A Marine friend of mine who served in Afghanistan and advocated strongly for his interpreter suggested this book to me so I could have a better understanding of this country that brought so much grief to other nations and their own citizens. It vastly increased my understanding of the country beyond the conflicts during the past three decades that I often read about. Barfield’s anthropology training definitely helped look at the bones of this country, allowing us to better understand the recent conflicts and what our leaders got wrong.
The country is extremely complex. The land locked country’s boarders are entirely by chance, splitting up communities. The country was always pressed with the Soviet Union on one side, Pakistan on the other, and Brittan always expressing their personal interest. The people from this poor, under-developed country was often pressed by all sides and ended up as a division between east and west, a fight between Western and Soviet views with a mixture of Muslim culture more pressing for most people in the county, people in the large rural areas.
The population are just an estimate since rural living and war has stopped an accurate count. It was never colonized so the country never had the true influence of another country or any growth of literacy or education. People are moving to larger cities, especially when so many left the country for the first time and experienced life outside their own village for the first time. Population has remained fairly stable due to the short life expediency of citizens with a “demographic profile typical of a premodern society which a high birthrate was matched by a high death rate,” as the author explained.
While there are many ethnic groups – Pashtuns (40%), Tajiks (30%), Hazaras(15%), Uzbeks (maybe 5%), Turkmen (another maybe 5%), Aimaqs, Nuristanis, Baluch, and some much smaller ones – the politics of Afghanistan are tired directly to Afghan cultural and religious values. Most of the population are still deeply rural, tied loosely to larger towns but their connection is their own family, village, and tribe. It’s more social than political. Almost all in Afghanistan are Muslims with Sunni’s making up the majority (roughly 85%) and a majority Shias and Ismailis. While the government is fought deeply in Kabul, the outcome has fairly small impact on the rural areas of town. The author pointed out that while the rural areas were more separated from the city and had different cultural identities, the villagers were dependent on relations with urban markets for many good. The federal government had to go through local leaders who had the reputation to be effective mediators and resolve differences, not because they represent national government but because they were local people.
In so many ways, Afghanistan has been a punching bag since the start of the 1900’s. While citizens fought against the threat from foreigners – Brittan, repeated Soviet Union threats, then the United States, they also suffered from their own governments. Non-Muslim foreigners are viewed as inferior to Afghans, even infidels, allowing people to join together despite their ethnic group to oppose foreign leadership. And, religion was the best way to unite the people of Afghanistan against others trying to impose their government on the people. Sadly, for 100 years, every leader was either slaughtered at home or forced to leave the country to save themselves.
There were repeated wars against Colonist attempts with the country winning the Third Anglo-Afghan War in April 1919 by bringing together the conservative religious groups against the British. These repeated victories increase the status of the country, especially in the Muslim world. Within a half dozen years, there was resistance within the country to taxation, draft to the military and changes to family life that went against their religion, especially liberal treatment of women. Issues that are in the news today – especially educating girls and wearing of veils – was relaxed because the clergy objected.
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan at the end of December 1979 thinking they could withdraw their troops after a few months, like they did in Czechoslovakia. But the turf and thinking was different and the occupation lasted a decade, causing one million deaths of Afghans, the migration of four million refugees, and drew in the United States and Saudi Arabia to spend a billion dollars to arm the other side. Conversely, the Soviets were spending five billion a year – and losing. The Taliban gained strength and when the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States did not have interest and the Taliban took advantage of the situation. At first, they brought stability but their abuses to human rights soon had almost all nations backing away from accepting them.
Despite the chaos, there was no push to divide the country. The author points to several reasons including that the people never connected ethnicity with nationalism so there was no break like in Yugoslavia. Further, the connection between rural areas allowed them for some independence and cooperation with the central government. Maintaining the government also allowed some continued support from the international community while also enough unity that boarder nations would not try to take over their country.
After 911, America quickly took control of the country, but the Taliban had support from so much illegal opium trade. The Karzai administration had rampart corruption, stealing away the citizen’s potion of economic recovery. The first national election was well received but the leader used corruption to win a second term. But, once again, conservative, religious believes caused contention between the United States and the West versus the conservative rural countryside that had the majority of the population. Stability of the government relied on rural cooperation more than the leadership of Kabul.
Barfield is able to walk the line between complex discussion on the control of this nation while keeping it readable. He speaks to how the ruling dynasty whose family took control in 1747 was able to maintain power until 1978 when the Soviet Union started to engage in their decade long struggle. The author explained that because it conflicts and skirmishes only came from other family members. It was only the “hereditary elites who saw government as their business.” The geography and lack of roads also helped in this since the government was so limited in the rural areas; during the winter months, many Afghans are entirely separated from the rest of the country. When there was a push for more involvement in 1964, King Zahir Shah agreed to a parliamentary system but didn’t give it much power.
It's ironic that a nation that stayed neutral in both world wars would be locked in so many wars, including being a place for cold war skirmish between Russia and the United States then later Ground Zero in the War against Terrorism. It’s also remarkable that the unraveling of the Soviet Union and withdraw of this intervention with little interest of the United States to play a role allowed the Taliban to get their footing in the government.
It is also ironic that while Afghanistan fought against other countries influencing their government but also often took subsidies from others, be it the Soviet Union, Britain, or, more recently, the United States. Earlier, Britain provides a subsidy that allowed Afghanistan to build a powerful military. Germany, Japan and the United States provided incredible funding during the 1930’s. Germany was especially popular since they fought against two of the country’s top enemies – Brittan and Russia; neither shared a boarder so that allowed the citizens not to worry about next steps of these nations. Afghanistan was siding with the Nazi’s at the start of the war and felt the impact of Germany losing WWII. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, foreign loans and grants provided 2/3rds of their annual revenue, allowing the country to build roads. The Cold War was used by the country to pit the United States against the Soviets, securing more funding. The Soviets provide military aid while the United States gave humanitarian assistance. The author pointed out that while the Soviets build silos, the Americans then filled them with wheat. Both sides of the Cold War built roads and America provided education for the highly illiterate country.
Some assistance, such as reducing flooding and increased agricultural output by building a damn and the small road built around the country did allow some improvements for the citizens. But even with this incoming aid, since industry was state owned, it was hard to do business with the country. Furthermore, their right wing believes filled the university. Most funds never left Kabul, the focus of political activities.
The anthropologist side of the author made the book more interesting. He spoke about how historically wars were not against people of the state but about the leaders who controlled the area. While many people could get caught up in the war and lose their life, once the leader “acknowledged their submission” to the conqueror, a peace agreement could be reached. He points out that this is very different than the anti-colonial movements where it was about the rights of the people. Barfield also points out that when leaders face a common threat, they can set aside issues that usually divide them to come together to fight the outsider but once that risk is gone, they recapture their old grievances and take sides internally once again.
It was interesting when Barfield spoke about Ibn Khaldun’s “four-generation model” of dynasties. He spoke about the original leader who won the first conquest had “fresh opportunities,” using the qualities that allowed him to take control to govern. The second-generation has the socialization of his father but not necessary the raw skills. Khaldun points out that the third-generation leader often has a growth of corruption, siphoning off tax dollars for their own benefit. That makes it impossible for the fourth generation to win since the treasury is being detoured and resources are not there to support the nation. He raises the point that “success could never be made permanent.” In Afghanistan, the Durranis family remained in power for 230 years.