Even if one has read classic works on World War II, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets is a must-read for anyone interested in intelligence operations during that iconic conflict. It not only features familiar and well-documents stories gleaned from earlier volumes, but it builds upon more recently declassified information to give a truer and more complete version of some of those rumors and stories. For example, I am enough of a conspiracy buff to have believed (no matter how many sources contended that it wasn’t so) that Roosevelt knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack and allowed it to occur so that the U.S. would be drawn into the war over the objections of then (ironically enough) isolationist Republicans. Yet, deep down I know that whenever one is tempted to consider something a conspiracy or a breakdown in competence, one should choose the latter almost every time. So, when I believed in the past that the JN-25 code had been broken by our cryptographers and that JN-25 messages about Pearl Harbor had been intercepted and were in our hands (p. 116), I assumed (and you know what that does) that FDR knew. Instead, Stafford reveals rather, “The codebreakers were undermanned and short of resources, and their energies were heavily focused on Magic and the Battle of the Atlantic.” (p. 117) In short, this happened, despite signal intelligence, because of “tunnel vision” with regard to staffing and priorities.
So, pardon me if you’ve heard these before, but I didn’t realize that when the cypher was broken on a communique where Japanese Minister of War Tojo assured Hiroshi Oshima (a Japanese diplomat) that no attack on the Soviets was planned, FDR hared the intel with Stalin (p. 137). It had never occurred to me that Chou-en-lai had served as a British informant (p. 262). I either didn’t know or had forgotten that the Allies had wreaked vengeance on Admiral Yamamoto, planner of the Pearl Harbor attack, by assassinating him (p. 218). I didn’t realize that the U.S. was playing both sides against the middle in both the Yugoslavian and Greek civil wars (pp. 274-275). I didn’t recall ever reading before about the U.S. shooting down six British bombers in Indo-China because they were engaged in a covert action which hadn’t been communicated to the U.S. (p. 288).
The volume delineates inter-service rivalry between Britain’s intelligence communities and the U.S. intelligence communities throughout the book, but it was fascinating to see how the British had (in a document released shortly before this book was published in 1999) manipulated their intelligence cooperation so that whenever a colonial interest (India, Burma, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.) was involved that Britain should be the “senior partner” with regard to intelligence operations (p. 287). “Wild Bill” Donovan of the OSS complained over and over again that the sole purpose of the British remaining in control was to thwart U.S. intelligence-gathering and covert activities.
Prior to reading Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets, I had read a lot about how close Churchill and FDR were (including the suggestion by one critic of Churchill that the relationship was “almost homosexual” – p. 240). Yet, I had never considered how much their views might diverge on some matters. In their opinions of Chinese leader Chiang-kai-shek, for example, they were widely different. Roosevelt saw him as a Chinese George Washington (p. 257) while Churchill “…was far less sure than Roosevelt that he would even survive as leader of China.” (p. 265). With such insights as these, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets provides an interesting reading experience and deserves a place on one’s history shelf (as it will on mine).