of History at Cornell University. Kagan was considered among the foremost American scholars of Greek history and is notable for his four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
August 15, 2011
This is the 3d volume of Kagan's monumental tetralogy about the Peloponnesian War. A peace between Athens and Sparta was brokered in 421 BC by the Athenian politician and general Nicias. The peace ended the Archidamian phase of the war, a 10-year struggle which exhausted the 2 main powers and their allies. War-weariness and the need for the Athenians to restore their financial resources inspired the movement toward peace, as did the Spartan desire for the return of their men taken prisoner in 425. The story of that peace is the concern of the 1st half of this volume, though the reader might wonder if the violent competition carried on by Sparta as it tried to restore order and secure its hegemony over the Peloponnesus and by Athens as it tried to destabilize the region and interfere with Sparta's allies could be called peace.
The 2d half of the book relates the history of Athens' disastrous invasion of Sicily, the tragedy of their failire, and how, in 413, the general war resumed when Agis, attempting to take advantage of the Sicilian quagmire Athens found itself in, led a Spartan invasion of Attica to take control of the countryside around Athens.
I think one can look at the Peloponnesian War, particularly this phase of it, in those terms of hegemony, destabilization, and quagmire, a word instantly bringing to mind America's involvement in Vietnam. Kagan doesn't emphasize their parallels. After all, he's most interested in interpreting and expanding such primary source materials as Thucydides, Plutarch, poets such as Euripides, and other historians, modern as well as ancient. But his telling becomes epic. One could easily say war is always tragic, often best illustrated in catastrophic defeat and failure become turning points from which armies and nations can't recover. One thinks of Stalingrad or Gettysburg. But Kagan wonderfully explains and details how the destruction of the great Athenian hoplite army and fleet around Syracuse was a much earlier example of the same kind of military and national tragedy.
I'd call this history rather than military history. Not only is the book an account of Spartan-Athenian-Syracusan events between 421-413 BC, those aspects of ancient Greek life relevant to those events are related as well, including Greek drama which reported on those events, and also the religious aspects of Greek life affecting them. Kagan emphasises the importance of superstition and omens to the Greeks. His long explanation of the sacrileges and desecrations of the likenesses of Hermes just prior to the Sicilian expedition, their political and social impact and the discussion of the social forces behind them makes for rascinating reading.
You don't need a particular interest in classical Greece to enjoy Kagan's books on the war between Athens and Sparta. This is simply great history. He writes so well, too. One reason Kagan's books are such wonderfully reader friendly history is because he writes complex, loopy but elegant sentences that lap against the mind just as surely as the Aegean laps at the shores of all the islands populated by those people. They are sentences that bring to life a time long ago when short, sturdy men with beards sailed the Mediterranean and marched with purpose over Greece's hills and spoke forcefully in assemblies. Through histories such as this, they're still speaking to us today.
The 2d half of the book relates the history of Athens' disastrous invasion of Sicily, the tragedy of their failire, and how, in 413, the general war resumed when Agis, attempting to take advantage of the Sicilian quagmire Athens found itself in, led a Spartan invasion of Attica to take control of the countryside around Athens.
I think one can look at the Peloponnesian War, particularly this phase of it, in those terms of hegemony, destabilization, and quagmire, a word instantly bringing to mind America's involvement in Vietnam. Kagan doesn't emphasize their parallels. After all, he's most interested in interpreting and expanding such primary source materials as Thucydides, Plutarch, poets such as Euripides, and other historians, modern as well as ancient. But his telling becomes epic. One could easily say war is always tragic, often best illustrated in catastrophic defeat and failure become turning points from which armies and nations can't recover. One thinks of Stalingrad or Gettysburg. But Kagan wonderfully explains and details how the destruction of the great Athenian hoplite army and fleet around Syracuse was a much earlier example of the same kind of military and national tragedy.
I'd call this history rather than military history. Not only is the book an account of Spartan-Athenian-Syracusan events between 421-413 BC, those aspects of ancient Greek life relevant to those events are related as well, including Greek drama which reported on those events, and also the religious aspects of Greek life affecting them. Kagan emphasises the importance of superstition and omens to the Greeks. His long explanation of the sacrileges and desecrations of the likenesses of Hermes just prior to the Sicilian expedition, their political and social impact and the discussion of the social forces behind them makes for rascinating reading.
You don't need a particular interest in classical Greece to enjoy Kagan's books on the war between Athens and Sparta. This is simply great history. He writes so well, too. One reason Kagan's books are such wonderfully reader friendly history is because he writes complex, loopy but elegant sentences that lap against the mind just as surely as the Aegean laps at the shores of all the islands populated by those people. They are sentences that bring to life a time long ago when short, sturdy men with beards sailed the Mediterranean and marched with purpose over Greece's hills and spoke forcefully in assemblies. Through histories such as this, they're still speaking to us today.
August 25, 2026
This volume is the third in Kagan’s series on the history of the Peloponnesian War, covering the period from the Peace of Nicias in 421 BC, which didn’t really go as planned because the Spartans were unable to keep up their end of the bargain, to the Athenian setback in Sicily in 413 BC.
There are lots of states to keep up with in this period in addition to the Athenians, Spartans, Corinthians, Megarians and Boeotians. Argos becomes a major player in the war, along with smaller democracies like Mantinea and Elis. After a complicated set of negotiations, the democracies (Athens included) decide to band together, but are defeated at the Battle of Mantinea in 418.
A frustrated Athens eventually lashes out by committing atrocities on Melos, preceded by the famous dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians depicted by Thucydides (which Kagan characteristically contends is not a bad summary of what was actually said), and alliances continue to shift.
Athens then decides to launch an expedition to Sicily (at that time part of Magna Graecia) to support an ally against Syracuse. Nicias, who negotiated the fragile peace that bears his name, argues against it but makes one error after another in command, and the Athenians end up losing virtually all of the men and ships they had committed to the endeavour.
A running theme in this one is that Kagan tries to provide political reasons for certain military decisions that may otherwise seem baffling, especially to military historians who occasionally doubt what Thucydides, Plutarch and Diodorus relate because those choices seem so illogical to them. Being a historian, especially of the ancient world, sometimes requires a great deal of creativity!
The main thing I was hoping for from this volume, over and above what happened in the war, was a better sense of how febrile the political situation was in Athens during this period. The book does a fairly good job of conveying this, detailing how some Athenians saw bad omens on the eve of the Sicilian Expedition (including the desecration of statues of Hermes all over the city), and how they responded to revelations that rowdy aristocrats had been parodying the Eleusinian Mysteries in their men’s clubs.
It was also interesting to learn about what may be the first recorded instance of a state’s athletes being banned from competing in the Olympics, the Spartans having been barred in 420 BC. And having been exposed to largely negative views of Alcibiades (Pericles’ first cousin once removed), the book gave me a somewhat more positive perspective on him, but the bar was quite low.
As in the first two volumes, there’s plenty of detail, though Kagan’s more concise The Peloponnesian War, which I’ve been reading alongside these volumes, probably suffices for this stage of the war.
There are lots of states to keep up with in this period in addition to the Athenians, Spartans, Corinthians, Megarians and Boeotians. Argos becomes a major player in the war, along with smaller democracies like Mantinea and Elis. After a complicated set of negotiations, the democracies (Athens included) decide to band together, but are defeated at the Battle of Mantinea in 418.
A frustrated Athens eventually lashes out by committing atrocities on Melos, preceded by the famous dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians depicted by Thucydides (which Kagan characteristically contends is not a bad summary of what was actually said), and alliances continue to shift.
Athens then decides to launch an expedition to Sicily (at that time part of Magna Graecia) to support an ally against Syracuse. Nicias, who negotiated the fragile peace that bears his name, argues against it but makes one error after another in command, and the Athenians end up losing virtually all of the men and ships they had committed to the endeavour.
A running theme in this one is that Kagan tries to provide political reasons for certain military decisions that may otherwise seem baffling, especially to military historians who occasionally doubt what Thucydides, Plutarch and Diodorus relate because those choices seem so illogical to them. Being a historian, especially of the ancient world, sometimes requires a great deal of creativity!
The main thing I was hoping for from this volume, over and above what happened in the war, was a better sense of how febrile the political situation was in Athens during this period. The book does a fairly good job of conveying this, detailing how some Athenians saw bad omens on the eve of the Sicilian Expedition (including the desecration of statues of Hermes all over the city), and how they responded to revelations that rowdy aristocrats had been parodying the Eleusinian Mysteries in their men’s clubs.
It was also interesting to learn about what may be the first recorded instance of a state’s athletes being banned from competing in the Olympics, the Spartans having been barred in 420 BC. And having been exposed to largely negative views of Alcibiades (Pericles’ first cousin once removed), the book gave me a somewhat more positive perspective on him, but the bar was quite low.
As in the first two volumes, there’s plenty of detail, though Kagan’s more concise The Peloponnesian War, which I’ve been reading alongside these volumes, probably suffices for this stage of the war.
April 4, 2024
“Chance put the fate of the Athenians into the hands of the one man who was able to turn a mistake into a disaster.”
This excellent continuation in Kagan’s 4 book series on the Peloponnesian War raises the bar even higher than the first two volumes. It focused on Nicias, the man who secured peace with Sparta, led the military expedition to Sicily, and, according to Kagan, in so doing led Athens to the downfall of its empire.
While Kagan’s study of Nicias’ character is engaging enough, what really elevates this book is his critical engagement with Thucydides. While Thucydides seeks to instruct his readers with moral lessons and tells them the mistakes that have been made, his actual narrative sometimes betrays his own assertions. Each time it does so, Kagan is there to point it out, increase our understanding of what really happened, and help succinctly clarify the textual issues in a way that brings the reader to appreciate Thucydides’ history even more.
This excellent continuation in Kagan’s 4 book series on the Peloponnesian War raises the bar even higher than the first two volumes. It focused on Nicias, the man who secured peace with Sparta, led the military expedition to Sicily, and, according to Kagan, in so doing led Athens to the downfall of its empire.
While Kagan’s study of Nicias’ character is engaging enough, what really elevates this book is his critical engagement with Thucydides. While Thucydides seeks to instruct his readers with moral lessons and tells them the mistakes that have been made, his actual narrative sometimes betrays his own assertions. Each time it does so, Kagan is there to point it out, increase our understanding of what really happened, and help succinctly clarify the textual issues in a way that brings the reader to appreciate Thucydides’ history even more.
October 21, 2025
"A modern reader with a lesser knowledge and shallower understanding of the events than the great Athenian historian but, perhaps, with a greater distance from them, may be grateful for the valuable lessons in the behavior of unchecked direct democracies and yet, at the same time, observe that chance put the fate of the Athenians into the hands of the one man who was able to turn a mistake into a disaster."
June 2, 2023
Meesleepend en aangrijped narratief, intelligente beschouwing over Thucydides' interpretatie van de Atheense catastrofe.
August 8, 2021
A Powerful Lesson for the modern Reader.
I’ve dedicated the last month a half to read this incredible collection, I’m really happy with my purchase and the time I’ve invested into it. We must read this book not only as something that happened a long long time ago, but something that happens continually throughout history, this is our history, your history. The history of human being. We must open are eyes and learn from the past otherwise it might as well be us being slaughtered by the enemy next time.
Great book, worth every penny.
I’ve dedicated the last month a half to read this incredible collection, I’m really happy with my purchase and the time I’ve invested into it. We must read this book not only as something that happened a long long time ago, but something that happens continually throughout history, this is our history, your history. The history of human being. We must open are eyes and learn from the past otherwise it might as well be us being slaughtered by the enemy next time.
Great book, worth every penny.
May 10, 2021
Giving this one 5 stars is a no-brainer for me, Donald Kagan never fails to give a clear picture of the military and political situation at the time, the analysis of contemporary and modern historians as well as his own. The Peloponnesian War is immensely complex and piecing it all together has literally taken centuries and the modern reader benefits greatly from it. If you know a decent amount about the war but want to dive in further then Kagan is the one to pick up.
January 19, 2023
Volume 3 of 4 in Donald Kagan’s work on the Peloponnesian War, begin with an in-depth look at the shaky 8yr peace between Athens and Sparta (421-413). Kagan argues that the peace was inherently unstable judging by the motives of each side. Sparta entered the peace due to a temporary weakness, while Athens was induced by the ascending leadership of the peace faction benefiting from the death of Cleon. After Pericles, Athens suffers from a lack of a leading first citizen. Neither Nicias or Alcibiades commands a majority. As a result, Athens devolves more-and-more to the whims of the mob. This is proven in the catastrophic Sicilian Campaign. It is fascinating to read the sequence of errors and events that lead to the utter destruction of Athens’ expeditionary force. History seems to put most of the failure on the irrational decisions of democracy and the timidness of Nicias. My heart weeps for Demosthenes death at the hands of Syracusians. Credit to Athens that they carry on for many more years despite such a disaster.
August 26, 2024
Love the Kagey boy
October 8, 2011
Fabulous scholarship!
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews