Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought

by Martin Jay

Long considered "the noblest of the senses," vision has increasingly come under critical scrutiny by a wide range of thinkers who question its dominance in Western culture. These critics of vision, especially prominent in twentieth-century France, have challenged its allegedly superior capacity to provide access to the world. They have also criticized its supposed complicity with political and social oppression through the promulgation of spectacle and surveillance.Martin Jay turns to this discourse surrounding vision and explores its often contradictory implications in the work of such influential figures as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Guy Debord, Luce Irigaray, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. Jay begins with a discussion of the theory of vision from Plato to Descartes, then considers its role in the French Enlightenment before turning to its status in the culture of modernity. From consideration of French Impressionism to analysis of Georges Bataille and the Surrealists, Roland Barthes's writings on photography, and the film theory of Christian Metz, Jay provides lucid and fair-minded accounts of thinkers and ideas widely known for their difficulty.His book examines the myriad links between the interrogation of vision and the pervasive antihumanist, antimodernist, and counter-enlightenment tenor of much recent French thought. Refusing, however, to defend the dominant visual order, he calls instead for a plurality of "scopic regimes." Certain to generate controversy and discussion throughout the humanities and social sciences, Downcast Eyes will consolidate Jay's reputation as one of today's premier cultural and intellectual historians.

Genres: Philosophy, History, France, Theory, Art, Nonfiction, 20th Century

638 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1993

Reviews

[عبدالكريم الدخين · Rating 4 out of 5]

في كتابه البالغ الأهمية Downcast Eyes، لا يكتب مارتن جاي تأريخًا لحاسة البصر بقدر ما ينقّب عن لحظة حضارية بكاملها: لحظة اختلال التوازن بين الحواس، وهيمنة العين بوصفها الوسيط المركزي للمعرفة والسلطة في الحداثة الغربية. ومن خلال تتبّع فلسفي دقيق للقرن العشرين الفرنسي، يمتد من هنري برجسون إلى ميشيل فوكو، مرورًا بسارتر ولاكان وليفيناس وميرلو-بونتي، يرصد جاي كيف تحوّلت الرؤية من أداة للحقيقة إلى موضع للشبهة، ومن أساس للمعرفة إلى مكمن للهيمنة.

ينطلق جاي من أطروحة محورية: أن البصر، بوصفه حاسة أساسية، شكل البنية التحتية الإبستمولوجية لمشروع الحداثة الغربية. وقد بدأ هذا مع ديكارت الذي منح الرؤية مكانة معرفية عليا، حين اعتبرها قناة محايدة لنقل الواقع، ومصدرًا مباشرًا لبناء الأفكار داخل العقل. لقد جعل ديكارت من “الرؤية العقلية” مرآة للوجود، ورسّخ بذلك ما أسماه جاي “الامتياز البصري” في تراتبية الحواس الحداثية. فالعين – في هذا السياق – ليست مجرد عضو فسيولوجي، بل أداة رمزية لبناء الحقيقة الموضوعية.

لكن هذا الامتياز لم يبقَ على حاله. في الفلسفة الفرنسية للقرن العشرين، تحديدًا بعد الحربين العالميتين وصعود الحساسيات ما بعد البنيوية، تعرّضت الرؤية لنقد جذري، لا بوصفها قدرة حسية فقط، بل بوصفها نمطًا سلطويًا من المعرفة.

فمثلًا، عند سارتر، النظر ليس فعلًا محايدًا، بل شكل من أشكال التشييء. يقول في الوجود والعدم: “أن تُنظَر يعني أن تُختزل إلى موضوع خارجي في وعي الآخر”، أي أننا لا نعي ذواتنا إلا عبر مرآة الآخرين، وهو وعي مشوب بالقلق والخجل، حيث يصبح الوجود في عيون الغير فعلًا من أفعال السلب والهيمنة. هكذا تصبح الذات حبيسة “نظرة الآخر”، في علاقة لا تخلو من عبودية رمزية.

أما عند موريس ميرلو-بونتي، فينقلب الإدراك من كونه “تمثيلًا بصريًا” إلى تجربة مجسّدة. فالرؤية ليست أداة منفصلة عن الجسد، بل هي تعبير عن “تجسد الذات في العالم”، حيث يتشابك الرائي والمرئي في نسيج واحد. هنا لا تعود الرؤية مرآةً تعكس الواقع، بل تصبح تجربة لغوية-جسدية يتشكل فيها المعنى من خلال الحضور الجسدي واللغة معًا، لا من خلال صورة محايدة.

ليفيناس من جهته يذهب أبعد، معتبرًا أن الوجه، لا العين، هو المعطى الأساسي للأخلاق. “حتى حين لا يُنظر إليّ، فإنني في موضع نظر دائم” – في هذه الجملة يلخّص ليفيناس هشاشة الوجود الإنساني حين يُختزل إلى مرئي، ويُفرّغ من حضوره الأخلاقي بوصفه آخرًا لا يُختزل.

وينبّه جاي إلى أن نقد الرؤية لم يكن مقتصرًا على الفلاسفة، بل امتدّ إلى الحقول النسوية وما بعد الاستعمار. فالنسويات الفرنسيات – مثل لورا مالفي – رأين أن السينما والتصوير والإعلانات كرّست “نظرة ذكورية” (male gaze)، تجعل من المرأة موضوعًا للعرض لا فاعلًا في المعنى، وتعيد إنتاج الهيمنة الجندرية من خلال لغة الصورة. فالرؤية هنا ليست فقط مسألة حسية، بل بنية أيديولوجية تُطبع داخل ثقافة كاملة. الجسد المؤنث يُعاد تشكيله ليطابق تخيلات الرجل، لا ليعبّر عن نفسه.

وتبرز هذه البنية البصرية أيضًا في تحليل جاي للاستعمار، حيث يشير إلى أن البياض – كما يُعرض في الفن والأدب – يمثل النور والرؤية والحقيقة، بينما يُقصى السواد إلى الهامش، ويُعرّف فقط من خلال ما يُرى فيه، لا من خلال ما يراه هو. وهكذا تسقط الذوات المستعمَرة من موقع الفاعلية، لتُختزل إلى كائنات مرئية بلا صوت أو إرادة.

ويصل هذا النقد إلى ذروته عند ميشيل فوكو، الذي أعاد تعريف البصر بوصفه تقنية للضبط لا للمعرفة. ففي تحليله لـ”البانوبتيكون”، يرى أن سلطة الرؤية لا تقوم على المعرفة، بل على خلق ذات خاضعة. العين لم تعد أداة فهم، بل أداة مراقبة دائمة، تزرع في الجسد آليات الطاعة. إنها عين لا تحتاج إلى ناظر دائم، يكفي الإحساس بالمراقبة لتحوّل الذات إلى شرطي داخلي على نفسها. هذه الرؤية تؤسس لـ”مجتمع الانضباط”، حيث تكون البنية الاجتماعية مبنية على رؤية تفرز وتعاقب وتصنف.

ومن الطريف أن المسيحية نفسها لم تسلم من هذا النقد البصري. فكما ينقل جاي عن مفكرين يهود، فإن “عبادة الصورة” في الكاثوليكية – عبر التماثيل والأيقونات – شكّلت انحرافًا عن سلطة الكلمة، وهيمنة للرؤية على الروح، حتى أصبح الإيمان ذاته مشروطًا بـ”ما يُرى”، لا بما يُسمع ويُعقل. وقد أثار هذا مفارقة لافتة بين التقاليد الأيقونية والتقاليد الأيقونوفوبية (مثل الإسلام واليهودية والبروتستانتية).
يرى رولان بارت أن الصور تمثل صدمة للرائي، لأنها مباشرة وممتلئة، بحيث لا يمكن معها إجالة الفكر وإنتاج المعنى، فهي تعطل اللغة، تعدم المعنى، لأنها تستولي ويُستولى عليها فيكون هناك ذات وموضوع، فاعل ومفعول به، مُستَأسد عليه، لذلك يعبر عنها بأنها موت مسطح أو جثة رمزية..

أما غي ديبور، في مجتمع الفرجة، فيرينا كيف أصبح الواقع مجرد عروض، وأن “كل ما كان يُعاش مباشرة، صار يُمثّل فقط”. لم تعد الذات تعيش تجربتها، بل تعيد تمثيل ما تراه. نحن لا نحزن، بل نحاكي مشهد الحزن. لا نفرح، بل نعيد إنتاج ما رأيناه من تمثيلات السعادة. وهكذا، كما يشير جاي، تُمأسس الرؤية داخل اقتصاد استهلاكي، حيث الصورة ليست مجرد تمثيل بل نمط وجود.

في ختام الكتاب، يتأمل جاي إمكانات “البصر البديل”، ويفتح بابًا نحو رؤى نقدية مضادة، من أمثال بودريار، الذي رأى في الصور محاكاة مفرطة (simulation) تمزج بين الواقع والوهم في نموذج لا يسمح بالتمييز بين الأصل والنسخة.
،

الكتاب قديم نوعًا ما كان في التسعينات، أي أنه قبل ثورة وسائل الاتصال الحديث، وظهور الاقتصاد السلوكي، وضرب اللغة عبر التصوير، والسيكوبولتيك وغيرها من المفاهيم.. ولكنه مهم ومحوري في فهم عالمنا، وجذور كثير من الرؤى التي تنتشر والسلوكيات التي تشاع بين فينة وأخرى ..




مع قراءتي للكتاب تذكرت طه عبدالرحمن في دين الحياء ونقده لآفات الصور من التفرج والتكشف والتجسس، وكيف رأى أن ثورة الصور أضرت بصلة الإنسان بالإنسان وصلته بالله فهي ليست تواصلا بقدر ماهي تفاصل، وعزلة، وحجاب عن السمع الذي هو طريقنا إلى الله جل جلاله عبر الوحي، والكلام طويل في هذا الشأن ..

[Campbell Rider]

Read this for my thesis on the philosophy of perception and blindness. The chapter on Enlightenment philosophy was particularly important for me, but the whole book is full of insights. There's an enduring attitude throughout the critique of 'ocularcentrism' that contrasts the quantitative, objectifying spatiality of vision with the qualitative, temporal subjectivity of the aural and tactile (which is what I aim to challenge in my research).

[Michael A. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Magisterial and erudite tome that is essentially the only book you need for this rather niche, but important, topic. Complex ideas expressed in fairly readable prose. Tons of footnotes for further reading. An impressive accomplishment.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Martin Jay is one of my favorite intellectual historians and this is the first book of his I read, though definitely not his last. Here he takes on the history of truth as representation and examines the implications for philosophy when visual representation is no longer privelaged. An accessible book and very much worth reading.

[sologdin · Rating 3 out of 5]

reads post-war continental philosophy through the tropology of the oculus. actually a very fertile, considering how rhetorics of the visual mediate references to mental processes. See what I mean?

Ends up with nifty little observations, e.g., whereas phallocentrism is cockocracy and phallogocentrism is cocktalkocracy, phallogoculocentrism is cocktalkgawkococracy, or so.

[Peter · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was more remedial reading, a book I was supposed to read for my oral comps, which happened ten years ago this fall! Martin Jay was, at the time, arguably the silverback of the subfield of intellectual history. He worked in the primary vein of “respectable” intellectual history – twentieth century European philosophy – and balanced theoretical sophistication with actual historical spadework, failing to go overboard the way some of the early adopters of critical theory in the historical profession were said to have done. There were maybe two or three of his monographs on my comps list, which is a lot. I meant to read this one- I just experienced my first adult depression episode mid-comps-reading and that disrupted my otherwise pretty good pace.

Approaching this ten years after I was supposed to, and not in the midst of a giant reading frenzy before a test that turned out to have little to do with my future prospects, was probably a better way to do it. Among other things, I tend to think distance from the academy and its greasy poles helps a historian take on board the actual content of intellectual history, because the ideas whose history you are studying stop having such immediate status/career relevance. Especially given that the fevers over “theory” and how historians and others should posture themselves towards it had yet to entirely break by the early tens – has it by now? Who knows? – intellectual history in that theory-vein could be tricky to really see.

Ironic! Given that this whole book is about how intellectuals, French ones in specific, came to create whole frameworks around how sight is not, as they would never put it, “all that.” This is a funny thing to think about, for a few reasons. I’m a clumsy Anglo, and to me, disregarding sight, and not treating sight as our primary sensory input and sensory inputs as our main way of understanding the world (and not understanding the world as the main purpose of intellectual pursuits), is utterly non-intuitive. Moreover, it doesn’t really make a lot of sense that the French, of all people, would pursue an “antiocular” agenda, to use Jay’s word. Rene Descartes, one of the fathers of profoundly sight-based scientific methodology, was French; so, too, have been a disproportionate share of pioneers in the visual arts, from painting to photography to cinema, for centuries.

Jay, in an endearing move, grants that he’s not too different- he, too, is a son of the Enlightenment, whose very name implies the primacy of vision. We can’t get away from vision metaphors and visual evidence. But, he says, it’s still worth understanding what is going on here, and he very quickly establishes the importance of antiocular or ocular-skeptic thought in French thinking and in thought more generally. We do have four other senses, and sight, whatever its wonders, is also possible – easy, even – to deceive. Our visual apparatus is pretty impressive – notice how long and hard engineers have to work to get computers to replicate it, versus getting them to vastly exceed, say, our capacity to do math – but it’s not perfect, and moreover, our reliance on it can make it hard to get another perspective to correct for what our sight might not see… as it were (there’s a lot of those “as it were” moments in “Downcast Eyes” as we stumble across – there’s a nonvisual metaphor! – our language’s seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of visual metaphors).

Arguably, the French caught onto this quicker than the Anglos precisely because of the importance that vision played in their intellectual and artistic culture. If you were going to do something new in French thought, for a long time, that meant going against the prevailing Cartesian ocularcentric rationalism, that is, bringing into question the utility and reliability of sight. Religious anti-Enlightenment types emphasized the sense of hearing, namely, what one hears from God (the fact that, like, you can’t really record the voice of God, that it’s less “hearing” than “imagining”... well, it’s not like they record anyone’s voice, not back then…). Later on, philosophical rebels against positivism, like Henri Bergson, emphasized all four of the other senses, but especially touch. Moreover, being early adopters of photography and film, French intellectuals quickly caught on to how different the photograph was from what one sees with the naked eye, and the ways in which photography and especially moving photographs could be manipulated, and manipulate themselves. To say nothing of all the painters who either had to find new rationales after the spread of photography, or else rework and/or re-propagate older, non-documentary/strict representationalist rationales.

All of this played into the full-bore anti-ocularism that came to characterize French philosophy in the twentieth century. This is also where I lose the thread a little. That’s not Jay’s fault. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (respectively highly and gently skeptical towards sight- though given how fucked up Sartre’s eyes were, can you blame him?) are tricky, not easy to read and comprehend. Bataille, Deleuze, and Guattari are pretty hard to understand. Lacan, I tend to think, I cannot grasp because there is nothing there to grasp. Yes, I’m aware that internet-borne children with much less education than I have throw around ideas from all those people (well, mostly the last four) like nothing. Well, I tend to think that’s because they are, mostly, nothing, that by the time you get to Lacan and his followers, it really is a game of meaningless postures that has no relation to external reality. People who learn about Lacan (via Zizek youtube videos, generally) before they knew what the categorical imperative is (or, you know, any history not included in a Paradox Games title) might as well be memorizing Pokemon stats and pitting them against each other, as many no doubt were with the same zeal they eventually took on theory.

I’m not some pragmatist intellectual luddite. I think plenty of figures from “French theory” had a lot to contribute and I even enjoyed reading some of them, though I do think they could have been clearer. That being said, I think even Jay’s lucidity wasn’t enough to lead anywhere productive when it entered the labyrinth of Lacanian nonsense, and Deleuze and Guattari are only a little better. I get that Jay couldn’t afford to ignore them. In many respects, these and their epigones are the end result of the whole project, that they disregarded sight as both a tool and as a symbol, a back-door monkey-paw victory for the counterenlightenment (though, as Jay continually points out, visual metaphors are utterly inescapable, especially given how many different registers – the sight that measures external reality, the flash of insight within the mind, the vision of imagination – in which it operates) in favor of… as far as I can tell, in favor of meaningless palaver. I don’t know- it sounds to me like a case of worthwhile questions leading to whole towering structures of useless non-answers that we’re expected to take seriously because we don’t want to sound like fulminating culture warriors insisting we all go back to “the canon.” So, these star ratings are based in part on enjoyment and utility, and I didn’t get a ton out of the back half of the book. Still, an impressive feat of intellectual history. I can see why they made such a big deal of the guy, back when I was in school. ****

[Pete · Rating 5 out of 5]

Jay explores the evolution of our perspectives of vision, showing how the eye both as sense and trope shapes our understanding of the world and of truth. He argues that the eye was the preeminent sense from Descartes through the Enlightenment, and that its reliability finally collapsed with the modernist era. Jay is careful not to overstate his case and repeatedly tempers his argument with contrary evidence. Along the way, he takes us from the Greeks to the post-modernists, and provides extraordinarily effective and succinct summaries of the work of a who’s who of thinkers, including Habermas, Lacan, Lyotard, Derrida, Baudrillard, Bataille, Foucault, Heidegger, Althusser, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Metz, Levinas, Breton, Debord, and Bergson, plus the Romantic poets, effortlessly weaving it all together in ways that make his analysis, far from daunting, a pleasure. His footnotes alone
are worth the price of admission, but the book itself is a study in lucidity, fresh thinking and erudition.

[Joseph Sales]

Nowadays the word "Marxist" has a certain quaintness to it, like it belongs to the same family as "horticulturalist" or "futurist". It is hard to realize that it used to have cachet to generations of serious thinkers and artists. It was one of the streams that deeply influenced cultural critics like the Walter Benjamin, Adorno, and the Frankfurt School. But it seems so 20th century, like something you have to dust off after rummaging around in the back of your garage.

Professor Jay was one of my teachers in college and a most brilliant mind. I haven't read this book yet but plan to since to me he is the exemplary scholar. I find it amusing how teachers are so important to a young mind. The topics he broached (culture, visuality, difference) are the ones that I think about years later.

[Andy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Worth it just for the first few chapters alone - which provide a thorough overview of visualism in Western thought from the pre-Socratics up to the 20th century. From Descartes onwards Jay focuses mainly on French thinkers, fair enough considering the aims of his work. My only complaint is that some of the latter chapters are overlong, and despite their length, don't do a particularly good job of explaining the topic at hand - okay, really I'm just thinking of the chapter on Lyotard. Still, as with all Jay's work, this is the place to start for the intellectual history of his chosen topic, and he provides extensive references to direct readers on to the more in-depth works.

[kyle · Rating 5 out of 5]

For me this was a page turner. Some topics were basically completely new (Bataille, the development of French film theory), I gained new appreciation for figures I never had much interest in (Lyotard) and learn fascinating tidbits about others I had read for years (Foucault, Bergson). I'm sure I'll return to this for years to come.

[William West · Rating 5 out of 5]

Awesome... basically twentieth century french philosophy in one volume. Read and explicated brilliantly.

[Shulamith Farhi · Rating 4 out of 5]

A helpful introductory survey of the visual metaphor in "French Theory".

[Gort · Rating 1 out of 5]

Optio saepe ut. Accusantium enim commodi exercitationem saepe voluptatem natus possimus. Enim ex provident molestiae delectus at cum quia. Aliquid quod sunt aut quis quia nulla ea.

[Jessica Zu]

only read the required chapters. a fun read