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Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War
When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in Vietnam has been a source
of enduring controversy.
Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration's involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis
in Vietnam.
Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president's inner circle, Jones shows
that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was
ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem's leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of
ironies, the coup resulted in Diem's death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement. Still, these events only confirmed Kennedy's view about South Vietnam's inability to win the war and therefore did not lessen his resolve to reduce the U.S. commitment. By the
end of November, however, the president was dead and Lyndon Johnson began his campaign of escalation. Jones argues forcefully that if Kennedy had not been assassinated, his withdrawal plan would have spared the lives of 58,000 Americans and countless Vietnamese.
Written with vivid immediacy, supported with authoritative research, Death of a Generation answers one of the most profoundly important questions left hanging in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy's death.
of enduring controversy.
Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration's involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis
in Vietnam.
Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president's inner circle, Jones shows
that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was
ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem's leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of
ironies, the coup resulted in Diem's death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement. Still, these events only confirmed Kennedy's view about South Vietnam's inability to win the war and therefore did not lessen his resolve to reduce the U.S. commitment. By the
end of November, however, the president was dead and Lyndon Johnson began his campaign of escalation. Jones argues forcefully that if Kennedy had not been assassinated, his withdrawal plan would have spared the lives of 58,000 Americans and countless Vietnamese.
Written with vivid immediacy, supported with authoritative research, Death of a Generation answers one of the most profoundly important questions left hanging in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy's death.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
592 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2003
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About the author
Howard Jones
132 books15 followersA specialist in the history of American foreign policy, Howard Jones was Distinguished University Research Professor Emeritus at the University of Alabama.
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September 12, 2021
By 1961, it had become clear that the conditions in South Vietnam were deteriorating rapidly. The people around the Presidential palace in Saigon were corrupt and opportunistic, President Diem's army was weakened by favoritism, his cruel repression of political dissidents had stifled Vietnamese nationalism, and his lack of popularity among the rural population was hindering anti-guerrilla efforts. Diem had promised reforms, but none seemed to be forthcoming. American military advice was asked for, but frequently disregarded – for example, in an over-stretching of the "strategic hamlet" program, which aimed to clear areas of Communist guerrillas and protect the local inhabitants. Anti-guerrilla tactics were taught but ignored. Funds were solicited for additional Vietnamese battalions, but those battalions were too cautious about going out to meet the enemy.
As President Diem became more and more distant from his own people, the Saigon government was increasingly controlled by an unbalanced man, Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The Catholic Diem, Nhu, and Nhu's sharp-tongued wife – Madam Nhu – were accused of religious persecution by powerful Buddhist leaders. In 1963, the picture worsened even more. Diem's troops broke up a demonstration of Buddhists and raided Buddhist pagodas. Photographs of Buddhist monks burning themselves to death in protest – as well as Madam Nhu's shockingly insensitive remarks on the "barbecue show" sacrifice of "so-called holy men" – provoked calls in Congress to cut off all aid to South Vietnam. Vietnamese students rioted against the government. Governmental officials resigned in protest. And internal security began to occupy the full attention of the staggering Diem regime, which caused the war effort to falter. Nhu was reported to be trying to make a secret deal with the North (the CIA doubted this report, though), and he and his wife publicly criticized the United States for pushing for the continuation of the war.
The Buddhist crisis deeply offended President Kennedy. "Human ... rights are not expected," he pointedly said in his September, 1963, United Nations speech, "when a Buddhist priest is driven from his pagoda." He was further annoyed by Nhu's statement that there were too many American troops in Vietnam. "Any time the government of South Vietnam would suggest it," replied the President, "the day after it was suggested we would have some troops on their way home." However, while he castigated "repressive actions" in public, he believed that sometimes the national security required this country to aid dictators. He realized that it was risky to rely on a single man, but there was no easy way to broaden that man's government or to develop more representative civilian leaders without jeopardizing the war effort. The growing chaos among the non-Communists in Saigon was a cause of further worries for Kennedy. Countering guerrilla warfare was more a political than a military problem, he had stressed in 1961, and a government incapable of political action and popular reform could not fight guerrillas effectively.
In a letter to Diem, he urged the South Vietnamese president to stop censoring and harassing American reporters and underscored that American officials and officers in Vietnam, while mindful of the country's independence, must participate substantially in the decision-making affecting in which US resources, and thousands of members of armed forces, were committed. The consistent rejection of American advisers' recommendations had rendered much of the aid and effort ineffective, wrote Kennedy.
At the same time – September 1963 – during an interview, the President agreed with one reporter's statement that the United States was locked into a policy from which it was difficult to shift. He told another even more directly that Diem could regain the support of the people and win the war only "with changes in policy and perhaps with personnel. ... I don't think the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last two months the government has gotten out of touch with the people. ... In the first analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet-Nam, against the Communists."
In a controversial cable dispatched during the last August weekend, the President had gone even further. It indicated that the United States would not block any spontaneous military revolt against Diem. No coup followed, buy Kennedy grew more and more skeptical that the war could ever be won with the Diem regime. He retained his great personal admiration for President Diem, and therefore accepted that the US should try to make the best of him, not overthrow him. However, he was unwilling to thwart any local movements against the regime. He refused to fund Nhu's Special Forces and strengthened the authority of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who was the most hostile to the Diem family official out of all State, Defense, and CIA officials in Saigon.
But those efforts were too late and fruitless. Kennedy blamed himself for failing to focus more on the political and social programs in South Vietnam. Now Diem, refused to listen to him, and Madam Nhu toured the country, hurling bitter attacks at Kennedy's policies. Furthermore, the President's own advisers were deeply divided on the issue. While the State Department reported that the political chaos in Saigon had affected the war effort outside the capital negatively, the military and the CIA spoke confidently and optimistically of the war and of Diem's leadership abilities. This often led to bitter disputes, and each side attempted to pressure the President when the other was not around. Kennedy, meanwhile, realized that whichever way he turned, the United States was doomed to lose the respect of the Vietnamese.
Finally, on November 1, 1963, as corruption, repression, and disorder increased, the government was seized successfully by the Vietnamese military without any help from the United States. Although all previous reports of potential plots and coups had reached American ear one way or another, the timing and scale of this one was not known in the United States when it was launched – much less to Kennedy. The generals took over the government and assassinated Diem and Nhu, who had refused the offer of refuge in the American Embassy.
Kennedy was stunned by Diem's tragic end. A disorganized military clique took control in Saigon. The new leaders had no more popularity among the people and administrative competence than their predecessors. It became clear that no early end of the was in sight. President Kennedy decided it was high time for the United States to get out of Vietnam. He had already approved the NSAM-263 directive to withdraw the bulk of US personnel from Vietnam by 1965. Now he was ready to expedite his efforts to end American involvement there. Had he not been assassinated, the Vietnam conflict might have not escalated to an all-out war fought with American forces. The trouble was that to the very end, he continued to defend US involvement publicly – afraid that otherwise he would not be elected for a second term – so his withdrawal actions remained virtually unknown. That is why it was so easy for the Pentagon to sweep them under the rug once the President was dead.
DEATH OF A GENERATION is a highly compelling study that chronicles the uneasy relations between the American government and the Diem regime in South Vietnam. It is meticulously researched and offers valuable insight into President Kennedy's decision- and policy-making in regard to Vietnam. Howard Jones aims to prove that Kennedy, despite his mistakes, was committed to limiting US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict and that had he lived, he would have eventually withdrawn from that quagmire.
As President Diem became more and more distant from his own people, the Saigon government was increasingly controlled by an unbalanced man, Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. The Catholic Diem, Nhu, and Nhu's sharp-tongued wife – Madam Nhu – were accused of religious persecution by powerful Buddhist leaders. In 1963, the picture worsened even more. Diem's troops broke up a demonstration of Buddhists and raided Buddhist pagodas. Photographs of Buddhist monks burning themselves to death in protest – as well as Madam Nhu's shockingly insensitive remarks on the "barbecue show" sacrifice of "so-called holy men" – provoked calls in Congress to cut off all aid to South Vietnam. Vietnamese students rioted against the government. Governmental officials resigned in protest. And internal security began to occupy the full attention of the staggering Diem regime, which caused the war effort to falter. Nhu was reported to be trying to make a secret deal with the North (the CIA doubted this report, though), and he and his wife publicly criticized the United States for pushing for the continuation of the war.
The Buddhist crisis deeply offended President Kennedy. "Human ... rights are not expected," he pointedly said in his September, 1963, United Nations speech, "when a Buddhist priest is driven from his pagoda." He was further annoyed by Nhu's statement that there were too many American troops in Vietnam. "Any time the government of South Vietnam would suggest it," replied the President, "the day after it was suggested we would have some troops on their way home." However, while he castigated "repressive actions" in public, he believed that sometimes the national security required this country to aid dictators. He realized that it was risky to rely on a single man, but there was no easy way to broaden that man's government or to develop more representative civilian leaders without jeopardizing the war effort. The growing chaos among the non-Communists in Saigon was a cause of further worries for Kennedy. Countering guerrilla warfare was more a political than a military problem, he had stressed in 1961, and a government incapable of political action and popular reform could not fight guerrillas effectively.
In a letter to Diem, he urged the South Vietnamese president to stop censoring and harassing American reporters and underscored that American officials and officers in Vietnam, while mindful of the country's independence, must participate substantially in the decision-making affecting in which US resources, and thousands of members of armed forces, were committed. The consistent rejection of American advisers' recommendations had rendered much of the aid and effort ineffective, wrote Kennedy.
At the same time – September 1963 – during an interview, the President agreed with one reporter's statement that the United States was locked into a policy from which it was difficult to shift. He told another even more directly that Diem could regain the support of the people and win the war only "with changes in policy and perhaps with personnel. ... I don't think the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last two months the government has gotten out of touch with the people. ... In the first analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet-Nam, against the Communists."
In a controversial cable dispatched during the last August weekend, the President had gone even further. It indicated that the United States would not block any spontaneous military revolt against Diem. No coup followed, buy Kennedy grew more and more skeptical that the war could ever be won with the Diem regime. He retained his great personal admiration for President Diem, and therefore accepted that the US should try to make the best of him, not overthrow him. However, he was unwilling to thwart any local movements against the regime. He refused to fund Nhu's Special Forces and strengthened the authority of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who was the most hostile to the Diem family official out of all State, Defense, and CIA officials in Saigon.
But those efforts were too late and fruitless. Kennedy blamed himself for failing to focus more on the political and social programs in South Vietnam. Now Diem, refused to listen to him, and Madam Nhu toured the country, hurling bitter attacks at Kennedy's policies. Furthermore, the President's own advisers were deeply divided on the issue. While the State Department reported that the political chaos in Saigon had affected the war effort outside the capital negatively, the military and the CIA spoke confidently and optimistically of the war and of Diem's leadership abilities. This often led to bitter disputes, and each side attempted to pressure the President when the other was not around. Kennedy, meanwhile, realized that whichever way he turned, the United States was doomed to lose the respect of the Vietnamese.
Finally, on November 1, 1963, as corruption, repression, and disorder increased, the government was seized successfully by the Vietnamese military without any help from the United States. Although all previous reports of potential plots and coups had reached American ear one way or another, the timing and scale of this one was not known in the United States when it was launched – much less to Kennedy. The generals took over the government and assassinated Diem and Nhu, who had refused the offer of refuge in the American Embassy.
Kennedy was stunned by Diem's tragic end. A disorganized military clique took control in Saigon. The new leaders had no more popularity among the people and administrative competence than their predecessors. It became clear that no early end of the was in sight. President Kennedy decided it was high time for the United States to get out of Vietnam. He had already approved the NSAM-263 directive to withdraw the bulk of US personnel from Vietnam by 1965. Now he was ready to expedite his efforts to end American involvement there. Had he not been assassinated, the Vietnam conflict might have not escalated to an all-out war fought with American forces. The trouble was that to the very end, he continued to defend US involvement publicly – afraid that otherwise he would not be elected for a second term – so his withdrawal actions remained virtually unknown. That is why it was so easy for the Pentagon to sweep them under the rug once the President was dead.
DEATH OF A GENERATION is a highly compelling study that chronicles the uneasy relations between the American government and the Diem regime in South Vietnam. It is meticulously researched and offers valuable insight into President Kennedy's decision- and policy-making in regard to Vietnam. Howard Jones aims to prove that Kennedy, despite his mistakes, was committed to limiting US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict and that had he lived, he would have eventually withdrawn from that quagmire.
January 27, 2013
The only reason this intellectually dishonest work got even two stars was because it did narrate the assassination of the Diem brothers in a gripping fashion, and flesh out some of the lesser-known players in the Kennedy administration's bungling and stumbling into the beginning of large-scale American combat involvement in Vietnam.
Otherwise, this is just brazen hagiography that, in my opinion, dishonestly attempts to construe the scholarly and historical evidence in such a way as to minimize JFK's role in putting the United States squarely in the middle of Vietnam conflict during his administration - which is precisely what he did. Even when the author criticizes Kennedy for his Vietnam missteps - of which there were plenty, not the least of which was his complicity in the illegal assassination of Diem and his brother Nhu - he does so in a way that attempts to shift the blame for his mistakes onto his subordinates.
President Kennedy was a hawk and committed Cold Warrior, my liberal friends: you need to recognize that and get over it. No matter how much ink you spill and documentary films you shoot in attempt to absolve Saint Kennedy of his part in bringing on the Vietnam war, the facts of history simply aren't going to back it up.
Otherwise, this is just brazen hagiography that, in my opinion, dishonestly attempts to construe the scholarly and historical evidence in such a way as to minimize JFK's role in putting the United States squarely in the middle of Vietnam conflict during his administration - which is precisely what he did. Even when the author criticizes Kennedy for his Vietnam missteps - of which there were plenty, not the least of which was his complicity in the illegal assassination of Diem and his brother Nhu - he does so in a way that attempts to shift the blame for his mistakes onto his subordinates.
President Kennedy was a hawk and committed Cold Warrior, my liberal friends: you need to recognize that and get over it. No matter how much ink you spill and documentary films you shoot in attempt to absolve Saint Kennedy of his part in bringing on the Vietnam war, the facts of history simply aren't going to back it up.
August 5, 2018
Another 60s refugee yearning for the days of yore. Fact is the 60s so-called revolution affected really only a tiny minority of people. Rich lefties sent their sons to college, or to Canada, to avoid the draft while the vast majority of us lived our lives quietly or went to Vietnam. The 60's generation will always be the narcissistic and selfish generation believing everything was about them and their needs & screw the country & everyone else.
When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in Vietnam has been a source of enduring controversy. Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration's involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president's inner circle, Jones shows that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem's leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of ironies, the coup resulted in Diem's death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement.
When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in Vietnam has been a source of enduring controversy. Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration's involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president's inner circle, Jones shows that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem's leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of ironies, the coup resulted in Diem's death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement.
September 12, 2020
"Death of a Generation" by Howard Jones puts the nail in the coffin of the old-school belief that Johnson's war was simply a continuation of JFK's policies. The evidence that JFK was going to pull out of Vietnam is overwhelming, and one has to wonder how any respectable historian could ever have believed otherwise. John M Newman deserves credit from getting the ball rolling with his courageous book, JFK and Vietnam. But "Death of a Generation" hits it out of the ballpark.
November 6, 2023
Published 2002/2003
Kennedy, the author says, believed Vietnam would be the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia.
After the death of Diem and Nhu, Saigon celebrated but not for long.
Six months after, Kennedy was shot ----he lay dead and with him the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam. Galbraith pointed out that Kennedy was going to bring the troops home. President Kennedy sought to halt the Americanizing of the war in a process that President Richard M. Nixon made known as Vietnamization.
Kennedy, the author says, believed Vietnam would be the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia.
After the death of Diem and Nhu, Saigon celebrated but not for long.
Six months after, Kennedy was shot ----he lay dead and with him the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam. Galbraith pointed out that Kennedy was going to bring the troops home. President Kennedy sought to halt the Americanizing of the war in a process that President Richard M. Nixon made known as Vietnamization.
March 20, 2017
I read this book about six months ago. Very informative and disturbing.....Sometime I found myself going back into time to have a better sense of what I was reading. RJH
August 13, 2015
Wonderful detail surrounding the Kennedy Administration and JFK's attempts to reform Diem in confronting the Vietcong. An amazingly well researched book.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews