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The Chatham House Version: And Other Middle Eastern Studies
Here returned to print, at a timely moment in history, is Elie Kedourie's classic study of the Middle East in modern times. In analyzing British failures in the region during the zenith of their power and influence, Mr. Kedourie attributes much of Britain's faulty and disastrous handling of Middle East problems to what he calls "the Chatham House version." It was a view of Middle Eastern history and politics propounded and propagated in the various publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (known popularly as Chatham House), written or edited by Arnold Toynbee. The episodes that Mr. Kedourie investigates show "successive and cumulative manifestations of illusion, misjudgment, maladroitness, and failure." Together they point up hard lessons for the Bush administration or any outside power that would intervene in Middle Eastern affairs.
"No better guide...can be found to the pitfalls awaiting those who seek to control the Middle East to their own advantage."― Asian Affairs
"These twelve studies in the modern history of the Middle East [form] the most learned book, the most demanding therefore of rethinking, that has come out on the Middle East for many years, and anyone who in the future writes on any Middle Eastern subject, from any point of view, without consulting it, will do so at his or her grave peril."― London Telegraph
"No better guide...can be found to the pitfalls awaiting those who seek to control the Middle East to their own advantage."― Asian Affairs
"These twelve studies in the modern history of the Middle East [form] the most learned book, the most demanding therefore of rethinking, that has come out on the Middle East for many years, and anyone who in the future writes on any Middle Eastern subject, from any point of view, without consulting it, will do so at his or her grave peril."― London Telegraph
512 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1984
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About the author
Elie Kedourie
39 books16 followersElie Kedourie, CBE, FBA was a British historian of the Middle East. He wrote from a liberal perspective, dissenting from many points of view taken as orthodox in the field. He was at the London School of Economics (LSE) from 1953 to 1990, becoming Professor of Politics.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
February 18, 2025
Elie Kedourie’s The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies is a collection of essays that critically examines British foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the intellectual and ideological underpinnings that influenced British actions during the 20th century. Originally published in 1970, the book challenges the prevailing narratives of the time, particularly those associated with Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), which Kedourie argues promoted a naïve and misguided approach to Middle Eastern affairs.
A central theme of the book is Kedourie’s contention that British policymakers, influenced by liberal internationalist ideals and a belief in self-determination, misjudged the political and cultural realities of the region. He critiques what he sees as Britain’s romanticized and ultimately destructive engagement with Arab nationalism, particularly in the post-Ottoman period. Kedourie, known for his conservative and realist approach to international politics, argues that British policy was shaped by wishful thinking rather than a pragmatic understanding of the Middle East’s deeply entrenched political and social structures.
The book is structured as a series of essays, each addressing different aspects of British policy and intellectual thought on the Middle East. Kedourie begins with a critique of T. E. Lawrence and the mythology surrounding his role in the Arab Revolt, arguing that British officials like Lawrence promoted an unrealistic vision of Arab nationalism that had little basis in political reality. He extends this critique to Chatham House scholars and policymakers, whom he accuses of fostering an ideological commitment to self-determination that disregarded the complexities of tribal, sectarian, and authoritarian tendencies in the region.
Kedourie’s analysis is particularly scathing when discussing the British withdrawal from Palestine and the establishment of Israel. He argues that British officials, influenced by anti-imperialist sentiment and misplaced guilt over colonialism, failed to manage the transition responsibly, exacerbating tensions between Arabs and Jews. Similarly, he critiques Britain’s role in Iraq, arguing that the imposition of a Western-style state structure on a deeply divided society led to long-term instability.
One of the book’s strengths is its rigorous critique of Western intellectual assumptions about the Middle East. Kedourie’s deep knowledge of Ottoman and Middle Eastern history allows him to challenge the Eurocentric notion that democracy and nationalism could be easily transplanted into non-Western contexts. His realist perspective provides a counterbalance to more idealistic narratives that emphasize modernization and state-building.
However, the book is not without its limitations. Kedourie’s polemical style and strong ideological stance may alienate readers who favor a more balanced assessment of British policy. His dismissal of nationalist movements as largely artificial constructs imposed by Western intellectuals arguably underestimates the agency of Middle Eastern actors who shaped their own political destinies. Additionally, while Kedourie is critical of British failures, he offers little in the way of alternative policy prescriptions, beyond suggesting a more cautious and less interventionist approach.
The Chatham House Version remains a seminal work in Middle Eastern studies and diplomatic history, offering a forceful critique of British policy and the intellectual trends that shaped it. Kedourie’s arguments, though controversial, provide an essential counterpoint to prevailing narratives about decolonization and nationalism. While his skepticism of Arab nationalism and self-determination may seem excessively rigid, his insights into the dangers of ideological policymaking remain relevant for contemporary foreign policy discussions. Scholars and students of Middle Eastern history, international relations, and imperial policy will find this book an essential, if provocative, addition to their reading.
GPT
A central theme of the book is Kedourie’s contention that British policymakers, influenced by liberal internationalist ideals and a belief in self-determination, misjudged the political and cultural realities of the region. He critiques what he sees as Britain’s romanticized and ultimately destructive engagement with Arab nationalism, particularly in the post-Ottoman period. Kedourie, known for his conservative and realist approach to international politics, argues that British policy was shaped by wishful thinking rather than a pragmatic understanding of the Middle East’s deeply entrenched political and social structures.
The book is structured as a series of essays, each addressing different aspects of British policy and intellectual thought on the Middle East. Kedourie begins with a critique of T. E. Lawrence and the mythology surrounding his role in the Arab Revolt, arguing that British officials like Lawrence promoted an unrealistic vision of Arab nationalism that had little basis in political reality. He extends this critique to Chatham House scholars and policymakers, whom he accuses of fostering an ideological commitment to self-determination that disregarded the complexities of tribal, sectarian, and authoritarian tendencies in the region.
Kedourie’s analysis is particularly scathing when discussing the British withdrawal from Palestine and the establishment of Israel. He argues that British officials, influenced by anti-imperialist sentiment and misplaced guilt over colonialism, failed to manage the transition responsibly, exacerbating tensions between Arabs and Jews. Similarly, he critiques Britain’s role in Iraq, arguing that the imposition of a Western-style state structure on a deeply divided society led to long-term instability.
One of the book’s strengths is its rigorous critique of Western intellectual assumptions about the Middle East. Kedourie’s deep knowledge of Ottoman and Middle Eastern history allows him to challenge the Eurocentric notion that democracy and nationalism could be easily transplanted into non-Western contexts. His realist perspective provides a counterbalance to more idealistic narratives that emphasize modernization and state-building.
However, the book is not without its limitations. Kedourie’s polemical style and strong ideological stance may alienate readers who favor a more balanced assessment of British policy. His dismissal of nationalist movements as largely artificial constructs imposed by Western intellectuals arguably underestimates the agency of Middle Eastern actors who shaped their own political destinies. Additionally, while Kedourie is critical of British failures, he offers little in the way of alternative policy prescriptions, beyond suggesting a more cautious and less interventionist approach.
The Chatham House Version remains a seminal work in Middle Eastern studies and diplomatic history, offering a forceful critique of British policy and the intellectual trends that shaped it. Kedourie’s arguments, though controversial, provide an essential counterpoint to prevailing narratives about decolonization and nationalism. While his skepticism of Arab nationalism and self-determination may seem excessively rigid, his insights into the dangers of ideological policymaking remain relevant for contemporary foreign policy discussions. Scholars and students of Middle Eastern history, international relations, and imperial policy will find this book an essential, if provocative, addition to their reading.
GPT
March 31, 2013
Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz should have read this before deciding that Iraq was a good place to invade. It's been done before. Wolfowitz really should have known better; he probably knew the history as recounted here, but like so many, thought "this time would be different." A good companion to "The insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920," by James Aylmer Lowthorpe Haldane for those who want to understand what the U.S. didn't understand before it invaded Iraq.
April 27, 2023
Thought provoking but…
- very dense writing style
- not really for a generalist reader
- has his own academic axes to grind (and does)
So while I found a number of the themes to be compelling, hard to recommend as a good read.
- very dense writing style
- not really for a generalist reader
- has his own academic axes to grind (and does)
So while I found a number of the themes to be compelling, hard to recommend as a good read.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews