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Lost Decade: The US Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power
Lost Decade is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for America's present and future.
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of US foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Obama Administration's 2011 "Pivot to Asia," marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In Lost Decade, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot's strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of America's global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.
The authors stress that the US has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of US foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Obama Administration's 2011 "Pivot to Asia," marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In Lost Decade, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot's strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of America's global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.
The authors stress that the US has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.
480 pages, Hardcover
Published June 11, 2024
About the author
Robert D. Blackwill
30 books16 followersRobert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
July 21, 2024
In a world increasingly dominated by the Asian economic powerhouse, Robert Blackwill and Richard Fontaine's "Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power" rings out like a clarion call. This is not a book that dwells on past missteps, but a clarion call to action, a roadmap for America's return as the leading strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific. Blackwill and Fontaine, foreign policy heavyweights, meticulously dissect the "pivot to Asia" – a strategy with immense potential, tragically left unrealized. They expose the missed opportunities, the under-investment in vital alliances, and the failure to fully engage with the region's economic dynamism. Yet, far from being a lament, the book serves as a springboard for a renewed American commitment. The authors celebrate the enduring strengths the US brings to the table: its unwavering commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and a free and open Indo-Pacific. They lay out a compelling vision for a revitalized pivot, one that prioritizes deeper economic ties, strengthens military cooperation, and fosters a vibrant network of partnerships. "Lost Decade" doesn't shy away from the challenges: China's assertive territorial claims, its economic coercion, and its attempts to reshape the regional order. However, the book is not a eulogy for American influence. It's a battle cry, a call to arms for a reinvigorated US presence that capitalizes on America's inherent advantages. Blackwill and Fontaine offer a clear-eyed assessment of the landscape, but their message is ultimately one of hope and opportunity. With a renewed commitment, the US can not only counter China's ambitions but also work collaboratively with regional partners to build a more prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific for all. This book is a must-read for anyone who believes in the enduring power of American leadership and its vital role in shaping a peaceful and prosperous future for Asia.
September 12, 2024
This review originally appeared in the Cipher Brief: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/book-r...
Lost Decade is the latest in a series of books that look at the state of US-China relations and project the future. For example: Destined for War by Graham Allison (2017), 2034: A Novel of the Next World War by Elliot Ackerman and Admiral James Stavridis (2021), The Long Game by Rush Doshi (2021), and World on the Brink by Dmitri Alperovitch (2024) all make the same point. China’s rise presents a major challenge to the United States and the U.S. is poorly positioned to meet it.
Blackwell and Fontaine, who undoubtedly are well known to many of the readers of The Cipher Brief, argue that China “poses an abiding and proximate threat to all five” vital American interests: reducing the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyberattacks against the U.S. and our allies; the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and delivery systems; maintaining a regional balance of power that promotes peace; preventing the emergence of hostile or failed states in the Western hemisphere; and maintaining the stability of major international systems in trade, finances, environment, etc. The author’s statements about the Western hemisphere and nuclear proliferation are a bit of stretch in my view, but their basic argument that U.S. interests and China’s actions put us on a collision course is hard to dispute.
The Lost Decade is an examination of U.S.-China policy from the Clinton administration to today with a concentration on the last decade, essentially the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. As far back as 1993, U.S. policymakers were talking about the importance of paying more attention to East Asia. Certainly the 1990s were a critical decade in the evolution of the region: Japan-U.S. trade frictions, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the transition to democracy in South Korea and Taiwan, the Asian tiger economies and the Asian financial crisis, etc. I was Director of the Office East Asia Analysis (at the CIA) at that time and one of my young analysts asked me if I thought the Clinton administration would really pivot and devote more time and energy to Asia. I told the analyst, “Yes, but you have to remember that there is an off-ramp at the Middle East.”
That is basically the story that Blackwell and Fontaine tell. Despite a recognition of the increasing importance of East Asia and the desire to devote more time and energy to it, that change never happened. They observe correctly, I believe, that U.S. China policy was the critical piece in dealing with an evolving region, and that the assumption driving policy was that by bringing China into the World Trade Organization and other international bodies, the China issue could be handled, and China’s economic development would lead to political moderation. That did not happen. (In 1997 I published an article in National Security Studies Quarterly titled The Future of East Asia Meeting the Challenge of the Eight Realities, which argued that Chinese and U.S. interests, despite the good relations of the moment, were fundamentally different.)
Lost Decade credits the Trump administration with changing the U.S. view on China from one of cooperation to competition, a policy that the Biden administration has continued and built on. But Blackwell and Fontaine make a strong case that although the U.S. has talked a good game about a “pivot to Asia,” nothing much has happened materially. From the Obama administration to the present, there has been much rhetoric and some increased diplomacy, but little or nothing in terms of shifting resources from other regions to Asia.
This disconnect between language and action has contributed significantly to a decline in U.S. influence globally and created opportunities that China has been quick to exploit, according to the authors. They point out, as many others have, that at present there is no U.S. grand strategy for dealing with China or the other international challenges the U.S. faces. They make the point that Putin’s aggression in Europe and the events in the Middle East since October 2023 only make things more difficult, and that what we are left with is more sanctions and small steps without an overarching plan, in short, a make-it-up as you go along approach.
The book concludes with the six reasons the last three administrations have not been able to “pivot to Asia,” and sets out four strategic principles. The authors state, “As important as to what to do is how to think about the task before the United States (author’s emphasis).” Their recommendations are consistent with the other books I mentioned at the top of the review: articulate a positive vision; accept America’s global role; calculate trade-offs and great power competition; and pursue unity. Specifically, they advocate the United States strengthen its alliances and make its European allies a central part of its China strategy; de-risk our economic ties with China and join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); increase defense spending and boost power projection in Asia; shift military resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia; intensify diplomacy with China; and support the forces for democracy and liberalism.
Destined for War explores possible U.S.-China futures and how easily it could end in disaster. The Long Game looks at the challenge to U.S. interests. World on the Brink covers the history of U.S. China-Relations since Nixon and offers, like Lost Decade, policy options. For an understanding of how difficult it will be to execute on the policy options and the challenges in doing so, Lost Decade is the book you want. Taken together, the four are a powerful package.
Lost Decade is the latest in a series of books that look at the state of US-China relations and project the future. For example: Destined for War by Graham Allison (2017), 2034: A Novel of the Next World War by Elliot Ackerman and Admiral James Stavridis (2021), The Long Game by Rush Doshi (2021), and World on the Brink by Dmitri Alperovitch (2024) all make the same point. China’s rise presents a major challenge to the United States and the U.S. is poorly positioned to meet it.
Blackwell and Fontaine, who undoubtedly are well known to many of the readers of The Cipher Brief, argue that China “poses an abiding and proximate threat to all five” vital American interests: reducing the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyberattacks against the U.S. and our allies; the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and delivery systems; maintaining a regional balance of power that promotes peace; preventing the emergence of hostile or failed states in the Western hemisphere; and maintaining the stability of major international systems in trade, finances, environment, etc. The author’s statements about the Western hemisphere and nuclear proliferation are a bit of stretch in my view, but their basic argument that U.S. interests and China’s actions put us on a collision course is hard to dispute.
The Lost Decade is an examination of U.S.-China policy from the Clinton administration to today with a concentration on the last decade, essentially the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. As far back as 1993, U.S. policymakers were talking about the importance of paying more attention to East Asia. Certainly the 1990s were a critical decade in the evolution of the region: Japan-U.S. trade frictions, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the transition to democracy in South Korea and Taiwan, the Asian tiger economies and the Asian financial crisis, etc. I was Director of the Office East Asia Analysis (at the CIA) at that time and one of my young analysts asked me if I thought the Clinton administration would really pivot and devote more time and energy to Asia. I told the analyst, “Yes, but you have to remember that there is an off-ramp at the Middle East.”
That is basically the story that Blackwell and Fontaine tell. Despite a recognition of the increasing importance of East Asia and the desire to devote more time and energy to it, that change never happened. They observe correctly, I believe, that U.S. China policy was the critical piece in dealing with an evolving region, and that the assumption driving policy was that by bringing China into the World Trade Organization and other international bodies, the China issue could be handled, and China’s economic development would lead to political moderation. That did not happen. (In 1997 I published an article in National Security Studies Quarterly titled The Future of East Asia Meeting the Challenge of the Eight Realities, which argued that Chinese and U.S. interests, despite the good relations of the moment, were fundamentally different.)
Lost Decade credits the Trump administration with changing the U.S. view on China from one of cooperation to competition, a policy that the Biden administration has continued and built on. But Blackwell and Fontaine make a strong case that although the U.S. has talked a good game about a “pivot to Asia,” nothing much has happened materially. From the Obama administration to the present, there has been much rhetoric and some increased diplomacy, but little or nothing in terms of shifting resources from other regions to Asia.
This disconnect between language and action has contributed significantly to a decline in U.S. influence globally and created opportunities that China has been quick to exploit, according to the authors. They point out, as many others have, that at present there is no U.S. grand strategy for dealing with China or the other international challenges the U.S. faces. They make the point that Putin’s aggression in Europe and the events in the Middle East since October 2023 only make things more difficult, and that what we are left with is more sanctions and small steps without an overarching plan, in short, a make-it-up as you go along approach.
The book concludes with the six reasons the last three administrations have not been able to “pivot to Asia,” and sets out four strategic principles. The authors state, “As important as to what to do is how to think about the task before the United States (author’s emphasis).” Their recommendations are consistent with the other books I mentioned at the top of the review: articulate a positive vision; accept America’s global role; calculate trade-offs and great power competition; and pursue unity. Specifically, they advocate the United States strengthen its alliances and make its European allies a central part of its China strategy; de-risk our economic ties with China and join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); increase defense spending and boost power projection in Asia; shift military resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia; intensify diplomacy with China; and support the forces for democracy and liberalism.
Destined for War explores possible U.S.-China futures and how easily it could end in disaster. The Long Game looks at the challenge to U.S. interests. World on the Brink covers the history of U.S. China-Relations since Nixon and offers, like Lost Decade, policy options. For an understanding of how difficult it will be to execute on the policy options and the challenges in doing so, Lost Decade is the book you want. Taken together, the four are a powerful package.
May 17, 2026
First off, I'm looking forward to the second installment in this series come 2032. This is sarcasm...but another installment would be interesting...and appropriate because I see the recommendations as unrealistic, unattainable, and unlikely for reasons I'll discuss below, BUT the recommendations are exactly what I'd expect from smart people who have done their research and thought through these very real challenges. May my perspective is just my inner pessimist talking...
Fontaine and Blackwill put together a comprehensive work that exhaustively examines the array of U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, and informational efforts made to dealing with China in the second decade of this "Pacific century." Spoiler alert, and as implied by the book's title, it's not going well. Their analysis and discussion of our actions from a domestic and international relations perspective is robust and even somewhat repetitive at times. Due to their chosen structure from the book, they highlight several events and initiatives from multiple perspectives. This was helpful in trying to fully grasp the complex situations and positions from a variety of stakeholders. When I consider Graham's Essence of Decision though...it's probably all scratching the surface and I feel like our countries momentum will be a difficult thing to change in order to achieve the "To Do" list that Blackwill and Fontaine optimistically propose in their conclusion. I don't see the current administration pursuing any of the recommendations realistically.
But that's probably because I'm not entirely sure I agree with their assessment, or assumption, about the overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy. They say it, "should be to preserve the core pillars of the international order, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. The United States benefits from and has a vital interest in maintain, a global order governed by rules rather than brute power, one in which countries enjoy sovereignty, disputes are resolved peacefully, markets are open to trade, human rights are considered universal, and democracy can flourish. Since the 1940s, Washington has opposed hostile spheres of influence emerging in Eurasia precisely because they threaten the United States' desired rules-based order." This explanation seems incompatible with the nationalistic, isolationist, and illiberal movement hyped and backed by the current U.S. administration. Of the four strategic principles the authors derive from this fundamental idea of U.S. foreign policy, the perhaps greatest challenge is unity. A virtue, central to democratic values, for which I continue to hope for, but seems to grow more allusive daily. Barring that unity, none of their recommendations are realistic for, as they pointed out several times in the book with the TPP, it will devolve into a branding of how the opposition party is doing things "wrong" when, particularly in the realm of international politics, there is rarely a "right" and "wrong" action. Although...maybe some of the U.S.'s current actions certainly have the potential to prove me wrong on that.
Their "To-Do" list is accurate and it could work, but it's unrealistic in our current environment and, unless there's a significant shift in domestic policies in the years to come, it's unlikely that these recommendations would be workable before the 2030s. Perhaps the current strategy will prove effective in rebalancing power in the Pacific in favor of the U.S. My current take is that this book certainly offers a good roadmap, but there doesn't seem to be much interest in roadmaps.
Fontaine and Blackwill put together a comprehensive work that exhaustively examines the array of U.S. diplomatic, economic, military, and informational efforts made to dealing with China in the second decade of this "Pacific century." Spoiler alert, and as implied by the book's title, it's not going well. Their analysis and discussion of our actions from a domestic and international relations perspective is robust and even somewhat repetitive at times. Due to their chosen structure from the book, they highlight several events and initiatives from multiple perspectives. This was helpful in trying to fully grasp the complex situations and positions from a variety of stakeholders. When I consider Graham's Essence of Decision though...it's probably all scratching the surface and I feel like our countries momentum will be a difficult thing to change in order to achieve the "To Do" list that Blackwill and Fontaine optimistically propose in their conclusion. I don't see the current administration pursuing any of the recommendations realistically.
But that's probably because I'm not entirely sure I agree with their assessment, or assumption, about the overarching goal of U.S. foreign policy. They say it, "should be to preserve the core pillars of the international order, even as specific rules and institutions change and adapt. The United States benefits from and has a vital interest in maintain, a global order governed by rules rather than brute power, one in which countries enjoy sovereignty, disputes are resolved peacefully, markets are open to trade, human rights are considered universal, and democracy can flourish. Since the 1940s, Washington has opposed hostile spheres of influence emerging in Eurasia precisely because they threaten the United States' desired rules-based order." This explanation seems incompatible with the nationalistic, isolationist, and illiberal movement hyped and backed by the current U.S. administration. Of the four strategic principles the authors derive from this fundamental idea of U.S. foreign policy, the perhaps greatest challenge is unity. A virtue, central to democratic values, for which I continue to hope for, but seems to grow more allusive daily. Barring that unity, none of their recommendations are realistic for, as they pointed out several times in the book with the TPP, it will devolve into a branding of how the opposition party is doing things "wrong" when, particularly in the realm of international politics, there is rarely a "right" and "wrong" action. Although...maybe some of the U.S.'s current actions certainly have the potential to prove me wrong on that.
Their "To-Do" list is accurate and it could work, but it's unrealistic in our current environment and, unless there's a significant shift in domestic policies in the years to come, it's unlikely that these recommendations would be workable before the 2030s. Perhaps the current strategy will prove effective in rebalancing power in the Pacific in favor of the U.S. My current take is that this book certainly offers a good roadmap, but there doesn't seem to be much interest in roadmaps.
March 22, 2025
Meticulous and thorough, Blackwill and Fontaine document the origins of the pivot (or rebalance) and its failed implementation as they see it. The book is a bit long and could perhaps be streamlined a bit by cutting some of the content on Europe and/or the Middle East, though the global vision of the pivot helps to add context and depth. Sadly the policy recommendations in the conclusion are likely made moot by the 2024 election of Donald Trump in the United States, who has ran roughshod over the authors' recommendations: e.g., rejoin the CPTPP, bolster alliances in Asia, and coordinate policy with European allies.
January 2, 2025
I could not emphasise the damage towards American presence in the Indo Pacific by abandoning TPP.
February 28, 2025
My friend helped ghostwrite this. It was like the China policy bible. Really well done. Got a bit long in the military side
May 28, 2025
So so so boring
February 1, 2026
Really, really excellent. The best book on foreign policy I’ve ever read, hands down.
November 23, 2024
An absolute triumph. The parts on the TPP and BW3 were fascinating. Truly a shame that every recommendation made in the book is about to be ignored.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews