Oriana Skylar Mastro’s “Upstart: How China Became a Great Power” is a sharp, conceptually ambitious account of how China climbed into the great-power club not by mechanically copying the United States, but by acting like a strategic **startup** in world politics. Drawing on business competition theory, Mastro argues that Beijing rose through a deliberate blend of emulation, exploitation, and entrepreneurship that allowed it to expand its power while minimizing premature backlash from established powers. Mastro’s central claim is that China has pursued an “upstart strategy” defined by three Es:
- Emulation: selectively copying great-power practices where the United States clearly sets the efficiency frontier, especially in areas such as military modernization and certain aspects of foreign policy craft.
- Exploitation: targeting U.S. blind spots—regions, institutions, and issue areas Washington neglects or mismanages—to gain influence at low cost, from weaker parts of the international order to gray zones of competition.
- Entrepreneurship: innovating in domains where emulation would be too provocative or suboptimal, experimenting with new instruments of economic statecraft, security partnerships, and narrative shaping.
The book moves across four arenas—foreign policy, economics, conventional military power, and nuclear strategy—to show how these three Es operated over roughly three decades. Mastro leans heavily on granular data and Chinese-language sources to reconstruct Beijing’s choices, which gives the analysis empirical bite and helps separate cliché from genuine doctrinal change. Especially strong are the chapters that demonstrate how China leveraged “home court advantage” in regional military contests while avoiding direct, premature showdowns with U.S. strengths further afield. What makes “Upstart” especially useful is its attack on lazy historical analogies that treat China as simply another version of Wilhelmine Germany or rising America. By specifying the conditions under which a revisionist state can grow inside an order without immediately overturning it, Mastro offers policymakers a more precise diagnostic tool for anticipating Chinese moves and missteps. The closing policy guidance—which pushes the United States to become more entrepreneurial in its own statecraft rather than just “out-spend” Beijing—turns the book from an academic study into a provocative strategic manual for today’s great-power competition.