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Eye of the Firestorm
For his exploits and astuteness, Roland de Vries has rightfully been called the Rommel of the SADF. In this forthright, warts-and-all but compassionate autobiography he recounts the fascinating story of the transformation of a small, colonial army into, pound-for-pound, the best fighting force on the planet.
Eye of the Firestorm could be used to enhance the teaching within the military, security and leadership development. In a sense, this is an easy-to-read text book with many real-life examples of young leaders and commanders within the domains of the defence and security. It is a soldier's life story about how he lived through the South African Border War and the transformation that followed when South Africa became a fully democratic State on 27 April - it is also about gaining perspective in life. This book puts in perspective the African way of warfare and expounds about operational concept tactics, terrain, command and leadership displayed from opposing sides. Eye of the Firestorm tells about a free-spirited man who breaches the conventional and challenges the traditional. Roland de Vries believes with a passion that strengh lies in the many rhythms of manoeuvre and by being surprisingly different.
This book weaves a fabric of richness to life in the military as well as the South African Border War. It covers a military career spanning over 37 years. Expect the unexpected from a man who believes that those who are entrusted to him count and need to be given the best fighting chance in life. That there is hope for the future, that there is always a way and that we can fight our way through any firestorm!
Eye of the Firestorm could be used to enhance the teaching within the military, security and leadership development. In a sense, this is an easy-to-read text book with many real-life examples of young leaders and commanders within the domains of the defence and security. It is a soldier's life story about how he lived through the South African Border War and the transformation that followed when South Africa became a fully democratic State on 27 April - it is also about gaining perspective in life. This book puts in perspective the African way of warfare and expounds about operational concept tactics, terrain, command and leadership displayed from opposing sides. Eye of the Firestorm tells about a free-spirited man who breaches the conventional and challenges the traditional. Roland de Vries believes with a passion that strengh lies in the many rhythms of manoeuvre and by being surprisingly different.
This book weaves a fabric of richness to life in the military as well as the South African Border War. It covers a military career spanning over 37 years. Expect the unexpected from a man who believes that those who are entrusted to him count and need to be given the best fighting chance in life. That there is hope for the future, that there is always a way and that we can fight our way through any firestorm!
960 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 11, 2013
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November 6, 2019
The book is important as it fills a void which has not been covered until now with regards to South Africa's Border War. The author was instrumental in writing the doctrine of mechanized warfare for the SADF.
Writing a doctrine is akin to the work of a musical composer, who is influenced and inspired by previous works, de Vries states that his primary influence was that of Basil Liddel-Hart and the German general Heinz Guderian. It is interesting that he did not mention the work of JFC Fuller who was a contemporary of Liddel Hart, nor does he mention any study of the Soviet doctrines of Operational Art and Deep Battle, mainly by Tukachevsky, Isserson, Varfolomeev and others.
The latter doctrine caters for an army of 250 divisions but many of its principles could and should have been applied to the SADF. The book highlights certain central failures of the SADF in the border war (most of these, unintentionally).
Firstly, when the author designed the mechanized battalion he and his colleagues did not include a reconnaissance platoon built into the unit. The little reconnaissance ever done (mainly consisting of merely leading the 250 vehicle, 55 km long column, through Angola to its objective) were given to a couple of platoon commanders who were sharp navigators. This is not the role of an infantry platoon commander. A reconnaissance screen was never deployed ahead of the unit and basic tasks of reconnaissance were never given. The author shows no understanding of reconnaissance as a military profession or how to use it, and neither do other SADF officers. The noisy mechanized column was used to crash through the bush and storm SWAPO and FAPLA positions. These troops, not being suicidal, simply melted away long before the vehicle borne force arrived. The metaphor is using a short sighted elephant to hunt a jackal.
SAAF preparatory air strikes were also largely ineffective and only served to warn the enemy of the impending attack. The next failure is repeatedly mentioned by the author throughout - it is that of field intelligence, which was non-existent. The SADF was often thwarted and frustrated by a severe lack of intelligence and relied on artillery spotter officers (FOO/FAO) and reports from small infantry squads, mainly from 32 Battalion. It is not the role of the artillery spotting officer to collect, compile and report intelligence, though he may well make incidental contributions here and there. Here again, the failure is linked to the lack of reconnaissance units or an understanding of their role as well as no existing SADF field intelligence units at the time. Field intelligence is also a military profession all unto itself, and it didn't exist in the SADF. No effort was ever made to cultivate HUMINT sources among the Angolan population or even within SWAPO and FAPLA. The South Africans paid dearly for this.
Thirdly, the author showed some understanding of the components of Soviet Deep Battle, such as striking the enemy support and rear echelons, their logistical effort, command and control, using vertical (and/or amphibious) envelopment and extensive deception (Maskirovka), but this was never used by him, at least until Operation Meebos II and never properly by the SADF. The only deception used by the SADF took the form of not attacking from the south as the enemy expected, once using a feint attack during Operation Hooper and some localized psyops with loudspeakers, here and there. To be effective, all these measures of Deep Battle need to be used simultaneously, in order to maximize their effect, create chaos and to harm the main effort at the front. Command and control nodes aren't only attacked, but their capacity for processing information is overwhelmed and paralyzed by multiple simultaneous strikes, throughout the enemy echelons and to their rear as well. A great negative example would be Operations Hooper and Packer where a half-hearted effort was made to attack the logistics route between Cuito Cunivale and Menongue, but it was not done simultaneously or in coordination with the main SADF effort.
De Vries constantly laments the lack of air-superiority experienced from the mid '80's and onward and describes how the skies were abandoned to the Cuban and Soviet MiGs and SAMs. This in turn emboldened the Cubans overall and was a contributing factor to their aggressive action against the SADF in 1988. It is inexplicable why the outstanding SADF Special Forces were never used to attack enemy radar, SAM batteries and airfields. This should have been done immediately prior to, or at the H Hour of every operation. At times artillery was used against SAMs and was planned against airfields, but was never actually undertaken. This in itself is a significant strategic failure of the senior SADF leadership.
Lastly, an organizational failing of the SADF would render those armed forces stricken, when all operations had to be halted or ended prior to the discharge of national servicemen. This stemmed from the SADF using two recruitment intakes a year for its servicemen. The simple solution would have been to adjust to four intakes a year, every quarter. This way, each intake would provide a company to a particular battalion. Thus, only one company of each battalion would have to be replaced (a new company would rotate in after its basic training, as the old company demobilized) and the battalion (or brigade, etc) could then maintain a continuum of operations. There are other variations to this solution - it's just a matter of some planning and implementation.
All of these errors show a glaring lack of imagination and thought on the part of not only the author himself at times, but of the SADF leadership as a whole. The author does however describe much ability, competence, effectiveness and bravery throughout the book. Much of the adaptation and formulation of conventional mechanized warfare for the Southern African theater is to be commended and provides very interesting reading.
The book overall makes for engaging reading, but at times is a little tedious, which is why I gave it four and not five stars.
Writing a doctrine is akin to the work of a musical composer, who is influenced and inspired by previous works, de Vries states that his primary influence was that of Basil Liddel-Hart and the German general Heinz Guderian. It is interesting that he did not mention the work of JFC Fuller who was a contemporary of Liddel Hart, nor does he mention any study of the Soviet doctrines of Operational Art and Deep Battle, mainly by Tukachevsky, Isserson, Varfolomeev and others.
The latter doctrine caters for an army of 250 divisions but many of its principles could and should have been applied to the SADF. The book highlights certain central failures of the SADF in the border war (most of these, unintentionally).
Firstly, when the author designed the mechanized battalion he and his colleagues did not include a reconnaissance platoon built into the unit. The little reconnaissance ever done (mainly consisting of merely leading the 250 vehicle, 55 km long column, through Angola to its objective) were given to a couple of platoon commanders who were sharp navigators. This is not the role of an infantry platoon commander. A reconnaissance screen was never deployed ahead of the unit and basic tasks of reconnaissance were never given. The author shows no understanding of reconnaissance as a military profession or how to use it, and neither do other SADF officers. The noisy mechanized column was used to crash through the bush and storm SWAPO and FAPLA positions. These troops, not being suicidal, simply melted away long before the vehicle borne force arrived. The metaphor is using a short sighted elephant to hunt a jackal.
SAAF preparatory air strikes were also largely ineffective and only served to warn the enemy of the impending attack. The next failure is repeatedly mentioned by the author throughout - it is that of field intelligence, which was non-existent. The SADF was often thwarted and frustrated by a severe lack of intelligence and relied on artillery spotter officers (FOO/FAO) and reports from small infantry squads, mainly from 32 Battalion. It is not the role of the artillery spotting officer to collect, compile and report intelligence, though he may well make incidental contributions here and there. Here again, the failure is linked to the lack of reconnaissance units or an understanding of their role as well as no existing SADF field intelligence units at the time. Field intelligence is also a military profession all unto itself, and it didn't exist in the SADF. No effort was ever made to cultivate HUMINT sources among the Angolan population or even within SWAPO and FAPLA. The South Africans paid dearly for this.
Thirdly, the author showed some understanding of the components of Soviet Deep Battle, such as striking the enemy support and rear echelons, their logistical effort, command and control, using vertical (and/or amphibious) envelopment and extensive deception (Maskirovka), but this was never used by him, at least until Operation Meebos II and never properly by the SADF. The only deception used by the SADF took the form of not attacking from the south as the enemy expected, once using a feint attack during Operation Hooper and some localized psyops with loudspeakers, here and there. To be effective, all these measures of Deep Battle need to be used simultaneously, in order to maximize their effect, create chaos and to harm the main effort at the front. Command and control nodes aren't only attacked, but their capacity for processing information is overwhelmed and paralyzed by multiple simultaneous strikes, throughout the enemy echelons and to their rear as well. A great negative example would be Operations Hooper and Packer where a half-hearted effort was made to attack the logistics route between Cuito Cunivale and Menongue, but it was not done simultaneously or in coordination with the main SADF effort.
De Vries constantly laments the lack of air-superiority experienced from the mid '80's and onward and describes how the skies were abandoned to the Cuban and Soviet MiGs and SAMs. This in turn emboldened the Cubans overall and was a contributing factor to their aggressive action against the SADF in 1988. It is inexplicable why the outstanding SADF Special Forces were never used to attack enemy radar, SAM batteries and airfields. This should have been done immediately prior to, or at the H Hour of every operation. At times artillery was used against SAMs and was planned against airfields, but was never actually undertaken. This in itself is a significant strategic failure of the senior SADF leadership.
Lastly, an organizational failing of the SADF would render those armed forces stricken, when all operations had to be halted or ended prior to the discharge of national servicemen. This stemmed from the SADF using two recruitment intakes a year for its servicemen. The simple solution would have been to adjust to four intakes a year, every quarter. This way, each intake would provide a company to a particular battalion. Thus, only one company of each battalion would have to be replaced (a new company would rotate in after its basic training, as the old company demobilized) and the battalion (or brigade, etc) could then maintain a continuum of operations. There are other variations to this solution - it's just a matter of some planning and implementation.
All of these errors show a glaring lack of imagination and thought on the part of not only the author himself at times, but of the SADF leadership as a whole. The author does however describe much ability, competence, effectiveness and bravery throughout the book. Much of the adaptation and formulation of conventional mechanized warfare for the Southern African theater is to be commended and provides very interesting reading.
The book overall makes for engaging reading, but at times is a little tedious, which is why I gave it four and not five stars.
November 6, 2019
The book is important as it fills a void which has not been covered until now with regards to South Africa's Border War. The author was instrumental in writing the doctrine of mechanized warfare for the SADF.
Writing a doctrine is akin to the work of a musical composer, who is influenced and inspired by previous works, de Vries states that his primary influence was that of Basil Liddel-Hart and the German general Heinz Guderian. It is interesting that he did not mention the work of JFC Fuller who was a contemporary of Liddel Hart, nor does he mention any study of the Soviet doctrines of Operational Art and Deep Battle, mainly by Tukachevsky, Isserson, Varfolomeev and others.
The latter doctrine caters for an army of 250 divisions but many of its principles could and should have been applied to the SADF. The book highlights certain central failures of the SADF in the border war (most of them, unintentionally).
Firstly, when the author designed the mechanized battalion he and his colleagues did not include a reconnaissance platoon built into the unit. The little reconnaissance ever done (mainly consisting of leading the 250 vehicle, 55 km column, through Angola to its objective) were given to a couple of platoon commanders who were sharp navigators. This is not the role of an infantry platoon commander. A reconnaissance screen was never deployed ahead of the unit and basic tasks of reconnaissance were never given. The author shows no understanding of reconnaissance as a military profession or how to use it, and neither do other SADF officers. The noisy mechanized column was used to crash through the bush and storm SWAPO and FAPLA positions. These troops, not being suicidal, simply melted away long before the vehicle borne force arrived.
SAAF preparatory air strikes were also largely ineffective and only served to warn the enemy of the impending attack. The next failure is repeatedly mentioned by the author throughout - it is that of field intelligence, which was non-existent. The SADF was often thwarted and frustrated by a severe lack of intelligence and relied on artillery spotter officers (FOO/FAO) and reports from small infantry squads, mainly from 32 battallion. It is not the role of the artillery spotting officer to collect, compile and report intelligence, though he may well make incidental contributions here and there. Here again, the failure is linked to the lack of reconnaissance units or an understanding of their role as well as no existing SADF field intelligence units at the time. No effort was ever made to cultivate HUMINT sources among the Angolan population or even within SWAPO and FAPLA. The South Africans paid dearly for this.
Thirdly, the author showed some understanding of the components of Deep Battle, such as striking the enemy rear units, logistical effort, command and control, using vertical (and/or amphibious) envelopment and extensive deception (Maskirovka), but this was never used by him, at least until Operation Meebos II and never properly by the SADF. The only deception used by the SADF was by not attacking from the south as the enemy expected, once using a feint attack during Operation Hooper (I believe) and a little psyops with loudspeakers, here and there. To be effective, this all needs to be done simultaneously in order to maximize its effect, create chaos and to harm the main effort at the front. Command and control isn't to be only struck, but also for its capacity of processing information to be overwhelmed by multiple simultaneous strikes throughout its echelons and behind them too.
He constantly laments the lack of air-superiority experienced from the mid '80's and on and describes how the skies were abandoned to the Cuban and Soviet MiGs and SAMs. It is inexplicable why the outstanding SADF Special Forces were never used to attack enemy radar, SAM batteries and airfields. This should have been done immediately prior to, or at the H Hour of every operation. At times artillery was used against SAMs and was planned against airfields, but was never actually undertaken. This in itself is a huge failure of the senior SADF leadership.
Lastly, an organizational failing of the SADF would render those armed forces stricken, when all operations had to be halted or ended prior to the discharge of national servicemen. This stemmed from the SADF using two recruitment intakes a year for its servicemen. The simple solution would have been to adjust to four intakes a year, every quarter. This way, only one company of each battalion would have to be replaced (a new company would rotate in after its basic training, as the old company demobilized) and the unit could then maintain a continuum of operations.
All of these show a glaring lack of imagination and thought on the part of not only the author himself at times, but of the SADF leadership as a whole. The author does however describe much ability, competence, effectiveness and bravery throughout the book. Much of their adaptation and formulation of conventional mechanized warfare is to be commended and makes for most interesting reading. The book largely makes for engaging reading, but at times is a little tedious, which is why I gave it four and not five stars.
Writing a doctrine is akin to the work of a musical composer, who is influenced and inspired by previous works, de Vries states that his primary influence was that of Basil Liddel-Hart and the German general Heinz Guderian. It is interesting that he did not mention the work of JFC Fuller who was a contemporary of Liddel Hart, nor does he mention any study of the Soviet doctrines of Operational Art and Deep Battle, mainly by Tukachevsky, Isserson, Varfolomeev and others.
The latter doctrine caters for an army of 250 divisions but many of its principles could and should have been applied to the SADF. The book highlights certain central failures of the SADF in the border war (most of them, unintentionally).
Firstly, when the author designed the mechanized battalion he and his colleagues did not include a reconnaissance platoon built into the unit. The little reconnaissance ever done (mainly consisting of leading the 250 vehicle, 55 km column, through Angola to its objective) were given to a couple of platoon commanders who were sharp navigators. This is not the role of an infantry platoon commander. A reconnaissance screen was never deployed ahead of the unit and basic tasks of reconnaissance were never given. The author shows no understanding of reconnaissance as a military profession or how to use it, and neither do other SADF officers. The noisy mechanized column was used to crash through the bush and storm SWAPO and FAPLA positions. These troops, not being suicidal, simply melted away long before the vehicle borne force arrived.
SAAF preparatory air strikes were also largely ineffective and only served to warn the enemy of the impending attack. The next failure is repeatedly mentioned by the author throughout - it is that of field intelligence, which was non-existent. The SADF was often thwarted and frustrated by a severe lack of intelligence and relied on artillery spotter officers (FOO/FAO) and reports from small infantry squads, mainly from 32 battallion. It is not the role of the artillery spotting officer to collect, compile and report intelligence, though he may well make incidental contributions here and there. Here again, the failure is linked to the lack of reconnaissance units or an understanding of their role as well as no existing SADF field intelligence units at the time. No effort was ever made to cultivate HUMINT sources among the Angolan population or even within SWAPO and FAPLA. The South Africans paid dearly for this.
Thirdly, the author showed some understanding of the components of Deep Battle, such as striking the enemy rear units, logistical effort, command and control, using vertical (and/or amphibious) envelopment and extensive deception (Maskirovka), but this was never used by him, at least until Operation Meebos II and never properly by the SADF. The only deception used by the SADF was by not attacking from the south as the enemy expected, once using a feint attack during Operation Hooper (I believe) and a little psyops with loudspeakers, here and there. To be effective, this all needs to be done simultaneously in order to maximize its effect, create chaos and to harm the main effort at the front. Command and control isn't to be only struck, but also for its capacity of processing information to be overwhelmed by multiple simultaneous strikes throughout its echelons and behind them too.
He constantly laments the lack of air-superiority experienced from the mid '80's and on and describes how the skies were abandoned to the Cuban and Soviet MiGs and SAMs. It is inexplicable why the outstanding SADF Special Forces were never used to attack enemy radar, SAM batteries and airfields. This should have been done immediately prior to, or at the H Hour of every operation. At times artillery was used against SAMs and was planned against airfields, but was never actually undertaken. This in itself is a huge failure of the senior SADF leadership.
Lastly, an organizational failing of the SADF would render those armed forces stricken, when all operations had to be halted or ended prior to the discharge of national servicemen. This stemmed from the SADF using two recruitment intakes a year for its servicemen. The simple solution would have been to adjust to four intakes a year, every quarter. This way, only one company of each battalion would have to be replaced (a new company would rotate in after its basic training, as the old company demobilized) and the unit could then maintain a continuum of operations.
All of these show a glaring lack of imagination and thought on the part of not only the author himself at times, but of the SADF leadership as a whole. The author does however describe much ability, competence, effectiveness and bravery throughout the book. Much of their adaptation and formulation of conventional mechanized warfare is to be commended and makes for most interesting reading. The book largely makes for engaging reading, but at times is a little tedious, which is why I gave it four and not five stars.
October 31, 2020
Brilliant life and story
Read
April 11, 20192017-06 – Eye of the Firestorm: The Namibian - Angolan - South African Border War - Memoirs of a Military Commander. Roland de Vries (Author). 2016. 624 Pages.
Wow! Nicholle surprised me with this book … it had been on my birthday list in 2015 when it was originally slated to come out. First ... it is a good book, prone to rambling at times. It’s a memoir so I give it wide latitude. I read the authors book “Mobiele Oorlogvoering: n Perspektief Vir Suider-Afrika” which was a stunning almost text book for conducting maneuver warfare. This book presents many of the ideas in that book in English. It also discusses how those ideas were put into use and what happened. Outside of his role in the development of mobile infantry in South Africa (including the Ratel infantry vehicle) there is a lot for both the casual reader and serious military professional to enjoy and learn about his experiences in Angola and Namibia in both conventional operations and counter-insurgency. This material covers about 75% of the book. What may be more interesting and longer lasting though was his role as head of transformation for the transition from the South African Defense Force (SADF) (Apartheid regime) to the South African National Defense Force (modern South Africa) the challenges of creating a coherent, functional, capable force from disparate traditions (SADF, Umkhonto weSizwe, Inkatha Freedom Party, and others) experiences, orientations. Remember they were cobbling together a modern military force from factions who had been actively killing each for decades. The writing is mostly focused on the chronology but often his enthusiasm carries him away … it’s a memoir so just roll with it. If you read this and are unfamiliar with what was going on in Southern Africa during the Cold War … you are about to get a decent education … though the lens is one man’s experience … it helps that he was pivotal in many regards. Get a copy, get a drink, and a snack and marvel at what was.
Wow! Nicholle surprised me with this book … it had been on my birthday list in 2015 when it was originally slated to come out. First ... it is a good book, prone to rambling at times. It’s a memoir so I give it wide latitude. I read the authors book “Mobiele Oorlogvoering: n Perspektief Vir Suider-Afrika” which was a stunning almost text book for conducting maneuver warfare. This book presents many of the ideas in that book in English. It also discusses how those ideas were put into use and what happened. Outside of his role in the development of mobile infantry in South Africa (including the Ratel infantry vehicle) there is a lot for both the casual reader and serious military professional to enjoy and learn about his experiences in Angola and Namibia in both conventional operations and counter-insurgency. This material covers about 75% of the book. What may be more interesting and longer lasting though was his role as head of transformation for the transition from the South African Defense Force (SADF) (Apartheid regime) to the South African National Defense Force (modern South Africa) the challenges of creating a coherent, functional, capable force from disparate traditions (SADF, Umkhonto weSizwe, Inkatha Freedom Party, and others) experiences, orientations. Remember they were cobbling together a modern military force from factions who had been actively killing each for decades. The writing is mostly focused on the chronology but often his enthusiasm carries him away … it’s a memoir so just roll with it. If you read this and are unfamiliar with what was going on in Southern Africa during the Cold War … you are about to get a decent education … though the lens is one man’s experience … it helps that he was pivotal in many regards. Get a copy, get a drink, and a snack and marvel at what was.
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