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Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq
In the current Middle East, insurgency tactics are used with frequency and increasing success. But guerrilla war-fare is not just the tool of modern-day terrorists. Its roots stretch back to our very own revolution.
In Violent Politics, William Polk takes us on a concise, brilliant tour of insurgencies throughout history, starting with the American struggle for independence, when fighters had to battle against both the British and the loyalists, those colonists who sided with the monarchy. Instinctively, in a way they probably wouldn't have described as a coherent strategy, the rebel groups employed the tactics of insurgency.
From there, Polk explores the role of insurgency in several other notable conflicts, including the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleon, the Irish struggle for independence, the Algerian War of National Independence, and Vietnam. He eventually lands at the present day, where the lessons of this history are needed more than ever as Americans engage in ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq—and beyond.
In Violent Politics, William Polk takes us on a concise, brilliant tour of insurgencies throughout history, starting with the American struggle for independence, when fighters had to battle against both the British and the loyalists, those colonists who sided with the monarchy. Instinctively, in a way they probably wouldn't have described as a coherent strategy, the rebel groups employed the tactics of insurgency.
From there, Polk explores the role of insurgency in several other notable conflicts, including the Spanish guerrilla war against Napoleon, the Irish struggle for independence, the Algerian War of National Independence, and Vietnam. He eventually lands at the present day, where the lessons of this history are needed more than ever as Americans engage in ongoing campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq—and beyond.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published September 1, 2007
52 people are currently reading
1269 people want to read
About the author
William R. Polk
30 books50 followersWilliam R. Polk taught Arabic literature and history at Harvard University and the University of Chicago, served on the Policy Planning Council under President Kennedy, negotiated the Egyptian-Israeli Suez ceasefire, and founded the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. He has written nineteen books.
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September 18, 2009
This is a book about insurgency and some of its major tools--terrorism and guerilla warfare. William Polk begins by observing that one factor is common to insurgencies (page xiii): "no matter how they differ in form, duration, and intensity, a single thread runs through them all: opposition to foreigners. Occupation by outsiders creates the conditions for insurgency, then. That is the central thesis of his book.
Throughout the book, he explores his thesis by examination of a number of case studies--some well know and some less so. The first case study has an ironic twist to it--it is the American Revolution. He then considers, in order by chapter, the Spanish resistance to Napoleon, the Philippine insurrection, the Irish case, Yugoslav partisans in World War II, Greece after World War II, Kenya and the Mau Mau, Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.
One commonality across many (but not all) of these examples is that the insurgency begins with a ludicrously small number of militants. However, there are circumstances where this small group will expand and, in the end, triumph over the occupation. Other trends: as the small bands successfully carry out ambushes and otherwise annoy the foreigners, others within the occupied country begin to pay attention. Often, the dominant government then seeks to suppress the rebellion. Sometimes, they become so oppressive and repressive that it begins to trigger larger and larger numbers of people joining the insurgency.
Another factor that is important is Mao's famous argument that in a successful insurgency, the rebellious ones are like "fish" in a "sea" of sympathetic people, able to hide among and operate within the supportive masses.
One interesting tidbit in this book focuses on current American counterinsurgency theory. The current handbook, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, has as one of its authors Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, currently in charge of the American action in Iraq. Many people assess the current counterinsurgency doctrine as sound (and, indeed, if you read Petraeus' manual, you will find it pretty convincing), but Polk demurs. He contends that despite its apparent freshness, the American doctrine is still flawed. Polk remains deeply skeptical of any occupying power being able to determine beforehand if the occupation will be successful or if insurgency will develop and, in the end, triumph over the occupier.
I'm not sure that I am in accord with Polk in all details (his conclusion does not convince me), but it is a thought provoking work, and the various case studies provide historical examples of what can go right and what can go wrong for both insurgencies and occupying powers.
Worth a read. . . .
Throughout the book, he explores his thesis by examination of a number of case studies--some well know and some less so. The first case study has an ironic twist to it--it is the American Revolution. He then considers, in order by chapter, the Spanish resistance to Napoleon, the Philippine insurrection, the Irish case, Yugoslav partisans in World War II, Greece after World War II, Kenya and the Mau Mau, Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.
One commonality across many (but not all) of these examples is that the insurgency begins with a ludicrously small number of militants. However, there are circumstances where this small group will expand and, in the end, triumph over the occupation. Other trends: as the small bands successfully carry out ambushes and otherwise annoy the foreigners, others within the occupied country begin to pay attention. Often, the dominant government then seeks to suppress the rebellion. Sometimes, they become so oppressive and repressive that it begins to trigger larger and larger numbers of people joining the insurgency.
Another factor that is important is Mao's famous argument that in a successful insurgency, the rebellious ones are like "fish" in a "sea" of sympathetic people, able to hide among and operate within the supportive masses.
One interesting tidbit in this book focuses on current American counterinsurgency theory. The current handbook, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, has as one of its authors Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, currently in charge of the American action in Iraq. Many people assess the current counterinsurgency doctrine as sound (and, indeed, if you read Petraeus' manual, you will find it pretty convincing), but Polk demurs. He contends that despite its apparent freshness, the American doctrine is still flawed. Polk remains deeply skeptical of any occupying power being able to determine beforehand if the occupation will be successful or if insurgency will develop and, in the end, triumph over the occupier.
I'm not sure that I am in accord with Polk in all details (his conclusion does not convince me), but it is a thought provoking work, and the various case studies provide historical examples of what can go right and what can go wrong for both insurgencies and occupying powers.
Worth a read. . . .
February 27, 2025
William Polk’s Violent Politics offers a compelling analysis of guerrilla warfare and insurgency, tracing their evolution from the Napoleonic Peninsular War to modern conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Polk’s thesis centers on the idea that insurgencies are driven by resistance to foreign oppressors—whether the French in Spain, Algerians against French rule, Vietnamese against both French and American domination, or Afghans opposing Soviet occupation. These cases illustrate the recurring pattern of insurgency as a struggle against external control, a theme that shapes his analysis.
Polk identifies three critical pillars of a successful insurgency:
Political Legitimacy: Broad popular support is essential for insurgent success. To legitimize their cause, insurgents must craft a political vision that resonates deeply with the populace, thereby earning the right to “speak for the nation.” This dynamic reflects Mao’s frequently cited adage that guerrillas depend on the population as a “sea” sustaining the “fish” of resistance. Polk estimates that political legitimacy accounts for 80% of an insurgency’s success, far outweighing tactical or operational factors.
Administrative Infrastructure: After weakening the colonial or occupying power, successful insurgencies build parallel governance structures. By establishing what Polk terms the “anti-government” and providing essential services, security, and justice, insurgents further undermine the occupier’s authority while strengthening their own. Though often overlooked, Polk suggests this administrative framework makes up roughly 15% of an insurgency’s success, serving as a bridge between military tactics and long-term political viability.
Military Tactics: Only about 5% of an insurgency’s success hinges on military victory. Given the stark power imbalance, direct confrontations are strategically doomed—guerrillas instead act as persistent thorns in the occupier’s side, targeting administration, supply lines, and isolated units to wear down their resolve. Insurgents rely on harassment, sabotage, and terror to erode the enemy’s political will rather than seeking battlefield dominance. Polk illustrates how brute force—such as U.S. tactics in Vietnam or Israel’s bombardment of Gaza—often backfires, fueling resentment and recruitment. For guerrillas, endurance is the key to victory.
Some Key Insights:
Anti-Foreigner Sentiment: Insurgencies thrive when framed as resistance to foreign occupation. Once occupiers withdraw—even if replaced by puppet regimes—the insurgency’s unifying cause dissolves, as seen in post-WWII Philippines.
Guerrilla vs. Conventional Warfare: Polk reinterprets the American Revolution, crediting guerrilla and terrorist tactics (targeting Loyalists, hit-and-run raids, etc.) rather than Washington’s conventional strategies for success. He warns that historically, insurgents weaken when they transition to conventional military structures.
Repression backfires: Brutal counterinsurgency tactics (e.g., French actions in Algeria, U.S. in Iraq) typically strengthen insurgents by alienating civilians.
Some Critiques:
Abrupt Conclusions: Some chapters, such as the discussion on the Philippine resistance, end too quickly, feeling rushed and leaving key takeaways underdeveloped.
Missed Case Studies: Given how frequently Mao Zedong’s successful guerrilla campaign against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces is referenced, a dedicated chapter analyzing his strategy would have been valuable. This is especially relevant because Polk’s framework emphasizes that successful insurgencies are waged as resistance to foreign oppressors. Mao’s success stands out as an exception, as his campaign was waged against a nationalist group within China rather than an external occupier. Similarly, a chapter on the Cuban guerrillas would have been insightful, as their victory was also against a domestic regime rather than a foreign power—though one that served foreign business interests. While this case studies would have added depth to the book, my interest in it is largely personal preference.
Repetitiveness: The book occasionally reiterates ideas and phrasing too frequently, sometimes within the same few pages. A further round of editing could have streamlined the arguments, reducing redundancies—such as the repeated use of the "fish in the sea" analogy—for a sharper, more concentrated focus.
Despite these minor flaws, Violent Politics is essential reading. Polk’s central thesis—that insurgencies win through politics and administration, not firepower—remains urgent in an era of forever wars. This is vividly illustrated by his richly detailed case studies, such as Vietnam, Algeria, and the Philippines, which weave military history with political analysis into a cohesive framework. By connecting these diverse struggles, Polk exposes a recurring themes that liberation movements exploit to outlast empires.
Polk identifies three critical pillars of a successful insurgency:
Political Legitimacy: Broad popular support is essential for insurgent success. To legitimize their cause, insurgents must craft a political vision that resonates deeply with the populace, thereby earning the right to “speak for the nation.” This dynamic reflects Mao’s frequently cited adage that guerrillas depend on the population as a “sea” sustaining the “fish” of resistance. Polk estimates that political legitimacy accounts for 80% of an insurgency’s success, far outweighing tactical or operational factors.
Administrative Infrastructure: After weakening the colonial or occupying power, successful insurgencies build parallel governance structures. By establishing what Polk terms the “anti-government” and providing essential services, security, and justice, insurgents further undermine the occupier’s authority while strengthening their own. Though often overlooked, Polk suggests this administrative framework makes up roughly 15% of an insurgency’s success, serving as a bridge between military tactics and long-term political viability.
Military Tactics: Only about 5% of an insurgency’s success hinges on military victory. Given the stark power imbalance, direct confrontations are strategically doomed—guerrillas instead act as persistent thorns in the occupier’s side, targeting administration, supply lines, and isolated units to wear down their resolve. Insurgents rely on harassment, sabotage, and terror to erode the enemy’s political will rather than seeking battlefield dominance. Polk illustrates how brute force—such as U.S. tactics in Vietnam or Israel’s bombardment of Gaza—often backfires, fueling resentment and recruitment. For guerrillas, endurance is the key to victory.
Some Key Insights:
Anti-Foreigner Sentiment: Insurgencies thrive when framed as resistance to foreign occupation. Once occupiers withdraw—even if replaced by puppet regimes—the insurgency’s unifying cause dissolves, as seen in post-WWII Philippines.
Guerrilla vs. Conventional Warfare: Polk reinterprets the American Revolution, crediting guerrilla and terrorist tactics (targeting Loyalists, hit-and-run raids, etc.) rather than Washington’s conventional strategies for success. He warns that historically, insurgents weaken when they transition to conventional military structures.
Repression backfires: Brutal counterinsurgency tactics (e.g., French actions in Algeria, U.S. in Iraq) typically strengthen insurgents by alienating civilians.
Some Critiques:
Abrupt Conclusions: Some chapters, such as the discussion on the Philippine resistance, end too quickly, feeling rushed and leaving key takeaways underdeveloped.
Missed Case Studies: Given how frequently Mao Zedong’s successful guerrilla campaign against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces is referenced, a dedicated chapter analyzing his strategy would have been valuable. This is especially relevant because Polk’s framework emphasizes that successful insurgencies are waged as resistance to foreign oppressors. Mao’s success stands out as an exception, as his campaign was waged against a nationalist group within China rather than an external occupier. Similarly, a chapter on the Cuban guerrillas would have been insightful, as their victory was also against a domestic regime rather than a foreign power—though one that served foreign business interests. While this case studies would have added depth to the book, my interest in it is largely personal preference.
Repetitiveness: The book occasionally reiterates ideas and phrasing too frequently, sometimes within the same few pages. A further round of editing could have streamlined the arguments, reducing redundancies—such as the repeated use of the "fish in the sea" analogy—for a sharper, more concentrated focus.
Despite these minor flaws, Violent Politics is essential reading. Polk’s central thesis—that insurgencies win through politics and administration, not firepower—remains urgent in an era of forever wars. This is vividly illustrated by his richly detailed case studies, such as Vietnam, Algeria, and the Philippines, which weave military history with political analysis into a cohesive framework. By connecting these diverse struggles, Polk exposes a recurring themes that liberation movements exploit to outlast empires.
June 30, 2008
Violent Politics reads like a dinner guest regaling a table with insightful commentary on choice topics. Witty, incisive and instructive, Polk captures your attention without ever boring you. The first portion, which touches mainly on the American Revolution, covers ground most everyone vaguely understands. One fact, though, that was new to me was learning of Washington's opposition to guerrilla warfare and his strong desire to emulate the Continental Line after the former sovereign's battlefield tactics. This desire, without the involvement of the French, would have meant the downfall of the Revolution. Since my high school history texts never dared to impugn good ol' George, it was an interesting perspective.
Other chapters include a study of Spanish versus the Napoleonic French (my fave chapter), Filipino insurrection, Vietnam, and Afghanistan versus Russians/British. Each builds on the former until we have a clear picture of trends that affect and influence war/insurrection today.
Other chapters include a study of Spanish versus the Napoleonic French (my fave chapter), Filipino insurrection, Vietnam, and Afghanistan versus Russians/British. Each builds on the former until we have a clear picture of trends that affect and influence war/insurrection today.
June 27, 2020
This was a really interesting book. Polk manages to succinctly analyze the common thread in all insurgencies throughout the last 250 years to set down some pretty firm limitations when fighting them. Setting out his logic and argument in the introduction, he spends each chapter analyzing the evolution of national insurgencies against foreign adversaries and their power to stops a supposedly unbeatable foe in its tracks. Polk also draws meaningful parallels with the insurgencies against American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to emphasize that this time it is NOT different and uses this to question the wisdom of a policy that sees no limit to the power of the US.
October 17, 2009
An excellent history on the subject of insurgency. How truly unfortunate that most foreign policy decision-makers (e.g., national leaders in France, United Kingdom, and the United States of America) have not been versed in or have not heeded the lessons of history concerning such matters. Mr. Polk crafted a very readable and interesting analysis of the risks associated with invading and occupying other sovereign countries. Those of you who have read Bernard Fall's Street Without Joy (1962 history of France's misadventure in Indochina) will certainly find Mr. Polk's work very interesting.
March 28, 2020
A critique on the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the book goes over 11 national uprisings in three centuries to underline a common denominator: In the beginning, insurgents are few and fight as terrorists; to succeed, they need wider recognition as a nationalist movement, otherwise they fail (e.g. IRA or Basque separatists). In this struggle, the author posits that nationalism overcomes ideology: once a population considers its rulers as foreign, an insurgency which has achieved wider recognition is virtually unmanageable.
April 16, 2008
This book makes the point, eloquently and with strong examples and reasoning, that insurgencies are about resisting foreign control of a society, and that the foreigners lose regardless of technological or numerical advantages, short of settling in to permanent occupation using mass immigration to become the new natives and the harshest of methods to suppress or kill off the old ones. Not encouraging reading for neocons dreaming of empire, but reasoned and realistic.
March 2, 2018
Once I realized the intended audience and purpose of this book, I appreciated it much more than when I took the subtitle at its face value. This book isn't exactly a history of insurgency, and it's not aimed at students of history. It's not really even what I thought it was midway through, which was a series of case studies in support of a theory of international security, written for political scientists. Well, it is both of these things, but that's not the main point.
Instead, this book is written for senior military and diplomatic leaders in the late Bush administration, desperately warning them of the foolishness of expanding American overseas military occupations. Polk does this through showing, pretty convincingly, that local/native insurgencies will always win, and foreign occupying forces will always lose. The case studies include the American revolution (probably the least convincing, but rhetorically a smart inclusion for an audience of patriotic Americans), the Spanish fight against Napoleon's occupation, basically the whole modern history of the Philippines, Ireland's independence "Troubles", Yugoslav Partisans in WWII, Greek resistance in WWII, the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Algerian anticolonial fight, Vietnam in two parts--French and American, and finally Russia's war in Afghanistan. Interestingly, Polk frequently quotes Mao and invokes Mao's theory of guerrilla war, but doesn't include China as a case study. My guess for this omission is that its inclusion would weaken his native vs foreign narrative, but the omission leaves a noticeable gap.
As I said, overall the thesis is convincing. That is, insurgencies are successful when (and because) they gain local political legitimacy and disrupt the operations of the occupying (or puppet) state and set up their own administration. The military aspects of the insurgency--both from the insurgent and occupying points of view--are means, not ends. Polk even cites a rough quantification: military decisions and force account for only 5% of the likelihood of success, behind various political necessities. So even with overwhelming military force, occupiers are not going to win.
I don't have many critiques of this theory, and my critiques of the conclusion and appeal are mostly limited to the way events in Iraq and Afghanistan (and Somalia and Iran) have unfolded differently than when Polk was writing, in the depths of the Iraq civil war in 2005-06. One thing I didn't appreciate was the lack of attention paid to the civilian populations caught up between occupiers and insurgents. In Kenya, for example, Polk brings up the concentration camps and other British brutality, but only as they relate to Britain's political loss. I also would have liked to see more explicit recognition that these insurgencies were largely anti-colonial fights - Polk carefully avoids any value judgments in imperial/colonial projects overall.
This turned into a 3/4-ass review, unlike my usual #halfassedreviews.
Instead, this book is written for senior military and diplomatic leaders in the late Bush administration, desperately warning them of the foolishness of expanding American overseas military occupations. Polk does this through showing, pretty convincingly, that local/native insurgencies will always win, and foreign occupying forces will always lose. The case studies include the American revolution (probably the least convincing, but rhetorically a smart inclusion for an audience of patriotic Americans), the Spanish fight against Napoleon's occupation, basically the whole modern history of the Philippines, Ireland's independence "Troubles", Yugoslav Partisans in WWII, Greek resistance in WWII, the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Algerian anticolonial fight, Vietnam in two parts--French and American, and finally Russia's war in Afghanistan. Interestingly, Polk frequently quotes Mao and invokes Mao's theory of guerrilla war, but doesn't include China as a case study. My guess for this omission is that its inclusion would weaken his native vs foreign narrative, but the omission leaves a noticeable gap.
As I said, overall the thesis is convincing. That is, insurgencies are successful when (and because) they gain local political legitimacy and disrupt the operations of the occupying (or puppet) state and set up their own administration. The military aspects of the insurgency--both from the insurgent and occupying points of view--are means, not ends. Polk even cites a rough quantification: military decisions and force account for only 5% of the likelihood of success, behind various political necessities. So even with overwhelming military force, occupiers are not going to win.
I don't have many critiques of this theory, and my critiques of the conclusion and appeal are mostly limited to the way events in Iraq and Afghanistan (and Somalia and Iran) have unfolded differently than when Polk was writing, in the depths of the Iraq civil war in 2005-06. One thing I didn't appreciate was the lack of attention paid to the civilian populations caught up between occupiers and insurgents. In Kenya, for example, Polk brings up the concentration camps and other British brutality, but only as they relate to Britain's political loss. I also would have liked to see more explicit recognition that these insurgencies were largely anti-colonial fights - Polk carefully avoids any value judgments in imperial/colonial projects overall.
This turned into a 3/4-ass review, unlike my usual #halfassedreviews.
January 28, 2024
William Polk recounts the structure of insurgence, terrorism, and guerrilla war from across history. His accounts showcase the ways insurgencies rise, continue, and fall. I found his recounts of history to be thorough but brief. Polk has opened my eyes to many conflicts around the world and one thing is abundantly clear: natives will always resist foreign occupation.
The book finishes by examining American foreign policy in the Middle East. It’s clear US foreign policy is directed by warmongering capitalist who view war as a profitable political tool. It is best to quote from the Great War leader President Eisenhower,
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children… that is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from the cross of iron.”
I would be interested to hear Polk’s comments about the current climate of the prolonged US war in the Middle East. It seems he predicted the future. Fifteen years later and the US is still engaged in a losing, never ending war costing tax payers trillions. Hearing Polk’s comments too about the current state of the Israeli-Palestine war would be interesting.
This book is a must read for those who want to understand the state of global affairs from the eroded, outdated perspective of western imperialism. Three centuries of insurgency and guerrilla warfare and nothing has been learned by the imposing powers.
The book finishes by examining American foreign policy in the Middle East. It’s clear US foreign policy is directed by warmongering capitalist who view war as a profitable political tool. It is best to quote from the Great War leader President Eisenhower,
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children… that is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from the cross of iron.”
I would be interested to hear Polk’s comments about the current climate of the prolonged US war in the Middle East. It seems he predicted the future. Fifteen years later and the US is still engaged in a losing, never ending war costing tax payers trillions. Hearing Polk’s comments too about the current state of the Israeli-Palestine war would be interesting.
This book is a must read for those who want to understand the state of global affairs from the eroded, outdated perspective of western imperialism. Three centuries of insurgency and guerrilla warfare and nothing has been learned by the imposing powers.
March 12, 2022
William Polk has managed in my opinion to comprise key episodes in human history which reflect exactly the essence of a violent XIX century and an even more violent XXth century. His fabulous collection out of which some of his episodes are the reflection of his own personal experience made a huge impression on me especially as the moment I was reading this book coincides with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in february 2022 a time in which I would have never thought that the violent past would be coming into the present. This book serves also as a dictionary to understand this contemporary invasion , a brutality which we could resemble of the US interventions in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan or the French invasion of Algeria or Vietnam. Really interesting book which would make you reconsider some of the recent events as per the violent Western intervention into different societies just for political or economical reasons.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 25, 2019
As a history major, and a big history nerd, I knew a lot of the underlying basic information. However, Polk takes a look at America's use of insurgency, terrorism and guerilla war tactics to be successful. Most people would credit Vietnam as the start of this "new kind of war," but Polk argues that it has a much longer history in our country than the 1960s. It was also not a style of war we were pushed to as a repsonse to another country's tactics, but something we used successfully from the start. This was a very interesting take on our nation's history, and really got me to look at events in a different way.
June 28, 2018
Something I wish Pres. Bush and the Congress at the time had read well before the beginning of the Iraq War and GWOT. We no longer live in a world where outright war is feasible. Guerilla warfare will be the norm for the years to come and unless we can think of effective ways to counter it, it will be the force that will always defeat large states like the US and Russia.
Read
March 27, 2020How insurgency/ terrorism/ GW from the centuries has evolved and how the different powers of that time tackled them, how many of them were successful and how many of them failed.... what were the reasons for success and failures.... William Polk has explained all this quite well and with different angle. those who has interest in understanding Insurgency, GW this book is recommended for him
March 7, 2024
It’s pretty interesting, giving a short overview of some insurgencies I was well acquainted with and some I was reading about for the first time in any depth (Spanish insurgence against the French.) overall nothing groundbreaking but enjoyable to read and I did learn some new things
December 5, 2025
This was an interesting look at some insurgencies/ countries fighting back. More politics than war strategy which was disappointing. If you are interested in this topic, you will enjoy this book. However, the book won't make you interested in the topic if you aren't already.
March 11, 2020
Excellent journey about insurgency and terrorism.
August 10, 2023
Not what I thought it would be - more about warfare tactics of guérilla warfare than about how the surrounding political climate led to warfare.
October 25, 2013
Violent Politics by William Polk, former professor of history at the University of Chicago (and holder of many other posts as well), is a concise summary of the history and mishaps associated with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies running from the American Revolution through Algeria, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Balkans, Greece, Afghanistan, and of course, Vietnam.
Polk’s well-document contention is that insurgencies (internal attempts to overthrow repressive regimes) center on three elements: the political, the administrative, and the military. For him the political challenge usually involves an initial ten to fifty disaffected activists who are skilled in reaching out to a generally disaffected populace. Polk estimates that a successful insurgency ultimately is 80% political, adopting Mao’s dictum that insurgency (or revolution) is a mixture of fish (insurgents) in need of a sea (the public) in which to swim. Once the fish begin swimming, they must communicate their discontent--again, a political task--in such a way that their message is securely conveyed and that they are housed, fed, equipped, and hidden during their initial phase of weakness. This blends into the administrative task, which entails killing off the current government and providing substitute services, from health clinics to schools to sanitation. Administration is 15% of the successful insurgent’s job.
Then comes the remaining 5%, fighting. Here Polk observes--remember, he’s an historian, and a good one--the successful insurgent should hit and run, not confront a sitting regime or puppet regime or invading foreign force for as long as it takes to demoralize it politically. Head-on battles between insurgents and well-equipped, highly trained armies are not good for the insurgents’ health. What the insurgent must do is keep pushing, pushing, pushing...counting on the populace to feed it intelligence as well as food...steal the enemy’s arms...lure the enemy into a fatal show of force and then pounce...all the while hoping for an indication that somehow the insurgency will be able to obtain broad political recognition, inside and outside the country.
There are very few individuals as knowledgeable as Polk on this subject; that’s why he can be so detailed and yet so concise. This is a fascinating book for Americans who have recently been through the Iraq War, are winding down their failed efforts in Afghanistan, and contemplating future counterinsurgencies in Africa ...not to mention the raging civil war in Syria.
The bottom line is that insurgencies can be snuffed out by strong governments within their own borders, but they seldom can be stopped by foreign powers. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia, all great powers, have failed many times in trying to put down foreign insurgencies either directly or through puppet governments. The core reason for this is that in the final analysis the politics of a given country are determined by the people of that country. If a military machine only has 5% of the overall conflict to work with, no military machine can really succeed--not when deployed from abroad.
I’ve spent a lot of time working on the insurgency/counterinsurgency issue--once in a way that was very up close and personal (see my book Nights in the Pink Motel about Iraq)--and have nothing but admiration for Polk’s swift survey of how the world really works. In his final chapter, he properly debunks the verbiage contained in the U.S. Army’s new manual on counterinsurgency. There is no way a military machine, even one as gigantic as the United States’ defense establishment, can prevail in an internal conflict abroad. Diplomacy, backed by military power, can be helpful, but ultimately the neoconservative fantasy of the U.S. fighting a “long war” (forty years?) to put the world right is just that--a fantasy.
Violent Politics is the kind of book you can trust, read quickly, and measure based on your own knowledge, whether you are twenty-three or seventy-three. There’s essentially nothing in here that’s off-base. A good bit of it has happened in your lifetime, and it will keep happening, unfortunately. Often a great power’s best option is not to make things better, but try to ensure we don’t make them worse.
For more of my comments on contemporary writing, see Tuppence Reviews (Kindle).
Polk’s well-document contention is that insurgencies (internal attempts to overthrow repressive regimes) center on three elements: the political, the administrative, and the military. For him the political challenge usually involves an initial ten to fifty disaffected activists who are skilled in reaching out to a generally disaffected populace. Polk estimates that a successful insurgency ultimately is 80% political, adopting Mao’s dictum that insurgency (or revolution) is a mixture of fish (insurgents) in need of a sea (the public) in which to swim. Once the fish begin swimming, they must communicate their discontent--again, a political task--in such a way that their message is securely conveyed and that they are housed, fed, equipped, and hidden during their initial phase of weakness. This blends into the administrative task, which entails killing off the current government and providing substitute services, from health clinics to schools to sanitation. Administration is 15% of the successful insurgent’s job.
Then comes the remaining 5%, fighting. Here Polk observes--remember, he’s an historian, and a good one--the successful insurgent should hit and run, not confront a sitting regime or puppet regime or invading foreign force for as long as it takes to demoralize it politically. Head-on battles between insurgents and well-equipped, highly trained armies are not good for the insurgents’ health. What the insurgent must do is keep pushing, pushing, pushing...counting on the populace to feed it intelligence as well as food...steal the enemy’s arms...lure the enemy into a fatal show of force and then pounce...all the while hoping for an indication that somehow the insurgency will be able to obtain broad political recognition, inside and outside the country.
There are very few individuals as knowledgeable as Polk on this subject; that’s why he can be so detailed and yet so concise. This is a fascinating book for Americans who have recently been through the Iraq War, are winding down their failed efforts in Afghanistan, and contemplating future counterinsurgencies in Africa ...not to mention the raging civil war in Syria.
The bottom line is that insurgencies can be snuffed out by strong governments within their own borders, but they seldom can be stopped by foreign powers. The United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia, all great powers, have failed many times in trying to put down foreign insurgencies either directly or through puppet governments. The core reason for this is that in the final analysis the politics of a given country are determined by the people of that country. If a military machine only has 5% of the overall conflict to work with, no military machine can really succeed--not when deployed from abroad.
I’ve spent a lot of time working on the insurgency/counterinsurgency issue--once in a way that was very up close and personal (see my book Nights in the Pink Motel about Iraq)--and have nothing but admiration for Polk’s swift survey of how the world really works. In his final chapter, he properly debunks the verbiage contained in the U.S. Army’s new manual on counterinsurgency. There is no way a military machine, even one as gigantic as the United States’ defense establishment, can prevail in an internal conflict abroad. Diplomacy, backed by military power, can be helpful, but ultimately the neoconservative fantasy of the U.S. fighting a “long war” (forty years?) to put the world right is just that--a fantasy.
Violent Politics is the kind of book you can trust, read quickly, and measure based on your own knowledge, whether you are twenty-three or seventy-three. There’s essentially nothing in here that’s off-base. A good bit of it has happened in your lifetime, and it will keep happening, unfortunately. Often a great power’s best option is not to make things better, but try to ensure we don’t make them worse.
For more of my comments on contemporary writing, see Tuppence Reviews (Kindle).
August 6, 2011
I feel sleepy and not feel want to write. However, I found this review over the internet that was exactly what I wanted to say:
"Based on extraordinary research and more than thirty years of professional experience as Professor of History and Founding Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago, Dr. Polk has definitely produced an excellent read to educate us the intrinsic nuances of insurgency and the cost of occupancy through brilliant comparative analysis.
Dr. Polk compares a dozen or more insurgencies and guerrilla wars of the past three centuries ( from the American Revolution to struggles in Ireland to Algeria to Spain and finally to Afghanistan and Iraq), and concludes that they share a universal characteristic --opposition to foreign rulers.
The conclusion of Polk's study is scary.
He lays out the enormous human and financial costs of trying to impose a foreign solution on people who do not want to be controlled by outsiders. It's just devastating when you look at the Iraq numbers alone. The monetary costs of running the Iraq war is $10 million an hour - and rising more than 20% a year. What about the precious lives?
Dr. Polk's historical knowledge of this subject makes him probably the best person on this planet to advice our future policy makers on starting a war (if they are willing to listen.)
"Violent Politics" is a must read, not only for those who make the decisions, but also for those who vote for them."
Taken from Amazon.com
"Based on extraordinary research and more than thirty years of professional experience as Professor of History and Founding Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago, Dr. Polk has definitely produced an excellent read to educate us the intrinsic nuances of insurgency and the cost of occupancy through brilliant comparative analysis.
Dr. Polk compares a dozen or more insurgencies and guerrilla wars of the past three centuries ( from the American Revolution to struggles in Ireland to Algeria to Spain and finally to Afghanistan and Iraq), and concludes that they share a universal characteristic --opposition to foreign rulers.
The conclusion of Polk's study is scary.
He lays out the enormous human and financial costs of trying to impose a foreign solution on people who do not want to be controlled by outsiders. It's just devastating when you look at the Iraq numbers alone. The monetary costs of running the Iraq war is $10 million an hour - and rising more than 20% a year. What about the precious lives?
Dr. Polk's historical knowledge of this subject makes him probably the best person on this planet to advice our future policy makers on starting a war (if they are willing to listen.)
"Violent Politics" is a must read, not only for those who make the decisions, but also for those who vote for them."
Taken from Amazon.com
November 13, 2017
Finally! It took me far too long to read this relatively short book (mostly due to my fucked-up glasses prescription), but it was well worth the extra time and effort. Not quite 4 stars, but easily 3½. Somewhat ironically, the most telling part of the book was the very end, where the author, a former State Department official of the Kennedy administration, quoted a speech made by President Eisenhower in 1953:
"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. [...] This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."
Nowadays, he would be thrown out of the Republican party and reviled by all the so-called "conservatives" (who ought to be called "destructives" since they espouse the wholesale dismantling, i.e. destruction, of the U.S. Government) and all the ignorant fools who follow them. As depressing as this book was for me to read, it must have been immeasurably more depressing for Professor Polk to write; in any case, it is well worth reading...
"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. [...] This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."
Nowadays, he would be thrown out of the Republican party and reviled by all the so-called "conservatives" (who ought to be called "destructives" since they espouse the wholesale dismantling, i.e. destruction, of the U.S. Government) and all the ignorant fools who follow them. As depressing as this book was for me to read, it must have been immeasurably more depressing for Professor Polk to write; in any case, it is well worth reading...
July 10, 2011
Although at times a bit too simplifying and too quick at drawing conclusions, William Polk's book nevertheless is a very interesting and witty tour de force through the most important insurgencies und guerrilla wars of the last two hundred years, covering the "original" guerrilla war in Spain, the Irish war of independency, the Vietnam wars of France and the USA, and some more. These overviews are very short and not very deep but Polk, knowing so much about these events, tells the storys from a new perspective.
Unfortunatley, the conclusion, covering the recent wars in Iraque, Afghanistan and Somalia, isn't as conclusive and definite as it should have been (regarding the information Polk draws form analysis of the 12 chapters).
What I really appreciated about the book is that Polk gives the reader a huge load of sources, including some scarcely widespread ones, to dig into for further information.
Unfortunatley, the conclusion, covering the recent wars in Iraque, Afghanistan and Somalia, isn't as conclusive and definite as it should have been (regarding the information Polk draws form analysis of the 12 chapters).
What I really appreciated about the book is that Polk gives the reader a huge load of sources, including some scarcely widespread ones, to dig into for further information.
January 8, 2009
This is a 250 page book that reads like an essay. Polk puts forth a detailed thesis in the intro, and then flies through a dozen insurgent movements that constantly relate back to the first point he makes...very easy to follow despite the overwhelming use of acronyms.
Pros: Great for history, policy, and politics geeks, while being extremely timely (regarding Iraq and Afghanistan)
Cons: A bit disturbingly sympathetic with these movements, painting all as valiant freedom fighters...a gross oversimplification at times. Also fails to address movements that are less black/white such as Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, etc.
Pros: Great for history, policy, and politics geeks, while being extremely timely (regarding Iraq and Afghanistan)
Cons: A bit disturbingly sympathetic with these movements, painting all as valiant freedom fighters...a gross oversimplification at times. Also fails to address movements that are less black/white such as Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, etc.
September 27, 2009
Briefly describes a series of insurgency movements, starting with the American Revolution. I learned about American involvement in the Philippines and Tito in Yugoslavia. The analysis is good until the last couple of pages when the author gets onto his soapbox about Iraq, and a couple of conspiracy theories about Bush. The book is 95% sensible, besides that it is a fun read.
February 11, 2008
The book is an excellent historical overview and his cross-example conclusions are valuable but I would use a grain of salt with his wrap up. Also, I think it would benefit from comparison to internal guerilla movements that aren't motivated by external involvement.
February 6, 2010
Books which specialize, and simultaneously fill little holes in my histories, are what I most appreciate. They are also very hard to find. Thanks Dad. This book is concise, and engagingly written. The rare goldilocks effect. Not to detailed, not to glossy. Just right.
May 29, 2015
This survey includes a range of insurgencies, from the obvious through to those that are little known. One central theme emerges again and again from this comparative study: people do not like being governed by an entity they regard as "foreign".
August 6, 2010
Excellent history of insurgency. Is nothing short of revelatory in terms of understanding what the US strategy in the Middle East is doomed to ultimate failure and a tragic waste of human lives.
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March 4, 2011I loved it because it showed how a insurgency develops.
April 1, 2014
A very informative book full of the history that most of us don't learn in school.
December 26, 2021
A good book to understand concept, conduct and execution of GW.
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