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The Norton History of Modern Europe #7
The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present
Since its first publication over thirty years ago, The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present has offered students a concise and authoritative historical narrative of the events that shaped twentieth-century Europe. The Fifth Edition retains these strengths while embracing recent developments and current research. The text covers a century of rapid and tumultuous change, from increased population and migration in the early 1900s through the ongoing unrest in the Balkans.
668 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1971
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
February 16, 2016
I read this book years ago and have now reread the first part, the one related to WW1. The “Present” alluded to in the title is the 1970s.
Felix Gilbert (1905-1991) was a half German half British historian who became American in the 1930s. His mother was the granddaughter of the musician Felix Mendelssohn (so we should not be surprised at Gilbert's given name). His expertise was really the Renaissance and his book Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence is also in my TBR.
I have limited myself to the years until the end of the First War, as part of my reading around the debacle that we are commemorating this year.
This book is almost like a textbook. It is so very clear and so broad in its range. It is clear in the writing, in the development of ideas and arguments, and it touches on the Financial, Demographic, Political, Social, Cultural, and Military aspects of this complex period.
After a few chapters on some general aspects, which were either shared or in which the European countries differed, he then groups these powers according to two big buckets. Some had a Parliamentary Government (UK, France, Spain and Italy) and some functioned under an Authoritarian Government (Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary). Once the players are presented he traces the Dance of Alliances in which dancers kept changing partners as each new diplomatic crises arose: the First Moroccan crisis, the Bosnian one, the Second Moroccan crisis, the First Balkan wars, etc, and onto the Final Outbreak.
The war itself is developed with a similar clarity, discussing the geographic theatres as conceived by the various powers, and bringing in very plainly the determinant role the Russian revolution and the later entry of the US had on the conflict.
Gilbert’s choice of introducing the players along the two axes of Parliamentary-Authoritarian proves very appropriate as he then later expounds on the domestic political changes undergone by the various countries. In all of them there was either an abrupt change of Cabinet or an even more abrupt transformation materialized in full-fledged revolutions.
The book is also nicely illustrated, and most important, comes with a series of maps tracking the shifting of frontiers during the succeeding years of warfare.
Gilbert's volume then for me acts as the neutral scaffolding on which I can place other readings with various interpretations of this war.
January 23, 2021
The sad but valid title of this book reveals that it is the final volume in the generally excellent Norton History of Modern Europe. Roughly double the length of others in the series, it was written by the general editor, Felix Gilbert, a fellow at the legendary Institute for Advanced Study.
The text is a methodical, thorough chronological narrative of the period that enables the reader to put well-known events into a broad perspective of historical development without reaching for grand theories.
Gilbert's main focus is on domestic and international politics, including the wars. On these subjects he is in total command. However, his comments on the leading characters of the period (Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Churchill, etc.) do not provide sharp insight, with the exception of some telling remarks about Charles de Gaulle. He sensibly adds color with occasional references to contemporary literature, and does not spend time on modern art.
Gilbert's analyses of the economic disasters and recoveries of the period are sometimes weak or contradictory. When the British Labor Party nationalized major industries in the late 1940s, Gilbert calls it "coincidence" that a "severe economic crisis" ensued, and this policy failed to benefit the "masses". But in France, he observes that the costs of industrial nationalizations and other government expenditures aggravated “[t]he development which hurt the French people most”, namely price inflation.
He mentions needs for "land reform", meaning redistribution of farmland into smaller units -- for example, in southern Italy. But elsewhere he notes that southeastern Europe was severely hurt during the Depression of the 1930s because "small farms with...high production costs were the prevailing form of land ownership."
The book has additional more serious issues.
On the painful subject of the crimes of the National Socialists, or Nazis, against Jews and others -- surely among the most significant events of the century -- Gilbert remains rather cerebral. (Gilbert was himself a German Jew who found safe refuge in America.) He narrates the Nazi meeting at Wannsee in January, 1942 that planned the "final solution". The resulting plan to "comb" Europe of Jews from west to east meant "of course" the death camps and gas chambers. Gilbert does not mention the Einsatzgruppen that conducted mass murders across Eastern Europe; the large network of camps in multiple countries; the living and dying conditions in the camps; the medical experiments. A mere two or three sentences on the implementation of the Holocaust is inadequate in a book that earlier on devotes two pages to the idealistic musings of Sidney and Beatrice Webb.
The book's treatment of Bolshevik Socialism, or Communism, has more pervasive flaws.
Gilbert mentions that Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin's last will included a statement that Stalin was too ruthless to hold power. This failed request does not absolve Lenin of responsibility for what followed in Russia. From the moment he stepped off a train provided by Russia's German enemy in April, 1917, Lenin fought for two goals -- socialist revolution and Bolshevik dictatorship -- "with ruthless single-mindedness and with a complete disregard for human life and legal restrictions." Despite a brief period of economic relaxation necessitated by civil war, it was Lenin who established absolute Communist Party control over ideology, propaganda, domestic affairs, and the international Communist movement. Following Lenin’s death, Stalin took these powers into his own hands starting in 1924.
Gilbert highlights Stalin's relentless focus on state-run planning and rapid industrial development. But his description of forced agricultural collectivization -- which increased in brutality in order to crush resistance by the kulaks or wealthier peasants -- neglects to mention the human costs of these policies: the starvation to death of millions of peasant families. Gilbert even claims that despite exaggerated propaganda, "the main goals [of the Soviet Five-Year Plans] were undoubtedly achieved" -- overlooking that increased agricultural efficiency was a principal goal of those plans.
As for Stalin’s methods of political control, the author’s summary of the infamous show trials in the 1930s fails to capture the absurdity of lifelong Communist leaders breathlessly denouncing themselves as conspiring traitors. Gilbert’s understatement that such confessions were "perhaps obtained through pressure" is laughable.
Gilbert does not mention Stalin's annotated execution lists of tens of thousands of names, instead maintaining that Stalin had "rational cause to fear the influence" of potential Bolshevik opponents. His text makes no reference to the Gulag, though Solzhenitsyn is listed in his bibliography. He also omits the Soviet Union's pervasive controls and intrusive spying on all aspects of private life.
Most serious of all, in 1937, Stalin arrested and executed eight of Russia's best military leaders, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Then in 1939, he signed the Nazi-Soviet pact with Hitler, cynically agreeing to split Poland in two based on the incorrect assumption that this would concentrate Nazi aggression on France and Britain rather than Russia. Stalin sought to uphold this agreement rather than prepare Russia for war. Gilbert fails to mention that these steps severely increased Russia's vulnerability; when the Nazis invaded unprepared Russia in 1941, they were able to penetrate quickly to Moscow, Leningrad and in 1942, to Stalingrad. The catastrophic setbacks during the Nazi invasion and the horrible battles that followed caused the deaths of millions of Russian soldiers and civilians -- not mentioned by Gilbert.
In the postwar period, when Eastern Europe was dominated by the Soviet Union, Gilbert describes the widespread resistance to “forced and rapid collectivization”. This developed into serious rebellions against Soviet authority in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), which the Russians put down with military force. Gilbert does not explain why such passionate resistance to Communist policies and Russian domination recurred in various forms across most of Eastern Europe. This was suppressed by secret police, domestic spies, political arrests, and military force.
It is not surprising therefore that the author, writing in 1979, like most academic experts failed to perceive the weaknesses of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe. It took political leaders of vision (Reagan, Kohl, Gorbachev) to bring down the Berlin Wall, liberate Eastern Europe, and end Communism in Russia.
Like the prominence of Europe itself, Gilbert's book ends without a flourish. In concluding, he refers to Orwell's 1984 and raises the excellent question, what does history mean after a period of such thorough transformation? His answer, which alludes to the final breakdown of Europe's feudal legacy and its replacement with social equality, is at best incomplete.
Nor does he address other questions one could well ask about Europe's decline: Was it inevitable? Where did the crucial turns occur that led to this outcome? What have the welfare state and the Brussels bureaucracy contributed to Europe's strength or weakness? What is the role of Europe in today's world?
As global leadership and power are redistributed from Europe to the United States, China, and elsewhere, what elements of Europe's heritage and culture will serve as a resource and inspiration, and which will be lost?
At the end of his tour through the bloodiest years in European history, Gilbert leaves it to the reader to ponder these difficult questions.
(The above is a review of the second edition, published in 1979.)
The text is a methodical, thorough chronological narrative of the period that enables the reader to put well-known events into a broad perspective of historical development without reaching for grand theories.
Gilbert's main focus is on domestic and international politics, including the wars. On these subjects he is in total command. However, his comments on the leading characters of the period (Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Churchill, etc.) do not provide sharp insight, with the exception of some telling remarks about Charles de Gaulle. He sensibly adds color with occasional references to contemporary literature, and does not spend time on modern art.
Gilbert's analyses of the economic disasters and recoveries of the period are sometimes weak or contradictory. When the British Labor Party nationalized major industries in the late 1940s, Gilbert calls it "coincidence" that a "severe economic crisis" ensued, and this policy failed to benefit the "masses". But in France, he observes that the costs of industrial nationalizations and other government expenditures aggravated “[t]he development which hurt the French people most”, namely price inflation.
He mentions needs for "land reform", meaning redistribution of farmland into smaller units -- for example, in southern Italy. But elsewhere he notes that southeastern Europe was severely hurt during the Depression of the 1930s because "small farms with...high production costs were the prevailing form of land ownership."
The book has additional more serious issues.
On the painful subject of the crimes of the National Socialists, or Nazis, against Jews and others -- surely among the most significant events of the century -- Gilbert remains rather cerebral. (Gilbert was himself a German Jew who found safe refuge in America.) He narrates the Nazi meeting at Wannsee in January, 1942 that planned the "final solution". The resulting plan to "comb" Europe of Jews from west to east meant "of course" the death camps and gas chambers. Gilbert does not mention the Einsatzgruppen that conducted mass murders across Eastern Europe; the large network of camps in multiple countries; the living and dying conditions in the camps; the medical experiments. A mere two or three sentences on the implementation of the Holocaust is inadequate in a book that earlier on devotes two pages to the idealistic musings of Sidney and Beatrice Webb.
The book's treatment of Bolshevik Socialism, or Communism, has more pervasive flaws.
Gilbert mentions that Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin's last will included a statement that Stalin was too ruthless to hold power. This failed request does not absolve Lenin of responsibility for what followed in Russia. From the moment he stepped off a train provided by Russia's German enemy in April, 1917, Lenin fought for two goals -- socialist revolution and Bolshevik dictatorship -- "with ruthless single-mindedness and with a complete disregard for human life and legal restrictions." Despite a brief period of economic relaxation necessitated by civil war, it was Lenin who established absolute Communist Party control over ideology, propaganda, domestic affairs, and the international Communist movement. Following Lenin’s death, Stalin took these powers into his own hands starting in 1924.
Gilbert highlights Stalin's relentless focus on state-run planning and rapid industrial development. But his description of forced agricultural collectivization -- which increased in brutality in order to crush resistance by the kulaks or wealthier peasants -- neglects to mention the human costs of these policies: the starvation to death of millions of peasant families. Gilbert even claims that despite exaggerated propaganda, "the main goals [of the Soviet Five-Year Plans] were undoubtedly achieved" -- overlooking that increased agricultural efficiency was a principal goal of those plans.
As for Stalin’s methods of political control, the author’s summary of the infamous show trials in the 1930s fails to capture the absurdity of lifelong Communist leaders breathlessly denouncing themselves as conspiring traitors. Gilbert’s understatement that such confessions were "perhaps obtained through pressure" is laughable.
Gilbert does not mention Stalin's annotated execution lists of tens of thousands of names, instead maintaining that Stalin had "rational cause to fear the influence" of potential Bolshevik opponents. His text makes no reference to the Gulag, though Solzhenitsyn is listed in his bibliography. He also omits the Soviet Union's pervasive controls and intrusive spying on all aspects of private life.
Most serious of all, in 1937, Stalin arrested and executed eight of Russia's best military leaders, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Then in 1939, he signed the Nazi-Soviet pact with Hitler, cynically agreeing to split Poland in two based on the incorrect assumption that this would concentrate Nazi aggression on France and Britain rather than Russia. Stalin sought to uphold this agreement rather than prepare Russia for war. Gilbert fails to mention that these steps severely increased Russia's vulnerability; when the Nazis invaded unprepared Russia in 1941, they were able to penetrate quickly to Moscow, Leningrad and in 1942, to Stalingrad. The catastrophic setbacks during the Nazi invasion and the horrible battles that followed caused the deaths of millions of Russian soldiers and civilians -- not mentioned by Gilbert.
In the postwar period, when Eastern Europe was dominated by the Soviet Union, Gilbert describes the widespread resistance to “forced and rapid collectivization”. This developed into serious rebellions against Soviet authority in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), which the Russians put down with military force. Gilbert does not explain why such passionate resistance to Communist policies and Russian domination recurred in various forms across most of Eastern Europe. This was suppressed by secret police, domestic spies, political arrests, and military force.
It is not surprising therefore that the author, writing in 1979, like most academic experts failed to perceive the weaknesses of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe. It took political leaders of vision (Reagan, Kohl, Gorbachev) to bring down the Berlin Wall, liberate Eastern Europe, and end Communism in Russia.
Like the prominence of Europe itself, Gilbert's book ends without a flourish. In concluding, he refers to Orwell's 1984 and raises the excellent question, what does history mean after a period of such thorough transformation? His answer, which alludes to the final breakdown of Europe's feudal legacy and its replacement with social equality, is at best incomplete.
Nor does he address other questions one could well ask about Europe's decline: Was it inevitable? Where did the crucial turns occur that led to this outcome? What have the welfare state and the Brussels bureaucracy contributed to Europe's strength or weakness? What is the role of Europe in today's world?
As global leadership and power are redistributed from Europe to the United States, China, and elsewhere, what elements of Europe's heritage and culture will serve as a resource and inspiration, and which will be lost?
At the end of his tour through the bloodiest years in European history, Gilbert leaves it to the reader to ponder these difficult questions.
(The above is a review of the second edition, published in 1979.)
February 26, 2015
It's got action! It's got excitement! It's got drama! It even has Portugal! I mean it's got like half a page of Portugal in it. So you know, if you think Portugal is going to get equivalent play as the rest of them, read something else called Special Time Europe History, where everyone is equal and everyone gets equal play. Shit, even Romania has more action!
Not having a dig Romania, you're ok.
Not having a dig Romania, you're ok.
July 15, 2024
I got this book for a European history class as a textbook, stopped reading it before the semester even ended, then years later picked it up because it was in my backpack and I had time to kill before class. It’s an amazing book and I learned so much I never knew
February 10, 2019
A good book, with a few, but annoying inaccuracies.
April 15, 2020
Woohoo I finished it! Used as a textbook for my class it’s fairly dense and covers all of the 20th century but I liked the authors writing style and enjoyed the book.
October 23, 2020
It's an in-depth read, however my copy is from 2010idh and is out of date. I would love to see how it has been updated in the years since
April 14, 2024
Read for class and loved it. Written in a way that kept you interested. Felt like reading stories not history which was really refreshing compared to other history books.
December 28, 2013
This is a good if superficial history of Europe in the 20th century, suitable for Freshmen or readers who want a broad introduction to the subject. I had only one or two quibbles regarding the authors' claims, mostly having to do with World War II in the Pacific, which isn't even the main topic at hand. This is a good place to start if one is completely unfamiliar with European history and politics.
March 11, 2010
It is a great book, but it is easy to get the big picture until you read all chapters about that period of time.
Want to read
June 18, 2012Gilbert, Felix; et al.
The Norton History of Modern Europe
In compilation only.
The Norton History of Modern Europe
In compilation only.
August 1, 2012
I'm not an expert or too involved with history, but I understood and liked the book. nice written with interesting data. I had to read it for a course and I really enjoyed.
Read
January 9, 2017Quite an indepth view of the early 20th century.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews