Lost Decade is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for America's present and future.
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of US foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Obama Administration's 2011 "Pivot to Asia," marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In Lost Decade, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot's strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of America's global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.
The authors stress that the US has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.
In a world increasingly dominated by the Asian economic powerhouse, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine's "Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power" rings out like a clarion call. This is not a book that dwells on past missteps, but a clarion call to action, a roadmap for America's return as the leading strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific. Blackwill and Fontaine, foreign policy heavyweights, meticulously dissect the "pivot to Asia" – a strategy with immense potential, tragically left unrealized. They expose the missed opportunities, the under-investment in vital alliances, and the failure to fully engage with the region's economic dynamism. Yet, far from being a lament, the book serves as a springboard for a renewed American commitment. The authors celebrate the enduring strengths the US brings to the table: its unwavering commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. They lay out a compelling vision for a revitalized pivot, one that prioritizes deeper economic ties, strengthens military cooperation, and fosters a vibrant network of partnerships. "Lost Decade" doesn't shy away from the challenges: China's assertive territorial claims, its economic coercion, and its attempts to reshape the regional order. However, the book is not a eulogy for American influence. It's a battle cry, a call to arms for a reinvigorated US presence that capitalizes on America's inherent advantages. Blackwill and Fontaine offer a clear-eyed assessment of the landscape, but their message is ultimately one of hope and opportunity. With a renewed commitment, the US can not only counter China's ambitions but also work collaboratively with regional partners to build a more prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific for all. This book is a must-read for anyone who believes in the enduring power of American leadership and its vital role in shaping a peaceful and prosperous future for Asia.
Lost Decade is the latest in a series of books that look at the state of US-China relations and project the future. For example: Destined for War by Graham Allison (2017), 2034: A Novel of the Next World War by Elliot Ackerman and Admiral James Stavridis (2021), The Long Game by Rush Doshi (2021), and World on the Brink by Dmitri Alperovitch (2024) all make the same point. China’s rise presents a major challenge to the United States and the U.S. is poorly positioned to meet it.
Blackwell and Fontaine, who undoubtedly are well known to many of the readers of The Cipher Brief, argue that China “poses an abiding and proximate threat to all five” vital American interests: reducing the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyberattacks against the U.S. and our allies; the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and delivery systems; maintaining a regional balance of power that promotes peace; preventing the emergence of hostile or failed states in the Western hemisphere; and maintaining the stability of major international systems in trade, finances, environment, etc. The author’s statements about the Western hemisphere and nuclear proliferation are a bit of stretch in my view, but their basic argument that U.S. interests and China’s actions put us on a collision course is hard to dispute.
The Lost Decade is an examination of U.S.-China policy from the Clinton administration to today with a concentration on the last decade, essentially the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. As far back as 1993, U.S. policymakers were talking about the importance of paying more attention to East Asia. Certainly the 1990s were a critical decade in the evolution of the region: Japan-U.S. trade frictions, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the transition to democracy in South Korea and Taiwan, the Asian tiger economies and the Asian financial crisis, etc. I was Director of the Office East Asia Analysis (at the CIA) at that time and one of my young analysts asked me if I thought the Clinton administration would really pivot and devote more time and energy to Asia. I told the analyst, “Yes, but you have to remember that there is an off-ramp at the Middle East.”
That is basically the story that Blackwell and Fontaine tell. Despite a recognition of the increasing importance of East Asia and the desire to devote more time and energy to it, that change never happened. They observe correctly, I believe, that U.S. China policy was the critical piece in dealing with an evolving region, and that the assumption driving policy was that by bringing China into the World Trade Organization and other international bodies, the China issue could be handled, and China’s economic development would lead to political moderation. That did not happen. (In 1997 I published an article in National Security Studies Quarterly titled The Future of East Asia Meeting the Challenge of the Eight Realities, which argued that Chinese and U.S. interests, despite the good relations of the moment, were fundamentally different.)
Lost Decade credits the Trump administration with changing the U.S. view on China from one of cooperation to competition, a policy that the Biden administration has continued and built on. But Blackwell and Fontaine make a strong case that although the U.S. has talked a good game about a “pivot to Asia,” nothing much has happened materially. From the Obama administration to the present, there has been much rhetoric and some increased diplomacy, but little or nothing in terms of shifting resources from other regions to Asia.
This disconnect between language and action has contributed significantly to a decline in U.S. influence globally and created opportunities that China has been quick to exploit, according to the authors. They point out, as many others have, that at present there is no U.S. grand strategy for dealing with China or the other international challenges the U.S. faces. They make the point that Putin’s aggression in Europe and the events in the Middle East since October 2023 only make things more difficult, and that what we are left with is more sanctions and small steps without an overarching plan, in short, a make-it-up as you go along approach.
The book concludes with the six reasons the last three administrations have not been able to “pivot to Asia,” and sets out four strategic principles. The authors state, “As important as to what to do is how to think about the task before the United States (author’s emphasis).” Their recommendations are consistent with the other books I mentioned at the top of the review: articulate a positive vision; accept America’s global role; calculate trade-offs and great power competition; and pursue unity. Specifically, they advocate the United States strengthen its alliances and make its European allies a central part of its China strategy; de-risk our economic ties with China and join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); increase defense spending and boost power projection in Asia; shift military resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia; intensify diplomacy with China; and support the forces for democracy and liberalism.
Destined for War explores possible U.S.-China futures and how easily it could end in disaster. The Long Game looks at the challenge to U.S. interests. World on the Brink covers the history of U.S. China-Relations since Nixon and offers, like Lost Decade, policy options. For an understanding of how difficult it will be to execute on the policy options and the challenges in doing so, Lost Decade is the book you want. Taken together, the four are a powerful package.
Blackwill and Fontaine deserve credit for trying to render the most comprehensive assessment possible of such a recent strategic reorientation (or, they might argue, a fitful, jagged attempt at such a reorientation).
At the same time, “Lost Decade” itself presents several missed opportunities — ironic, given the book’s central argument about how U.S. policymakers missed several opportunities to deliver on the Pivot to Asia in the decade since the phrase first emerged.
First, Blackwill and Fontaine may marshal hundreds of citations and references, but future historians will undoubtedly have more resources at their disposal when covering the 2011-2023 period from a greater distance that allows for clearer vision.
On a related note, the book’s primary contribution seems to be the most robust collection to date of publicly available information about the Pivot to Asia, combined with analysis from two foreign policy experts. At the same time, the authors do not uncover or reveal previously unknown information about key policymaker decisions, discussions, or goals — the stuff of great books by foreign-policy journalists like David Sanger or Edward Wong.
Substantively, the authors place enormous weight on senior-leader travel as a measuring stick for U.S. priorities or accomplishments, but they don’t fully explain why senior-leader engagement in any given region actually matters or what senior-leader travel is supposed to accomplish.
Finally, the authors expend a considerable amount of pages on the U.S. government’s ultimate inability to join the TPP, which became firmer after the 2016 presidential primary season. By contrast, they spend far less time imagining what effective U.S. trade policy in Asia could look like within parameters allowed by American politics, or what a politically effective effort to adjust those parameters could look like — two opportunities where readers would have benefited from their insight.
For these reasons, “Lost Decade” will probably not be remembered in ten years as the most authoritative rendering of the Pivot to Asia. But for these same reason, the book may very well be remembered as an initial snapshot that every future study must somehow reckon with.
Meticulous and thorough, Blackwill and Fontaine document the origins of the pivot (or rebalance) and its failed implementation as they see it. The book is a bit long and could perhaps be streamlined a bit by cutting some of the content on Europe and/or the Middle East, though the global vision of the pivot helps to add context and depth. Sadly the policy recommendations in the conclusion are likely made moot by the 2024 election of Donald Trump in the United States, who has ran roughshod over the authors' recommendations: e.g., rejoin the CPTPP, bolster alliances in Asia, and coordinate policy with European allies.