Focuses on the 'Californian ideology' - a blend of 1960s hippieness and free market economics. Whilst these initially seem at odds with each other, its proponents saw this being overcome by technology. Following Marshall McLuhan, they saw technology as a force promoting individualism and disdain for authority. By the 2000s this was being interpreted as a shift away from power concentrated in states and governments towards economically powerful individuals.
Techno-optimism was promoted during the years of the Clinton presidency and by the turn of the millennium had also become the ideologies of the mature capitalists countries represented in the OECD. Prospects for economic growth became associated with technological innovation. All of this required the freeing up of entrepreneurialism and the flexibility of product, labour and capital.
Durand points to 'five paradoxes of the new capitalism. These are:
"1/ The continuous reinvigoration of economic structures thanks to start-uppers' thirst for adventure.
"2/ The pinnacle of workplace autonomy and creativity.
"3/ A culture of openness and mobility.
"4/ The promise of share prosperity; and
"5/ The ideal of the state becoming obsolete."
In practice these ideals are confounded by real movements within the circuits of capital accumulation. Among these he highlights the return to monopoly which absorbs 'friendly start-ups' into giant corporations. This also suppresses the initial tendency towards increased competition, seen in the 1990s when innovative companies were joisting for their places in the market. This challenged the dominant companies that were around at the time (IBM, Xerox, etc) but gave way to the underlying forces of centralisation which marked the 2000s. In the place of a stable structure of competitive firms, the process returned to a "densification of techno-economic links between organisations, and to a bigger international, if not global, projection for large firms and the production networks which they dominate."
This ended the hope for creative and autonomous workplaces. Exactly the opposite dynamic kicked in. Information technologies were used in the workplace to suppress non-productive time and standardise the actions of workers. This produces another paradox: the skills required of workers increases but their ability to use this as part of a creative process is diminished, leading to alienation and discontent.
Durand discusses the polarisation of space, between the dynamic core of the ICT (information, communication, technology) firm, which rests on innovation fostered in cooperative networks, and the structures which turn this innovation into saleable products. At one end of this spacial divide there is silicon valley, where the high added value jobs are concentrated, and at the other a dispersal of production across supply chains dominated by intensively worked, comparatively low-paid jobs. The consequences of this for regions beyond California are considered, with Europe a case in point. Its share of global GDP as fallen form 25.8 percent in 1980 to 14.5 in 2023. This is attributed to the gap between the EU's institutional sophistication in terms of macroeconomic management and its failures in promoting growth, employment, and the absence of EU firms in the top tier of IT companies. Its move towards deregularisation and liberalisati0on in the 2000s weakened its indigenous firms at a point when China and South Korea was promoting public investment in its industrial businesses.
The discussion so far concerns the initial success of ICT in reshaping the capitalist economy as well as its limitations. But what about the 'feudalism' part of the critique? Durand writes that the hopes for economic growth fostered by the Californian ideology have fizzled out and, in parallel, its promotion of an enhanced democratic accountability has gone south. Meanwhile, the rise of authoritarian leaders in Europe and the USA, and the alliances nurtured by China and Russia is generating other methods of rule that are fully compatible with ICT capitalism. There is frank contempt shown for individual freedom and democratic rights by Silicon Valley forms. Liberal democracy is revealed as extremely fragile under the new dispensation and renewed interest is being shown in the 'refeudalisation of the public sphere formulated by Jurgen Habermas in the 1960s.
Refeudalisation has been set on its way, in its early stages by the incursion of the mass media into households and the consumerist transformation of the family sphere. Public conversation is dominated by a discourse which aims to attract a mass audience for consumer goods - ie advertising. This is detrimental to the quality of public debate. "The business of information and debate seeks to manufacture consensus, or, rather, what we might call cognitive centres around which subjectivities converge." There are two senses in which this operates: firstly, the convergence of opinions supports the personification of political orientations behind leader-figures in ways which echo the feudal incarnation and representation of power. (All of this pps 66 onwards). Secondly, the fusion of mass entertainment with advertising leads to a mixture of genres... from which the state itself is not immune. Private enterprise evokes the idea that in their consumption decisions people act in the capacity of citizens, meaning that the state also has to address its citizens like consumers.
Moving on to discuss the strategies of ICT firms, the point is made, citing Jeff Bezos, that through opportunities provided by digitalisation and personalisation of information, companies are able to get ahead of consumers in the shaping of choice. Cyberspace has been created over which individuals roam and maintain the assumptions of the previous dispensati0n (liberal capitalism) that they are free, self-determining individuals. In reality, the rules that govern this space are made by ICT corporations and they require individuals to confirm to these standards.
"This new land to be conquered stretches far and wide, and covers everything that can be digitised [...] The colonisation of these new data-rich lands is the result of a wide variety of technical and legal devices. But in all cases it involves a form of territorial appropriation: the idea is to plant markers whenever data can be extracted . This is the extractivist moment in the formation of Big Data, the moment of capturing sources."
Referencing Zuboff, the point is made that the goal of surveillance capitalism is to make behaviour more predictable. As Big Data grows to bigger scales, awareness of its effects on social life become a matter for scientists and other specialists. It becomes harder for the multitude to take matters into its own hands. The concentration of value in the higher reaches of the value chain makes technical knowledge amenable to being cast as intellectual property which also creates obstacles for people outside the charmed circle of the knowledge elite to break in and challenge monopoly power.
At this point the argument merges with the Keynesian critique of rentier capitalism. Rather than promote innovation it has the effect of closing the door to competition as prospective new entrants find themselves challenged over intellectual property infringement. New investment opportunities are restricted and innovation slowed down, leading to a rise in the amount of capital sitting idle - further fuelling financial instability. As Durand put it, "The digital boom is fuelling a gigantic rentier economy; and this is not because information is a new source of value, but because the control of information and knowledge - intellectual monopolisation - has become the most powerful means of capturing value." (p141)
The objection to techno-feudalism is succinctly state: "The rise of digital technology is overturning competitive relations in favour of dependence, upsetting the overall mechanism, and tending to give precedence to predation over production." (p191) It becomes all about mechanisms for capturing value. How are these negative forces to be countered? Not easily. Liberal responses point to a forced breakup of anti-competitive monopolies but, as the major firms in the sector point out, this implies destroying the use value represented by comprehensive data pools and agile algorithms that support utility. Something more radical is needed and Durand points towards a democratic economy, something within reach precisely because digital algorithms have the potential to become the 'invisible hand' that guides the workings of the economy.