The Evolution of Operational Art

by Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, Bruce W. Menning (Translation)

One can argue that the development of true doctrine required the formal adoption of the concept of operational art. Prior to the Great War, no army in the world possessed a codified body of thought that enabled senior military commanders to visualize the aggregate effects of tactical engagements across time and space. By 1918, after a dramatic revision of drill regulations into something approaching true doctrine, the German army was furthest in realizing this goal. Ultimately, though, the Germans could not translate tactical success into strategic victory because they could not resource military operations in sufficient depth to render local successes decisive. Understanding that the character of warfare in 1918 was radically different from 1914 would have enabled Ludendorff to see the flaws in the MICHAEL offensives and perhaps mitigate them. And although the interwar German Army spent a great deal of effort reflecting on the lessons of 1914-1918, German understanding of the operational art remained incomplete. The separate and unequal Allied efforts against Nazi Germany in World War II, followed immediately by the superpower competition of the Cold War, created a significant gap in American officers' understand­ ing of the factors that contributed to Soviet victories on the Eastern Front. As a result, in the decades following the war the concept of "operational art" was recognized and adopted by the US Army almost as a proprietary creation. In the 1990s, however, Western military historians and theorists discovered that the Soviets had gotten there first. Bruce Menning's translation of Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1936 treatise The Evolution of Operational Art is the best example available of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. Isserson, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and others like them were founding members of a focused military Enlightenment whose goal was to change the way armies and leaders thought about war. Moreover, unlike contemporaries such as B.H. Liddell Hart or Billy Mitchell, they had the opportunity to build their ideas into the modem Soviet Army and see their doctrine survive despite the existential challenges of Stalin's purges and the German invasion.

Genres: Military Fiction, Russia, History

136 pages, Paperback

First published October 16, 1932

Reviews

[Zare · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book on evolution of art of war post WW1.

After reading several books about evolving military art and practice I was surprised how much final years of WW1 paved the way for the modern approach to warfare. Isserson manages to explain in a very simple terms limitations of the WW1 linear approach (constant attempts of outflanking that just caused the front to grow ever wider (since defenders wanted to prevent the envelopment) to the point of reaching geographical limitations that basically "killed" any further maneuverability and as a consequence resulted in grinding trench warfare) and experiences from 1918 on both sides (German mass firepower approach and Allied tank tactics) that were proof-of-concept of new ways of waging wars and showed the most promising directions for development of both technical and application means required for successful war fighting [in the future]. Author discusses both offensive and defensive operations (which I found interesting since Soviet doctrine was always more concentrated on offensive) and it is very interesting how both French, British and German experiences from WW1 are analyzed and lessons learned from them.

It is a very interesting book that did not lose anything with time. As a matter of fact I think that predominance of low intensity warfare in last 30 or something years caused the very unfortunate turn of events - (a) military was always deployed and fought the war in conditions where opposition does not have production means of any type (be it because they are various militant cells or states deprived of anything through sanctions that lasted in some cases for decade) so combat is basically just a prolonged police action (level of casualties not withstanding) without any doubt about the dominance of intervening force; (b) politicians got comfortable in starting wars where they know army will encounter, as Black Adder famously said, natives armed with sharpened kiwis. Without casualties wars in all their forms (especially preventive wars that recently totally circumvented the UN and ended , post-facto, with "ooops, we thought they were danger ..... nothing to see here, gotta soldier on now") became something acceptable.

Basically if you look at it, this is not such a different position than say 1900's - major powers fighting preventive police actions (that do take years to finish) with shiny, hi-tech and extremely expensive toys and everybody shunting and dismissing any [what you might call] proper conflict. Reason is very simple - in today's interconnected world making economic pressure seems very risk free and it works until politicians (generally part of society that suffers of grandeur and inability to learn from history because they only live in 4-year cycles) make a great error in judgement and make pressure at the wrong time and place and come across unexpected consequences for their own states. Hopefully we will get another generation of politicians that will also be able statesmen - people who will understand the need for cooperation and communication (maybe third incarnation of League of Nations/UN until some new hegemony starts messing things up in the future - everything is in cycles, ain't it?). To prevent wars world needs statesmen, not bureaucrats.

As Isserson repeats multiple times, true war requires dedication, organization and proper application of force in form of multiple strikes across the width and depth of the theater. His descriptions of echelon approach to breaking through the defensive line and exploiting the momentum (without which entire breakthrough loses meaning) are explained in so easily understandable language it is no wonder book still resonates today, one more proof that basics will always survive the test of time.

Excellent book, highly recommended.

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Isserson outlines an evolution of tactics and firepower which eventually resulted in the fixed fronts of WWI. In short, deadlier firepower strengthened the positional defenses along fronts requiring adversaries to lengthen opposing fronts to achieve envelopment. This process of escalation continued until both sides found themselves entrenched along the entire front. With no room for linear maneuver, Isserson postulates that operations in depth will become key for overcoming the fixed front phenomenon. Additionally, this process of tactics driving strategy eliminates the possibility for intelligent application of force capable of disrupting enemy escalation. Thus Isserson proposes the execution of operational art to distribute battles (incorporating both airpower and landpower) in time (through strategic echelon) and space (depth) for unified purpose.
This is an incredibly short and simple read for a text on operational art and Isserson's trace of the impact of firepower, communications, and transportation technology on the evolution of operational art is superb. Chapter 2-3 is essentially "Vulcan's Anvil" using the Franco-Prussian War instead of the US Civil War. Isserson's principle limitation is that his concept of operational art is still aimed at overcoming a tactical problem (achieving breakthrough). This largely stems from Isserson's dialectic which leads him to falsely conclude that future wars will necessarily take on the positional characteristics of the entrenched defenses of WWI. Irregardless, Isserson's general observations on operational art and his brief depiction of operational command are just as relevant today as they were in 1927.

[J.R. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The pre-WWII Soviet perspective on the necessity to develop doctrine on the opertional level of war. Reads like a military educational institution assignment paper.

The premise states that the Napoleonic Wars were the last point in history where generals commanded tactical deployment of troops to win wars. As technology and manning increased, belligerents widened their fronts and linear war found its natural limits with geographic barriers.

Once the lines stretched sea-to-sea, the natural evolution in formation forced the lines to 'deepen". Doctrine hadn't caught up to this new reality in WWI and there was no concept of "operational" war. This caused a stalemate because anytime a belligerent made tactical success with a penetration of the enemy line, it exhausted it resources and couldn't exploit that success with follow on tactical engagements. Commanders hadn't developed an operational perspective on linking seperate tactical battles into one operational objective.

The idea of operational art, is the application of multiple tactical engagements linked together in pursuit of a strategic goal. I.e. one battle ensues in order to penetrate the enemy line. A separate battle ensues with a follow on unit to widen the lane and penetrate throughout the depth of the line. A follow on unit breaches the line and exploits the enemy rear. An other unit continues through the lane to envelop a separate flank and cut off there lines of communication; etc.

[Blue Morse · Rating 5 out of 5]

Written by Soviet Commander Georgia Isserson in 1936, this is one of the best interwar writings I’ve ever read on the future of warfare and the basic tenets of operational art.

Unlike the retrospective and often self-inflating memoirs from the likes of men such as Hart or Guderian, this is one of the most clear and concise unpretentious writings by a military visionary who had a true grasp of the fundamental problems in the First World War and the need for deep operations beyond the forward echelon of troops.

Ironically, Isserson would fall victim to Stalins great military purge, being arrested and imprisoned in June 1941 only a few days before Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, his infamous invasion of Russia.

Some of the best quotes:
- “A tactical effort is only a step on the way to the aim and can never be an end in itself.”

- “The basic mission of our operational art is substantiation and elaboration of the theory of deep operation for annihilation.”

- “The challenge to operational art ... how to link separate, tactically independent combat efforts in space along a front and in time.”

- “Future operation will no longer be a broken chain of interrupted battles. It will be a continuous chain of merged combat efforts throughout the entire depths.”

- “The center of gravity within the art of leadership now shifts to controlling the course of operation.”

[Dhruv · Rating 4 out of 5]

Amazing book for military science

Here is the work that pretty much defined the operational level of war as an intermediate between the tactical and the strategic. Unbelievable as it sounds, this book written before the kick off of WW2 perfectly predicts engagments like the Battle of the Bulge.

While the Soviets did not properly appreciate the time element of Blitzkrieg or attempt to preserve the life of their forces, their Tactics undoubtedly worked. Recommended read for people deeply interested in military science, if only for the historical context.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Phenomenal read that lays out a template for large unit operations. Presents a logic that spurs thought and can easily in incorporate new tactics (technology). One of my top 10.