I read this last year, and wrote a short essay about it that I then failed to have published anywhere. I'd forgotten about it. Well, here are my thoughts about Leys and 'World Literature,' and a few other things. I haven't edited it.
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When I was a teaching assistant for a class on world literature, we had our students define the subject in a short paper. One freshman argued, more or less, that “world literature was invented by Goethe to exclude literature from outside Western Europe.” Precocious, but this really happened. “World literature makes it impossible for Eastern European, African, and Asian writers to gain the audience they deserve. The concept must be destroyed.” Pierre Ryckmans, the sinologist, novelist and essayist who publishes as Simon Leys, would have been aghast. Leys was born in Belgium and settled in Australia in 1970. His pen name comes from Victor Segalen’s novel René Leys, whose narrator, Victor Segalen, is a sinophile living in Pei-king under the final Qing emperor. René Leys fools Segalen, telling him that he’s had a child with the Empress and is head of the secret police in the Forbidden City. Leys dies, and Segalen realizes he’s been duped, but he chooses to idealize his friend rather than remember him as a liar.
Just as Segalen kept his faith in René, Simon Leys still believes in literature’s power and importance. Of course, he’s not alone. This quarter’s n + 1, for instance, includes a history of world literature: despite Goethe’s efforts, literature ended up becoming less international, and less political, in the 19th century. Today’s world literature is an apolitical sop to the middle class; politics turns up only in historical fiction, because “past horrors, unlike contemporary ones… tend to be events liberal readers agree about”—and liberal readers buy world literature. The market demands that contemporary world literature ignore contemporary injustices. Just as my freshman did, n + 1 argues, not without cause, that this depoliticized ‘Global Lit’ needs to be destroyed and replaced with an “internationalist literature of the revolutionary left” that will oppose power, tell the truth, and create a taste for revolutionary politics. Most importantly, it will not treat “literature as a self-evident autonomous good.” Leys would disagree, obstinately, but sensitively.
Many of the best essays in The Hall of Uselessness are about writers who were particularly open to the languages and literatures of other peoples, and Leys shares their openness. The Hall includes formal academic essays, literary criticism, public lectures, reviews, polemic, parables and forewords about, among other things, European and East Asian literature, history, and politics. Leys knows that, because of this breadth, specialists might suspect him of frivolity or irresponsibility; his essay on Chinese aesthetics suggests a response. It describes the sinologist’s conundrum: “specialisation is necessary” because no individual can hope to understand all of Chinese culture; but “specialisation is impossible” because “if he is not guided by a global intuition, the specialist remains forever condemned to the fate of the blind men in the well-known Buddhist parable,” who each grope one part of an elephant, and then argue about what they’re touching: a snake? A pillar? A broom?
This is also the conundrum of world literature. If we want to read, we need to specialize to some degree. We can’t read everything. But we also can’t just read at random; we need to be guided by a global intuition. For Leys, we should be guided by the apolitical idea that the literary tradition is an autonomous, useless, and self-evident good. We should read and write literature for its own sake.
That’s not to say that politics has no place in Leys’s essays. Many of them are political, though many of the political essays are, unfortunately, among his least likable. Leys writes well about the tyrants of Asia; his essay on Mao is as balanced as anyone could expect. But that only makes his splenetic attacks on the intellectuals who covered up the famines and genocides of China and Cambodia more bizarre. It often seems that Leys is more offended by the fools—e.g., Alain Badiou telling us not to allow “reactionary critics to neutralize and negate” Stalin, Mao, Tito and Hoxha—than he is by the executives of genocide.
To his credit, Leys tries to understand why people like Badiou say what they do; his best answer is that they suffer a “failure of the imagination.” Even when they know all about atrocities, some intellectuals don’t really grasp what they know. Here Leys follows Orwell, who said that people without expertise (e.g., according to himself, Orwell) can still have “the power to grasp what kind of world we are living in.” Even if you don’t know how many people the Khmer Rouge murdered, you can still grasp that the Khmer Rouge was a brutal, horrible regime. This is the imaginative grasp that people like Badiou don’t have.
Literature can help us remedy that lack by stimulating our imagination. Leys uses Don Quixote as an example. Cervantes wrote Don Quixote in order to make money and mock knights and damsels stories. Such profiteering and parody aren’t usually conducive to greatness, but we still read Don Quixote, because Quixote transcends Cervantes’s aims. Cervantes began with the thought that Quixote is a madman, and a fool; we follow him when we use ‘quixotic’ to mean “hopelessly naïve and idealistic.” But “hopelessly naïve and idealistic” can also be a complimentary description of literature, set against the world, insisting that we should be more just, more beautiful, and more loving than we are. Cynics dismiss Quixote as naïve and idealistic, but for most readers his naivety and idealism are as inspiring as they are amusing. And Quixote’s imagined world looks much more charming than the one we have to live in.
So, ultimately, politics and literature come together in Leys’s essays, because he thinks that the imaginative power we develop through reading helps us better understand social and political events. It also gives us ideals by which to judge them. The Chinese writer (and political prisoner) Liu Xiaobo, for instance, had an epiphany when he was teaching in New York. He realized both that his own learning was nothing compared to “the fabulous riches of the diverse civilizations of the past,” and that the “Western answers to mankind’s modern predicament” were no better than China’s. So he vowed to “use Western civilization as a tool to critique China”, and to use his “own creativity as a tool to critique the West”—the ideals of the West and those of China can be used to criticize the societies of each. I don’t know if Liu will be able to hold on to those ideals while he suffers in prison; I doubt I could. But his imprisonment does show that a broad engagement with world literature gave him a great capacity for critical thought. If, like Liu, we can understand the ideals and flaws in the thought and art of different peoples, we’ll give ourselves the best chance we have to criticize injustice.
So where revolutionaries demand a new world literature, Leys points to what we already have: a tradition that started long before writing, and will continue long after everybody’s bêtes noires, Naipaul and Rushdie. And, rather than demand democratization, Leys argues that the products and subjects of world literature—truth, intelligence, beauty and love—are elitist. They are the goals of an education, “ruthlessly aristocratic and high-brow”, in which “a chance is given to men to become what they truly are.”
All this can sound like a humanistic platitude. But Leys’s elitist, formalist understanding of world literature actually has far-reaching, radical political content: literature helps us to understand and hold onto an ideal of human happiness, in which as many people as possible are at leisure to be liberal, but ‘liberal’ in the ancient sense—to be free from poverty and oppression, and so able to act in one’s own interests. In recent years this ideal has been threatened by one of the paradoxes of capitalism: “the wretched lumpenproletariat is cursed with the enforced leisure of demoralizing and permanent unemployment, whereas the educated elite, whose liberal professions have been turned into senseless money-making machines, are condemning themselves to the slavery of endless working hours.” Those who have the time to be happy have no money; those who can afford to be happy have no time for it.
Today’s radicals tend to ignore the paradox and reject the ideal, but at least one old revolutionary understood the problem and sought a solution for the former, rather than the destruction of the latter. At the end of Capital’s third volume, Marx wrote of his hope that, one day, we’d be able to enter “the true realm of freedom,” and accept “the development of human powers as an end in itself.” Bad press to the contrary, he wasn’t talking about our ability to produce ever more rubber widgets. The ‘human powers’ are the artistic and moral abilities that Marx, among many others, thought were exemplified in the traditions of world literature. When we find an old conservative like Leys defending the same ideals as an arch-revolutionary like Marx we should probably conclude that there’s something to them.
Note: Leys isn’t immune to failures of imagination. In one essay here, published in 2000, he suggests that clergy should remain celibate, because married clergy would be “too cruel and unfair to their children.” Aside from ignoring the experiences of protestant churches and Maronite Catholics, Leys must have known about the child abuse taking place in too many Catholic dioceses in Australia: the group Broken Rites has been publicizing cases since 1993. His homophobia is another case of this failure.