Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education

by Nel Noddings

With numerous examples to supplement her rich theoretical discussion, Nel Noddings builds a compelling philosophical argument for an ethics based on natural caring, as in the care of a mother for her child. In Caring—now updated with a new preface and afterword reflecting on the ongoing relevance of the subject matter—the author provides a wide-ranging consideration of whether organizations, which operate at a remove from the caring relationship, can truly be called ethical. She discusses the extent to which we may truly care for plants, animals, or ideas. Finally, she proposes a realignment of education to encourage and reward not just rationality and trained intelligence, but also enhanced sensitivity in moral matters.

Genres: Philosophy, Education, Feminism, Nonfiction, Grad School, Parenting, Gender

258 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1984

About the author

Nel Noddings is an American feminist, educationalist, and philosopher best known for her work in philosophy of education, educational theory, and ethics of care.

Noddings received a bachelors degree in mathematics and physical science from Montclair State College in New Jersey, a masters degree in mathematics from Rutgers University, and a Ph.D. in education from the Stanford University School of Education.

Nel Noddings worked in many areas of the education system. She spent seventeen years as an elementary and high school mathematics teacher and school administrator, before earning her PhD and beginning work as an academic in the fields of philosophy of education, theory of education and ethics, specifically moral education and ethics of care. She became a member of the Stanford faculty in 1977, and was the Jacks Professor of Child Education from 1992 until 1998. While at Stanford University she received awards for teaching excellence in 1981, 1982 and 1997, and was the associate dean or acting dean of the School of Education for four years. After leaving Stanford University, she held positions at Columbia University and Colgate University. She is past president of the Philosophy of Education Society and the John Dewey Society. In 2002-2003 she held the John W. Porter Chair in Urban Education at Eastern Michigan University. She has been Lee L. Jacks Professor of Education, Emerita, at Stanford University since she retired in 1998.

Nel Noddings has 10 children and in 2009 had been married for 60 years. She has described her early educational experiences and her close relationships as key in her development of her philosophical position.

Reviews

[Regan · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is an oft cited (and criticized) book in Feminist Ethics. It is one of the earlier attempts to develop a theory of care (to contrast with the justice perspective). She shares in common with previous feminist ethicists a commitment to theorizing about real life (particularly women's lives), and she shares a feminist ontology that understands individuals as constituted by and through relation ("relational selves").

Noddings believes with others that a revaluation of care is necessary both in personal and public relationships, however she primarily focuses on the personal. Her paradigmatic case of caring-for is the mother/child relationship, but she includes teacher/student as well. As such her account of caring is primarily an account of an asymmetrical relationship. It is also a sentimentalist account--our obligations to care stem from our commitment to sustaining relationships and connectedness (reason is not a motivating, but may be a loosely guiding principle).

It is this reader's belief that Noddings has more or less adopted Martin Buber's "I and Thou" wholesale and is attempting to (re)work it into a feminist ethic. Buber famously identified two orientations towards this world: There is the I-it relationship in which the "it" is rationalized and instrumentalized for the I's use. (The It here can be a person, as well as idea, object, etc). It is the ordinary world of ordinary things. The second orientation (the "primary" one, in the sense that it lends the I-it relationship MEANING), is the I-You relationship. According to Buber this relationship, when it is entered into is wholly reciprocal, unmediated, essentially timeless/ahistorical. In other words it is essentially a transcendent relationship with a You. When we are engaged with the You, the You "fills our firmament." Another way of saying this is that nothing exists outside the I-You relationship when one is in the relationship.

Noddings cites Buber amply, and yet she seems to miss fundamental features of his thinking, which could actually help to correct her own account. First, I believe she misses almost entirely the world of I-it, which is the background "reality" as it were, of the world. She wants to establish the I-You as the primary relationship because it is the most fundamentally caring. But Buber himself does not think we can sustain ourselves in an I-You capacity. We can, as it were, drink from its well and be nourished, but we cannot live on You alone. It is too all-engrossing of a relationship, and after all we have things like dishes to do and art to make. But Nodding takes just this engrossment as a central feature that cannot be gotten rid of (in fact she prefers 'engrossment' with the other to 'empathy.' But engrossment is incredibly problematic. Most obviously it runs the risk of being too myopic, but it also leaves the one-caring liable (and perhaps even obligated) to sacrifice herself selflessly for the one cared-for.

Buber's I-Thou relationship is predicated on reciprocity, and thus he thinks a true I-Thou relationship is remarkably rare, and thus all the more to be cherished. Noddings wants to claim that the caring relationship she is talking about is reciprocal (she claims it is), but it is not reciprocal in the strong sense that Buber means. Noddings is at pains to show that caring cannot be called complete unless the caring is recognized by the cared-for. This allows her to claim a thin notion of reciprocity, but it doesn't amount to much. How can infants truly "reciprocate"? Noddings' emphasis on unequal relationships prevents her from exploring a more robust notion of reciprocity, which is needed since the majority of our adult relationships are voluntary and more equalized.

The last thing I will mention is Noddings very clever, but ultimately strange claim that we enhance the ethical ideal of caring in ourselves through feeling joy in relation to others. She derives joy (this is the clever part) from an inversion of Sartre. Sartre believed that our existential aloneness leads to develop a (quasi-metaphysical) anxiety. Noddings, who construes human beings as existentially bound in relation, decides that this leads to a (quasi-metaphysical, mostly magical/woo woo) joy in this fact. (Why this follows, I'm not sure). This experience of joy is supposed to replenish us to continue our acts of caring-for.

First, I'm not sure you can derive joy purely from a natural fact of our existence such as relatedness. There are plenty of natural things that I don't take joy in. For instance,I have to take a shit sometimes, but that doesn't mean I relish it. Similarly, Noddings seems to be assuming that all care-givers (or most anyway) are actually GOOD and competent care-givers. But why should we assume that? Not everyone has children because they planned it, and some parents are just shitty parents. Some kids don't get the right care they need because their parents have to work 3 jobs to make ends meet, and some kids don't get the right care because their fathers are locked away in jail for non-violent crimes. In other words, bad caring happens all the time, and it's not clear to me that Noddings' happy-hoorah-probably-white-middle-class parenting happens for plenty of children.

Maybe it should, but if she's developing an ethic of care based on "lived experience" then she needs to acknowledge that social structures actually militate against caring for many (especially) marginalized women/men.

[Q Crain · Rating 5 out of 5]

Most important book I own or have read.

This is the philosophy/ethic one ought to live by.

[Serge · Rating 4 out of 5]

Going to use this book to help my Ethics Bowl students articulate a moral framework (desparely need in times such as these)
P.xiii The reciprocity in caring relations is not contractual; that is, we do not expect the cared-for to balance the relation by doing what the one-caring (or carer) does. In equal relations, we do expect that, under appropriate conditions, the parties will exchange places as carer and cared-for. The world is not divided into carers and cared-fors as separate and permanent classes. We are all inevitably cared-fors at many times and, ideally, most of us are carers.

P.xiv … the ethic of care is not about moral credit. It is about moral life and what makes it possible. The contributions of the cared-for sustain us in our attempts to care.

…Today, in a world shaken by the violence of nations and groups whose acts are “justified” by the principles they espouse, an ethic of care is even more important and ultimately reasonable. Our efforts should be directed to transforming the conditions that make caring difficult or impossible. .
… We often justify our acts, especially those that cause harm, by claiming adherence to a recognized moral principle

P.xv Caring-for is the direct face-to-face attempt to respond to the needs of a cared-for. It uses the response of the cared-for in monitoring and shaping what it does to meet these needs…. In contrast to caring-for, caring-about is characterized by some distance. It moves us from the face-to-face world of direct responsibility into the wider public realm.

P.5 We want to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring

Wherever there is a principle, there is implied its exception and, too often, principles function to separate us from each other. We may become dangerously self-righteous when we perceive ourselves as holding a precious principle not held by the other. The other may then be devalued and treated “differently.” Our ethic of caring will not permit this to happen. We recognize that in fear, anger, or hatred we will treat the other differently, but this treatment is never conducted ethically.

P.6 The philosopher who begins with a supremely free consciousness– an aloneness and emptiness at the heart of existence– identifies anguish as the basic human affect. But our view , rooted as it is in relation, identifies joy as a basic human affect .

P.13 Undergoing conflict is another risk of caring, and we shall consider a variety of possible conflicts.

P.16 As I think about how I feel when I care, about what my frame of mind is, I see that my caring is always characterized by a move away from myself.

P.18 Many of us think that it is not only possible to care for everyone but morally obligatory that we should do so. We can, in a sense that will need elaboration, “care about” everyone; that is, we can maintain an internal state of readiness to try to care for whoever crosses our path. But this is different fro the the caring-for to which we refer when we use the word “caring.”

P.19 Gabriel Marcel characterizes this attitude in terms of “disposability (disponibilite), the readiness to bestow and spend oneself and make oneself available, and its contrary, indisposability.

P.24 To care is to act not by fixed rule but by affection and regard

To act as one-caring, then, is to act with special regard for the particular person in a concrete situation. We act not to achieve for ourselves a commendation but to protect or enhance the welfare of the cared-for

P.33 I have claimed that the one-caring is engrossed in the other. But this engrossment is not completely characterized as emotional feeling. There is a characteristic and appropriate mode of consciousness in caring.

P.38 Can I be free of guilt? I do not think it is possible. Paul Tillich describes the anxiety of guilt as ontological. It transcends the subjective and objective. It isa constant threat in caring. In caring, I am turned both outward (toward the other) and inward ( my engrossment may be reflected upon); when caring fails, I feel its loss.

P.39 The risk of guilt is present in all caring. But its likelihood is greater in caring that is sustained over time.

P.40 Martin Buber says: “Love is responsibility of an I for a Thou: in this consists what cannot consist in any feeling.” Caring, too, although it is not necessarily accompanied by love, is partly responsibility fo the other– for the cared-for

P.43 Kierkegaard interprets Abraham’s action as supra-ethical, that is, as the actio of an individual who is justified by his connection to God, the absolute. For him, as for us, the individual is higher than the universal, but for him that “higher” status is derived from “absolute duty toward God.” Hence a paradox is produced. Out of duty to God, we may be required to do to our neighbor what is ethically forbidden.

P.55 I am suggesting strongly that we have no ethical responsibility to cooperate with law or government when it attempts to involve us in unethical procedures. Spying, infiltration, entrapment, betrayal are all anathema to one-caring, and she cannot justify them on the basis of principle.

P.95 But there is another difficulty in answering the request for justification. Consideration of problems of justification requires us to concentrate on moral judgments, on moral statements…..
For an ethic of caring, the problem of justification is not concentrated upon justified action in general. We are not “justified” – we are obligated– to do what is required to maintain and enhance caring. We must justify “not-caring”; that is, we must explain why, in the interest of caring for ourselves as ethical selves or in the interest of others for whom we care, we may behave as ones-not-caring toward this particular other.

P.99 An ethic of caring is a tough ethic. It does not separate self and other in caring, although, of course, it identifies the special contribution of the one-caring and the cared-for in caring. In contrast to some forms of agapism, for example, it has no problem in advocating a deep and steady caring for self.

P.101 My concern is for the ethical ideal, for my own ethical ideal and for whatever part of it others in my community may share. Ideally, another human being should be able to request, with expectation of positive response , my help and comfort.

P.115 The perceived lack of alternative induces minimal ethical functioning under the diminished ideal. The ethical agent accepts responsibility; it is she who is, personally, committed to caring. Built on perceived autonomy cooperating with one form of natural feeling , her ethic treasures both the natural feeling that it seeks to preserve and the autonomy by which it is embraced. When the one-caring is driven to the point where she perceives only one solution, and that in opposition to the enhanced ideal, she is badly shaken and, in extreme cases, broken… There can be no greater evil, then, than this: that the moral autonomy of the one-caring be so shattered that she acts against her commitment to care.

But this evil is not An Evil sustained by cosmic forces and just waiting to trap the weak and unwary. It is created by individual human beings making conscious choices. When one intentionally rejects the impulse to care and deliberately turns her back on th ethical, she is evil, and this evil cannot be redeemed. Sarte also says that “ evil cannot be redeemed,” and I think he is pointing to the same thing– that evil is chosen by the evil one as good is chosen by the good.

P.117 Cruelty and harsh judgment are not strangers to religion. Further, the frequent insistence on obedience to rules and adherence to ritual contributes to the erosion of genuine caring.

P.123 Nothing is more important in nurturing the ethical ideal than attribution and explication of the best possible motive. The one-caring holds out to the child a vision of this lovely self actualized or nearly actualized.

P.133 Those, like Sartre, whose ontology posits a lonely emptiness trying to actualize itself, a consciousness forever subject to some object, see anguish as the inevitable accompaniment of our realization of our aloneness– of our essential freedom to choose ourselves and our world.

P.139 In Sartre’s view this switch from the externally oriented control of rational, instrumental thinking represents a “degradation of consciousness.” If I cannot achieve my goal in the instrumental world, I create a magical world to replace that of instrumentalities.

P.141 …in our framework, consciousness does not resist the call to duality. It seeks relatedness; it is not reduced or degraded by the other’s subjectness. We cannot escape responsibility, but that responsibility is always shared. Consciousness may, then, take on an explicit attitude of openness; that is, consciousness may make a commitment to give over the control that is always in its power to other forms of subjectivity.

P.145 receptive joy occurs when we are engaged as though possessed– when we are caught up in a relation. We may have ceased manipulative activity and fallen quiet; we are listening. We are not trying so much to produce a particular product or answer as we are trying to understand, to see.

P.150 The caring relation, in particular, requires engrossment and motivational displacement on the part of the one-caring and a form of responsiveness or reciprocity on the part of the cared-for

[Ida Marie · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't quite agree with everything, not at all - but that's part of the fun

[Sharad Pandian · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a book I am torn about. On the one hand, I think Noddings shows that attention to caring and its role in shaping ethical behaviour is incredibly valuable, vital.

Here's a quick summary of some key features of her account she provides halfway through:

This is the place to make clear-and to test-the basic notions on which an ethic of caring rests. I have been using relation as ontologically basic and the caring relation as ethically basic. We may think of relation as a set of ordered pairs generated by some rule. The sense in which I have used this term requires that the rule include some description of affect-that is, that the rule say something about the subjective experience of members in the relation. The caring relation, in particular, requires engrossment and motivational displacement on the part of the one-caring and a form of responsiveness or reciprocity on the part of the cared-for. It is important to re-emphasize that this reciprocity is not contractual; that is, it is not characterized by mutuality. The cared-for contributes to the caring relation, as we have seen, by receiving the efforts of one-caring, and this receiving may be accomplished by a disclosure of his own subjective experience in direct response to the one-caring or by a happy and vigorous pursuit of his own projects. (150-1)

Her attention to the phenomenology of care, the importance of the cared-for's response as a success condition of the care relation, and the many insights into pedagogy make this luminous and illuminating.

I'll admit I think her treatment of relationships with animals, plants, and ideas came off as quite shoddy because she relegates them to a second-tier compared to human relations without good-enough reasons to back this up, particularly by the lights of her own anti-universalizing approach. Of course ideas and animals can't respond with same sensory receptivity as humans, but relations with non-humans can be analogous-enough in terms of engrossment and receptivity. I suspect that her insistence on the notion of "natural caring" introduces a universality she would be better off doing away with, or at least approaching sociologically.

A far deeper issue is that she's not just advocating for taking care seriously but crowning it as exhausting the ethical realm. While I hold no brief for fetishizing "reason", to throw out the entire theoretical realm wholesale makes it pathetically myopic. Even if caring starts and is sustained at home, to dismiss the muscular operation of reasoning abstractly as not even ethical betrays an astonishing lack of curiosity and imagination, a profoundly careless engagement with the textures of life.

[Gea · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nel Noddings worked in public schools for over two decades before obtaining her Ph.D. in educational theory and philosophy from Stanford University in 1975. She has written many books and is an important voice for feminine epistemology. Noddings establishes the foundation for an ‘ethic of care,’ which is expanded on through her term ‘Caring’ (with a capital ‘C’). Caring occurs: through the relationship between the one-caring and the cared-for; when the one-caring has a displacement of motivation and is striving to be fully present with and truly meet the unique needs of the cared-for; and when the cared-for is open to receive the one-caring. The sensitive and trained intelligence of Caring allows for the cared-for to develop to his/her fullest potential and satisfies the one-caring through seeing this growth and development. Noddings shows how trained or completely logical learning is different from learning through Caring and highlights the importance of the latter. This is an important book for those interested in, education, feminine epistemology, and parenting.

[L Nehlsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nel Noddings' Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education is a thought-provoking exploration of the ethics of care, offering a refreshing perspective on moral philosophy and education. In this foundational work, Noddings argues for a shift away from traditional ethical theories that prioritize abstract principles and rules, advocating instead for an approach centered on relationships and individuals' lived experiences.
Noddings' concept of care ethics emphasizes the importance of empathy, compassion, and relational understanding in moral decision-making. She posits that genuine moral education should focus on nurturing caring relationships and developing the capacity for empathy in students. This approach is not just a theoretical concept, but a practical necessity in today's diverse and interconnected world, where understanding and appreciating different perspectives is crucial.
What sets this book apart is Noddings' ability to connect philosophical theory with practical applications in educational settings. She provides concrete examples of how educators can foster a caring school environment, equipping them with the tools to encourage students to engage in meaningful relationships and develop a moral responsibility toward others.

[Michael Sanchez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Such a penetrating, radical book that proposes a 'radically' feminine approach to relations outside of our masculine-dominated hierarchical view of relations. The book has definitely challenged some of my own views and thus has revealed assumptions I held that were previously outside of awareness (i.e., regarding competition, education, the function of striving, and sacrifices made for success as opposed to investing in relationships and prioritizing relationships with others above all else). Definitely interesting!

[Toby Newton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Establishes the case for care. Establishes why care is feminine, but not the exclusive province of women (cf. too, Gilligan's shift from the "different voice" being initially female, then human, but with essentially maternal notes). Establishes why, with a certain kind of man in charge, care will always be in too short supply.

My interest lies in how we might educate boys and girls differently, so that together, as educated men and women, they can supplant that kind of man (who isn't always male).

[Adam · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an early text in care ethics. It does have a few significant problems (parochialism and essentialism), but I'm looking forward to reading the later work of Noddings and other care ethicists. Some insights and applications from the first and last chapters remain worth reading.

[Andrew Jampol-Petzinger · Rating 5 out of 5]

A provocative and far-reaching book. As tempted as I am to disagree with several of Noddings’ ethical conclusions, the application of a theoretical framework to the ideas of caring at work in folks like Gilligan (1982) makes this particularly invaluable for moral philosophers.

[Vítor Medeiros · Rating 3 out of 5]

Caring is a great normatization of Gilligan's inputs concerning moral development. An essential work of contemporary moral philosophy.

[madelyn · Rating 2 out of 5]

fav terf fr. Read for Feminist Philosophy, Fall 2022

[Virtuella · Rating 1 out of 5]

I am trying to read this book, but I think I will give up. There are many good points in it, but there is just too much that gets up my nose,like when she claims that the only thing that really matters in education is the caring relationship between teacher and pupil. Pardon me, but if we don’t aim for some kind of intellectual growth, why then should children go to school at all? They may as well stay at home with their loving primary carers. Also, it got on my nerves that she talked as if all women were a) mothers and b) defined by motherhood. I have children, but "mother" is only one role among several that define me.

That said, I did find quite a few things that I strongly agreed with, e.g. that ethics derived exclusively from principles, rules and rational discourse have significant limitations. On the other hand, only because they have limitations doesn’t mean these approaches are altogether useless. Furthermore, I don’t think the limitations can be overcome by replacing all rational discourse exclusively with the affective concept of caring.

The problem with hers is that it’s a single-issue world view, which I always treat with scepticism. No doubt caring is an important dimension of human relationships, but I don’t think it’s the only or even the principal one. The asymmetrical relationship of one-caring and cared-for is really only suitable for particular relationships like parent/child. I think the relationships between independent adults even in an intimate relationship, let alone in a public or professional context, are better described in terms of cooperation, mutuality, solidarity, loyalty, responsibility, respect and, yes, fairness and justice. Likewise, I would contest that the impulse to be caring is the single core impulse of human existence. There are others, equally valid, for example the impulse to be productive and creative. Cynics would say the basic human impulse is self-preservation!

I think it’s a huge problem with her concept that it seems to leave the entire area of public and political life outside moral considerations. If all ethical action is confined to concrete interpersonal relationships, how shall we tackle what the Latin American liberation theology calls “structural sin”: structures of racism, sexism, social injustice etc? These things are important! Finally, if this concept deserves any feminist label at all, it would be what Naomi Wolf calls “victim feminism.” Noddings may mention in passing that men can be caring, too, but she addresses the readers a “us, the mothers.” I think by and large most men will dismiss her concept as one that doesn’t concern them, and many women will be made to feel guilty, because they do not meet that standard of self-denial and self-sacrifice and completely-dissolving-one’s-individuality-in-total-identification-with-the-other. I certainly don’t measure up to that, but I don’t accept the charge, and I don’t think it’s healthy and desirable for either the carer or the cared-for.

[Nick Klagge · Rating 4 out of 5]

I appreciated this book immensely and was very close to giving it 5 stars. There were a couple of sections where it dragged, and I think it probably would have been even more compelling as a 150-page book than as a 200-page book.

I got interested in care ethics from reading about (my hero) Jane Addams and her ethical perspectives, which are a sort of precursor. This book nails what seems to me to be a very robust and compelling alternative to rules-based moral frameworks without degenerating into wishy-washy-touchy-feeliness (what Noddings calls "agapism") in any way. This is too brief a space to give her framework its due, but at heart, she begins with the fundamental caring relationship between mother and child. She then extends this and related types of "natural caring" into the realm of "ethical caring", meaning situations with the potential for caring where it does not necessarily come instinctively to us. She bridges this gap by describing an individual caring for his or her own "ethical self", the realistic but aspirational ideal of oneself as one-caring. This seems to address the perceived conflict that Carol Gilligan discusses at length between "selfishness" and "giving".

Noddings seems to me to be a clear successor to Addams in her strict focus on achievable virtue and ideals that are grounded in the history of the self. There is no call to "love everyone" or to care for anonymous people on the other side of the world as much as for one's own family and immediate community.

My favorite part of this book was the section on perceptions of everyday routines, which really struck a chord with me.

[Jerrod · Rating 4 out of 5]

Stimulating look at how ethics are shaped by relationships and power positions, though the theory could be construed as being quite relativistic. Given the books focus on teaching and parenting, the ethical focus is on subordinates and superiors. This is fine as far as it goes, but many relationships in contemporary society are, to a large degree, with anonymous others at the checkout line or the stop light, and those that are not anonymous are between persons of equal status: co-workers (excluding bosses), spouses/significant others, and friends. While Noddings discusses our duty to "care for" diminishes with the other's distance (physically and relationally) from us, I don't think she does a good job of extending her theory of ethics based on caring to the relationships between equals. One might respond that someone (no always the same person) in the relationship is always in the caring-for position, so the theory extends just fine, but that is not satisfactory to me. While I don't take this as a general theory of ethics, it has changed the way I view my relationships with others.

[Joshua Stein · Rating 3 out of 5]

There's a lot that can be said about Noddings, and that should be said. She's definitely doing a different kind of ethics than what most of us are used to. It's not heavily analytic. It's explicitly not connected to Kant or Aristotle, which is a nice change of pace.

Noddings is an interesting ethicist, and though her theory of ethics with impact bias is interesting, it is worth considering the approach that she's taking in assessing the value of the action, and there should be a conversation about the way in which we regard "objective" ethics, in contrast to biased ethics.

Does caring make the act better? Noddings seems to think so, and while she didn't convince me, she did demonstrate that we need a better assessment of the question.

[Shane · Rating 4 out of 5]

This shouldn't be shocking, but as an educator noddings is more interested in education than in ethical theory. Because of this the final chapter, the one on education, is the best section. I also enjoy her conception of reorganizing schools for caring education, though I think that her vision not possible in some subject areas at some levels. Even though her vision is difficult to impossible in those areas, it is very similar in other subject areas to modern methods, though I am not sure if that is due to her influence or not.

[Mmelbi · Rating 3 out of 5]

Let say this book is the first phase of a new philosophy, the philosophy of care, it is the first phase because to describe the book is very fair to say, it is a descriptive analysis of the philosophy of care; the caring act, the caring relation, and ethics. I liked the book especially after I read "Caring to know", then, it was clear to me that Noddings provided the basis of a new humanitarian field. The care theory starts with an ideal home and moves outward with a sense of justice.

[AJ · Rating 3 out of 5]

interesting view of philosophy and ethics from a female perspective. according to noddings, to care is to be human and each of our decisions, if we are to be ethical, needs to be framed by how we care for others. nice critique of more esoteric writing by male philosophers(kant, mill, etc.)

[Melanie Stand · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a MUST READ book, particularly for those working with young people, such as teachers or youth workers. This book is very challenging in how education is currently delivered and how it would be best delivered. Echoes of Buber's 'I-Thou' theology throughout Nodding's musings. LOVE THIS!

[Mona · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book really gets your mind thinking about what it means to connect soul to soul to another human being.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great read. Made me really think about caring.

[Ron Christiansen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read in a BYU class on education--an interesting professor who suggested, quite scandalously at BYU that hometeaching worked against caring.

[M. Crabtree · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my favorite education books...I really liked her approach to education and appreciated her pointing out of ways that women can be uniquely strong as teachers.