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In Lieu of Ideology: An Intellectual Biography of Goh Keng Swee
Born in Malacca in 1918, Dr Goh Keng Swee reached maturity at a time when European colonialism was breathing its last. By the time this keen-eyed Malayan became self-governing Singapore's first Minister of Finance in 1959, he had made a name for himself as the colony's foremost social scientist, having carried out groundbreaking surveys on urban poverty and housing. He immediately initiated pioneering projects that laid the ground for the island's economic success. When Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, Dr Goh took charge of building an army from scratch.His contributions to the infrastrucutre of Singapore in the fields of Finance, Defence and Education are well recorded. What is less understood was the man's legendary practical sense. This work avoids reliance on secondary accounts and concentrates strongly on Dr Goh's own words to comprehend his potent and proactive powers of reasoning, and in tne process captures the history of Singapore as well.
247 pages, Kindle Edition
First published August 27, 2010
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About the author
Ooi Kee Beng
29 books1 followerDr Ooi Kee Beng was born and raised in Penang, Malaysia. He is the Deputy Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, editor of the Penang Monthly, and Visiting Associate Professor at the Department of Public and Social Administration at Hong Kong City University. He was also Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at National University of Singapore (2009–11). A prolific writer, his books include the award-winning The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time (2006); In Lieu of Ideology: An Intellectual Biography of Goh Keng Swee (2010); Between UMNO and a Hard Place (2010) and The Eurasian Core and Its Edges: Dialogues with Wang Gungwu on the History of the World (2015).
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September 22, 2025
Ooi's aim with this book was to "understand Dr Goh... through his own words", tracing Goh's "trends of thought" through his writings and situating them in historical context (pp xix-xx). He splits the book into two parts: the first two chapters cover Goh as "The Social Scientist", covering his pre-war writings and when he was in civil service before 1959. The next six chapters cover Goh as "The Nation Builder", covering his writings after he entered politics. In distilling the essence of Goh's thinking, Ooi opines that Goh's basic tendency was "achievement-orientated", aiming towards "economic growth", and in pursuit of that, "national stability and security was imperative, and that required shrewd institutional manipulation of global capitalism and judicious control over macro-economic factors." (pp xxi-xxii).
Goh's first work on economics that Ooi covers is Capitalism Versus Socialism, written in 1938 when Goh was schooling in Raffles College, in the middle of the Great Depression (pp 16-24). Goh analysed capitalism's structure, recognising that market prices guided producers in line with classic theory. However, he noted the severe instability caused by the inherently cyclical nature of capitalism (the trade cycle), which leads to great economic wastage, income inequality, and an "occasional paradox" of "poverty in the midst of plenty". He thus held that capitalism should be "subjected to severe criticism" (p 22). However, socialism was not the solution, as it would "destroy the incentive of profits and social distinction" (p 21). Goh also opined that, for a system with central regulation and planning, "the technical difficulties attending the construction of such a system and the practical difficulties of administration etc., must be immense" (pp 19, 23). This was made worse by the "extreme difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory price system", and by the fact that "any centralization of control [lent] itself to abuse". Goh thus concluded that "the catastrophic trade depressions of Capitalism [were] perhaps preferred to one of Stalin’s occasional ‘purges’", and while capitalism had grave weaknesses, socialism as a remedy was "dangerous" (p 23).
After Goh graduated from Raffles, he wrote The Economic Front from a Malayan Point of View in 1940. In it, Goh set out the observation that a peace-time economy largely follows classical theory, but war conditions "injected a new and critical criterion into the equation, which was that the use of the existing resources of a country must be geared towards “ultimate victory”." He thus opined that such an economy must control its economy for no less than three reasons: 1) Handle the expensive business of supplying the armed forces; 2) Maintain the health of its population; and 3) Prevent the enemy from achieving the above two aims ""as far as possible by means of military action”. Strengthening oneself involves weakening the enemy." (pp 28-29) Goh thus suggested limiting new capital that private industries were allowed to attract to assure government access to savings and keep its cost low (since the government need not compete on costly interest rates). Saving must also be prioritised as consumption increases demand which drives up the prices of essential goods (p 30). Lastly, he advocated for control of foreign trade and currency exchange to curb capital flight (by calling in privately-held gold and foreign exchange resources) and expand import capacity (for the import of raw material for production and war items) while maintaining a favourable balance to trade (p 31). Moving to the other side, he evaluated Nazi Germany's economy as being plagued by shortage of economic resources, which forced it to invade Poland. Goh opined that the Allies had superior economic and financial resources, but ultimately concluded that "wars are won and lost on the battlefields." (pp 32-34) He ends this work on opining on Malaya's contribution to the war effort being "almost wholly economic" as it buttressed the British economy and was the biggest exporter to the United States outside the American Dollar bloc (p 35), and reiterated the need for exchange control, restrictions on imports and exports, control of capital issues, fixing of maximum prices for certain foods and engineering stores (p 38), and encouraging saving and decreasing of expenditure (including 'panic buying') (p 41). Ooi observes that this work showed "how Goh considered Malaya as an economy in its own right" and analysed the war effort and the global economy "in a Malaya-centric manner", rather than viewing Malaya as simply a part of Britain's war economy (p 41).
In 1946, Goh joined the Social Welfare Department and conducted social surveys, including A Social Survey of Singapore (1947) and Urban Incomes & Housing 1953-54 (1956). The surveys gave Goh "intimate knowledge about the urban population and the harsh socio-economic conditions and political uncertainty under which [Singapore's] ethnically diverse society laboured" (p 49). His PhD dissertation was on Techniques of National Income Estimation in Underdeveloped Territories, with Special Reference to Asia and Africa (1956), which neither Ooi nor I summarise for lack of space. Ooi observes, however, that this further showed Goh's understanding that "concepts developed in the West were not always suitable for application in underdeveloped countries" (p 71). In 1957, Goh gave a speech to the Malayan Economic Society titled Entrepreneurship in a Plural Economy, where he encouraged entrepreneur- rather than state-initiated industrialisation (p 75), and he opined that, when it came to the role of the state, "by maintaining economic activity at a higher level than would otherwise be the case, [the state helped] to provide a general climate of prosperity which would add to the confidence of private investors". The state also had to care for the "general climate of opinion" and "the psychological atmosphere under which private investment plans [were] made", extending the Keynesian idea of animal spirits beyond economic factors (p 77)
Goh joined politics in 1959. In 1963, Goh gave a series of radio talks titled Some Problems of Industrialisation in Singapore, where he talked about the need to recruit able people from overseas into the Economic Development Board and study which industries would be best for Singapore, import-substitution industrialisation (with import duties imposed to help local factories grow), and the controversial issue of labour unions where strikes and wage demands plagued pioneer industries and caused factories to close down, and thus he set up a Commission of Inquiry to analyse and recommend action, and appealed to Singaporean workers to "calculate the effects of whatever action they take on industrial growth" and realise that their "real employer" was "the overseas customer" (pp 101-104).
Upon Singapore's separation from Malaysia, Goh took up the Defence portfolio, and in his speeches, he regularly used his wide knowledge of military history to frame his positions. In Creating an Officer Corp (1966), Goh observed that post-Meiji Japan militarised society to create an army with fighting spirit, the British relied on "aristocratic tradition and the sense of historic mission", while the Americans repeated a "code of honour". However, Singapore was too different from these societies, and thus it needed to come up with other means of military and civil motivation. But he admitted that he did not know what that way was, and urged the newly minted officers to strike out this novel path (pp 130-131). In Hard and Soft Armies (1966), Goh divided armies into "hard" and "soft", with Sparta being a perfect case of the former and the latter including armies found in Medieval Europe and China's Spring and Autumn Era. He observed that the Spartans, while unmatched in close combat, "left its generals with no sense of strategy." (p 132) Even after he eventually left the Ministry of Defence, Goh continued to opine on defence, citing Adam Smith that "the duty of a government [was] “to prevent the growth of cowardice”" (in 1976) (pp 141-143), and arguing that a strong military required “a high regard for physical courage and daring, for ability to endure hardship, for loyalty and patriotism”, and discipline and morale when it came to work (in 1973) (p 143). In that same 1973 speech, Goh also observed that "good generals were “voracious readers” who sought “thorough-going professionalism”, and who were “proficient in methods of doctrine and alert to innovations and methodology”." (p 144) I don't think there is much to trace in Goh's thought in this area of defence, save to say that defence remained a foremost consideration of Goh's throughout his political career.
In 1967, after two years in the Ministry of Defence, Goh returned to his Finance portfolio and gave his budgetary speech titled Two Years of Economic Progress. In it, Goh observed that the rate of growth was insufficient, and he suggested developing the tourism sector (though industrial growth remained his "principal weapon" (p 110)). He also shifted his strategy for economic growth from import substitution to export orientation, and opined that the British withdrawal brought a new urgency to Singapore's development and "required the government to involve itself even more in direct investments, infrastructure creation, and building training institutes." (p 111) In 1968, Goh gave a talk on radio and television titled The Crucial Years where he forecasted that additional public expenditure and induced private investment would be required to counteract the reduction in British spending. As such, he urged trade union leaders to assist in maintaining industrial peace and stability while assisting in implementing programmes aimed at increasing productivity, argued that Singapore had not taken full advantage of tourists or shipping potential, announced the founding of a Development Bank, and the creation of Jurong Town Council to manage industrial estates (pp 148-151). Goh's measures proved sound, and Ooi quipped, "On hindsight, it is impossible not to be struck by how the crisis precipitated by the British withdrawal generated solutions that define Singapore to this day." (p 152)
In a conference speech in 1972 titled Outlook for Singapore, Goh identified four reasons why Singapore survived and prospered: 1) Central geographic location and natural harbour; 2) Slim administration that favoured free trade; 3) Efficiency in administration that kept business costs low; and 4) Sustained economic growth where all parties gained (p 121). In 1975, Goh delivered a lecture titled Some Unsolved Problems of Economic Growth. In it, he argued that "modern growth" economists were unable to explain current problems as they "assumed a continuing state of full employment", and thus they are unable to account for inflationary recession (p 124). This led to wrong policies for developing economies, which combined with accelerated population growth rates, cornered these countries via the Malthusian Trap (where population growth exceeds increase in food supply and income growth, causing savings and income to fall) and/or the Ricardian Bind (where a rise in income pushes food prices up, leading to increased cost of labour, reduced profits, and eventually stopping economic expansion) (p 126). In summary, Goh observed that "growth must kick off at such a rate that the economy shot away from the stagnating effects of traditional socio-economic conditions, habits and population patterns, and that a healthy growth rate must be maintained for an extended period. Political will and stability were prerequisites for such a project." (p 127)
In 1991, Goh wrote a paper titled Why a Currency Board?. In it, he narrated the history of Singapore's financial system in the late 1960s and criticised Keynes on two counts: 1) Increased government expenditure financed by central bank policies (as advocated by Keynes) risked inflation; and 2) Keynes' theory did not consider foreign trade, and increased consumption could lead to increased imports, worsening trade deficits (p 162). In any case, Singapore is too open a trading economy and too small an island country to rely on central bank financing deficits and/or suffer a bad trade deficit. Singapore thus chose to maintain a Currency Board System "which was legally obliged to issue currency only when backed by at least 100% of overseas assets." This would: 1) Maintain a strong SGD, protecting against inflation (especially when almost 2/3 of citizens' expenditure is spent on imported goods); 2) Signal citizens that if they wanted more and better services, they had to pay for it through taxes and fees; and 3) Indicate to academics that "what is fashionable in the West is not necessarily good for Singapore." (p 163) In 1984, Goh spoke in Parliament on the MAS Amendment Bill, his final parliamentary speech before he retired, where he explained Singapore's unique conditions where financial management was concerned. Rather than watch its money supply like western central banks, the MAS had to watch foreign exchange rates by "buying or selling foreign currencies against the Singapore dollar or by swap operations", allowing the Singapore dollar to float within a band set by MAS and the Ministries of Finance and Trade and Industry (pp 169-170) Goh opined that this system worked very well, "guided by Adam Smith's gentle and invisible hand", and "So long as we continue to work diligently and skilfully, so long as we spend carefully, and so long as we don’t lend Singapore dollars to foreigners, it will continue to work beautifully." (p 170)
While Goh spent most of his political career in the fields of economics, finance and defence as outlined above, he also dedicated his energies towards two other areas during his career: the study of human behaviour and education policy. Concerning the former, Goh opined in a speech titled Management in the Developing Society (1963) that "What provided more serious resistance to the creation of modern societies in Asia was the fact that status and position continued to be determined “largely by birth and heredity”." (p 179) In 1970, Goh commented on the emerging hippie culture in America in a speech at the anniversary dinner of the Democratic Socialist Club, opining that "Once they reject established values, once they consider conventional ethical codes as a hypocritical cover for unjust practices, then the door is wide open for uninhibited hedonistic practices of all kinds." (p 182) In 1972, Goh warned against young Singaporeans copying Western fashions and, by extension, Western culture, which Goh saw as lacking "a set of sound basic values" (p 185).
Concerning education policy, Goh argued in 1967 that the focus on good examination scores in Singapore led to neglect of other aspects of education, including creative imagination, character and moral values (pp 202-203). Goh's Report on Education (1978) also led to the creation of streaming to allow each pupil to study at a pace suitable for them, and focused on bilingualism (pp 226-227) In 1982, Goh announced a Moral Education subject in schools, but this was withdrawn five years later as it "accentuated differences in religious practices and beliefs instead of providing common ground for moral behaviour, leading to cases of aggressive proselytization." (p 234)
After his retirement in 1985, apart from remaining deputy Chairman of the MAS until 1992 and GIC until 1994, Goh was made Economic Advisor to China's State Council in 1985 (p 241). In that capacity, Goh advocated for the enlargement for space for enterprise autonomy and reduction of dependence of such enterprises on government departments in 1990 (p 252). He also advocated for price reforms, the dismantling of large and medium-sized enterprises which were effectively welfare states in themselves (the proverbial 'iron rice bowl'), and the establishment of a labour market, free capital market, professional civil service, Federal Constitution, and modern judiciary system in a paper he wrote in 1991 (pp 257-258). With the benefit of hindsight, Ooi notes that Kung and Lin in 2007 argued that the growth of town and village enterprises (whose collective output surpassed state-owned enterprises in 1993) were "a crucial launching pad" for China's gradual marketisation in the 1990s (p 267).
Final thoughts
I think Ooi provides a useful survey of Goh's work and how his thought developed throughout his life, and though most of his work revolved around developing economies, I see no reason why modern Singapore should not continue to hold to some fundamentals he advocated for and established, including the need for a strong political will and stability, prudent public spending, avoidance of trade deficit given the openness of its economy, and pragmatically prioritising the welfare of citizens in the form of economic growth above other goals a state may divert resources towards.
Goh's first work on economics that Ooi covers is Capitalism Versus Socialism, written in 1938 when Goh was schooling in Raffles College, in the middle of the Great Depression (pp 16-24). Goh analysed capitalism's structure, recognising that market prices guided producers in line with classic theory. However, he noted the severe instability caused by the inherently cyclical nature of capitalism (the trade cycle), which leads to great economic wastage, income inequality, and an "occasional paradox" of "poverty in the midst of plenty". He thus held that capitalism should be "subjected to severe criticism" (p 22). However, socialism was not the solution, as it would "destroy the incentive of profits and social distinction" (p 21). Goh also opined that, for a system with central regulation and planning, "the technical difficulties attending the construction of such a system and the practical difficulties of administration etc., must be immense" (pp 19, 23). This was made worse by the "extreme difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory price system", and by the fact that "any centralization of control [lent] itself to abuse". Goh thus concluded that "the catastrophic trade depressions of Capitalism [were] perhaps preferred to one of Stalin’s occasional ‘purges’", and while capitalism had grave weaknesses, socialism as a remedy was "dangerous" (p 23).
After Goh graduated from Raffles, he wrote The Economic Front from a Malayan Point of View in 1940. In it, Goh set out the observation that a peace-time economy largely follows classical theory, but war conditions "injected a new and critical criterion into the equation, which was that the use of the existing resources of a country must be geared towards “ultimate victory”." He thus opined that such an economy must control its economy for no less than three reasons: 1) Handle the expensive business of supplying the armed forces; 2) Maintain the health of its population; and 3) Prevent the enemy from achieving the above two aims ""as far as possible by means of military action”. Strengthening oneself involves weakening the enemy." (pp 28-29) Goh thus suggested limiting new capital that private industries were allowed to attract to assure government access to savings and keep its cost low (since the government need not compete on costly interest rates). Saving must also be prioritised as consumption increases demand which drives up the prices of essential goods (p 30). Lastly, he advocated for control of foreign trade and currency exchange to curb capital flight (by calling in privately-held gold and foreign exchange resources) and expand import capacity (for the import of raw material for production and war items) while maintaining a favourable balance to trade (p 31). Moving to the other side, he evaluated Nazi Germany's economy as being plagued by shortage of economic resources, which forced it to invade Poland. Goh opined that the Allies had superior economic and financial resources, but ultimately concluded that "wars are won and lost on the battlefields." (pp 32-34) He ends this work on opining on Malaya's contribution to the war effort being "almost wholly economic" as it buttressed the British economy and was the biggest exporter to the United States outside the American Dollar bloc (p 35), and reiterated the need for exchange control, restrictions on imports and exports, control of capital issues, fixing of maximum prices for certain foods and engineering stores (p 38), and encouraging saving and decreasing of expenditure (including 'panic buying') (p 41). Ooi observes that this work showed "how Goh considered Malaya as an economy in its own right" and analysed the war effort and the global economy "in a Malaya-centric manner", rather than viewing Malaya as simply a part of Britain's war economy (p 41).
In 1946, Goh joined the Social Welfare Department and conducted social surveys, including A Social Survey of Singapore (1947) and Urban Incomes & Housing 1953-54 (1956). The surveys gave Goh "intimate knowledge about the urban population and the harsh socio-economic conditions and political uncertainty under which [Singapore's] ethnically diverse society laboured" (p 49). His PhD dissertation was on Techniques of National Income Estimation in Underdeveloped Territories, with Special Reference to Asia and Africa (1956), which neither Ooi nor I summarise for lack of space. Ooi observes, however, that this further showed Goh's understanding that "concepts developed in the West were not always suitable for application in underdeveloped countries" (p 71). In 1957, Goh gave a speech to the Malayan Economic Society titled Entrepreneurship in a Plural Economy, where he encouraged entrepreneur- rather than state-initiated industrialisation (p 75), and he opined that, when it came to the role of the state, "by maintaining economic activity at a higher level than would otherwise be the case, [the state helped] to provide a general climate of prosperity which would add to the confidence of private investors". The state also had to care for the "general climate of opinion" and "the psychological atmosphere under which private investment plans [were] made", extending the Keynesian idea of animal spirits beyond economic factors (p 77)
Goh joined politics in 1959. In 1963, Goh gave a series of radio talks titled Some Problems of Industrialisation in Singapore, where he talked about the need to recruit able people from overseas into the Economic Development Board and study which industries would be best for Singapore, import-substitution industrialisation (with import duties imposed to help local factories grow), and the controversial issue of labour unions where strikes and wage demands plagued pioneer industries and caused factories to close down, and thus he set up a Commission of Inquiry to analyse and recommend action, and appealed to Singaporean workers to "calculate the effects of whatever action they take on industrial growth" and realise that their "real employer" was "the overseas customer" (pp 101-104).
Upon Singapore's separation from Malaysia, Goh took up the Defence portfolio, and in his speeches, he regularly used his wide knowledge of military history to frame his positions. In Creating an Officer Corp (1966), Goh observed that post-Meiji Japan militarised society to create an army with fighting spirit, the British relied on "aristocratic tradition and the sense of historic mission", while the Americans repeated a "code of honour". However, Singapore was too different from these societies, and thus it needed to come up with other means of military and civil motivation. But he admitted that he did not know what that way was, and urged the newly minted officers to strike out this novel path (pp 130-131). In Hard and Soft Armies (1966), Goh divided armies into "hard" and "soft", with Sparta being a perfect case of the former and the latter including armies found in Medieval Europe and China's Spring and Autumn Era. He observed that the Spartans, while unmatched in close combat, "left its generals with no sense of strategy." (p 132) Even after he eventually left the Ministry of Defence, Goh continued to opine on defence, citing Adam Smith that "the duty of a government [was] “to prevent the growth of cowardice”" (in 1976) (pp 141-143), and arguing that a strong military required “a high regard for physical courage and daring, for ability to endure hardship, for loyalty and patriotism”, and discipline and morale when it came to work (in 1973) (p 143). In that same 1973 speech, Goh also observed that "good generals were “voracious readers” who sought “thorough-going professionalism”, and who were “proficient in methods of doctrine and alert to innovations and methodology”." (p 144) I don't think there is much to trace in Goh's thought in this area of defence, save to say that defence remained a foremost consideration of Goh's throughout his political career.
In 1967, after two years in the Ministry of Defence, Goh returned to his Finance portfolio and gave his budgetary speech titled Two Years of Economic Progress. In it, Goh observed that the rate of growth was insufficient, and he suggested developing the tourism sector (though industrial growth remained his "principal weapon" (p 110)). He also shifted his strategy for economic growth from import substitution to export orientation, and opined that the British withdrawal brought a new urgency to Singapore's development and "required the government to involve itself even more in direct investments, infrastructure creation, and building training institutes." (p 111) In 1968, Goh gave a talk on radio and television titled The Crucial Years where he forecasted that additional public expenditure and induced private investment would be required to counteract the reduction in British spending. As such, he urged trade union leaders to assist in maintaining industrial peace and stability while assisting in implementing programmes aimed at increasing productivity, argued that Singapore had not taken full advantage of tourists or shipping potential, announced the founding of a Development Bank, and the creation of Jurong Town Council to manage industrial estates (pp 148-151). Goh's measures proved sound, and Ooi quipped, "On hindsight, it is impossible not to be struck by how the crisis precipitated by the British withdrawal generated solutions that define Singapore to this day." (p 152)
In a conference speech in 1972 titled Outlook for Singapore, Goh identified four reasons why Singapore survived and prospered: 1) Central geographic location and natural harbour; 2) Slim administration that favoured free trade; 3) Efficiency in administration that kept business costs low; and 4) Sustained economic growth where all parties gained (p 121). In 1975, Goh delivered a lecture titled Some Unsolved Problems of Economic Growth. In it, he argued that "modern growth" economists were unable to explain current problems as they "assumed a continuing state of full employment", and thus they are unable to account for inflationary recession (p 124). This led to wrong policies for developing economies, which combined with accelerated population growth rates, cornered these countries via the Malthusian Trap (where population growth exceeds increase in food supply and income growth, causing savings and income to fall) and/or the Ricardian Bind (where a rise in income pushes food prices up, leading to increased cost of labour, reduced profits, and eventually stopping economic expansion) (p 126). In summary, Goh observed that "growth must kick off at such a rate that the economy shot away from the stagnating effects of traditional socio-economic conditions, habits and population patterns, and that a healthy growth rate must be maintained for an extended period. Political will and stability were prerequisites for such a project." (p 127)
In 1991, Goh wrote a paper titled Why a Currency Board?. In it, he narrated the history of Singapore's financial system in the late 1960s and criticised Keynes on two counts: 1) Increased government expenditure financed by central bank policies (as advocated by Keynes) risked inflation; and 2) Keynes' theory did not consider foreign trade, and increased consumption could lead to increased imports, worsening trade deficits (p 162). In any case, Singapore is too open a trading economy and too small an island country to rely on central bank financing deficits and/or suffer a bad trade deficit. Singapore thus chose to maintain a Currency Board System "which was legally obliged to issue currency only when backed by at least 100% of overseas assets." This would: 1) Maintain a strong SGD, protecting against inflation (especially when almost 2/3 of citizens' expenditure is spent on imported goods); 2) Signal citizens that if they wanted more and better services, they had to pay for it through taxes and fees; and 3) Indicate to academics that "what is fashionable in the West is not necessarily good for Singapore." (p 163) In 1984, Goh spoke in Parliament on the MAS Amendment Bill, his final parliamentary speech before he retired, where he explained Singapore's unique conditions where financial management was concerned. Rather than watch its money supply like western central banks, the MAS had to watch foreign exchange rates by "buying or selling foreign currencies against the Singapore dollar or by swap operations", allowing the Singapore dollar to float within a band set by MAS and the Ministries of Finance and Trade and Industry (pp 169-170) Goh opined that this system worked very well, "guided by Adam Smith's gentle and invisible hand", and "So long as we continue to work diligently and skilfully, so long as we spend carefully, and so long as we don’t lend Singapore dollars to foreigners, it will continue to work beautifully." (p 170)
While Goh spent most of his political career in the fields of economics, finance and defence as outlined above, he also dedicated his energies towards two other areas during his career: the study of human behaviour and education policy. Concerning the former, Goh opined in a speech titled Management in the Developing Society (1963) that "What provided more serious resistance to the creation of modern societies in Asia was the fact that status and position continued to be determined “largely by birth and heredity”." (p 179) In 1970, Goh commented on the emerging hippie culture in America in a speech at the anniversary dinner of the Democratic Socialist Club, opining that "Once they reject established values, once they consider conventional ethical codes as a hypocritical cover for unjust practices, then the door is wide open for uninhibited hedonistic practices of all kinds." (p 182) In 1972, Goh warned against young Singaporeans copying Western fashions and, by extension, Western culture, which Goh saw as lacking "a set of sound basic values" (p 185).
Concerning education policy, Goh argued in 1967 that the focus on good examination scores in Singapore led to neglect of other aspects of education, including creative imagination, character and moral values (pp 202-203). Goh's Report on Education (1978) also led to the creation of streaming to allow each pupil to study at a pace suitable for them, and focused on bilingualism (pp 226-227) In 1982, Goh announced a Moral Education subject in schools, but this was withdrawn five years later as it "accentuated differences in religious practices and beliefs instead of providing common ground for moral behaviour, leading to cases of aggressive proselytization." (p 234)
After his retirement in 1985, apart from remaining deputy Chairman of the MAS until 1992 and GIC until 1994, Goh was made Economic Advisor to China's State Council in 1985 (p 241). In that capacity, Goh advocated for the enlargement for space for enterprise autonomy and reduction of dependence of such enterprises on government departments in 1990 (p 252). He also advocated for price reforms, the dismantling of large and medium-sized enterprises which were effectively welfare states in themselves (the proverbial 'iron rice bowl'), and the establishment of a labour market, free capital market, professional civil service, Federal Constitution, and modern judiciary system in a paper he wrote in 1991 (pp 257-258). With the benefit of hindsight, Ooi notes that Kung and Lin in 2007 argued that the growth of town and village enterprises (whose collective output surpassed state-owned enterprises in 1993) were "a crucial launching pad" for China's gradual marketisation in the 1990s (p 267).
Final thoughts
I think Ooi provides a useful survey of Goh's work and how his thought developed throughout his life, and though most of his work revolved around developing economies, I see no reason why modern Singapore should not continue to hold to some fundamentals he advocated for and established, including the need for a strong political will and stability, prudent public spending, avoidance of trade deficit given the openness of its economy, and pragmatically prioritising the welfare of citizens in the form of economic growth above other goals a state may divert resources towards.
November 26, 2025
**on Human Element**
Dr. Goh Keng Swee: The social values which [motivated] the people of modern societies. These included “Respect of the law and order as the basis of social discipline”; “awareness of rights and obligations”; “attitudes towards work, willingness to endure the disciplines of the wage system, eagerness for advancement in education, and, at a higher level, insatiable intellectual curiosity and abounding business enterprise.”
These “intangibles”, he proclaimed, were more basic to economic growht than obviously economic factors like “capital investment, the infrastructure of social overheads and the like”, I believe that most developing countries have been misled by economists as to the importance of economic factors. I will be the last, being by training an economist myself, to deny the importance of economic factors, but the process of development and modernization does not begin and end with economic factors. It is necessary that we should pay due regard to them, but it is not sufficiently merely to do so.
> In short, economic development for non-advaned countries required a social revoluition of certain type. First, an educated citizenry was needed. With literacy came an awareness of “the benefits of economic development” as well as a social disciplien that would guide citizens away from “frivolous pursuits” towards “A fuller and more cultured life”. Education had to be functional as well because individuals were endowed differently in any case, “no society could consist entirely of the intelligentsia”.
>
>
> The second important factor for growth was “the opportunity which a society afforded to those with talent, ability and skills to rise to the position for which they were best fitted”. For this to happen, an able leadership was needed, which was free from corruption.
>
> Entrepreneurs are something which the state cannot directly create. Entrepreneurial talent emerges if the conditions in society are appropriate. All the state can and should do is to remove the restrictions on the development of such talent.
>
> Asian countries often failed because governments would not adopt economic growth as their first priority. The deeper effectof this was “its inhibitory effect on enterprise and the growth of an energetic and self-assured managerial class”
>
>
> For a start, political instability in these countries meant that resources were directed towards “non economic objectives” such as building a strong military, which drew money and skulls away from capital formation. Such a situation discouraged foreign and local investments, and what was worse, led to political posturing.
>
> Such political postures are likely to take the form of exaggerated nationalism with its comcomitant anti-foreign and anti-capitalist content. When the economic situation goes from bad to worse, the political gestures become increasingly extreme. At some stage in the debacle, there is a resort to the incantation of magic words as a remedy for all troubles.
>
> Paying bribes might seem a way of speeding things up, but what often happened was that the other side would respond by increasing the number of signatures required. In petty corruption, the spoils were shared “by spreading decision making over large number of officials”. This in itself might not seem serious because the end result was that business transactions gained legitimacy. What was much worse was that monopolies or oligopolies would soon appear since the local market tneded to be limited, and in many cases, a permit was tantamount to a winning lottery ticket.
>
on Education and Knowledge
Summarilly, there were six blessings that distinguished advaned countries from less developed countries: the Western respect for law was based on citizens being “members of an orderly society in which individual libery and property rights were ensured in the administration of justice”; universal franchise made leaders sensitive to public opinion; a long tradition of public service allowed for smooth power transition; a highly competent civil service was maintaned; a high level of education existed, and; corruption was absent in high places. LDCs tended to lack serveral, if not all, these conditions.
**on Economics**
> The encouraging of educational opportunities in science, engineering and technical skills and managerial profiency had to occur alongside the efforts to motivate industrial capital. Waiting for one to enhance the other would not work.
>
> Another statement: Practitioners need to be innovative in grappling with tasks of a third world economy. The book of rules tells you very little abnd precedents borrowed from advanced countries have a nasty habit of coming apart in your hands.
>
> A government is judged not so much by its expressions of good intentions but by its concrete achievements in the way of economic prosperity and public welfare
>
**on The case of China**
> Goh admitted that too much praise had been given to goverment involvment in these cases. Governments merely maintained “a conductive economic environment”; the determining factor was entrepreneurship.
>
> Goh advised Malaysial, Indonesia and Thailand to spend hugely on education at the secondary and teritiary level, and encourage more students to move into the science stream.
>
Dr. Goh Keng Swee: The social values which [motivated] the people of modern societies. These included “Respect of the law and order as the basis of social discipline”; “awareness of rights and obligations”; “attitudes towards work, willingness to endure the disciplines of the wage system, eagerness for advancement in education, and, at a higher level, insatiable intellectual curiosity and abounding business enterprise.”
These “intangibles”, he proclaimed, were more basic to economic growht than obviously economic factors like “capital investment, the infrastructure of social overheads and the like”, I believe that most developing countries have been misled by economists as to the importance of economic factors. I will be the last, being by training an economist myself, to deny the importance of economic factors, but the process of development and modernization does not begin and end with economic factors. It is necessary that we should pay due regard to them, but it is not sufficiently merely to do so.
> In short, economic development for non-advaned countries required a social revoluition of certain type. First, an educated citizenry was needed. With literacy came an awareness of “the benefits of economic development” as well as a social disciplien that would guide citizens away from “frivolous pursuits” towards “A fuller and more cultured life”. Education had to be functional as well because individuals were endowed differently in any case, “no society could consist entirely of the intelligentsia”.
>
>
> The second important factor for growth was “the opportunity which a society afforded to those with talent, ability and skills to rise to the position for which they were best fitted”. For this to happen, an able leadership was needed, which was free from corruption.
>
> Entrepreneurs are something which the state cannot directly create. Entrepreneurial talent emerges if the conditions in society are appropriate. All the state can and should do is to remove the restrictions on the development of such talent.
>
> Asian countries often failed because governments would not adopt economic growth as their first priority. The deeper effectof this was “its inhibitory effect on enterprise and the growth of an energetic and self-assured managerial class”
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> For a start, political instability in these countries meant that resources were directed towards “non economic objectives” such as building a strong military, which drew money and skulls away from capital formation. Such a situation discouraged foreign and local investments, and what was worse, led to political posturing.
>
> Such political postures are likely to take the form of exaggerated nationalism with its comcomitant anti-foreign and anti-capitalist content. When the economic situation goes from bad to worse, the political gestures become increasingly extreme. At some stage in the debacle, there is a resort to the incantation of magic words as a remedy for all troubles.
>
> Paying bribes might seem a way of speeding things up, but what often happened was that the other side would respond by increasing the number of signatures required. In petty corruption, the spoils were shared “by spreading decision making over large number of officials”. This in itself might not seem serious because the end result was that business transactions gained legitimacy. What was much worse was that monopolies or oligopolies would soon appear since the local market tneded to be limited, and in many cases, a permit was tantamount to a winning lottery ticket.
>
on Education and Knowledge
Summarilly, there were six blessings that distinguished advaned countries from less developed countries: the Western respect for law was based on citizens being “members of an orderly society in which individual libery and property rights were ensured in the administration of justice”; universal franchise made leaders sensitive to public opinion; a long tradition of public service allowed for smooth power transition; a highly competent civil service was maintaned; a high level of education existed, and; corruption was absent in high places. LDCs tended to lack serveral, if not all, these conditions.
**on Economics**
> The encouraging of educational opportunities in science, engineering and technical skills and managerial profiency had to occur alongside the efforts to motivate industrial capital. Waiting for one to enhance the other would not work.
>
> Another statement: Practitioners need to be innovative in grappling with tasks of a third world economy. The book of rules tells you very little abnd precedents borrowed from advanced countries have a nasty habit of coming apart in your hands.
>
> A government is judged not so much by its expressions of good intentions but by its concrete achievements in the way of economic prosperity and public welfare
>
**on The case of China**
> Goh admitted that too much praise had been given to goverment involvment in these cases. Governments merely maintained “a conductive economic environment”; the determining factor was entrepreneurship.
>
> Goh advised Malaysial, Indonesia and Thailand to spend hugely on education at the secondary and teritiary level, and encourage more students to move into the science stream.
>
January 4, 2015
An interesting approach in writing this book - instead of speaking to the person one is writing about or speaking his close friends and associates, the author took the approach to analyse significant writings of late Dr Goh instead. And, it seems that Dr Goh was amazingly consistent and held deep convictions, some of which lasted through his whole life.
A relatively short book. Easy read.
A relatively short book. Easy read.
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