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Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism
“Provocative and engaging…The array of urgent questions and crises facing our democracy makes one miss Richard Rorty’s insistent, relentlessly questioning, and dedicated to the proposition that we can’t afford to let our democracy fail.”
―Chris Lehmann, New Republic
“Richard Rorty was the most iconoclastic and dramatic philosopher of the last half-century. In this final book, his unique literary style, singular intellectual zest, and demythologizing defiance of official philosophy are on full display.”
―Cornel West
“Coherent, often brilliant, and it presents a clear and timely case for political pragmatism.”
―Jonathan Rée, Prospect
“Today, there are few philosophers left whose thoughts are inspired by a unifying vision; there are even fewer who can articulate such a view in terms of such a ravishing flow of provocative, but sharp and differentiated, arguments.”
―Jürgen Habermas
Richard Rorty’s final masterwork offers his culminating thoughts on the influential version of pragmatism he began to articulate decades ago in his groundbreaking Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . He identifies anti-authoritarianism as the principal impulse and virtue of pragmatism. Anti-authoritarianism, in this view, means acknowledging that our cultural inheritance is always open to revision because no authority exists to ascertain the truth, once and for all. If we cannot rely on the unshakable certainties of God or nature, then all we have left to go on―and argue with―are the opinions and ideas of our fellow humans. The test of these ideas, Rorty suggests, is relatively Do they work? Do they produce the peace, freedom, and happiness we desire? To achieve this enlightened pragmatism is not easy, though. Pragmatism demands trust. It demands that we think and care about what others think and care about, and that we account for their doubts of and objections to our own beliefs.
No book offers a more accessible account of pragmatism, just as no philosopher has more eloquently challenged the hidebound traditions arrayed against the goals of social justice.
―Chris Lehmann, New Republic
“Richard Rorty was the most iconoclastic and dramatic philosopher of the last half-century. In this final book, his unique literary style, singular intellectual zest, and demythologizing defiance of official philosophy are on full display.”
―Cornel West
“Coherent, often brilliant, and it presents a clear and timely case for political pragmatism.”
―Jonathan Rée, Prospect
“Today, there are few philosophers left whose thoughts are inspired by a unifying vision; there are even fewer who can articulate such a view in terms of such a ravishing flow of provocative, but sharp and differentiated, arguments.”
―Jürgen Habermas
Richard Rorty’s final masterwork offers his culminating thoughts on the influential version of pragmatism he began to articulate decades ago in his groundbreaking Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . He identifies anti-authoritarianism as the principal impulse and virtue of pragmatism. Anti-authoritarianism, in this view, means acknowledging that our cultural inheritance is always open to revision because no authority exists to ascertain the truth, once and for all. If we cannot rely on the unshakable certainties of God or nature, then all we have left to go on―and argue with―are the opinions and ideas of our fellow humans. The test of these ideas, Rorty suggests, is relatively Do they work? Do they produce the peace, freedom, and happiness we desire? To achieve this enlightened pragmatism is not easy, though. Pragmatism demands trust. It demands that we think and care about what others think and care about, and that we account for their doubts of and objections to our own beliefs.
No book offers a more accessible account of pragmatism, just as no philosopher has more eloquently challenged the hidebound traditions arrayed against the goals of social justice.
272 pages, Paperback
First published August 17, 2021
49 people are currently reading
616 people want to read
About the author
Richard Rorty
113 books417 followersRichard Rorty (1931–2007) developed a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism that expressed itself along two main axes. One is negative—a critical diagnosis of what Rorty takes to be defining projects of modern philosophy. The other is positive—an attempt to show what intellectual culture might look like, once we free ourselves from the governing metaphors of mind and knowledge in which the traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics (and indeed, in Rorty's view, the self-conception of modern philosophy) are rooted. The centerpiece of Rorty's critique is the provocative account offered in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, hereafter PMN). In this book, and in the closely related essays collected in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982, hereafter CP), Rorty's principal target is the philosophical idea of knowledge as representation, as a mental mirroring of a mind-external world. Providing a contrasting image of philosophy, Rorty has sought to integrate and apply the milestone achievements of Dewey, Hegel and Darwin in a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and naturalism. Characterizations and illustrations of a post-epistemological intellectual culture, present in both PMN (part III) and CP (xxxvii-xliv), are more richly developed in later works, such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989, hereafter CIS), in the popular essays and articles collected in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), and in the four volumes of philosophical papers, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991, hereafter ORT); Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991, hereafter EHO); Truth and Progress (1998, hereafter TP); and Philosophy as Cultural Politics (2007, hereafter PCP). In these writings, ranging over an unusually wide intellectual territory, Rorty offers a highly integrated, multifaceted view of thought, culture, and politics, a view that has made him one of the most widely discussed philosophers in our time.
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December 26, 2021
Getting published 15 years after his death and 25 years after the lectures which serve as the basis for the book were delivered, Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism comes as something of a coda to Rorty's oeuvre. Across his literary career, much of Rorty's appeal rested in his willingness and eagerness to take on political and social thought, during a moment when anglo analytic philosophy remained focused on hammering out technical issues largely related to linguistic philosophy. Interestingly, it's quite possible that some of the interlocutors like John McDowell presented technically stronger approaches. The whole point of Rorty's pragmatism, though, was to ask what's the value of a theory or approach (a vocabulary or language game) in social practice.
This work marshalls Rorty's thought in its mature stage and works it out in social and political practice. Although he calls it utopian, in contradistinction to the pessimism or cynicism of Foucault or Heidegger, we would recognize this as a fully fallen utopianism. Incredibly, though, this is the value of his work because he does fully appreciate our situation in late 20th and early 21st century society. In his vision and our situation, we are forever on this side of Jordan. There is no other side of Jordan. We must try to make our way through the desert of the real with the tools and theories (language games and vocublaries) that are most useful in our quests. Rorty sets out to deliver us and our thought from the will to Truth, which he fears will continue to lead us on side quests and often tilting after windmills. In his self-styled therapeutic philosophy, he safely delivers his thought and us away from Scylla and the sirens song of truth, including foundationalism and the quest for certainty. In this sense, in this late work Rorty continues to work as a deflationist. In taking inspiration from and imputing his point of view to Donald Davidson and John Dewey, in many arguments he simply declines to engage with his interlocutors who are (he argues) still asking and trying to answer old questions and trying to find correspondence with truth or fact or the external world. Going back to his first works, Rorty has a wholly different view on the role of language. As with other works, he directs readers away from the old traditional problems of philosophy, and argues there are other better and more important (useful) questions to answer. He tries to set his readers back out there in the social world in our various social practices working on our various social projects under the auspices of utopianism trying to get the most people possible included within the project boundaries of advancing liberal democracy and trying to decrease the amount of suffering for the most people possible.
There are some weaknesses to this work, though; however, they are not wholly insurmountable. To people decades later, a few key notions in this work increasingly strike us as utopian indeed and perhaps a touch naive. The late 90s optimism at work in Rorty here seemed to consider the millennia-old siren song of truth and longing for foundations as the main and only threat. In the 1990s naivety, Rorty seems to underestimate the threat posed by Charybdis and the whirlpool of misinformation, gaslighting, and spin. In so doing, he overlooked the new threat and dismissed the need to address concerns that could arise from that direction. Fortunately, there do appear to be course corrections that Rorty was not able to or not interested in seriously addressing at the time. In our modern social practice and conventions, as a research community we have created our own hierarchy of evidence. Imagine a pyramid, and it starts with opinion pieces at the bottom, proceeds up through case studies the next level up, and at the peak we find randomized control trials, meta analyses, and systematic reviews. Put simply, elaborately designed clinical trials and well desinged syntheses of many such trials provide stronger evidence of what works, for whom, and under which circumstances than opinions from every Tom, Dick, and Harry. Following these social conventions keep us well clear of the old siren song of foundationalism and at the same time help us avoid the pitfalls and dangers of the spin zone and misinformation. These developments and advancements have been made in the spirit of the direction Rorty argued for, although the letter may have gone against some of his specific positions.
In any event, this work feels something like a message in a bottle from an earlier time. In it Rorty was engaging on issues that would become prescient in our time. It was great to hear some late thoughts from a major 20th century American thinker. However, in his blindspots, there were issues that he was unable or unwilling to address. These do not sink his message or the bottle containing them; they just smudge the words a little bit.
This work marshalls Rorty's thought in its mature stage and works it out in social and political practice. Although he calls it utopian, in contradistinction to the pessimism or cynicism of Foucault or Heidegger, we would recognize this as a fully fallen utopianism. Incredibly, though, this is the value of his work because he does fully appreciate our situation in late 20th and early 21st century society. In his vision and our situation, we are forever on this side of Jordan. There is no other side of Jordan. We must try to make our way through the desert of the real with the tools and theories (language games and vocublaries) that are most useful in our quests. Rorty sets out to deliver us and our thought from the will to Truth, which he fears will continue to lead us on side quests and often tilting after windmills. In his self-styled therapeutic philosophy, he safely delivers his thought and us away from Scylla and the sirens song of truth, including foundationalism and the quest for certainty. In this sense, in this late work Rorty continues to work as a deflationist. In taking inspiration from and imputing his point of view to Donald Davidson and John Dewey, in many arguments he simply declines to engage with his interlocutors who are (he argues) still asking and trying to answer old questions and trying to find correspondence with truth or fact or the external world. Going back to his first works, Rorty has a wholly different view on the role of language. As with other works, he directs readers away from the old traditional problems of philosophy, and argues there are other better and more important (useful) questions to answer. He tries to set his readers back out there in the social world in our various social practices working on our various social projects under the auspices of utopianism trying to get the most people possible included within the project boundaries of advancing liberal democracy and trying to decrease the amount of suffering for the most people possible.
There are some weaknesses to this work, though; however, they are not wholly insurmountable. To people decades later, a few key notions in this work increasingly strike us as utopian indeed and perhaps a touch naive. The late 90s optimism at work in Rorty here seemed to consider the millennia-old siren song of truth and longing for foundations as the main and only threat. In the 1990s naivety, Rorty seems to underestimate the threat posed by Charybdis and the whirlpool of misinformation, gaslighting, and spin. In so doing, he overlooked the new threat and dismissed the need to address concerns that could arise from that direction. Fortunately, there do appear to be course corrections that Rorty was not able to or not interested in seriously addressing at the time. In our modern social practice and conventions, as a research community we have created our own hierarchy of evidence. Imagine a pyramid, and it starts with opinion pieces at the bottom, proceeds up through case studies the next level up, and at the peak we find randomized control trials, meta analyses, and systematic reviews. Put simply, elaborately designed clinical trials and well desinged syntheses of many such trials provide stronger evidence of what works, for whom, and under which circumstances than opinions from every Tom, Dick, and Harry. Following these social conventions keep us well clear of the old siren song of foundationalism and at the same time help us avoid the pitfalls and dangers of the spin zone and misinformation. These developments and advancements have been made in the spirit of the direction Rorty argued for, although the letter may have gone against some of his specific positions.
In any event, this work feels something like a message in a bottle from an earlier time. In it Rorty was engaging on issues that would become prescient in our time. It was great to hear some late thoughts from a major 20th century American thinker. However, in his blindspots, there were issues that he was unable or unwilling to address. These do not sink his message or the bottle containing them; they just smudge the words a little bit.
June 16, 2021
It is always entertaining for me to read philosophy. People with immense knowledge of history, linguistics and philosophy, go after each other over the tiniest perceived faults in their logic, their opinions or even their choice of single words. They can argue about anything and everything. It is the only discipline I know where everyone is busy attacking everyone else’s work, while solving no problems at all.
Into this scenario stepped Richard Rorty (1931-2007), who gave a series of lectures in the 1990s that are only now being published in English, the language in which they were delivered. (They have been available in Spanish translation, the location of the lecture series, for years.) The book is called Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism, a weighty project if ever there was one. Rorty was in his prime, and the lectures fling ideas (and criticisms) with seeming total abandon. But it’s not abandon; it is the comfort of coming to this point after a lifetime of research, thought, revisions, battles and the realization that he had mastered the art. It’s a most positive experience to read.
Rorty’s niche was Pragmatism. Pragmatism (the philosophy) says that life and the universe are all there is: that human beings have nothing to know save their relations to each other and to other finite beings. Specifically, that they owe nothing to any non-human authoritarian (ie. God) but that they owe everything to their fellow humans with whom they live and communicate. This is a refreshing departure from the complex, difficult and often impossible to implement philosophies of the great names of the discipline.
Rorty called himself the therapeutic philosopher. He made it comfortable to understand philosophy. He refined this philosophy over a lifetime, and defended it against all comers. By the time of these lectures, he was totally confident, relaxed and in control. There is even mild humor and self-deprecation, not things you see much of in Aristotle or Plato, Heidegger or Nietzsche. He quotes his critics often, as if to say he has nothing to fear from them. And he doesn’t usually even bother to refute their criticisms. Rather, he takes the high road.
There are lecture/chapters on religion, language, philosophy, and morality, among others. He (and everyone in the business) call what they criticize “language-games”. It’s the most common accusation I see. The use of a specific word can be the cause of a whole new paper to be written and published. The different usages of the same word throughout the world and throughout history can be the cause of endless criticism and consternation. What the Ancient Greeks tossed around still matters to 21st century philosophers. Semantics is crucial to philosophy.
But then, Rorty brings out Charles S. Peirce for his side. Peirce’s most important meme was that language is not so much semantics as semiotics – signs. It is something that grabbed the attention of both philosophers and Noam Chomsky, wearing his linguistics hat. But while Rorty admits to being a fan, he also acknowledged that Peirce was no authority and no proof of anything. He never followed through, never dug down, never built a body of work, or even kept an organized notebook. He was a bit of a madman, or at very least eccentric. He worked alone, without the daily interaction of his peers or students that makes philosophy as vibrant as it is. He sat and thought about the world, and wrote down his thoughts. And that was the end of his effort. A lot of his writing has yet to make any sense to academics. But it sure seems profound. He is credited with founding Pragmatism.
Peirce (1839-1914) is actually buried about a quarter of a mile from my office in Milford, PA, and his gigantic home, now a National Parks Service office building, is just two miles in the other direction. He lived out in the countryside, living off a huge inheritance, writing out ideas without developing them into coherent theses. He was the Thomas Jefferson of philosophy; you can find a Peirce quote to fit almost any situation or opinion in philosophy, even if contradictory. Just like Jefferson. He relied totally on his name to circulate it with authority. Just like Jefferson. Rorty seems to recognize this, but cites him everywhere anyway.
The book is full of challenges, and not just from Rorty, but from his critics too. Having thought through the logic of religions, he concludes “There is no way in which the religious person can claim a right to believe as part of an overall right to privacy.”
He takes on the hoary subject of morality with ease. Christians believe there can be no morality without God. But Rorty shows that morality is simply born of large numbers. When there was just the family, it wasn’t an issue. When it was a village, things could get complicated, so rules started to appear. Long before Christianity popped into existence. In his wonderfully simple terms, Rorty said that morality and law began when controversy arose. Period.
He compares the Platonic idea that Truth and God are one, to a social, moral and ethical framework /gospel, that would have been accepted in polytheistic societies like Ancient Rome. Truth and God also have to reconcile with Aristotle, Newton and Darwin who found truth lay way beyond the knowledge of the church.
Professor Rorty’s views on religion did not sit well with Christian fundamentalists and evangelicals, of course. But as his skin thickened to the attacks, he came to this conclusion: “You have to be educated in order to be a citizen of our society, a participant in our conversation, someone with whom we can envision merging our horizons. So we are going to go right on trying to discredit you in the eyes of your children, trying to strip your fundamentalist religious community of dignity, trying to make your views seem silly rather than discussable. We are not so inclusivist as to tolerate intolerance such as yours.” Wow is about the only word that fits here.
So what did Rorty believe? “My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law.”
And finally: “I don’t think our practice of justifying our beliefs needs justification.”
The business of attacking religion is a standard ploy in philosophy. It is a fat target, with lots of hypocrisy to munch on. Yet it never ceases to amaze me that it always seems to be Christianity that is the whipping boy. I would love to have read Rorty’s attack on Hinduism and Buddhism and Islam for comparison. But western philosophy doesn’t seem to want to wander beyond western religion. This, to me, weakens Rorty’s case. But that is a quibble in this wide-ranging book.
What keeps coming through is Pragmatism’s appeal to the lowest common denominator: “At this level of abstraction, concepts like truth, rationality and maturity are up for grabs,” he says. He wants to take philosophy out of the ivory tower and apply it. His criticism of standard philosophical arguments bites hard: “How can you convince people that they are presupposing what they do not believe?”
Pragmatism encompasses pan-relationism. This boils down to anything has a sense if you give it one. It is another generous concept, in direct conflict with all kinds of philosophers for whom meaning is sacred, critical and often unapproachable. For Rorty, meaning can be found or made. Infinitely refreshing and accessible.
Pragmatism sloughs off a lot of what other philosophers argue over. They say it doesn’t matter. They put things in perspective. For example, they have no quarrel with Heidegger’s “bad moral character” as it doesn’t count against his philosophical achievements. Pragmatists attempt to get rid of the contrast between reality and appearance, Rorty said.
Once the reader gets to the lectures, it is smooth sailing. Unfortunately, there are two prefaces totaling nearly 40 pages that not only don’t reflect the warmth and breezy style Rorty wrote into his speeches, but they add nothing worth remembering at all. There is also an epilogue, which describes the lecture series that Rorty participated in, as well as some details about the lectures themselves. Eduardo Mendieta wrote it, as well as all the footnotes, where, incredibly to me, he noted every single change from the Spanish version of the lectures. Every word, translated to mean something slightly different, or cut altogether. Philosophers have issues.
David Wineberg
Into this scenario stepped Richard Rorty (1931-2007), who gave a series of lectures in the 1990s that are only now being published in English, the language in which they were delivered. (They have been available in Spanish translation, the location of the lecture series, for years.) The book is called Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism, a weighty project if ever there was one. Rorty was in his prime, and the lectures fling ideas (and criticisms) with seeming total abandon. But it’s not abandon; it is the comfort of coming to this point after a lifetime of research, thought, revisions, battles and the realization that he had mastered the art. It’s a most positive experience to read.
Rorty’s niche was Pragmatism. Pragmatism (the philosophy) says that life and the universe are all there is: that human beings have nothing to know save their relations to each other and to other finite beings. Specifically, that they owe nothing to any non-human authoritarian (ie. God) but that they owe everything to their fellow humans with whom they live and communicate. This is a refreshing departure from the complex, difficult and often impossible to implement philosophies of the great names of the discipline.
Rorty called himself the therapeutic philosopher. He made it comfortable to understand philosophy. He refined this philosophy over a lifetime, and defended it against all comers. By the time of these lectures, he was totally confident, relaxed and in control. There is even mild humor and self-deprecation, not things you see much of in Aristotle or Plato, Heidegger or Nietzsche. He quotes his critics often, as if to say he has nothing to fear from them. And he doesn’t usually even bother to refute their criticisms. Rather, he takes the high road.
There are lecture/chapters on religion, language, philosophy, and morality, among others. He (and everyone in the business) call what they criticize “language-games”. It’s the most common accusation I see. The use of a specific word can be the cause of a whole new paper to be written and published. The different usages of the same word throughout the world and throughout history can be the cause of endless criticism and consternation. What the Ancient Greeks tossed around still matters to 21st century philosophers. Semantics is crucial to philosophy.
But then, Rorty brings out Charles S. Peirce for his side. Peirce’s most important meme was that language is not so much semantics as semiotics – signs. It is something that grabbed the attention of both philosophers and Noam Chomsky, wearing his linguistics hat. But while Rorty admits to being a fan, he also acknowledged that Peirce was no authority and no proof of anything. He never followed through, never dug down, never built a body of work, or even kept an organized notebook. He was a bit of a madman, or at very least eccentric. He worked alone, without the daily interaction of his peers or students that makes philosophy as vibrant as it is. He sat and thought about the world, and wrote down his thoughts. And that was the end of his effort. A lot of his writing has yet to make any sense to academics. But it sure seems profound. He is credited with founding Pragmatism.
Peirce (1839-1914) is actually buried about a quarter of a mile from my office in Milford, PA, and his gigantic home, now a National Parks Service office building, is just two miles in the other direction. He lived out in the countryside, living off a huge inheritance, writing out ideas without developing them into coherent theses. He was the Thomas Jefferson of philosophy; you can find a Peirce quote to fit almost any situation or opinion in philosophy, even if contradictory. Just like Jefferson. He relied totally on his name to circulate it with authority. Just like Jefferson. Rorty seems to recognize this, but cites him everywhere anyway.
The book is full of challenges, and not just from Rorty, but from his critics too. Having thought through the logic of religions, he concludes “There is no way in which the religious person can claim a right to believe as part of an overall right to privacy.”
He takes on the hoary subject of morality with ease. Christians believe there can be no morality without God. But Rorty shows that morality is simply born of large numbers. When there was just the family, it wasn’t an issue. When it was a village, things could get complicated, so rules started to appear. Long before Christianity popped into existence. In his wonderfully simple terms, Rorty said that morality and law began when controversy arose. Period.
He compares the Platonic idea that Truth and God are one, to a social, moral and ethical framework /gospel, that would have been accepted in polytheistic societies like Ancient Rome. Truth and God also have to reconcile with Aristotle, Newton and Darwin who found truth lay way beyond the knowledge of the church.
Professor Rorty’s views on religion did not sit well with Christian fundamentalists and evangelicals, of course. But as his skin thickened to the attacks, he came to this conclusion: “You have to be educated in order to be a citizen of our society, a participant in our conversation, someone with whom we can envision merging our horizons. So we are going to go right on trying to discredit you in the eyes of your children, trying to strip your fundamentalist religious community of dignity, trying to make your views seem silly rather than discussable. We are not so inclusivist as to tolerate intolerance such as yours.” Wow is about the only word that fits here.
So what did Rorty believe? “My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is pretty much the only law.”
And finally: “I don’t think our practice of justifying our beliefs needs justification.”
The business of attacking religion is a standard ploy in philosophy. It is a fat target, with lots of hypocrisy to munch on. Yet it never ceases to amaze me that it always seems to be Christianity that is the whipping boy. I would love to have read Rorty’s attack on Hinduism and Buddhism and Islam for comparison. But western philosophy doesn’t seem to want to wander beyond western religion. This, to me, weakens Rorty’s case. But that is a quibble in this wide-ranging book.
What keeps coming through is Pragmatism’s appeal to the lowest common denominator: “At this level of abstraction, concepts like truth, rationality and maturity are up for grabs,” he says. He wants to take philosophy out of the ivory tower and apply it. His criticism of standard philosophical arguments bites hard: “How can you convince people that they are presupposing what they do not believe?”
Pragmatism encompasses pan-relationism. This boils down to anything has a sense if you give it one. It is another generous concept, in direct conflict with all kinds of philosophers for whom meaning is sacred, critical and often unapproachable. For Rorty, meaning can be found or made. Infinitely refreshing and accessible.
Pragmatism sloughs off a lot of what other philosophers argue over. They say it doesn’t matter. They put things in perspective. For example, they have no quarrel with Heidegger’s “bad moral character” as it doesn’t count against his philosophical achievements. Pragmatists attempt to get rid of the contrast between reality and appearance, Rorty said.
Once the reader gets to the lectures, it is smooth sailing. Unfortunately, there are two prefaces totaling nearly 40 pages that not only don’t reflect the warmth and breezy style Rorty wrote into his speeches, but they add nothing worth remembering at all. There is also an epilogue, which describes the lecture series that Rorty participated in, as well as some details about the lectures themselves. Eduardo Mendieta wrote it, as well as all the footnotes, where, incredibly to me, he noted every single change from the Spanish version of the lectures. Every word, translated to mean something slightly different, or cut altogether. Philosophers have issues.
David Wineberg
April 25, 2022
Rorty's Extended Legacy
The most recent collection of Rorty's work is a solid posthumous addition to his legacy as the reviver of American Pragmatism and a preeminent public intellectual philosopher. The essays are a mix of accessible public intellectual summaries of the history of philosophy and notes on longstanding, specialized debates with leading contemporaries.
I've read most of Rorty's work and while some of the essays tread familiar ground, there are generative new metaphors and framings throughout the collection.
Those new to pragmatism should read his earlier work first: for those more interested in 20th century debates in Anglophone, analytic philosophy, see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature; for those more interested in a more accessible, wide-ranging look at Rorty's influence as a public intellectual, see Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
The most recent collection of Rorty's work is a solid posthumous addition to his legacy as the reviver of American Pragmatism and a preeminent public intellectual philosopher. The essays are a mix of accessible public intellectual summaries of the history of philosophy and notes on longstanding, specialized debates with leading contemporaries.
I've read most of Rorty's work and while some of the essays tread familiar ground, there are generative new metaphors and framings throughout the collection.
Those new to pragmatism should read his earlier work first: for those more interested in 20th century debates in Anglophone, analytic philosophy, see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature; for those more interested in a more accessible, wide-ranging look at Rorty's influence as a public intellectual, see Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
January 4, 2023
What if we could have everything, at the cost of nothing?
March 23, 2022
The philosophy is an appalling blueprint for totalitarianism, but the presentation of it is lucid and helpful.
Want to read
July 27, 2022In case you don't know it, everyone's second favourite Santa-Claus (after Dennett) posted the actual lectures in his youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-k-IU...
February 10, 2023
Rorty’s book positively surprised me. Most part is quite readable and straightforward.
In terms of the ideas, I am mostly sold on his position. Simple and outcome oriented - ever since I started reading this book, I found myself asking his usual question: what difference does it make in actual practice, if any?
In terms of the ideas, I am mostly sold on his position. Simple and outcome oriented - ever since I started reading this book, I found myself asking his usual question: what difference does it make in actual practice, if any?
May 3, 2022
Erudite and fresh with insights about philosophy. I pretty much agree with most of what's in here, despite its moral being a tad sterile and boring.
January 23, 2022
Much to consider!
December 28, 2024
Reality is a Serious of Alternative Narratives
The Basis of Authoritarianism:
The authoritarianism of which Richard Rorty warns against, and offers philosophical pragmaticism as protection against, is too often innocuously stated as the quest for fundamental reality, the absolute ground of being, the bird’s-eye view of existence, objective judgement, certain knowledge, universal principles, complete truth or perfect information. In other words, it is ontological and epistemological in nature. The authoritarian impulse starts early with the ontology of the objective and epistemology of the true. That is, the insistence that reality must be (fill in the blank) and thus the truth that follows must be (fill in the blank). Once authoritarianism becomes political, it is too late.
We start down the path to political tyranny by insisting that there is one correct nature of reality and by implication, one correct truth that follows. This is prior to the formation of ideas and ideologies. Political authoritarianism is based upon a particular or even peculiar narrative of human existence which creates false expectations for the power of knowledge with the ideas and ideologies that follow going on to be imposed upon human social relations. For example, the political tyranny of the Nazis was based upon an ideology built up from ‘knowledge’ based a on peculiar version of ‘reality’.
We have to learn to how to think without always relying on authority outside of our most up-to-date social practices only made possible by human progress. The only problem is that all progress is reversible. There is no reality (God for example) behind appearances thus is there is no appearance-reality distinction to be made or dichotomy to be fretted over. Our highest ethical capacity is the ability to work together and cooperate to create and maintain a future of human progress fit for human flourishing with a sensitivity to alleviate suffering at all levels of sentient life. This is why belief in God (a special case ideology) leads to tyranny. There is nothing more consequential than religion when it is tied to the state, nothing is more inconsequential than religion in its natural state.
The Completion of the Enlightenment:
Pragmaticism carries forward the Enlightenment. The completion of the Enlightenment is to be found in dropping Enlightenment notions of rationalism while retaining Enlightenment notions of liberalism. That is, rational calculation is a typical characteristic of human beings, not a product of the Enlightenment. One can be barbaric as well as cruel and still be rational. The achievement of the Enlightenment is not to be found in a better method of thinking, but in better thinking. For example, ending slavery, wide spread education, equality of women, access to healthcare and secular government etc.
We are misled, or allow ourselves to be misled, by our misunderstanding of what truth represents. The optimal use of knowledge is to cohere our beliefs rather that in relating absolute knowledge to objective reality. It is practice, not principle, that matters most in human affairs. Interpretation comes prior to objectivity. First we interpret experience and events in a way that they cohere, we then dub this new coherence with the august title of objective fact or universal truth. Political authoritarianism can then come in the supernatural form of divine commands or in the human form of human commands based on our over confident pseudo knowledge (truth) of objective reality (laws of nature): when we setup invisible metaphysical authorities rather than communicating with each other. Rorty states this problem as the preference for the ‘vertical’ (pseudo-communication with a higher ontological authority or a deeper metaphysical reality) in place of the ‘horizontal’ (human mutuality, cooperation and communication). As humans, all we can really know is the conditions of our relationships with each other. It is upon this which we must build human society and civilization for better or worse. For the better when we recognize this. For the worse we pretend that there is a transcendental realm of existence different from our experience, that there are supernatural forces at work or that there is an ultimate objective reality which we must strive to understand and organize ourselves in accordance with. The opposite of ideology is not objective reality, it is another ideology. The opposite of what is true is not what is false, it is an alternative truth. If anything, we have too much truth in the world and too many people who are sure they know it.
Pragmaticism in Not Relativism:
Truth is that which builds upon itself and continues to advance human flourishing. We can provisionally recognize truth when we see that it is not fixed and that it can be expanded upon and built-up to yield additional true outcomes that we can take as true because they advance human wellness. This is simply good old fashion American pragmatic philosophy. That is, the appeal is to simply make the human condition better rather than an appeal to a grand narrative, an absolute reality or an immutable definition of truth, logic or reason – this is often referred to as foundationalism or as the correspondence theory of truth. There are no specific equations of reason or algorithms for arriving at the truth. The best we can do is to learn and improve without resorting to gross trial and error or supernatural nonsense. This is not relativism because in pragmaticism there is a feature of improvement, it is not simply a comparison between different ideas on the basis of a false equivalency. Relativism declares all ideas or ‘truths’ equal, compares them and surprisingly finds no basis for differentiation. Pragmaticism continuously compares ideas and truths in an attempt to identify those that contribute to the advancement of human flourishing. What is human flourishing? This is the key question for pragmaticism. What if some hypothetical, or not so hypothetical society, finds that flourishing is advanced by slavery? In reality, the problem is that slavery can and was justified by appealing to an absolute definition of truth, laws of nature and objective reality in the same manner as the anti-slavery position. So, in either case, we are left with human values based on social relations and the kind of society we want. The social consensus and its evolution are the most important factors in determining human values and thus human behavior. It is a matter of building a community of trust, not imposing universal principles. The best we can do is strive for continuous improvement rather than searching for the best fixed absolute values. We find ourselves skewered on the fork of pragmatism and foundationalism in an environment where claims to truth and objective reality are always risky. We are only answerable to each other and this is the great risk inscribed into the human condition. Progress is always reversible. There is no authority outside of our own practices, we just like to pretend there is to justify our practices. Our human rights are underwritten or undermined by our human action. There is no supernatural or superhuman guarantee. There is nothing written or natural or ordained by God to guarantee empathy. Empathy rests on human solidarity, this is the only truth upon which we can depend. Everything we do, say and think is based on our culture, our history, our social reality and ourselves which are all highly contingent. It is said that this sort of pragmatic approach will not provide one with reasons for not being a slave holder but nor will it provide one with reasons for being a slave holder. Truth is not discrete, it is nuanced and its search compels self-reflection, exploration and self-expression. It is a secular, humanist, pragmatic and progressive approach to human relations that must combine to save us from authoritarianism, both human and divine. We can only compare current practices (no slavery) to past practices (slavery) and evaluate which promotes human empathy, wellbeing and flourishing in as wide a circumference as possible.
Different Narratives Show that More Than One Truth can fit Observed Reality (My own Examples):
The Deck of Cards:
It is true that there are 4 suits of cards in a standard deck of playing cards. It also true that there two colors in the same deck of cards. The deck can be described as 4 runs of 13 cards each, as 13 sets of cards in 4 suits, or as a deck of 52 individual cards. All of these descriptions are true, they are all different and yet they all describe the same reality. There is no sense in arguing that one of them is the absolute truth or the objective reality or in fighting over what is true (or more true) or which real (or more real) in this case. As Rorty himself might ask, which of these concepts of deck of cards best mirrors the essential nature of the deck? The answer is none and insisting that one of our notions, which are only alternative descriptions, must mirror the essential nature of the deck is first: ontological authoritarianism in insisting that there is one essential reality and second: epistemological authoritarianism in insisting that we can know what is essential. These are really just tiresome descriptions of the same thing with none of them any closer than the other to the ‘essential’ nature of a deck of cards because there is no essential nature of ‘card deckness’. The deck of cards is really a series of relations. These relations change as different games are played with the same deck of cards.
The Solar System:
The Ptolemaic model of the solar system was geocentric. It provided correct explanations of observed astronomical phenomena as well as accurate retrodiction and prediction of the heavenly bodies but was of course an incorrect model. Ironically, it was completely backwards and this is what made it plausible. Galileo experienced firsthand the social and political authoritarianism when he challenged the ontological and epistemological authoritarianism of the reigning Ptolemaic model of the solar system. In order for the Catholic Church to maintain its political authority, the Earth had to be at the center of the solar system. This is an example of political authoritarianism following from ontological authoritarianism. A peculiar view of reality was necessary to sustain a particular type of authority.
The Table:
I was once told that a table is really not a table as we see it because it is really a collection of subatomic particles and empty space. I said yes, but this is only one of many possible narrative descriptions of observed and shared reality. I said a solid table is a more useful narrative description of this shared observed reality because we do not exist at the subatomic level. The subatomic or quantum level of existence is outside the range of our common experience. We do not have sense organs that operate at the molecular or atomic level of existence. Tables are not the logical construction of atoms and atoms are not the logical deconstructions of tables. Atoms, as the mode of existence, is more useful and a more relevant level of existence for the laboratory and the solid table is more useful and the most relevant narrative of existence for the living room - this is the most useful way in which to state our relatedness to our normative environment. At no time can we say that either of these narrative descriptions of the table is the true or correct one of reality any more than we can say that at the cosmic level of reality, tables have no existence.
The Basis of Authoritarianism:
The authoritarianism of which Richard Rorty warns against, and offers philosophical pragmaticism as protection against, is too often innocuously stated as the quest for fundamental reality, the absolute ground of being, the bird’s-eye view of existence, objective judgement, certain knowledge, universal principles, complete truth or perfect information. In other words, it is ontological and epistemological in nature. The authoritarian impulse starts early with the ontology of the objective and epistemology of the true. That is, the insistence that reality must be (fill in the blank) and thus the truth that follows must be (fill in the blank). Once authoritarianism becomes political, it is too late.
We start down the path to political tyranny by insisting that there is one correct nature of reality and by implication, one correct truth that follows. This is prior to the formation of ideas and ideologies. Political authoritarianism is based upon a particular or even peculiar narrative of human existence which creates false expectations for the power of knowledge with the ideas and ideologies that follow going on to be imposed upon human social relations. For example, the political tyranny of the Nazis was based upon an ideology built up from ‘knowledge’ based a on peculiar version of ‘reality’.
We have to learn to how to think without always relying on authority outside of our most up-to-date social practices only made possible by human progress. The only problem is that all progress is reversible. There is no reality (God for example) behind appearances thus is there is no appearance-reality distinction to be made or dichotomy to be fretted over. Our highest ethical capacity is the ability to work together and cooperate to create and maintain a future of human progress fit for human flourishing with a sensitivity to alleviate suffering at all levels of sentient life. This is why belief in God (a special case ideology) leads to tyranny. There is nothing more consequential than religion when it is tied to the state, nothing is more inconsequential than religion in its natural state.
The Completion of the Enlightenment:
Pragmaticism carries forward the Enlightenment. The completion of the Enlightenment is to be found in dropping Enlightenment notions of rationalism while retaining Enlightenment notions of liberalism. That is, rational calculation is a typical characteristic of human beings, not a product of the Enlightenment. One can be barbaric as well as cruel and still be rational. The achievement of the Enlightenment is not to be found in a better method of thinking, but in better thinking. For example, ending slavery, wide spread education, equality of women, access to healthcare and secular government etc.
We are misled, or allow ourselves to be misled, by our misunderstanding of what truth represents. The optimal use of knowledge is to cohere our beliefs rather that in relating absolute knowledge to objective reality. It is practice, not principle, that matters most in human affairs. Interpretation comes prior to objectivity. First we interpret experience and events in a way that they cohere, we then dub this new coherence with the august title of objective fact or universal truth. Political authoritarianism can then come in the supernatural form of divine commands or in the human form of human commands based on our over confident pseudo knowledge (truth) of objective reality (laws of nature): when we setup invisible metaphysical authorities rather than communicating with each other. Rorty states this problem as the preference for the ‘vertical’ (pseudo-communication with a higher ontological authority or a deeper metaphysical reality) in place of the ‘horizontal’ (human mutuality, cooperation and communication). As humans, all we can really know is the conditions of our relationships with each other. It is upon this which we must build human society and civilization for better or worse. For the better when we recognize this. For the worse we pretend that there is a transcendental realm of existence different from our experience, that there are supernatural forces at work or that there is an ultimate objective reality which we must strive to understand and organize ourselves in accordance with. The opposite of ideology is not objective reality, it is another ideology. The opposite of what is true is not what is false, it is an alternative truth. If anything, we have too much truth in the world and too many people who are sure they know it.
Pragmaticism in Not Relativism:
Truth is that which builds upon itself and continues to advance human flourishing. We can provisionally recognize truth when we see that it is not fixed and that it can be expanded upon and built-up to yield additional true outcomes that we can take as true because they advance human wellness. This is simply good old fashion American pragmatic philosophy. That is, the appeal is to simply make the human condition better rather than an appeal to a grand narrative, an absolute reality or an immutable definition of truth, logic or reason – this is often referred to as foundationalism or as the correspondence theory of truth. There are no specific equations of reason or algorithms for arriving at the truth. The best we can do is to learn and improve without resorting to gross trial and error or supernatural nonsense. This is not relativism because in pragmaticism there is a feature of improvement, it is not simply a comparison between different ideas on the basis of a false equivalency. Relativism declares all ideas or ‘truths’ equal, compares them and surprisingly finds no basis for differentiation. Pragmaticism continuously compares ideas and truths in an attempt to identify those that contribute to the advancement of human flourishing. What is human flourishing? This is the key question for pragmaticism. What if some hypothetical, or not so hypothetical society, finds that flourishing is advanced by slavery? In reality, the problem is that slavery can and was justified by appealing to an absolute definition of truth, laws of nature and objective reality in the same manner as the anti-slavery position. So, in either case, we are left with human values based on social relations and the kind of society we want. The social consensus and its evolution are the most important factors in determining human values and thus human behavior. It is a matter of building a community of trust, not imposing universal principles. The best we can do is strive for continuous improvement rather than searching for the best fixed absolute values. We find ourselves skewered on the fork of pragmatism and foundationalism in an environment where claims to truth and objective reality are always risky. We are only answerable to each other and this is the great risk inscribed into the human condition. Progress is always reversible. There is no authority outside of our own practices, we just like to pretend there is to justify our practices. Our human rights are underwritten or undermined by our human action. There is no supernatural or superhuman guarantee. There is nothing written or natural or ordained by God to guarantee empathy. Empathy rests on human solidarity, this is the only truth upon which we can depend. Everything we do, say and think is based on our culture, our history, our social reality and ourselves which are all highly contingent. It is said that this sort of pragmatic approach will not provide one with reasons for not being a slave holder but nor will it provide one with reasons for being a slave holder. Truth is not discrete, it is nuanced and its search compels self-reflection, exploration and self-expression. It is a secular, humanist, pragmatic and progressive approach to human relations that must combine to save us from authoritarianism, both human and divine. We can only compare current practices (no slavery) to past practices (slavery) and evaluate which promotes human empathy, wellbeing and flourishing in as wide a circumference as possible.
Different Narratives Show that More Than One Truth can fit Observed Reality (My own Examples):
The Deck of Cards:
It is true that there are 4 suits of cards in a standard deck of playing cards. It also true that there two colors in the same deck of cards. The deck can be described as 4 runs of 13 cards each, as 13 sets of cards in 4 suits, or as a deck of 52 individual cards. All of these descriptions are true, they are all different and yet they all describe the same reality. There is no sense in arguing that one of them is the absolute truth or the objective reality or in fighting over what is true (or more true) or which real (or more real) in this case. As Rorty himself might ask, which of these concepts of deck of cards best mirrors the essential nature of the deck? The answer is none and insisting that one of our notions, which are only alternative descriptions, must mirror the essential nature of the deck is first: ontological authoritarianism in insisting that there is one essential reality and second: epistemological authoritarianism in insisting that we can know what is essential. These are really just tiresome descriptions of the same thing with none of them any closer than the other to the ‘essential’ nature of a deck of cards because there is no essential nature of ‘card deckness’. The deck of cards is really a series of relations. These relations change as different games are played with the same deck of cards.
The Solar System:
The Ptolemaic model of the solar system was geocentric. It provided correct explanations of observed astronomical phenomena as well as accurate retrodiction and prediction of the heavenly bodies but was of course an incorrect model. Ironically, it was completely backwards and this is what made it plausible. Galileo experienced firsthand the social and political authoritarianism when he challenged the ontological and epistemological authoritarianism of the reigning Ptolemaic model of the solar system. In order for the Catholic Church to maintain its political authority, the Earth had to be at the center of the solar system. This is an example of political authoritarianism following from ontological authoritarianism. A peculiar view of reality was necessary to sustain a particular type of authority.
The Table:
I was once told that a table is really not a table as we see it because it is really a collection of subatomic particles and empty space. I said yes, but this is only one of many possible narrative descriptions of observed and shared reality. I said a solid table is a more useful narrative description of this shared observed reality because we do not exist at the subatomic level. The subatomic or quantum level of existence is outside the range of our common experience. We do not have sense organs that operate at the molecular or atomic level of existence. Tables are not the logical construction of atoms and atoms are not the logical deconstructions of tables. Atoms, as the mode of existence, is more useful and a more relevant level of existence for the laboratory and the solid table is more useful and the most relevant narrative of existence for the living room - this is the most useful way in which to state our relatedness to our normative environment. At no time can we say that either of these narrative descriptions of the table is the true or correct one of reality any more than we can say that at the cosmic level of reality, tables have no existence.
June 7, 2025
【Richard Rorty / Pragmatism as Anti-Totalitarianism (2021, Harvard University Press)】
--This means that we should separate the quest for greatness and sublimity from the quest for justice and happiness. (xxxii, Preface)
Bht he's not only logical but also sometimes unscientific. His usage of the word "polytheism" is also erroneous, judging from what polytheism actually is, for example, in some Asian cultures.
However, he makes a lot of important points as well.
--James should not have made a distinction between issues to be decided by intellect and issues to be decided by emotion. (P37, 2 'Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism')
He adds Habermas (P50, 3&4 'Universality and Truth) with summarizing his theory without his own dialectic criticized by Popper to his team despite his bigot's reactions (P58, 3&4).
However, this confident - or even sometimes pompous - liberal pragmatism is also a katana for harakiri of liberals. He started off calmly to get more and more excited, almost picking a quarrel at philosophers after a solid summary and raising some points he admires.
--One way to describe this commonality is to say that philosopherd as diverse as Davidson and Derrida, Putnam and Latour, Brandom and Foucault, are in the main, and despite occasional backsliding, pan-relatioanlists. (P85, 5, 'Pan-Relatioanlism')
Good, if only he used some better verb than "backslide."
"We anti-essentialists, of course" ...he was probably an abnormally excited successor of Russell, who thought that his "philosophy" was also "literature" and vice verse, unlike Russell himself. And for you're such an interesting philosopher saying things with conciseness like:
--...conception is the difference between closure and openness-- between the security of the unchanging and the Whitmanesque and Whitehead Ian romance of throwing oneself into the process of unpredictable change (P142, 7, "Ethics without Universal Obligations") please don't diagnose another "schizophrenic" (P115, 6, 'Against Depth').
--This means that we should separate the quest for greatness and sublimity from the quest for justice and happiness. (xxxii, Preface)
Bht he's not only logical but also sometimes unscientific. His usage of the word "polytheism" is also erroneous, judging from what polytheism actually is, for example, in some Asian cultures.
However, he makes a lot of important points as well.
--James should not have made a distinction between issues to be decided by intellect and issues to be decided by emotion. (P37, 2 'Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism')
He adds Habermas (P50, 3&4 'Universality and Truth) with summarizing his theory without his own dialectic criticized by Popper to his team despite his bigot's reactions (P58, 3&4).
However, this confident - or even sometimes pompous - liberal pragmatism is also a katana for harakiri of liberals. He started off calmly to get more and more excited, almost picking a quarrel at philosophers after a solid summary and raising some points he admires.
--One way to describe this commonality is to say that philosopherd as diverse as Davidson and Derrida, Putnam and Latour, Brandom and Foucault, are in the main, and despite occasional backsliding, pan-relatioanlists. (P85, 5, 'Pan-Relatioanlism')
Good, if only he used some better verb than "backslide."
"We anti-essentialists, of course" ...he was probably an abnormally excited successor of Russell, who thought that his "philosophy" was also "literature" and vice verse, unlike Russell himself. And for you're such an interesting philosopher saying things with conciseness like:
--...conception is the difference between closure and openness-- between the security of the unchanging and the Whitmanesque and Whitehead Ian romance of throwing oneself into the process of unpredictable change (P142, 7, "Ethics without Universal Obligations") please don't diagnose another "schizophrenic" (P115, 6, 'Against Depth').
December 24, 2025
The first half was 4/5
The latter half was less interesting.
As with a lot Rorty’s collections, a majority I found extremely interesting, and a few not so interesting. In this collection the not-so-interesting were primarily discussing Habermas, whom I just don’t find all that appealing to my own interests.
Also 3 of the lectures/essays were from collections I had previously read.
The lecture on Pan-Relationalism was 5/5
The latter half was less interesting.
As with a lot Rorty’s collections, a majority I found extremely interesting, and a few not so interesting. In this collection the not-so-interesting were primarily discussing Habermas, whom I just don’t find all that appealing to my own interests.
Also 3 of the lectures/essays were from collections I had previously read.
The lecture on Pan-Relationalism was 5/5
July 11, 2022
Provocative, incendiary, and pithily worded. Always a pleasure, even when we do not agree.
January 20, 2025
I loved this book, and honestly, it's way more accessible than the title makes it seem.
December 30, 2025
Rorty always writes well and is always interesting. The only problem is he's so helplessly wrong.
January 6, 2026
Read most of it, I ain’t ready for this yet.
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