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Agony At Anzio
December 1943. With the deadline for the massive OVERLORD invasion swiftly approaching, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief were locked in a bitter struggle over tactics. Churchill demanded a bold stroke on the Italian front. Stalin and the U.S. generals disagreed. But Churchill persisted . . . and the bloody result was a daring amphibious invasion of the Italian coastline just thirty miles south of Rome and behind German lines!
This controversial move almost proved disastrous. Nazi assassins were sent to kill the American commanders, and the invasion force was undersupplied and battle-weary. But in vicious hand-to-hand combat, the Allies emerged victorious . . . in the agonizing battle that broke the spine of German resistance on the Italian front.
This controversial move almost proved disastrous. Nazi assassins were sent to kill the American commanders, and the invasion force was undersupplied and battle-weary. But in vicious hand-to-hand combat, the Allies emerged victorious . . . in the agonizing battle that broke the spine of German resistance on the Italian front.
- GenresMilitary History
291 pages, Mass Market Paperback
First published January 1, 1990
About the author
William B. Breuer
41 books17 followersWilliam B. Breuer landed with the first assault waves in Normandy on D-Day (June 6, 1944), then fought across Europe. Later, he founded a daily newspaper on a string in Rolla, Missouri, and after that, a highly successful public relations firm in St. Louis, Missouri. He had been writing books full time since 1982
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
August 28, 2022
A fairly enjoyable book but because of the lack of a cohesive argument, it fell short in some regards. Probably 3.5 stars.
The book points out some of the contradictions in the Allied strategy for the invasion of Anzio and Nettuno, but these are well known. They can be mostly put down to half-heartedness: not enough resources put into it initially, and failure to exploit the early advantage gained. The author concludes that General Lucas bore the brunt of the criticism for this, and probably quite rightly exonerates him - he was following orders and the mad rush for the Alban Hills, or Rome would have exposed the Allies to greater danger. The real problem comes down to Churchill's misplaced notion that the landing itself would cause Kesselring to withdraw North-West. Of course, he did nothing of the sort but reinforced. Ultimately this had the effect of helping the Allied invasion of Normandy, but this seems to be something of a retrospective effect that has since been imputed into the strategy as an intention.
This book mainly covers the experience of British and American troops and little research went into looking at the experience of the German defenders. This is a weakness, I believe, because it comes across as one sided and partial. Similarly, the author made an effort to put Anzio in context by looking at contemporaneous events on the Gustav Line, but he loses interest in this quite early on and there is scant information about this.
The record of the fighting is quite detailed but is delivered somewhat staccato. The author jumps from one unrelated event to another and it is often quite difficult to follow that shifting.
Also, there could have been better maps to get an overview of the position of each division, as though these were confused on the ground, other historians have made a far better job of it.
The book points out some of the contradictions in the Allied strategy for the invasion of Anzio and Nettuno, but these are well known. They can be mostly put down to half-heartedness: not enough resources put into it initially, and failure to exploit the early advantage gained. The author concludes that General Lucas bore the brunt of the criticism for this, and probably quite rightly exonerates him - he was following orders and the mad rush for the Alban Hills, or Rome would have exposed the Allies to greater danger. The real problem comes down to Churchill's misplaced notion that the landing itself would cause Kesselring to withdraw North-West. Of course, he did nothing of the sort but reinforced. Ultimately this had the effect of helping the Allied invasion of Normandy, but this seems to be something of a retrospective effect that has since been imputed into the strategy as an intention.
This book mainly covers the experience of British and American troops and little research went into looking at the experience of the German defenders. This is a weakness, I believe, because it comes across as one sided and partial. Similarly, the author made an effort to put Anzio in context by looking at contemporaneous events on the Gustav Line, but he loses interest in this quite early on and there is scant information about this.
The record of the fighting is quite detailed but is delivered somewhat staccato. The author jumps from one unrelated event to another and it is often quite difficult to follow that shifting.
Also, there could have been better maps to get an overview of the position of each division, as though these were confused on the ground, other historians have made a far better job of it.
Displaying 1 of 1 review