I was serving in the US Army 82nd Airborne Division 1984 - 1987 when I read this book. The Special Forces 5th Group was assigned to Fort Bragg same as us, and I loved going to the JFK Special Forces museum down Ardennes Street. The museum is detailed about the history of the SF and it was only 10 years after the Vietnam War ended, so there remained a strong Vietnam-era veteran group on base at the time.
During the war, American prisoners suffered horrific torture at the hands of the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong. They suffered deadly jungle diseases, starvation, thirst, and torture. The American military knew of what went on thanks to intelligence reports, and decided to do something about it on November 21, 1970.
Led by a brilliant Special Forces soldier, a crack unit of America's toughest fighting men raided Son Tay in Vietnam where up to 70 or more American prisoners were being held. This is their story. The book details from the start of recruiting, training, and the actual mission and aftermath. The author dives into the finer details on how some recruits had to be coerced into volunteering due to the Army's standard belief of 'Never Volunteer for Anything.' That struck a cord with me because I'd heard that saying a lot. In the end, the men in the unit volunteered to a man. Using the latest and best equipment and weapons of their day, this crack unit of Special Forces men embarked on a historical raid that is forever remembered as the Son Tay Raid. I'm not going to spoil this for readers by giving away details. It's a great read for military historians!
This hard to find book details the Son Tay Prison Rescue Raid. When I was at Bragg, there were guys teaching at the JFK Center who'd been on this raid. Even though the prisoners had been moved, the raid really lifted morale for a lot of POWs who knew they hadn't been forgotten. There's also a theory that a large motivation for the raid was to kill Chinese advisers to the NVA who were at the camp.
In the scrolls of Elders it is written that someone got hold of James Cameron's December 1983 script titled FIRST BLOOD II: The Mission (which provided more than just the foundation of David Morrell's novelization of RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II) and transformed it into something at the 80s action-shlock powerhouse Cannon Films and would later be released in November 1984 as MISSING IN ACTION, starring Chuck Norris. Almost six months later to the day, Sly Stallone cemented himself into the annals of cinematic lore with a huge domestic and international splash, the sequel to FIRST BLOOD, known around the world simply as RAMBO 2. Both films took a complex issue, presumed American POWs in Vietnam, and simplified their return in cordite drenched machismo to heal America's still aching wound of the Vietnam War. THE RAID, published in '76 and way before both film ideas swam in the ether, demonstrates that it's not a determined lone warrior hatchet job assaulting a prison camp deep in enemy territory to bring the boys home, but a coordinated effort that takes planning, training, financing, procuring, skill, killing, and luck. Lots of it.
As a host of movies in the 1980s confirmed, busting out POWs was not a new concept and not a unique attempt. Out of 45 raids to rescue Americans between 66 and 1970, only one was successful. By the time 1973 rolled around, 119 rescue missions had resulted in still only one American prisoner recovered. The Son Tay raid, fascinating President Nixon in an impromptu Oval Office pitch, was just the biggest and most visible after the fact, and had the most sensationalized outcome; a big nothing burger that forced the reorganization of the US Intelligence community shortly thereafter. Thus, with the highest approval, the Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) was born and going full-steam faster than you can say 'Baby Water Buffalo'. It was a very Pentagon, close to the E Ring, hush huh, way beyond 'Top Secret' or 'Q clearance' type of deal. Out of the more than 500 volunteers of 6th and 7th Special Forces Group, 59 Raiders eventually made the cut, and that was only the beginning of the ordeal. The training was thorough, definitive, and intense. The air crews among the best available. Codenamed 'Kingpin', Operation Ivory Coast would use surprise, speed, and simplicity to guarantee success. The entire enterprise lasted from May to November 1970, from planning through execution, and bears the high quality watermark of any US Military operation similar to SNAFUs detailed in other great books the likes of A BRIGHT SHINING LIE by Neil Sheehan, ON WINGS OF EAGLES by Ken Follett, BLACKHAWK DOWN by MARK BOWDEN, and DELTA FORCE by Charlie Beckwith. Despite a 'Carte Blanche' letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordering full cooperation and an open budget, Operation Ivory Coast ran into supply problems for the planned raid on the Son Tay Prison Camp in North Vietnam. Ironically, the Sears Roebuck mail-order catalog saved the day.
To evoke the proper commitment from readers, THE RAID delves into a detailed history and explanation of Hoa Lo prison, aka Heartbreak Hotel in downtown Hanoi, dubbed the 'Hanoi Hilton' by its prisoners. Setting the scene with examples of the cruel and painful torture and conditions therein, the picture of captivity in North Vietnam was unreal, unbelievable, and not of this world. The North Vietnamese were consistent only in their inconsistency--and their brutality. As reported by released and escaped prisoners, pain and suffering was the order of most days. When acting up during official humanitarian visits, show prisoners were allegedly told "You shall know pain." And they all did. Understandably, the American public and military rank and file were itching to free those who risked all, dissatisfied with diplomatic efforts and channels stymied and blocked by the North Vietnamese. With plenty of boys rotting away, Son Tay citadel was activated on 5.24.68, stocked with 20 prisoners from the Hanoi Hilton, precisely 17 years before RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II would be released on Memorial Day weekend). Located 23 miles west of Hanoi and close to the provincial capital Son Tay, the prison camp was on the Song Con River, and housed 55 to 61 prisoners at various times. Conditions were primitive and brutal. Perhaps the perfect place to raid. Maybe too perfect.
THE RAID perfectly conveys the info its supposed to deliver, going the extra mile with additional fast track reviews of Army Special Forces, the Phoenix Operations, Studies and Observation Group (SOG), CIA, and psy-ops throughout Indochina, including fascinating reveals about the CIA, SOG, and weather modification activities near Laos (a rainmaking program named Operation Popeye!). Possibly too clinical and factual, THE RAID lacks some of the verve and zest of the previously mentioned tomes, though is at times highly entertaining with choice opinion such as "War is not a pink tea business," that it takes all kinds of clowns to make an Army work, and lingo like imbroglio, G-2ing it, and Dead Man's Curve. Being jam packed with interesting info, tidbits, and procedures, THE RAID also alleges that the only thing that the Son Tay raid proves was that it's nigh on impossible to stop the weight of the military bureaucracy once it gets rolling. Irrespective of where the reader lands on the spectrum, success or failure, of the 59 raiders participating in THE RAID, 50 of the troopers received at least a Silver Star, which cost the American taxpayer $1.70 each. Long on courage, daring, bravado, frustrating bureaucracy, and patriotism, THE RAID is a stellar account of the most visible POW rescue mission of the Vietnam War. To re-live the hope, the promise, the action and the juice of bringing back the boys, read THE RAID and get on the chopper.
"(General) Blackburn spent much of the day reviewing NSA's latest electronic intercepts; an updated 'air order of battle' was sent to Takhli (staging base in central Thailand), giving (General) Manor (overall commander of the raid) a last-minute status report on North Vietnam's air defense system." (page 170)
"The Son Tay raid had been given the number-one priority of all electronic intelligence work worldwide. An 'updated' electronic order of battle, air order of battle, and missile order of battle would be flown to Takhli (staging base in central Thailand) on Thursday, November 19, just before the mission launched." (page 151)
Extraordinary to see how much went into the effort to rescue these American servicemen and so sad for the same reason when it doesn't work out. Almost heartbreaking to read this and then "The Guts to Try" where some of the same individuals encounter an equally frustrating end.
I saw this book in the early 2000s, bought it and read it straight through, but not for the reason most would think. I was USAF assigned to CIA, Langley. We were to identify what POWS were alive and dead. It was in 1969-70. We had a letter writer named Brudno whose letters to his wife made no sense, He talked of his Jewish cousin Sue who got arrested across from a police station and kept saying Oy Veh. We actually invited Brudno's wife to Bolling AFB and debriefed her on what he was trying to tell us. Long story but he was getting Sue Oy to us and was a POW there. That meant nothing until we learned that was an old name for a town Son Tay!. No one knew of this camp. Recce was flown and it was discovered. Nothing came up and I got out of the service June 1, 1970. Later in November I would hear that the raid took place and no POWs. Brudno came home in 1973 and was the first POW to commit suicide. Years passed until this book and I learned that we were seeding the clouds in Laos to make it rain on the Ho Trail. We flooded out the camp!
Alan Brudno's name was added to the Wall in the early 2000s after much work by his brother to have his name added even though he did not die in Vietnam. There was resistance for years but with the help of journalist Joseph Galloway it came to happen. Without this book I would never have learned what did happen.In addition I have met the brother and Brudno's widow as well as Galloway. I know the author has died and I only wish I could have shared this with him
Dennis Marek
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Short account of the Special Forces raid on a Vietnamese prison camp site at the end of the Vietnam war. Interesting to see how the planning for something starts, and how once it's started it has a life of its own. The raid was ultimately unsuccessful (because the prisoners were moved to a different location shortly after the initial intelligence was received, and the mission took 4 more months to plan and execute), and some data suggesting it would be an empty camp was discounted, but the thought process was somewhat logical and the decision making apparatus (which went all the way to Nixon for approval) was complex.
This was a story of a top secret mission to rescue 61 POW’s at Son Tay prison compound 23 miles from Hanoi, North Vietnam. The book goes into detail about the planning and execution of the rescue attempt and what went right and what went wrong. Their mission gave the POW’s hope who were prisoners in Hanoi Hilton prison camp. The author did his research to write a detailed account for his book.
I read this when I was about 19, just prior to the Iran hostage raid that attempted to replicate the Son Tay Raid to free hostages in Tehran, and also prior to my service in Army Special Operations. I have reflected on the lessons of this book often since reading it, and if one also reads Charlie Beckwith's book, Delta Force, it's easy to see why the Iran raid failed while the Son Tay raid was carried out exactly as planned, despite the intelligence failure that deprived the raiders of the knowledge that the prisoners had been moved. In the case of Iran-Desert One, the lack of inter-service cooperation and interoperability, coupled with the stupid requirement to insure each service got to play doomed the mission, and led to the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command.
As one who participated in multiple rehearsals for raids of this type while on active duty, it is hard to describe how difficult it is to orchestrate such a complex operation. A big part of success is the ability of commanders to specially select soldiers and aircrews for such missions, as the Rangers and Delta and TF160 do with screening processes, often months long, to select only those who meet their standards. It has to be that way, because as any one who has done this kind of thing knows, planning and rehearsal are essential, but something almost always goes wrong during the actual op, and then you need excellent people on the ground who are smart and fit and well-trained enough to ad lib and make the mission a success anyway.
A lot of what was pioneered by the Son Tay Raiders became standard procedure for US Special Ops forces, so it is interesting to see the origin story in this book, but heartbreaking that they came so close, yet failed to bring back the POW's because of bad intelligence. For those who study military operations, bad intelligence is more the norm than the exception; maybe someday the US government will do something serious about demanding real results from the intelligence community that that the taxpayer funds to the tune of $100B USD annually.
A most interesting book! Regretfully, not as well known as it should be. The Son Tay raid was the first use of UAVs in intelligence gathering (the Buffalo Hunters sent over the camp.) The structure of the raiding force (handpicked volunteers, use of commercial sources for equipment v. the supply system) and its training are clear forerunners of the modern Special Operations forces.
One thing I've always wondered about.... It looks like the raiders had to fight their way out of an ambush at the camp. Was the raid given away by John Anthony Walker?
Not as detailed an account of the minutes on the ground as in another book I have read on the subject, but certainly comprehensive on the planning, and the aftermath and impact of the decisions surrounding the rescue attempt.