A VALUABLE COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON MANY ISSUES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
[NOTE: This book review pertains to the 1985 224-page first edition of this book.]
Peter Albert David Singer (born 1946) is an Australian moral philosopher and Bioethics professor at Princeton University.
He wrote in the Prologue to this 1985 book, “This book provides a platform for the new animal liberation movement. A diverse group of people share this platform: university philosophers, a zoologist, a lawyer, militant activists who are ready to break the law to further their cause, and respected political lobbyists who are entirely at home in parliamentary offices. Their common ground is that they are all, in their very different ways, taking part in the struggle for animal liberation. This struggle is a new phenomenon. It marks an expansion of our moral horizons beyond our own species and is thus a significant stage in the development of human ethics. The aim of this introduction is to show why the movement is so significant, first by contrasting it with earlier movements against cruelty for animals, and then by setting out the distinctive ethical stance which lies behind the new movement.” (Pg. 1)
After quoting Bentham’s famous statement, “The question is not, Can they [animals] REASON? Nor Can they TALK? but, Can they SUFFER?” he comments, “Bentham is clearly right. Whatever the test we propose as a means of separating human from non-human animals, it is plain that if all non-human animals are going to fail it, some humans will fail as well. Infants are neither rational nor autonomous. They do not use language and they do not possess a sense of justice. Are they therefore to be treated like non-human animals, to be fattened for the table, if we should fancy the taste of their flesh, or to be used to find out if some new shampoo will bluster human eyeballs?” (Pg. 5)
He clarifies, “The animal liberation movement… is NOT saying that all lives are of equal worth or that all interests of humans and other animals are to be given equal weight, no matter what those interests may be. It IS saying that where animals and humans have similar interests---we might take the interest in avoiding physical pain as an example, for it is an interest that humans clearly share with other animals---those interests are to be counted equally, with no automatic discount just because one of the beings if not human. A simple point, no doubt, but nevertheless part of a far-reaching ethical revolution.” (Pg. 9)
Tom Regan observes, “The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as OUR RESOURCES, here for US---to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money. Once we accept this view of animals---as our resources---the rest is as predictable as it is regrettable. Why worry about their loneliness, their pain, their death? Since animals exist for us, to benefit us in one way or another, what harms them doesn’t really matter---or matters only if it starts to bother us, make us feel a trifle uneasy when we eat our veal escalope, for example. So, yes, let us get veal calves out of solitary confinement, give them more space, a little straw, a few companions. But let us keep our veal escalope.” (Pg. 14)
Marian Stamp Dawkins suggests, “There are… ways of obtaining measures of how much an animal prefers or dislikes something. Here is the key to discovering the circumstances in which an animal finds things so unpleasant that we want to say that it is suffering. It will work hard to obtain or to escape from something---as hard as or harder than it will work to obtain food which most people would agree is an essential to health and welfare---then we can begin to compile a list of situations which cause suffering and, indeed, can arrive at a tentative further definition of suffering itself: animals suffer if kept in conditions in which they are without something that they will work hard to obtain, given the opportunity, or in conditions that they will work hard to get away from, also given the opportunity.” (Pg. 37-38)
Harriet Schleifer notes, “The ethical argument for vegetarianism becomes even more persuasive when one considers the reasons for it that are not related directly to farm animal welfare. (I will not discuss any of the health considerations that make the vegetarian diet an attractive option, since they do not have an essential moral basis.) Wildlife conservation is a popular concern for many people, though few know the extent to which domestic animals compete with wildlife for space and resources… Although the unfair distribution which characterizes international trade makes it an unlikely dream, it is also a fact that if everyone in the developed world became a vegetarian, it would be possible to give four tons of edible grain to every starving person.” (Pg. 67-68)
Richard D. Ryder contends, “The old argument has also raged about whether half a loaf of progress today is better than waiting for the full loaf at some uncertain time in the future. This argument has been complicated by doubt as to whether legislative half-measures should be regarded as pacing the way for more sweeping reforms or whether they merely take the wind out of the sails of the campaign and give Governments the excuse to do nothing for a few years… although legislative half-measures are probably better than nothing, this does not mean that they should be quietly accepted by reformers as the end of the road. Instead, campaigners should see them as stepping stones on the way and should maintain their pressure for further progress.” (Pg. 88)
Dale Jamieson observes that a “reason for having zoos is that they preserve species that would otherwise become extinct… There is some reason for questioning the commitment of zoos to preservation: it can be argued that they continue to remove more animals from the wild than they return. Still, zoo breeding programs have had some notable successes…[But] Is it really better to confine a few hapless Mountain Gorillas in a zoo than to permit the species to become extinct? To most environmentalists the answer is obvious: the species must be preserved at all costs. But this smacks of sacrificing the lower-case gorilla for the upper-case Gorilla. In doing this, aren’t we using animals as mere vehicles for their genes?” (Pg. 114-115)
Lewis Regenstein argues, “If we are to save the world’s wildlife, we must adopt an ethic that recognizes the right of all animals to exist, places equal value on the grotesque and the spectacular and shows as much concern for the crocodile as for the cheetah… We must realize that it is just as important to save a species of butterfly as the elephant, that the extinction of a species of mollusck is as great a tragedy as the loss of a bird of mammal. Even engendered plants should merit our concern, for not only do they have the right to live but also the well-being of a host of higher animals.” (Pg. 130)
Clive Hollands acknowledges, “There should be no misunderstanding about the enormous task facing the animal rights movement across the world as it tries first to chance in the public’s mind the concept of ‘kindness to animals’ to that of ‘animal rights’ and then to gain the support of the great silent majority for a cause which provides no apparent material advantage for the human species---indeed, a cause which may disadvantage humans financially as well as in other ways.” (Pg. 171)
Henry Spira (who was part of the ‘Coalition to Stop Draize Rabbit Blinding Tests’) wrote in the concluding essay, “There are several reasons why we succeeded where other animal groups before us failed. We chose our targets carefully. They were small enough, at first, for us to have a chance of success despite our very limited resources, but… could serve as symbolic victories which would lead on to bigger goals. We were meticulous in documenting the abuses against which we were protesting… We also tried to accentuate the positive. Many people perceive the movement against animal experiments as negative and anti-science. It would have been a mistake to ignore these perceptions… We avoided being personally hostile to our adversaries. Before we took any public stands, we always asked them to talk to us… We did not focus on people’s intentions or motives… if a large corporation reduces the number of animals it uses, it isn’t important whether it does this because it cares about animals of because it is seeking to avoid unfavorable publicity. The animals who are spared suffering will be better off either way.” (Pg. 206)
This collection will be of great interest to those studying Animal Rights.