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世界はなぜ地獄になるのか
ANTENNA Z
Paperback Shinsho
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October 1, 2025
Took me much longer than I thought to finish this book...While deceptibly short, Tachibana has managed to outline all of the "nausea" I have experienced since starting a liberal institution as an "Asian, Black cis-genered woman" as they would like to say. Why can people no longer discuss "challenging" social phenomena such as cancel culture, racism, or gender? The problem lies in what liberalism has become today...
[Intro]
Tachibana takes a thorough look at the hellscape the world has become in the post-Liberal age, or what he terms "Eudystopia." His main thesis, "The problems liberalism has created, cannot be solved by liberalism," is apt--when people try to pursue their individual happiness, there will be a clash with another's happiness, and no one can truely live "as they truly are" when everyone lives like that.
[Part 1~2]
Tachibana first takes a look at a famous artist who was cancelled, noting the paradox of the cancel culture in which ony those prominent enough to be noticed can be cancelled. This leads to the in-depth analysis of "politically correct" language and the challenges this "norm" brought about by globalism poses in cross-cultural "politeness." For example, in Japan it is "polite" to add the suffix 「さん」（--san) to one's elders, peers, and the likes. This could lead to scenes where one discrimnates based on the person's social positions or age. There is further the challenge of using 「敬語」, or deferential language. In most scenes it is considered "polite" to use 「敬語」to those who are older or people outside of one's immediate family. But if one uses 「敬語」in an informal setting, one could be considered "rude" for drawing a line between those on the "inside" and "outside," as formal language is often reserved for those on the "outside." The Japanese language, Tachibana notes, is grounded on social hierarchies and the very act of speaking is considered the same as "touching" someone with one's words. This is quite a different outlook from western languages such as English. But even then, Tachibana notes, that language holds power and authority, which is why after the large differences between people are "levelled" via liberalism, these "smaller" differences in language becomes prominent, to the point of people becoming offended at being called "Black" over "black."
[Part 3]
The second cancel-culture Tachibana picks up is the Aida Makoto incident, concerning his show, "Dog" which displayed grotesque images of pop-culture girls cut up in pieces and chained. While Makoto's position was that of deconstructing Japanese Art (日本画の解体）, many viewed his work to be morally problematic, especially against rape victims as degrading human morality of women. Tachibana notes that in this case, the only claim one can make is against the platform (i.e. those who allow artists such as Makoto to display such works in the public), not against the freedom of expression, which is reserved under liberal principles--or is it? What lies at the heart of the problem, Tachibana explains, is not only is the matter a question of morality and thus no clear outlines can be set, but that it is a matter of human heart and hurt one feels, both of which are too subjective to be measured or censured.
[Part 4]
In this part, Tachibana looks at some fascinating researches done on the question of why some people of some social groups die sooner than the other. Sir Michael Marmot's study on public servants' mortality rate according to their position within this job (i.e. whether they are at a management position or not) found that their status, even in a "white collar" job, affected mortality rate. In other words, if one's social/work status was low, people tended to die quicker. Tachibana links this to the "sociometre" one has where positive self-affirmation based on peer assessment increases pleasure, and pain when negative self-affirmation is based on peer assessment. Further, Tachibana finds a study that points out the stress the brain feels from physical violence is actually the same as verbal, non-physical violence, such as ostracism. But what I found was interesting was Tachibana's theory in which people escape pain and try to gain pleasure from social affirmation--since most people are unable to increase their status via success, authority, or virtue, they increasingly seek out those who are "unvirtuous" or "unjust" and become a sort of "virtue/justice police." With the rise of social media, people can play the "status game" by hunting out those who do not conform to their ideals/measures of "justice"--and this, Tachibana argues, is what lies at the heart of cancel culture.
[Part 5]
Yeonmi Park, a famous North Korean defector and activist, once said about the States that: "North Korea was pretty crazy, but not this crazy." Yeonmi Park, who used to be a "liberal" activist is now known as "conservative" activist and has been cancelled. Tachibana attributes such events of the "liberal" intellectual who becomes cancelled by the "left" to the rise of the digital natives generation, or the iGen, aka "snowflake generation." Those who grew up in the inception of the internet, social media, and the general experimentation of exposure to such mediums, are more susceptible to self-harm, depression, anxiety, etc. With the well-established basis of North American academia dominated by "white" academics, these academics must now prove to their students (who may be people of colour) that they are on their side--i.e. they are social justice warriors. Tachibana raises the question of whether "White people are racists from the moment they are born." He points out that such question has a basis in CRT, and problems such as microaggression is not a matter of personal sensitivity but historically evident, and inescapable. Tachibana wrily asks whether Japanese people cannot become "racists" because they are "people of colour" (and this a rhetorical question, since racism in Japan against non-Japanese is well-known), and notes further that theorists such as Robin DiAngelo seems to be creating a new "natural sin" that people cannot save themselves from, except this one limited to "whiteness" which is, unquestionably "racist." Hence, the quest for social justice against "racism" becomes a form of religion. (And I agree with Tachibana on this point. Whatever it may be, the new social justice issue does everything except what it claims it does, which is to help the marginalised, the oppressed, etc., etc.)
Another funny (okay, maybe I shouldn't say funny) point from the deterioration of the academia, especially in the CRT studies, was the series of hoax papers Helen Pluckrose, James Lindsay, and Peter Boghossian submitted, which were accepted in famous academic journals. But what's interesting is that Tachibana notes that this sort of confusion and wide-spread cancelling of academia "deconstruction" happens due to the two revolutions of post-modernism. The only reason we are able to talk once again about "justice" at all is because it is the "justice" of a minortiy. The second revolution is completed in "reified postmodernism" where textual racism is actually embedded in the material reality. Hence, the "minority" is always oppressed and is "right," whereas the "majority" oppresses the minority and is in the "wrong."
[Part 6]
So how does one escape this madness? Tachibana says, quite simply, to stay away from the landmines. Or, one could step on it, like a brave fool. Tachibana lists JK Rowling as one such "brave fool" and parses through the transgender landmine she stepped on. While Tachibana ultimately summs up the problem as: "There are only a handful (less than 0.5%) of the population who are transgender female who are autogynephilic and commit sexual violence." I found this conclusion rather unsatisfactory, given the insight and clarity with which Tachibana addressed this issue in this section. Tachibana then moves on to the problem of equality and equity, and also whether an individual can be held accountable for a nation-state's past actions. Tachibana calls the activists (in whatever field they are in) "gatekeepers of the truth" and points out this as another reason dialogue has become so difficult. That is to say, people who are already engaged and have put their eggs in one basket of a social issue tend to spend much more time and resource on the issue than the average person. This places the average person at a disadvantage, leaving them to apologetically say, "Oh, I didn't know that. But I guess you know more about this issue than me, so you must be correct." And thus, the "minorty" has triumphed over the "majority" who don't have enough time.
Sadly, Tachibana does not leave us with much idea of what to do in this "Eudystopia" we are currently living in. He claims that since it is a "Eudystopia," "heaven" is in the "hell" we live in. Perhaps, by the technological advancement, forbearance (even against those who are not?), and adapting to this world, we are able to find salvation...
Not convinced at all. But the analysis was wonderful.
[Intro]
Tachibana takes a thorough look at the hellscape the world has become in the post-Liberal age, or what he terms "Eudystopia." His main thesis, "The problems liberalism has created, cannot be solved by liberalism," is apt--when people try to pursue their individual happiness, there will be a clash with another's happiness, and no one can truely live "as they truly are" when everyone lives like that.
[Part 1~2]
Tachibana first takes a look at a famous artist who was cancelled, noting the paradox of the cancel culture in which ony those prominent enough to be noticed can be cancelled. This leads to the in-depth analysis of "politically correct" language and the challenges this "norm" brought about by globalism poses in cross-cultural "politeness." For example, in Japan it is "polite" to add the suffix 「さん」（--san) to one's elders, peers, and the likes. This could lead to scenes where one discrimnates based on the person's social positions or age. There is further the challenge of using 「敬語」, or deferential language. In most scenes it is considered "polite" to use 「敬語」to those who are older or people outside of one's immediate family. But if one uses 「敬語」in an informal setting, one could be considered "rude" for drawing a line between those on the "inside" and "outside," as formal language is often reserved for those on the "outside." The Japanese language, Tachibana notes, is grounded on social hierarchies and the very act of speaking is considered the same as "touching" someone with one's words. This is quite a different outlook from western languages such as English. But even then, Tachibana notes, that language holds power and authority, which is why after the large differences between people are "levelled" via liberalism, these "smaller" differences in language becomes prominent, to the point of people becoming offended at being called "Black" over "black."
[Part 3]
The second cancel-culture Tachibana picks up is the Aida Makoto incident, concerning his show, "Dog" which displayed grotesque images of pop-culture girls cut up in pieces and chained. While Makoto's position was that of deconstructing Japanese Art (日本画の解体）, many viewed his work to be morally problematic, especially against rape victims as degrading human morality of women. Tachibana notes that in this case, the only claim one can make is against the platform (i.e. those who allow artists such as Makoto to display such works in the public), not against the freedom of expression, which is reserved under liberal principles--or is it? What lies at the heart of the problem, Tachibana explains, is not only is the matter a question of morality and thus no clear outlines can be set, but that it is a matter of human heart and hurt one feels, both of which are too subjective to be measured or censured.
[Part 4]
In this part, Tachibana looks at some fascinating researches done on the question of why some people of some social groups die sooner than the other. Sir Michael Marmot's study on public servants' mortality rate according to their position within this job (i.e. whether they are at a management position or not) found that their status, even in a "white collar" job, affected mortality rate. In other words, if one's social/work status was low, people tended to die quicker. Tachibana links this to the "sociometre" one has where positive self-affirmation based on peer assessment increases pleasure, and pain when negative self-affirmation is based on peer assessment. Further, Tachibana finds a study that points out the stress the brain feels from physical violence is actually the same as verbal, non-physical violence, such as ostracism. But what I found was interesting was Tachibana's theory in which people escape pain and try to gain pleasure from social affirmation--since most people are unable to increase their status via success, authority, or virtue, they increasingly seek out those who are "unvirtuous" or "unjust" and become a sort of "virtue/justice police." With the rise of social media, people can play the "status game" by hunting out those who do not conform to their ideals/measures of "justice"--and this, Tachibana argues, is what lies at the heart of cancel culture.
[Part 5]
Yeonmi Park, a famous North Korean defector and activist, once said about the States that: "North Korea was pretty crazy, but not this crazy." Yeonmi Park, who used to be a "liberal" activist is now known as "conservative" activist and has been cancelled. Tachibana attributes such events of the "liberal" intellectual who becomes cancelled by the "left" to the rise of the digital natives generation, or the iGen, aka "snowflake generation." Those who grew up in the inception of the internet, social media, and the general experimentation of exposure to such mediums, are more susceptible to self-harm, depression, anxiety, etc. With the well-established basis of North American academia dominated by "white" academics, these academics must now prove to their students (who may be people of colour) that they are on their side--i.e. they are social justice warriors. Tachibana raises the question of whether "White people are racists from the moment they are born." He points out that such question has a basis in CRT, and problems such as microaggression is not a matter of personal sensitivity but historically evident, and inescapable. Tachibana wrily asks whether Japanese people cannot become "racists" because they are "people of colour" (and this a rhetorical question, since racism in Japan against non-Japanese is well-known), and notes further that theorists such as Robin DiAngelo seems to be creating a new "natural sin" that people cannot save themselves from, except this one limited to "whiteness" which is, unquestionably "racist." Hence, the quest for social justice against "racism" becomes a form of religion. (And I agree with Tachibana on this point. Whatever it may be, the new social justice issue does everything except what it claims it does, which is to help the marginalised, the oppressed, etc., etc.)
Another funny (okay, maybe I shouldn't say funny) point from the deterioration of the academia, especially in the CRT studies, was the series of hoax papers Helen Pluckrose, James Lindsay, and Peter Boghossian submitted, which were accepted in famous academic journals. But what's interesting is that Tachibana notes that this sort of confusion and wide-spread cancelling of academia "deconstruction" happens due to the two revolutions of post-modernism. The only reason we are able to talk once again about "justice" at all is because it is the "justice" of a minortiy. The second revolution is completed in "reified postmodernism" where textual racism is actually embedded in the material reality. Hence, the "minority" is always oppressed and is "right," whereas the "majority" oppresses the minority and is in the "wrong."
[Part 6]
So how does one escape this madness? Tachibana says, quite simply, to stay away from the landmines. Or, one could step on it, like a brave fool. Tachibana lists JK Rowling as one such "brave fool" and parses through the transgender landmine she stepped on. While Tachibana ultimately summs up the problem as: "There are only a handful (less than 0.5%) of the population who are transgender female who are autogynephilic and commit sexual violence." I found this conclusion rather unsatisfactory, given the insight and clarity with which Tachibana addressed this issue in this section. Tachibana then moves on to the problem of equality and equity, and also whether an individual can be held accountable for a nation-state's past actions. Tachibana calls the activists (in whatever field they are in) "gatekeepers of the truth" and points out this as another reason dialogue has become so difficult. That is to say, people who are already engaged and have put their eggs in one basket of a social issue tend to spend much more time and resource on the issue than the average person. This places the average person at a disadvantage, leaving them to apologetically say, "Oh, I didn't know that. But I guess you know more about this issue than me, so you must be correct." And thus, the "minorty" has triumphed over the "majority" who don't have enough time.
The reason this world becomes hell is not because of some "conspiracy" but because it is beneficial to some.
Sadly, Tachibana does not leave us with much idea of what to do in this "Eudystopia" we are currently living in. He claims that since it is a "Eudystopia," "heaven" is in the "hell" we live in. Perhaps, by the technological advancement, forbearance (even against those who are not?), and adapting to this world, we are able to find salvation...
Not convinced at all. But the analysis was wonderful.
Displaying 1 of 1 review