The events of the American Revolution signified by Lexington, Bunker Hill, Valley Forge, Saratoga, and Yorktown are familiar to American readers. Far less familiar is the fact that, for the British, the American colonies were only one front in a world war. England was also pitted against France and Spain. Not always in command of the seas and threatened with invasion, England tried grimly for eight years to subdue its rebellious colonies; to hold Canada, the West Indies, India, and Gibraltar; and to divide its European enemies. In this vivid history Piers Mackesy views the American Revolution from the standpoint of the British government and the British military leaders as they attempted to execute an overseas war of great complexity. Their tactical response to the American Revolution is now comprehensible, seen as part of a grand imperial strategy.
Piers Gerald Mackesy was a British military historian who taught at the University of Oxford. Earning his D.Phil at Oriel College, Oxford, he taught at Pembroke College, Oxford from 1954 until his retirement in 1988. He was elected a fellow in the British Academy in 1988.
Reading Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy’s recent and excellent The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire piqued my interest in the British side of the history of the Revolution, which tends to be ignored by most historians and readers of the Revolution. That’s kind of a shame because the story is so much more interesting when viewed from Britain’s perspective.
Mackesy does a great job describing the many challenges Britain faced in attempting to deal with the colonial crises, and puts these challenges in a global context. As the British attempted to suppress the American rebellion, they were eventually caught up in a world war with its enemies France, Spain, and the Netherlands. These enemies challenged British military power almost everywhere, from Latin America, the Caribbean, and South America to the British home islands and the French coast to Gibraltar and Minorca to India to Africa.
The British were ill-prepared for such a global confrontation. the British cabinet (a coalition government at the time) had a poor grasp of strategy, the military was suffering from budgetary pinches, and commanders often lacked clear guidance and had to deal with incompetent administrators. The British did not even have a commander-in-chief until 1778. The army was small and the navy was in horrible shape, relatively small and spread thin by vast far-flung commitments.
Still, Britain seems to have fared well. It is often claimed that America defeated the world’s superpower during the Revolution. It’s a nice myth, but in reality, the British captured every major city during the war, and, arguably, the only defeats they did suffer were due to inferior numbers. Also, despite losing the colonies, they still managed to defend the Midwest, parts of the northeast, and their entire overseas empire from France and Spain. In some ways the war was actually a success for Britian.
Viewing the war from the British perspective is in many ways far more interesting than from the typical American perspective. There are still a few minor issues: Mackesy does not translate any of the French phrases used in the book. Sometimes he even refers to Britian in the first person ("we", "ours", "us", etc.), which makes for sometimes confusing reading. Still, this an excellent book well worth the time of any student of the Revolutionary War.
Of the many monuments built to memorialize the battles of the American Revolution, arguably the most unusual of these is not in the United States but on the island of Jamaica. It is there in the former capital of Spanish Town that one can find, underneath a colonnaded rotunda flanked by two cannons, a marble statue of Admiral George Brydges Rodney. Carved to commemorate his triumph over a Franco-Spanish fleet at the Battle of the Saintes in 1782, it depicts him in the uniform of a Roman general, gesturing with a baton in his right hand while his left hand rests upon the hilt of a sword which itself is sitting atop a shield propped up amidst seaweed and shells.
What makes this statue so unusual is not its incongruous portrayal of an admiral in a Roman uniform, but that it even exists at all. For despite winning numerous battles during the eight years of their war in America, Rodney’s Memorial is the only one erected by the British to glorify one of their commanders for a victory he won in it. In this respect it serves as a perfect metaphor for the way the conflict is understood today, for while there are innumerable books about the war the overwhelming majority of them focus primarily on the American side of it. This is one of the things that makes Piers Mackesy’s book so valuable. Rather than recounting the conflict from the viewpoint of the rebels Mackesy addresses instead how the British responded militarily to the rebellion in their North American colonies, detailing the factors that shaped their strategic decisions and their struggles to turn those decisions into victory.
As Macksey makes clear, the outbreak of war in 1775 caught the British government by surprise. Unprepared for such a challenge, they rushed to mobilize their forces and devise a strategy for them. Underpinning the latter was the assumption that the majority of the colonists were loyal, and that they would rise up in support of the Crown if given the opportunity to do so. Fueled by the assurances of prominent loyalists in the colonies, this belief shaped many of the decisions that would drive British strategy for the next six years, most critically that only a moderate military effort was needed to suppress a challenge posed by an extremist minority.
To that end, the British sought to isolate the rebellion from the rest of the colony. Their plan was to occupy New York City and build it up as a base, then march up the Hudson River to meet a second force sent south from Quebec. This would have the dual effect of cutting off New England from the other colonies and crushing them economically, while rallying loyalists throughout the region against the rebellion. Initially British forces enjoyed considerable success towards accomplishing these goals, as William Howe’s victory over George Washington at the Battle of Long Island forced the rebels to evacuate New York. Ultimate success was thwarted by the Americans, though, when John Burgoyne’s army surrendered to the Americans at Saratoga in October 1777 – a defeat which proved the turning point of the war
Burgoyne’s defeat changed the scope of the conflict for the British. In its aftermath the French joined in support of the Americans, turning an internal rebellion in one corner of the British empire into a much larger struggle for wealth and power. Exacerbating Britain’s difficulties further was the fact that, unlike in previous conflicts, France was now able to concentrate their full financial and military might against the British, without having to wage simultaneously a war on the European continent. And with Spain’s entry into the war in alliance with France in 1779 the Royal Navy was outnumbered on the seas for the first time. Ships and regiments intended for the North American colonies now had to be held back to protect against a possible invasion, or were redeployed to defend British colonies in the West Indies. And with their support in Parliament eroding, North’s government found it increasingly difficult to secure the necessary votes to finance a war with no real likelihood of success.
It was in search of the elusive prospect of victory that the British shifted their attention towards the southern colonies. After successfully clearing Georgia of rebel activity, British forces moved northwards into the Carolinas to deal with the rebellion there. There, however, the encountered the same dilemma that they faced in the north. For while the British could maintain control of the region when they dispersed their regiments through it, concentrating them to face Continental forces jeopardized their gains and exposed the outnumbered Loyalists in the region to retribution from vengeful rebels. It was an effort to resolve this dilemma by cutting off the rebels from their support to the north that Charles Cornwallis advanced into Virginia, only to be trapped in Yorktown when a French fleet cut him off from naval support.
Washington’s victory at Yorktown in October 1781 secured America’s independence, but it did not end the conflict. In its aftermath the French withdrew their fleet to the West Indies to pursue opportunities there. While Rodney’s victory over the French at the Saintes ended the threat to Britain’s colonies in the region, it occurred too late to save North’s government from a vote of no confidence. Thanks to Rodney and the relief of the Franco-Spanish siege of Gibraltar, North’s successor, Lord Shelburne, was able to secure a far more favorable peace than seemed possible when Cornwallis’s army surrendered, though one that still cost the empire their most substantial possessions.
While not uncritical of their efforts Mackesy is generally sympathetic to Britain’s wartime leadership, noting the challenges the faced and their considerable (if not ultimate) successes in addressing them. His assessments are one of the book’s greatest strengths, as unlike far too many historians he does not shy away from rendering judgments and offering his explanation for them. This is of a piece with the book as a whole. Drawing upon a formidable range of archival materials, he uses these materials to inform his incisive analysis of British strategy during their war for America. While some may not agree with his conclusions, they cannot afford to ignore his book, which even a half-century later remains the single best study about Britain’s effort to hold onto their colonies during the American Revolution, and one that is necessary reading for anyone seeking a well-rounded understanding of the factors that shaped the struggle for independence.
_The War for America_ is an exhaustive, densely written, often difficult, but ultimately rewarding, account of the American revolution from the British point of view. It does not provide blow by blow descriptions of all the battles, but rather a minutely in-depth look at the behind the scenes politics in England that affected the course of the conflict from start to finish.
In this reviewer's humble opinion, the book should be required reading for every American, as it explains something no American is ever taught in school: that the colonies were only one theater in a war that drew in other countries (notably France and Spain) and was therefore actually World War 0 (i.e. the world war before WWI). As Mackesy writes: "The struggle had opened in a grey dawn at Lexington; its last shot was fired eight years later on the other side of the world outside a dusty town in southern India."
An exceptionally well-written and interesting perspective on the American Revolution (or rebellion). The author approaches the war from the British Standpoint at a Geo-political level and is, by my accounting, relatively non-biased. Mackesy wrote the book while at Princeton during Vietnam but could have been writing to those thinking about our efforts in Afghanistan. The author is an Army Brat; served as a platoon leader/staff officer in Armored/Cavalry unit at closing of WWII and his Father commanded Norway campaign. He is also author of biography of Germain, British Secretary of Staff for America and main architect of war. He puts in context the conventional wisdom of the British of America and Americans at the opening of the revolution and focuses less on assigning blame and more on why did British decision makers make the decisions they made in the course of the war; particularly what influenced their decisions. I highly recommend this book for those looking on additional perspective on the American Revolution.
A good strategic overview of the Revolutionary War from the British perspective. If you want a blow by blow battle by battle narrative this is not for you. This is a painstaking analysis of how a powerful but flawed military machine was defeated at least in part by not being able to apply that power effectively, caused by both circumstances (particularly naval) & personalities. Britain’s performance in this conflict was not as disastrous as is often supposed, fighting 3 powers across the globe for over 6 years without compromising the rest of her possessions other than America.
Good book for anyone interested in military history. Focus is the British governments strategic problems during this war. A bit of a difficult read and some familiarity with 18th century naval tactics is assumed, but it is a different perspective of this conflict than most Americans are familiar with.
Outstanding. I enjoy reading about the American Revolution but this book is very different from the ones I have read. This well researched and laid out book is from the perspective of the British. Americans often see the revolution as the center of efforts, but for the British it was one of several challenges. The author is writing at the upper operational and strategic levels of war and shows how the British had to balance competing requirements across the globe while executing a counterinsurgency (some would characterize it as a civil war) in the Americas with the French and Spanish taking advantage of the action.
Complicated dry reading. Reads like a text book. Very informative if you want to know what the British were thinking and doing during America's struggle for independence. If you are a serious student of American History, then this book is a must.
The French Navy saved our behinds and gave us breathing room to reconstruct our military stance. The infighting in British Parliament caused great confusion and distrust between the admiralty and politicians. Call it fate or whatever, however, if Washington didn't have the tenacity he possessed and the alliances needed from the French, we would have met the fate as Canada did still under British rule.
Super detailed study of the American Revolution from the British perspective. Great focus is placed on strategic planning, leadership in London, and court politics. I now have a much greater appreciation of the logistical difficulty that the Brits faced during the entire conflict. Don't expect details about battles. The only reason that I give this four instead of five stars is that it is very dry and dull.
The coverage of the logistics of the war were well written and thoughtful. This book is a testament to Clausewitz's dictum that amateurs study tactics while professionals study logistics.
How did the American colonies defeat the world's strongest military? Well, we need to read books like this and Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy book "Divided Empire" to find the background behind the whole story.
This book isn't involved with the details of battles but of the never-ending changes in strategy and the infighting between their Lords and military leaders. It tells of the miscommunications and missed opportunities of moving ships, supplies and men to the three fronts of the war.
I say three fronts because until France and Spain entered the war England was playing "whack a mole" with the Continental Army. With their arrival the war expanded from England simply fighting in North America to having to defend their highly profitable sugar plantation colonies in the Carribean and England itself from invasion. As the author points out this is the only war of the eighteenth century in which England failed to win ascendancy at sea.
"Anglo-American ideas of rights of man were not generally well received in the political society of Europe; and it would not be wise to appeal to these, putting in the mouth of a French king assertions of natural liberty, popular sovereignty, and inalienable rights straight out of Rousseau's Social Contract" (pg. 161). So, if they weren't concerned with American independence or the rights of man what was France and Spain looking to gain? They signed an offensive alliance against England, the Convention of Aranjuez where Spain was to recover Gibraltar and to France the alliance promised Newfoundland, the recovery of Senegal and Dominica, re-establishment in India, and a share of Honduras logging.
While the author makes it confusing at times by simply referring to titles of people, he assumes we know who he is talking about I highly recommend this book to anyone who is serious about learning about the American Revolution because History is written by more than just the winners.
This work still stands out as the best military history of the American War of Independence, period. That's not saying as much as it should, because way too many of the books on that war are at best one-sided and at worst patriotic drivel. Macksey is an excellent military historian but a mediocre writer, and the book can be a slog. But he sees the whole picture because, as a Briton, he isn't obsessed with the war in North America to the exclusion of the wider war in which the American Revolution was embedded. And he understands that from London's perspective, by 1777 the war in North America was already starting to move from the center to the periphery of British interests. In my opinion, the indecisive Battle of Ushant was as important to Britain's strategic objectives as Saratoga or even Yorktown. It was from the moment the Royal Navy failed to establish an ascendant position at sea that things started to go horribly wrong for the British, and it wasn't until the Saintes that the ship of state was righted. This is a major corrective for those who want a better understanding of the War for America.
A grand methodological look at the internal parties involved during the revolution in Britain. This war consumes the fancy of many American writers, and yet has become obfuscated in the British national ethos, with its mainstream currency banking on the seniority's folly. Mackesy covers the lamentable condition that Lord North and Secretary of State for the Colonies, George Germain were embroiled in where centralisation of the military administration and offices was a stifled work in progress. With bickering admiralties and preferment of Generals, amidst a general antipathy to even fighting an American war, or a global one, the myth of a powerful stoic enemy across the waters becomes undone. One is left even more quizzical and awkward when fronted with the harsh reality rather than the age old visceral reaction.
Indispensable analysis of the top British politicians, generals and admirals who had to figure out how to fight the AWI, all while fighting each other. Know your AWI before you pick this up.
2008-01 - The War for America: 1775-1783. Piers Mackesy (Author). 1964. 565 pages.
This book presents the history of the war from a British point view. Given that it is from a British point of view it covers the war in its entirety from the causes and collision on the green in Lexington, MA to the final shots exchanged in India some eight years later.
The scope of this tome is at the strategic level. This will make it a bit of a surprise for most American readers who are used to the tactical and the operational when it comes this truly global conflict. Global in that the action takes place not just in North America, but also: The East Indies, The West Indies, Central America, The Caribbean, Gibraltar, Minorca, The English Channel, The Atlantic, Africa, and of course India.
In fact the percentage of text which actually covers the operations in North America which most Americans are familiar with is only about 25% of the book. Because it is a strategic overview there is much of the political wrangling which shaped the strategy and limited it as well. This means that readers more familiar with land operations are in for a whole lot of naval history in this book.
The highlights of this book besides its readability given the complexity of the topic are the focus on logistics. As any scholar of war in the American tradition knows logistics trump tactics. This book provides a keen insight into British abilities, failures and accomplishments when trying to fight a global campaign. Of note is the revelation that most British supplies from shovels, bullets, uniforms and even food for the operations in North America were shipped in from the home islands some 3,000 miles away. The logistical achievement of crown forces is a marvel given the limitations they faced when compared to modern abilities.
I must admit that my own familiarity with the naval actions, the island conflicts with Spain, the Dutch, and the French as well as the political shapings was very limited until I read this text. This did help me with my own focus (Campaigns of 1777 and conflict on the NW frontier) as it helped place the choices, plans, and actions into the complete context of British goals and aspirations. What clearly stands out is that the British lacked an agreed on coherent strategy for subduing the rebellion. This was a result of many in the government having no stomach for the conflict or sympathy for the ideals. The fluctuation between a land and a sea based strategy and between kindness and cruelty mixed in with the economic considerations seemed to be situations which the British largely worked out after the war was done in preparation for their struggle against Napoleon.
Mixed in with the conflicted aspirations was a disbelief that the Americans could actually win the conflict until the French joined in. There was among the British military and politicos a constant under appreciation of the American militia and Continentals which has it roots in the Seven Years War. This under appreciation contributed to their over valuation of the loyalists numbers, support and abilities. It is clear that the British did understand though how close the Americans were to total dissolution in 1780. Though even with that understanding they still really did not understand Washington or his army. Washington though not discussed at any length in this text seems to plague the British as they never really grasp this man and his role. This is natural considering that the British were far more concerned about the French and their abilities and intentions.
Though it must be admitted that many modern Americans simply fail also to grasp the centrality of Washington and the role that played and the role that he continues to play. As the song plays out: “Yet think not thirst of glory unsheathes our vengeful swords To rend your bands asunder, or cast away your cords 'Tis heaven-born freedom fires us all, and strengthens each brave son, For him who humbly guides the plough to god-like Washington.”
The text is accompanied by a good appendix listing troop strengths and locations for various years.