Pakistan is an ever-interesting country that forever seems to teeter on the edge of a precipice and blunders ahead from one self-inflicted crisis to another. It is a fascinating country, home to unpredictable politicians, unprofessional military personnel, and a gullible population that passionately believes in the infallibility and imagined greatness of their nation-state. Added to this heady mixture is the potentially destructive belief in the superiority of Islam, which, according to the Pakistanis, would help them tide over any wanton action they might collectively take as a nation.
Malhotra has authored a seminal work on the Pakistani state, revealing all the blemishes in the country's polity. Misplaced priorities and blind hatred for India have led Pakistan into a quagmire from which deliverance seems well nigh impossible. Military defeat in the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971 dealt a body blow to the psyche of the Pakistani nation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously took a vow promising that Pakistan would go on to become a nuclear state “even if the Pakistani nation has to eat grass.”
The policymakers in Pakistan were aware that they could achieve the goal of becoming a nuclear state only through covert means. Sourcing finances for the enterprise was a major obstacle, the solution to which was to prop up a financial institution that could covertly divert funds to the Pakistani state. Thus, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, headed by a shadowy banker named Agha Hassan Abedi, was set up. Abedi was tasked to create obscure money trails across the international financial banking system to route finances into Pakistan.
The most important player in the drama was the Pakistani nuclear physicist, A Q Khan. Khan had worked for long years in the nuclear industry in Europe. He was a duplicitous character who was adept at stealing technology and smuggling it into Pakistan. Bhutto assigned the task of developing a nuclear device for Pakistan to A Q Khan, who was more than happy to take on the job. The first step was enrichment of uranium, which Khan planned to do with the help of centrifuges, the designs of which he surreptitiously managed to smuggle out of Germany.
Developing a nuclear device does not come cheap, and garnering funds for that task was an onerous undertaking. As luck would have it, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan offered the Pakistanis a rare opportunity to leverage support from Western nations, acting as a bulwark to Russian designs in South Asia. This happened in the era of superpower rivalry between the United States and the erstwhile USSR, and the Americans were more than happy to ignore attempts at nuclear proliferation by the Pakistani state. The Pakistanis used the religion card to garner support to fight the Russian occupation in Afghanistan. They were actively involved in setting up a terror infrastructure and laying the groundwork for a dreaded militant force, the Taliban, to come into being. The master stroke was the tacit support they provided to the Taliban to harvest Poppies on a large scale in Afghanistan. The Taliban quickly recognised the potential of the immense wealth that could be generated through the drug trade, and it was just a matter of time before most of the drugs that moved into Europe and the Americas were sourced from Afghanistan. The Afghan drug trade went on to develop into a large-scale international operation, so much so that the Pakistani bank, BCCI, was involved in money laundering involving big players like Pablo Escobar’s Medellin cartel and the Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega. BCCI facilitated the movement of funds into Pakistan, which lined the coffers of Pakistani military officers as well as provided much-needed clandestine funds for the nascent nuclear programme of that country.
Malhotra’s account clearly delineates how the Americans used the Pakistanis to further their own interests. However, in the bargain, the Pakistanis shrewdly played a double game. After the horrendous twin tower bombing by Al Qaeda in September 2001, the Americans proclaimed an all-out war against Al Qaeda and their protectors, the Taliban. General Musharraf, who was at the helm of affairs in Pakistan, played a very shrewd game in balancing his loyalties with the Americans and the Taliban at the same time. The Pakistanis played a dangerous, duplicitous game of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. They are masters at this game, and in recent history, there have been numerous instances where they have repeatedly used this skill with uncanny finesse.
This book is as much an exposition of the unprincipled and hypocritical stand taken by the American state in its narrow national interest and for geopolitical expediency. Analysis of the effect of these actions unequivocally proves that the world has become a more dangerous place.
The role played by Pakistan in nuclear proliferation is beyond doubt. It is even more galling that Western democracies, for narrow geopolitical interests, tended to look the other way while that rogue nation laid the seeds for enduring unrest across the globe.
Iqbal Chand Malhotra’s volume makes for interesting reading, although I had a lingering feeling that he could have embellished the narrative with the usual tropes on clandestine operations happening across continents. However, it is to the author’s credit that the narrative sticks to its message in a straightforward manner. This book will interest anyone with a lingering interest in geopolitics and recent world history.