When studying warfare, it is very easy to become fixated with either the technology of combat (how many more books do we really need about the comparative armour protection of tanks, the range of anti-tank missiles, or the muzzle velocity of handguns??) or the practice of generalship (both issues of grand strategy and 'leadership habits' of the great commanders). This can often come at the expense of a recognition that warfare does ultimately come down to the action of individual soldiers, using their tactical weapons. This is the subject of this book by 'Leo Murray', the pseudonym of a British military psychologist.
The book takes the form of a narrative, describing Leo's experience as he grappled with various issues about combat in which the 'system' had only passing interest, yet which seemed to him of central importance. On his journey, he encounters various others searching in similar territory, some with the same perspective as him, others with different views. Given the sensitivity of the topic, most of these individuals are identified only by nicknames - Tank Colonel, Austrian General, and Gobby Scouser. This approach is both engaging, in that it gives a sense of progression to the story and of the reader learning something hidden, and yet also frustrating, as the key points within the book about combat psychology are never set out especially clearly. There is a contrast with Jim Storr's excellent 'Human Face of War', which does home in on the evidence and data behind the concepts he discusses.
That said, Murray's argument is both relatively simple and convincing. In essence, he notes that there tends to be a huge gulf between the performance of units in theory (or on exercise) and that in actual combat, and that the latter may vary wildly for the same unit between one day and the next. To explain this, he draws on a range of psychological factors, such as people's natural aversion to killing, the impact of fear on behaviour (which he defines as 'flee, freeze, fuss, or fight'), the effect of unit cohesion and officer compulsion, the contribution of efficacy (the sense of the comparative effectiveness of my pea-shooter against your flamethrower), physical proximity to the enemy, and the sheer ability of soldiers to think quickly when under huge pressure. Together, these various factors provide a means by which to understand why soldiers fight - or not.
Murray's book must be rated as one of the most important works on combat to have appeared in recent years, and should be required reading of everyone interested in the reality of combat. That said, it provokes as many questions as it answers and there is significant scope for a more analytical study to explore these issues in more detail.