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Plato's Dialogues #8
Alcibiade
Édition de : Jean-François Pradeau
Traduction (Grec ancien) : Chantal Marboeuf, Jean-François Pradeau
Comment se connaître soi-même ? La discussion menée dans l’Alcibiade rencontre rapidement cette question, alors qu’elle s’interroge sur les conditions psychologiques du gouvernement de soi et du gouvernement de la cité, ou encore de l’éthique et de la politique. À la recherche d’une définition de ce qu’est l’homme guidé par la quête de l’excellence, Alcibiade et Socrate conclueront que l’âme, dans ce qu’elle a de meilleur, c’est-à-dire l’intellect, doit être l’objet de tous nos soins.
Considéré pendant des siècles comme une introduction à l’ensemble de la philosophie platonicienne, l’Alcibiade est aujourd’hui un carrefour d’interprétations du platonisme. Le lecteur trouvera ici les éléments du dossier qui ont amené à soupçonner l’authenticité du dialogue, et de bonnes raisons d’en recommencer plus que jamais la lecture aujourd’hui.
Traduction (Grec ancien) : Chantal Marboeuf, Jean-François Pradeau
Comment se connaître soi-même ? La discussion menée dans l’Alcibiade rencontre rapidement cette question, alors qu’elle s’interroge sur les conditions psychologiques du gouvernement de soi et du gouvernement de la cité, ou encore de l’éthique et de la politique. À la recherche d’une définition de ce qu’est l’homme guidé par la quête de l’excellence, Alcibiade et Socrate conclueront que l’âme, dans ce qu’elle a de meilleur, c’est-à-dire l’intellect, doit être l’objet de tous nos soins.
Considéré pendant des siècles comme une introduction à l’ensemble de la philosophie platonicienne, l’Alcibiade est aujourd’hui un carrefour d’interprétations du platonisme. Le lecteur trouvera ici les éléments du dossier qui ont amené à soupçonner l’authenticité du dialogue, et de bonnes raisons d’en recommencer plus que jamais la lecture aujourd’hui.
256 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 301
32 people are currently reading
641 people want to read
About the author
Plato
5,203 books8,603 followersPlato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 70 reviews
March 4, 2017
La filosofía no es lo mío. Pero hay que cumplir con las obligaciones académicas
December 30, 2021
The author of this text is almost certainly not Plato, but they definitely were someone close enough/well-read in his writings that Platonic philosophy comes through here.
What starts off as a mocking narrative becomes a routine philosophical examination from Dr. Socrates, where he diagnoses misunderstanding justice, inheriting bad knowledge from the crowd, and imminent humiliation. The treatment: good chats about philosophy and a bit of cuddly time (not bodily, of course!).
What starts off as a mocking narrative becomes a routine philosophical examination from Dr. Socrates, where he diagnoses misunderstanding justice, inheriting bad knowledge from the crowd, and imminent humiliation. The treatment: good chats about philosophy and a bit of cuddly time (not bodily, of course!).
April 19, 2022
4.5
I liked it. At moments really intense and even though I know there are debates whether Plato wrote this, I still like the pace of the dialogue and some of the interesting points and conclusions that could be drawn from this work.
I liked it. At moments really intense and even though I know there are debates whether Plato wrote this, I still like the pace of the dialogue and some of the interesting points and conclusions that could be drawn from this work.
June 21, 2021
Atgaiva, kai filosofijoje nėra ignoruojama meilė (kad ir kaip daugelis norėtų užrietę nosis vaidinti, jog tai nėra esminis gyvenimo komponentas). 'Isn't everything we do in life a way to be loved a little more?'; meilė tarp Sokrato ir Alkibijado yra pagrindinė vara visame dialoge "Alkibijadas" dėstomų tiesų apie politiką ir filosofiją. Viliaus Bartninko vertimas yra puikus, kadangi holisitiškai apima ir gyvą kalbėjimą, ir perteikia filosofinę teoriją. Pasidaro aišku, dėl ko seniau šis dialogas tarnavo kaip įvadas į filosofiją -- kalba paprasta, tačiau pristato pagrindines Vakarų filosofijos tezes ir vaizdinius.
January 30, 2021
We get the term “Platonic love” from this dialogue, where Socrates lovingly teaches the young Alcibiades what is needed to be a great politician. Socrates shows Alcibiades his ignorance and champions the importance of self-knowledge: “Don’t you realize that the errors in our conduct are caused by this kind of ignorance, of thinking that we know when we don’t know?” (574). Therefore, Socrates urges Alcibiades to cultivate his soul, growing in self-knowledge and virtue which bring forth justice and self-control, for these are the most important qualities in a politician.
January 13, 2016
A helpful introduction to the dialogues of Plato. Constructs a helpful framework to understanding Plato's philosophy, but more importantly guides you toward the life and practice of philosophy. There is much here to glean.
December 12, 2021
În acest volum, urmărim dialogul lui Alcibiade cu Platon. Un dialog filozofic, despre realitatea vremii, natura umană, visele și aspirațiile celor implicați. Nu este o lectură rapidă, dar oferă o viziune despre literatura antică.
August 26, 2021
It’s one of Plato’s disputed works and for me the first half or so didn’t feel like any of the previous dialogues I’ve read, but as it moved along it started to resemble them more closely. I’m clearly no scholar on Plato but I did enjoy reading this overall and it makes a lot of sense why this was for a long time the main introduction for students to Platonic thought. I’d probably recommend it too as among the first few to be read by newcomers to the corpus of Western Philoosphy.
January 9, 2023
The authorship is questioned but it’s not unanimous that it’s spurious. The ancients considered this entry level wisdom and seemed to start with the Alcibiades and it’s clear why. Good entry level text on Knowing Yourself and seeking wisdom through philosophy.
August 23, 2025
Not a particular favorite.
Dramatically not exciting but follows a straight line; a lot of arguments are not convincing but the eye analogy is fascinating. Bears interesting aspects in the light of Athenian politics.
Dramatically not exciting but follows a straight line; a lot of arguments are not convincing but the eye analogy is fascinating. Bears interesting aspects in the light of Athenian politics.
September 28, 2022
Boi what the hell
December 16, 2025
Es y no es?
Es muy socrático/platónico pero, no se siente que fuese escrito por el autor que escribió la gran mayoría de los otros diálogos. Punto aparte, me gustó.
Es muy socrático/platónico pero, no se siente que fuese escrito por el autor que escribió la gran mayoría de los otros diálogos. Punto aparte, me gustó.
February 11, 2021
Introduciéndonos a Platón... no pensé que ño disfrutara tanto
July 9, 2016
The whole text is in dialogues. Alcibiades wants to advise a council on justice and war, and Socrates tells Alcibiades that because he has no learning of justice and war he shouldn't be advising people on such matters. This dialogue analyses the flawed logic of Alcibiades while Socrates tries to make him see reason. It is quite entertaining. Read some of the dialogue yourself below:
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear.
SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.
SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?
ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.
...
SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.
SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?
ALCIBIADES: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear.
SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.
SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?
ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.
...
SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.
SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?
ALCIBIADES: No, indeed.
SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 22, 2020
Alcibíades é um interlocutor mais ativo e interessante que o de outros diálogos. No geral, o tom mais direto e explícito (referências óbvias ao futuro de Alcibíades, ao Banquete e à República), e o final com ar de novela me fazem suspeitar de fato que este não seja um diálogo autêntico de Platão. Se produzido no ambiente da Academia, atesta a importância de Eros e a mecânica do seu funcionamento no relacionamento filosófico entre mestre e discípulo (reciprocidade, inversão de papeis, identificação da falta e do verdadeiro objeto do desejo etc.).
Me divertiu bastante (lembremos que diálogos são uma séria brincadeira).
Me divertiu bastante (lembremos que diálogos são uma séria brincadeira).
May 19, 2011
I still have trouble believing that this was written by Plato. When compared to the Symposium, these two books give two very different and interesting views of Alcibiades' character. If you lived in Ancient Greece and desired to become a philosopher, this would be one of the first texts your teacher would give you. In that sense, the book is kind of awesome.
March 5, 2017
Unul dintre cele mai bune dialoguri. Bogat în implicații, foarte cursiv, o lecție de maieutica. Ar tb sa fie citit de oricine, sa facă parte din educația de baza a oamenilor, dar mai ales a celor politici.
July 1, 2020
A Memorandum to Our Dear Leader:
Socrates: "In a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow sailors?"
Alcibiades: "Yes; I see that they will all perish."
Socrates: "In a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow sailors?"
Alcibiades: "Yes; I see that they will all perish."
October 13, 2015
WTH? hhahaha me dio ojos en la espalda.
November 24, 2021
Editor John Cooper's Plato edition inexplicably omits two key passages about God and vision and places them in the notes because they are "neoplatonist".
Terrible editing! Quit meddling with the text! Leave them in and give your baseless dumb opinion in the footnotes.
Also, please ignore the retarded editorial introduction worrying about whether Plato wrote this or not. There's a reason why centuries of platonists started with this short dialog, and it's not because they listened to editor's opinons. Jump straight in.
(Their comparison to Aristotle's Magna Moralis, however, is a valuable tip for further reading.)
Sooo... on the surface this dialog is a kind of a gay seduction-slash-romance between a daddy (Socrates) and a twink (Alcibiades), which, thankfully, quickly goes off script.
It is a little cringe in places, like at the end when Socrates pretends he's not dominating Alcibiades by saying it's really God being the bossy jerk. Socrates is kind of a shitty person in Plato, which is why I prefer Xenophon's version of Socrates as it feels more historical.
But mostly we must overlook the weird gay BDSM age-kink subtext and see it as good philosophy and great moral instruction. If possible.
Socrates starts with what I call Plato's Razor: if you can't spot a time when you were ignorant, nor identify who helped you gain knowledge, of a subject, then you don't have real knowledge of that topic.
And then Plato's Close Shave: if your mind is wavering about a subject, or if so-called experts disagree about a subject, then they have bad teachers and poor knowledge of the subject. (Because accurate and expert knowledge agrees.)
I couldn't help but think of macroeconomics, virology, sociology, and many other sciences in which disagreement shouts out agreement, and wish someone would give those fake experts a close Platonic shave.
Plato makes a number of strong equivalences in this dialog which are questionable.
Just = advantageous = admirable = unwavering = knowledge... THEREFORE evil is thinking you know when you don't know. Evil is stupidity and the disgrace of acting on false knowledge.
The rest of the dialog is Socrates shoehorning poor Alcibiades into his curriculum thus: understanding = self-knowledge = soul = wisdom/virtue.
The sequel Alcibiades II concerns the nature of wisdom.
Socrates admits that the arguments are makeshift and threadbare in this dialog, when he says the argument for the soul as the true self is basic. It's just an introduction. So we need to give Plato a break and enjoy the overture to the Platonic corpus.
Bernard Suzanne recommends this book as the opener for Plato's great initiatory work, The Philosopher.
I HIGHLY recommend IGNORING the academics, who seem compelled to do everything in their power to make Plato tedious, impractical, and useless to common readers. If they don't love wisdom then consign them to the flames.
Terrible editing! Quit meddling with the text! Leave them in and give your baseless dumb opinion in the footnotes.
Also, please ignore the retarded editorial introduction worrying about whether Plato wrote this or not. There's a reason why centuries of platonists started with this short dialog, and it's not because they listened to editor's opinons. Jump straight in.
(Their comparison to Aristotle's Magna Moralis, however, is a valuable tip for further reading.)
Sooo... on the surface this dialog is a kind of a gay seduction-slash-romance between a daddy (Socrates) and a twink (Alcibiades), which, thankfully, quickly goes off script.
It is a little cringe in places, like at the end when Socrates pretends he's not dominating Alcibiades by saying it's really God being the bossy jerk. Socrates is kind of a shitty person in Plato, which is why I prefer Xenophon's version of Socrates as it feels more historical.
But mostly we must overlook the weird gay BDSM age-kink subtext and see it as good philosophy and great moral instruction. If possible.
Socrates starts with what I call Plato's Razor: if you can't spot a time when you were ignorant, nor identify who helped you gain knowledge, of a subject, then you don't have real knowledge of that topic.
And then Plato's Close Shave: if your mind is wavering about a subject, or if so-called experts disagree about a subject, then they have bad teachers and poor knowledge of the subject. (Because accurate and expert knowledge agrees.)
I couldn't help but think of macroeconomics, virology, sociology, and many other sciences in which disagreement shouts out agreement, and wish someone would give those fake experts a close Platonic shave.
Plato makes a number of strong equivalences in this dialog which are questionable.
Just = advantageous = admirable = unwavering = knowledge... THEREFORE evil is thinking you know when you don't know. Evil is stupidity and the disgrace of acting on false knowledge.
The rest of the dialog is Socrates shoehorning poor Alcibiades into his curriculum thus: understanding = self-knowledge = soul = wisdom/virtue.
The sequel Alcibiades II concerns the nature of wisdom.
Socrates admits that the arguments are makeshift and threadbare in this dialog, when he says the argument for the soul as the true self is basic. It's just an introduction. So we need to give Plato a break and enjoy the overture to the Platonic corpus.
Bernard Suzanne recommends this book as the opener for Plato's great initiatory work, The Philosopher.
I HIGHLY recommend IGNORING the academics, who seem compelled to do everything in their power to make Plato tedious, impractical, and useless to common readers. If they don't love wisdom then consign them to the flames.
October 4, 2024
The most striking thing about this text is the concept of love it provides. Socrates makes a distinction between what "belongs" to parts of the body and what that thing is (that is to say, we have a "skill" that helps cultivate the body and clothes which 'belong' to the body); he doesn't really consider that these things also help the body (e.g., clothes warm us up). He makes another distinction: things which are used are not used by themselves. A hammer isn't used by itself; a person uses it. Hence, the soul uses the body and is separate from it and to cultivate the soul we must not cultivate things which belong to it--primarily, the body, the things to do with the body--but the soul itself. He does a non-sequitur and ascribes control to the soul--that is to say, the soul rules the body--and suggests that it is self-control which must be practiced to understand true self-cultivation.
Socrates, when discussing politics, suggests to us that we must think of knowledge as an acquisition--that we do not know which we do not know, that we think we know what we do not know. When Alcibiades wavers around the concept of justice, he thinks he knows but clearly does not; that is what he means. So his epistemic thought process isn't just that we need virtue to be good politicians, because we cannot impart that which we do not have, but rather that we need to 'know' virtue--that is to say, we need to know ourselves and go thence to virtue--just in the same way we are meant to know what the soul is and how we cultivate it. The point is precisely that to make a sure and sound judgment, we cannot wing it and go on our own affections; we must be sure of ourselves and free ourselves from delusions.
Where Socrates seems to go wrong is, first, that we cannot be too sure that the soul rules the body; it could very well be the case that the soul uses the body, but to "rule" is to ascribe a ton more power to it. Is it not possible for a machine which one uses to harm us? Or backflow?
Some of his arguments are also less verbose than needed. His argument about courage, for example, is something odd. We see that it is admirable to save our friends in battle, even if we all die, because it is a courageous thing to do; we are contrasting this with those who did not go to save our friends, but abandoned and saved their lives. What Socrates tries to claim is that the act of saving our friends is courageous, and since courage is good, doing this must also be good; that whatever is 'bad' about it is also bad, but it doesn't remove that which is good. Yet isn't it true that the people who lived are more likely than not going to be able to be more courageous in the future, to better results? They don't die; they can act in more events, in any case. So, isn't it true that the best action is not to be courageous, but rather to abandon--and is it admirable to do something foolish?
Socrates, when discussing politics, suggests to us that we must think of knowledge as an acquisition--that we do not know which we do not know, that we think we know what we do not know. When Alcibiades wavers around the concept of justice, he thinks he knows but clearly does not; that is what he means. So his epistemic thought process isn't just that we need virtue to be good politicians, because we cannot impart that which we do not have, but rather that we need to 'know' virtue--that is to say, we need to know ourselves and go thence to virtue--just in the same way we are meant to know what the soul is and how we cultivate it. The point is precisely that to make a sure and sound judgment, we cannot wing it and go on our own affections; we must be sure of ourselves and free ourselves from delusions.
Where Socrates seems to go wrong is, first, that we cannot be too sure that the soul rules the body; it could very well be the case that the soul uses the body, but to "rule" is to ascribe a ton more power to it. Is it not possible for a machine which one uses to harm us? Or backflow?
Some of his arguments are also less verbose than needed. His argument about courage, for example, is something odd. We see that it is admirable to save our friends in battle, even if we all die, because it is a courageous thing to do; we are contrasting this with those who did not go to save our friends, but abandoned and saved their lives. What Socrates tries to claim is that the act of saving our friends is courageous, and since courage is good, doing this must also be good; that whatever is 'bad' about it is also bad, but it doesn't remove that which is good. Yet isn't it true that the people who lived are more likely than not going to be able to be more courageous in the future, to better results? They don't die; they can act in more events, in any case. So, isn't it true that the best action is not to be courageous, but rather to abandon--and is it admirable to do something foolish?
March 16, 2023
The ancients believed that this dialogue should serve as one's introduction to Plato. Indeed, by its simple narrative structure, broad array of Platonic themes, and brisk pace, it is an excellent starting place for anyone wishing to get a handle on Plato. The premise is that Socrates is questioning Alcibiades now that he is 'of age' and about to influence other Athenians as a general and statesman. Socrates tells him that he's been waiting to introduce him to the life of virtue through his questioning, as Alcibiades has been too vain and fickle (as well as too handsome and popular) to understand anything from Socrates before this stage of his life. But now he is a bit older and is stepping into the public sphere. Now Socrates must initiate him into the life of virtue, leading him to recognize how crucial it is to know oneself, to educate one's soul in goodness.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, some skeptical Germans dismissed it as being "inauthentic," but that need not trouble the reader today. Now many Plato scholars believe that, if it's not an authentic dialogue, it at leasts accurately represents Plato's school during and just after his life. It's familiar-style dialogue between Socrates and his beloved Alcibiades; by the end they uncover that virtue is the highest good of a ruler, that the soul is the essence of a man while his body belongs to him, and that no one unjust or bad may rule over a city without harming its inhabitants. To "know thyself" is to cultivate virtue and goodness through intentional training, such as attaching oneself to Socrates. To understand virtue is to behold its shape in other people's souls, or to look to the great God Himself, and to model one's life accordingly.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, some skeptical Germans dismissed it as being "inauthentic," but that need not trouble the reader today. Now many Plato scholars believe that, if it's not an authentic dialogue, it at leasts accurately represents Plato's school during and just after his life. It's familiar-style dialogue between Socrates and his beloved Alcibiades; by the end they uncover that virtue is the highest good of a ruler, that the soul is the essence of a man while his body belongs to him, and that no one unjust or bad may rule over a city without harming its inhabitants. To "know thyself" is to cultivate virtue and goodness through intentional training, such as attaching oneself to Socrates. To understand virtue is to behold its shape in other people's souls, or to look to the great God Himself, and to model one's life accordingly.
January 24, 2025
Court dialogue sur la connaissance et ce que l'on croit savoir. J'en retiens un passage :
"SOCRATE
Et si tu naviguais sur un bateau, aurais-tu une opinion sur la manière de diriger le gouvernail en dehors ou en dedans, et, faute de le savoir, [117d]
t’égarerais-tu ou bien t’en remettrais-tu en toute tranquillité au pilote ?
ALCIBIADE
Je m’en remettrais au pilote.
SOCRATE
Donc, au sujet de ce que tu ne sais pas, tu ne t’égares pas si tu sais que tu ne sais pas.
ALCIBIADE
Non, sans doute.
SOCRATE
Remarques-tu donc que les erreurs dans l’action sont causées par cette ignorance qui est de croire savoir ce que l’on ne sait pas ?
ALCIBIADE
Que dis-tu là ?
SOCRATE
Nous entreprenons une action lorsque nous croyons savoir ce que nous faisons ?
ALCIBIADE
Oui.
SOCRATE
Lorsque l’on ne croit pas [117e] savoir, on s’en remet à d’autres ?
ALCIBIADE
Pourquoi en ferait-on autrement ?
SOCRATE
De même, de tels ignorants sont sauvés parce qu’ils s’en remettent à d’autres pour ce qu’ils ignorent ?
ALCIBIADE
Oui.
SOCRATE
Qui sont donc les ignorants ? Certes pas ceux qui savent.
ALCIBIADE
Assurément pas.
SOCRATE
Puisque ce ne sont ni ceux qui savent, ni ceux des ignorants qui savent qu’ils ne savent pas, que reste-t-il d’autre [118a] sinon ceux qui croient
savoir ce qu’ils ne savent pas ?"
"SOCRATE
Et si tu naviguais sur un bateau, aurais-tu une opinion sur la manière de diriger le gouvernail en dehors ou en dedans, et, faute de le savoir, [117d]
t’égarerais-tu ou bien t’en remettrais-tu en toute tranquillité au pilote ?
ALCIBIADE
Je m’en remettrais au pilote.
SOCRATE
Donc, au sujet de ce que tu ne sais pas, tu ne t’égares pas si tu sais que tu ne sais pas.
ALCIBIADE
Non, sans doute.
SOCRATE
Remarques-tu donc que les erreurs dans l’action sont causées par cette ignorance qui est de croire savoir ce que l’on ne sait pas ?
ALCIBIADE
Que dis-tu là ?
SOCRATE
Nous entreprenons une action lorsque nous croyons savoir ce que nous faisons ?
ALCIBIADE
Oui.
SOCRATE
Lorsque l’on ne croit pas [117e] savoir, on s’en remet à d’autres ?
ALCIBIADE
Pourquoi en ferait-on autrement ?
SOCRATE
De même, de tels ignorants sont sauvés parce qu’ils s’en remettent à d’autres pour ce qu’ils ignorent ?
ALCIBIADE
Oui.
SOCRATE
Qui sont donc les ignorants ? Certes pas ceux qui savent.
ALCIBIADE
Assurément pas.
SOCRATE
Puisque ce ne sont ni ceux qui savent, ni ceux des ignorants qui savent qu’ils ne savent pas, que reste-t-il d’autre [118a] sinon ceux qui croient
savoir ce qu’ils ne savent pas ?"
November 3, 2024
Je crois que c'est la première fois qu'une œuvre de Platon me plaît autant. J'y ai vu un peu de poésie, même si ce n'est pas le but recherché, notamment dans cette citation : "Celui qui t'aime est celui qui aime ton âme." Oui, c'est vrai. Le désir sexuel est important, mais au final, ce qui fait que des mariages de plus de cinquantes années subsistent encore, c'est l'amour qui lie ces âmes. Ça me rappelle le magnifique poème de Rosemonde Rostand.
Malgré ça, on retrouve certaines habitudes chez le personnages de Socrate, et la manière dont les dialogues platoniciens sont construits, qui m'irrite. D'abord la tendance a admirer Socrate et a toujours être d'accord avec ce qu'il dit, alors que personnellement certaines de ses conclusions me semblent plutôt hâtives et tendre vers le sophisme. C'est d'ailleurs cette manipulation, qui, même si elle sert des fins bienveillantes, n'en reste pas moins une méthode questionnable (on parle franglais ici) et qui me paraît moins honnête que celle des autres philosophes. Car, le fait qu'Alcibiade approuve les paroles de Socrate nous fait moins les questionner.
Malgré ça, on retrouve certaines habitudes chez le personnages de Socrate, et la manière dont les dialogues platoniciens sont construits, qui m'irrite. D'abord la tendance a admirer Socrate et a toujours être d'accord avec ce qu'il dit, alors que personnellement certaines de ses conclusions me semblent plutôt hâtives et tendre vers le sophisme. C'est d'ailleurs cette manipulation, qui, même si elle sert des fins bienveillantes, n'en reste pas moins une méthode questionnable (on parle franglais ici) et qui me paraît moins honnête que celle des autres philosophes. Car, le fait qu'Alcibiade approuve les paroles de Socrate nous fait moins les questionner.
December 4, 2024
Audiobook I listened two contained four dialogues, most likely attributable to Plato or one of his students: Alcibiades, Greater and Lesser Hippias, and Menexenus.
Alcibiades: is justice learned or is justice known? According to Plato’s reasoning, justice cannot be taught, since it is something already written on our hearts.
Greater Hippias: what is beauty? Are things beautiful because they appear beautiful or because they conform to an independent standard of beauty? Gold is beautiful. A golden ring in a pig’s snout is not beautiful. But nevertheless, gold is beautiful. Things are beautiful when they are appropriate, useful, favorable, and delightful.
Lesser Hippias: is Achilles the better man because he only lies by accident, or is Odysseus the better man because he lies intentionally? Certainly Odysseus has more skill at lying, but does that make him better than Achilles on that regard? (No)
Menexenus: this one didn’t even feel like Plato, since he was just conveying a speech made by Aspasia, the consort of Pericles about the course of the Peloponnesian War. Interesting, would be curious to know how it matches up to history.
Alcibiades: is justice learned or is justice known? According to Plato’s reasoning, justice cannot be taught, since it is something already written on our hearts.
Greater Hippias: what is beauty? Are things beautiful because they appear beautiful or because they conform to an independent standard of beauty? Gold is beautiful. A golden ring in a pig’s snout is not beautiful. But nevertheless, gold is beautiful. Things are beautiful when they are appropriate, useful, favorable, and delightful.
Lesser Hippias: is Achilles the better man because he only lies by accident, or is Odysseus the better man because he lies intentionally? Certainly Odysseus has more skill at lying, but does that make him better than Achilles on that regard? (No)
Menexenus: this one didn’t even feel like Plato, since he was just conveying a speech made by Aspasia, the consort of Pericles about the course of the Peloponnesian War. Interesting, would be curious to know how it matches up to history.
Read
May 21, 2020SOCRATES: “...You are wedded to stupidity, my good fellow, stupidity in the highest degree—our discussion and your own words convict you of it” (118b).
Words we all need to hear at some point.
I reached this point in the dialogue about 4 raspberry white claws deep (drink of choice for hellenistic philosophy) and it struck me personally.
This review already deleted itself twice, so if you want a philosophical discussion, prepare to be disappointed. I’ve got like 27 more of this dialogues to finish up.
Maybe I’ll add some quotes later that I like. Maybe not. Who knows?
Everyone should read Plato! It’s fun and important.
SOCRATES: “I was the first man to fall in love with you, son of, Clinias, and now that the others have stopped pursuing you I suppose you’re wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t given up...” (103a).
SOCRATES: “οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν/Please, be amazed” (103a).
ALCIBIADES: “When you ask me questions, first I think one thing, and then I think something else” (116e).
Words we all need to hear at some point.
I reached this point in the dialogue about 4 raspberry white claws deep (drink of choice for hellenistic philosophy) and it struck me personally.
This review already deleted itself twice, so if you want a philosophical discussion, prepare to be disappointed. I’ve got like 27 more of this dialogues to finish up.
Maybe I’ll add some quotes later that I like. Maybe not. Who knows?
Everyone should read Plato! It’s fun and important.
SOCRATES: “I was the first man to fall in love with you, son of, Clinias, and now that the others have stopped pursuing you I suppose you’re wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t given up...” (103a).
SOCRATES: “οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν/Please, be amazed” (103a).
ALCIBIADES: “When you ask me questions, first I think one thing, and then I think something else” (116e).
April 19, 2021
Alkibiades I
Aşk, erdem, kent yönetimi ve ruh üzerine, adeta Platon’un düşüncelerinin kısa özetlerini taşıyan bir diyalogdur. Alkibiades’in Şölen’deki Sokrates hayranı konumuna ulaşma yolculuğunu da görmüş oluruz burada. Tarihe baktığımızda ise, Alkibiades’in eğer bu diyalog gerçekleştiyse, Sokrates’in öğütlerine pek de kulak asmadığını, onun bilgeliğine hayran olmakla yetindiğini görmek mümkündür.
Diyalog bir anlamda güvenli bir mesafeden Devlet Adamı’ndaki demokrasi yargılarına ve filozof kral – aydınlanmış despot övgüsüne devam etmektedir; Alkibiades’in kendisine karşı tutkusunu açıklamaya zorladığı Sokrates ilk olarak öğrenmenin doğru yöntemlerini irdeleyecek, çoğunluğun iyi bir öğretici olamayacağını, bunun en açık sebeplerinden bir olarak da teknik bilgisi yetersiz kimselerin – yani şeylerin özünü anlamadan yargılar getirenlerin herhangi bir konu üzerinde mutabakat kuramayacağını, bunun onları üstünkörü tanımlamalar ile isabetli öğretilerden uzaklaştıracağını savunur. Bir diğer sorun ise, insanların doğru ve yanlışı aramaktan ziyade, en fazla pratik yarar sağlayacak sonuçların peşinden koştuğunu, bunun yapılan iş ne olursa olsun uzun vadede verimsizlikle sonuçlanacağını söyler. Zira herhangi bir konu hakkında yeterli bilgeliğe sahip olmadan, bu konuya dair yanlış ve doğruları uygulamamız çok güçtür, yapılan işin doğası ne kadar kompleks bir hale gelirse, bilgelik olmadan çıkılan yolda ortaya çıkacak yanlışların zararı da o kadar büyük ve şiddetli olacaktır. Alkibiades’in kent yönetmeye yeltenip de, kent yönetimi hakkında bütün öğretisini pratik ve yarar sağlayıcı etmenler üzerinden kurmasının tehlikesi bu şekilde yüzüne vurulmaktadır.
Aslında Platon diyaloglarında sürekli aynı eksende döndüğümüzü iyice fark ediyorum burada, Sofist’te de, Thaitetos’ta da, Devlet Adamı’nda da, Phaidros’da da, kendimizi tanımadan, varlığın özüne inip doğru bilgiyi aramadan, haz ve erdem arasında bir ölçü yakalamadan kalkılan hiçbir işin, en iyi ihtimalle güzel bir sanatın kopyasından başka bir şey olamayacağı söylenmektedir.
Sokrates’e göre bir arada yaşamakta olan bir toplum arasında dostluk ve sevgi zorunlu bir bağ değildir, ki kendi doğruları olan bireylerin olduğu bir yerde sürekli bir mutabakat ve övgü zinciri olması da imkansızdır, bu topluluğu bir arada tutan ana öğe sağduyu ve anlaşma olacaktır. Bu anlaşmanın temini ise ancak erdemli bir yaklaşım ile mümkün olacaktır. Burada Sokrates, Alkibiades’e kendini tanıma üzerine öğüdüyle dönecek, bu sefer bunun da özüne inilecek ve aslında kendini tanımanın, ruhunu tanımak olduğu sonucuna ulaşılacaktır. En tanrısal öğesiyle yönetilen ruhun, benliğin ta kendisi olduğunu vurguladığında Sokrates aslında orijinal soruya da cevap vermiş olacak, bir diğer taraftan da bilgeliği yine diğer tüm arayışların üstüne yerleştirecektir;
Sokrates, bedensel güzelliği ve maddi zenginliğinden dolayı değil, ruhu nedeniyle Alkibiades’in peşindedir, bu nedenle onun tek gerçek aşığı aslında kendisidir.
132a “Sana ait şeyler solarken, sen çiçek açıyorsun.”
Ruhun benliğin ta kendisi olduğu, bilmenin ise dünyasal olan ile öz olanın ayrılmasından sonra ortaya çıkacak verilerde yattığı yeterince vurgulandığında, kent yönetiminin sanatı da bilgelikten gelen adalet ve erdem olarak ortaya çıkacak, kendini tanımayanın, dolayısıyla ihtiyaçlarından, kendisi için iyi ve kötü olanın ne olduğundan bihaber olanın, başkaları için de bunu bilemeyeceği, haliyle yönetme vasfı olmadığı söylenir. Devlet Adamı içerisinde de gördüğümüz filozof kral övgüsü burada bu şekilde örneğini bulmuştur.
Alkibiades II
Platon’un, Sokrates’i Alkibiades ile konuşturduğu ikinci diyalogunda, birinci diyalogdaki kendini tanı öğüdü, bu sefer dualar ve dilekler üzerinden irdelenmekte, bir kez daha Sokrates karşısındaki genç Alkibiades’e sadece kendisi hakkında iyi ve kötüye dair bilgi sahibi kişinin dileklerinin onu mutluluğa götüreceğini anlatır.
Tapınağa dua etmeye gitmekte olan Alkibiades’i yolundan alıkoyan Sokrates’in ilk öğüdü, günümüze dek bir çok tragedya ve romana da konu olmuş bir paktın varlığını kabul ederek oluşturulmaktadır adeta, eğer dualarımız tanrıların eli açık bir anına denk gelirse, üzerine etraflıca düşünülmemiş dileklerimizin bizi nasıl bir noktaya götüreceğini bilebilir miyiz? Birinci diyalogda üzerinde durulmuş kendini tanıma, dolayısıyla önce kendin için, sonra başkaları için iyi ve kötüyü ayırt edebilme yetisi olmadan dua ve dileklerimizin sonucu büyük felaketler olabilir. Ancak burada Sokrates’in sorgusu zaten bu söyleneni cepte kabul etmekte, aslında sorgunun özünde, ölçülüp tartılmamış istek ve arzuların iyi ve kötü sonuçlarının mesuliyetinin kimde olacağı yatmaktadır. Dönemin yunan tragedyalarının genel teması olan bu hubris veya Platon nezdinde pathos, bir kez daha logos ile savaşa sokulmakta, çeşitli tragedya örneklerinden yararlanılarak sorguya devam edilmektedir.
Cehaletin tehlikesini vurgulamak için sadece felaketlere başvuramayız elbette, zaten asıl tehlike sürekli yapılan bir yanlışın büyük felaketler getirmediği, hatta sırf anlık fayda sağlaması nedeniyle yapılmaya devam etmesindedir. Burada kısa bir ad ignorantiam örneği devreye giriyor aslında;
147a “Çünkü böylesine bir bilgi olmadığı sürece şans insanı zenginlik, sağlık ya da buna benzer şeylere uygun bir rüzgarla götürse bile, bu durumlardan doğan yanlışların da çok büyük olacaklarını düşünüyorum. Çok şey bilmek ya da çok yetenekli olmak, bunların arasında iyiyi öğreten bilgi olmadığı sürece sadece şiddetli bir fırtınanın oyuncağı olmak değildir de nedir?”
Antik Yunanda dileklerin hedefi ve karşılıklarının sağlayıcısı tanrılara da değinilir elbette, Sokrates, Eutyphron diyalogundaki pozisyonunu burada da korumaktadır; bilgiden, ölçüden yoksun istek ve dileklerin karşılığında çıkan kötü sonuçlardan tanrıları sorumlu tutup suçlamayı uygun bulmadığını belirtecek, bir diğer noktada tanrılarla ticari ilişkiler kurmanın, beşeri olanla ilahi olanı karıştırmanın yanlışlığına değinecektir.
Aşk, erdem, kent yönetimi ve ruh üzerine, adeta Platon’un düşüncelerinin kısa özetlerini taşıyan bir diyalogdur. Alkibiades’in Şölen’deki Sokrates hayranı konumuna ulaşma yolculuğunu da görmüş oluruz burada. Tarihe baktığımızda ise, Alkibiades’in eğer bu diyalog gerçekleştiyse, Sokrates’in öğütlerine pek de kulak asmadığını, onun bilgeliğine hayran olmakla yetindiğini görmek mümkündür.
Diyalog bir anlamda güvenli bir mesafeden Devlet Adamı’ndaki demokrasi yargılarına ve filozof kral – aydınlanmış despot övgüsüne devam etmektedir; Alkibiades’in kendisine karşı tutkusunu açıklamaya zorladığı Sokrates ilk olarak öğrenmenin doğru yöntemlerini irdeleyecek, çoğunluğun iyi bir öğretici olamayacağını, bunun en açık sebeplerinden bir olarak da teknik bilgisi yetersiz kimselerin – yani şeylerin özünü anlamadan yargılar getirenlerin herhangi bir konu üzerinde mutabakat kuramayacağını, bunun onları üstünkörü tanımlamalar ile isabetli öğretilerden uzaklaştıracağını savunur. Bir diğer sorun ise, insanların doğru ve yanlışı aramaktan ziyade, en fazla pratik yarar sağlayacak sonuçların peşinden koştuğunu, bunun yapılan iş ne olursa olsun uzun vadede verimsizlikle sonuçlanacağını söyler. Zira herhangi bir konu hakkında yeterli bilgeliğe sahip olmadan, bu konuya dair yanlış ve doğruları uygulamamız çok güçtür, yapılan işin doğası ne kadar kompleks bir hale gelirse, bilgelik olmadan çıkılan yolda ortaya çıkacak yanlışların zararı da o kadar büyük ve şiddetli olacaktır. Alkibiades’in kent yönetmeye yeltenip de, kent yönetimi hakkında bütün öğretisini pratik ve yarar sağlayıcı etmenler üzerinden kurmasının tehlikesi bu şekilde yüzüne vurulmaktadır.
Aslında Platon diyaloglarında sürekli aynı eksende döndüğümüzü iyice fark ediyorum burada, Sofist’te de, Thaitetos’ta da, Devlet Adamı’nda da, Phaidros’da da, kendimizi tanımadan, varlığın özüne inip doğru bilgiyi aramadan, haz ve erdem arasında bir ölçü yakalamadan kalkılan hiçbir işin, en iyi ihtimalle güzel bir sanatın kopyasından başka bir şey olamayacağı söylenmektedir.
Sokrates’e göre bir arada yaşamakta olan bir toplum arasında dostluk ve sevgi zorunlu bir bağ değildir, ki kendi doğruları olan bireylerin olduğu bir yerde sürekli bir mutabakat ve övgü zinciri olması da imkansızdır, bu topluluğu bir arada tutan ana öğe sağduyu ve anlaşma olacaktır. Bu anlaşmanın temini ise ancak erdemli bir yaklaşım ile mümkün olacaktır. Burada Sokrates, Alkibiades’e kendini tanıma üzerine öğüdüyle dönecek, bu sefer bunun da özüne inilecek ve aslında kendini tanımanın, ruhunu tanımak olduğu sonucuna ulaşılacaktır. En tanrısal öğesiyle yönetilen ruhun, benliğin ta kendisi olduğunu vurguladığında Sokrates aslında orijinal soruya da cevap vermiş olacak, bir diğer taraftan da bilgeliği yine diğer tüm arayışların üstüne yerleştirecektir;
Sokrates, bedensel güzelliği ve maddi zenginliğinden dolayı değil, ruhu nedeniyle Alkibiades’in peşindedir, bu nedenle onun tek gerçek aşığı aslında kendisidir.
132a “Sana ait şeyler solarken, sen çiçek açıyorsun.”
Ruhun benliğin ta kendisi olduğu, bilmenin ise dünyasal olan ile öz olanın ayrılmasından sonra ortaya çıkacak verilerde yattığı yeterince vurgulandığında, kent yönetiminin sanatı da bilgelikten gelen adalet ve erdem olarak ortaya çıkacak, kendini tanımayanın, dolayısıyla ihtiyaçlarından, kendisi için iyi ve kötü olanın ne olduğundan bihaber olanın, başkaları için de bunu bilemeyeceği, haliyle yönetme vasfı olmadığı söylenir. Devlet Adamı içerisinde de gördüğümüz filozof kral övgüsü burada bu şekilde örneğini bulmuştur.
Alkibiades II
Platon’un, Sokrates’i Alkibiades ile konuşturduğu ikinci diyalogunda, birinci diyalogdaki kendini tanı öğüdü, bu sefer dualar ve dilekler üzerinden irdelenmekte, bir kez daha Sokrates karşısındaki genç Alkibiades’e sadece kendisi hakkında iyi ve kötüye dair bilgi sahibi kişinin dileklerinin onu mutluluğa götüreceğini anlatır.
Tapınağa dua etmeye gitmekte olan Alkibiades’i yolundan alıkoyan Sokrates’in ilk öğüdü, günümüze dek bir çok tragedya ve romana da konu olmuş bir paktın varlığını kabul ederek oluşturulmaktadır adeta, eğer dualarımız tanrıların eli açık bir anına denk gelirse, üzerine etraflıca düşünülmemiş dileklerimizin bizi nasıl bir noktaya götüreceğini bilebilir miyiz? Birinci diyalogda üzerinde durulmuş kendini tanıma, dolayısıyla önce kendin için, sonra başkaları için iyi ve kötüyü ayırt edebilme yetisi olmadan dua ve dileklerimizin sonucu büyük felaketler olabilir. Ancak burada Sokrates’in sorgusu zaten bu söyleneni cepte kabul etmekte, aslında sorgunun özünde, ölçülüp tartılmamış istek ve arzuların iyi ve kötü sonuçlarının mesuliyetinin kimde olacağı yatmaktadır. Dönemin yunan tragedyalarının genel teması olan bu hubris veya Platon nezdinde pathos, bir kez daha logos ile savaşa sokulmakta, çeşitli tragedya örneklerinden yararlanılarak sorguya devam edilmektedir.
Cehaletin tehlikesini vurgulamak için sadece felaketlere başvuramayız elbette, zaten asıl tehlike sürekli yapılan bir yanlışın büyük felaketler getirmediği, hatta sırf anlık fayda sağlaması nedeniyle yapılmaya devam etmesindedir. Burada kısa bir ad ignorantiam örneği devreye giriyor aslında;
147a “Çünkü böylesine bir bilgi olmadığı sürece şans insanı zenginlik, sağlık ya da buna benzer şeylere uygun bir rüzgarla götürse bile, bu durumlardan doğan yanlışların da çok büyük olacaklarını düşünüyorum. Çok şey bilmek ya da çok yetenekli olmak, bunların arasında iyiyi öğreten bilgi olmadığı sürece sadece şiddetli bir fırtınanın oyuncağı olmak değildir de nedir?”
Antik Yunanda dileklerin hedefi ve karşılıklarının sağlayıcısı tanrılara da değinilir elbette, Sokrates, Eutyphron diyalogundaki pozisyonunu burada da korumaktadır; bilgiden, ölçüden yoksun istek ve dileklerin karşılığında çıkan kötü sonuçlardan tanrıları sorumlu tutup suçlamayı uygun bulmadığını belirtecek, bir diğer noktada tanrılarla ticari ilişkiler kurmanın, beşeri olanla ilahi olanı karıştırmanın yanlışlığına değinecektir.
September 14, 2023
I like the line of questions: after the first 30 min of the dialogues, you get sucked into the narrative of the teacher and student. The thing is, there is a considerable amount of personality in this, despite it being a logical line of questioning.
It starts with: What is justice? What about a skilled laborer, men and women differences, what does it mean to govern. Then it goes to: Socrates, you're playing with my mind, what are you trying to control here? Then it goes to: I don't even know what I know anymore, I was saying "yes" a second ago, but then I say "no." Hehe, I am sure these are very simplifies versions of the exchange that took place, but it is cool to have it recorded like this.
You get a bit of history here too: because Socrates talks about their enemies like Spartans and Persians. "Even our enemies WIVES know we're too weak to take them."
Lewis Kirk read this as an audiobook on YouTube, you can check it out.
It starts with: What is justice? What about a skilled laborer, men and women differences, what does it mean to govern. Then it goes to: Socrates, you're playing with my mind, what are you trying to control here? Then it goes to: I don't even know what I know anymore, I was saying "yes" a second ago, but then I say "no." Hehe, I am sure these are very simplifies versions of the exchange that took place, but it is cool to have it recorded like this.
You get a bit of history here too: because Socrates talks about their enemies like Spartans and Persians. "Even our enemies WIVES know we're too weak to take them."
Lewis Kirk read this as an audiobook on YouTube, you can check it out.
November 24, 2024
How can one want to fix the world when one can't even rule his own soul? This can be seen as a conservative argument against any sort of revolutionary, which can be used dangerously, as politics is a form of war, too. If you are ruled by foreigners who just want to enslave you and put you and your kind at the bottom of the social ladder, is it ignorance to want to rule? What about in a world of class antagonism? There's merit and demerit to this book.
The king should not only be the one who is most fit to rule, but the most fit to rule on his ideological and sociological team. Maybe there were better aristocrats than Alcibiades and so this argument is valid towards him, but what if the greek slave wanted to rule, would this argument still fly?
The king should not only be the one who is most fit to rule, but the most fit to rule on his ideological and sociological team. Maybe there were better aristocrats than Alcibiades and so this argument is valid towards him, but what if the greek slave wanted to rule, would this argument still fly?
December 12, 2025
Stylistically and philosophically, it's clear that this was definitely not written by Plato, so Alcibiades is essentially the classical Greek equivalent of fanfic - lacking in both philosophy and dramatic interest. This is unfortunate because if Plato had actually written a dialogue where Socrates convinces Alcibiades that he's unfit for politics because he doesn't know anything, leading the young stud to swear his (obviously Platonic) allegiance to Socrates, it would have been a fun prequel to the Symposium. As another reviewer mentioned, the only thing worth reading here is the eye/mirror analogy; otherwise, it's a pretty basic exercise in early virtue ethics as a foundation for political philosophy, with a superficial dip into ontology (self = soul, obvs.).
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