Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations

by Stephen C. Schlesinger

The dramatic unfolding of how, against seemingly hopeless odds at the end of World War II, the most important international organization in the world, the United Nations, came to be.

In Act of Creation, Steven Schlesinger tells a pivotal and little-known story of how Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and the new American President, Harry Truman, picked up the pieces of the shattered campaign initiated by Franklin Roosevelt to create a "United Nations." Using secret agents, financial resources, and their unrivaled position of power, they overcame the intrigues of Stalin, the reservations of wartime allies like Winston Churchill, the discontent of smaller states, and a skeptical press corps to found the United Nations. The author reveals how the UN nearly collapsed several times during the conference over questions of which states should have power, who should be admitted, and how authority should be divided among its branches. By shedding new light on leading participants like John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, Adlai Stevenson, Nelson Rockefeller, and E. B White, Act of Creation provides a fascinating tale of twentieth-century history not to be missed.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, World History, European History, International Relations

402 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2003

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars

Stephen Schlesinger's book recounts the nine fateful weeks in 1945 when the world's foreign ministers and statesmen gathered in San Francisco to draft the UN Charter.

For me it is very hard to imagine a world without the United Nations. The organization has existed, for better or for worse, for seventy-five years. Yet, how many of us are actually aware of the complex process of its creation?

In the beginning of his work, Stephen Schlesinger takes a retrospective look at President Woodrow Wilson and the creation of the League of Nations. Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, was deeply distressed by the President's decision to head the American delegation to Paris in 1919 himself. He believed that Wilson's naive idealism wouldn't prove useful at the Paris Conference. As history demonstrated, Lansing was partially right – the President exhausted himself only to eventually see his dream overruled by the Congress. The League of Nations itself was also a failure – it proved itself incapable of handling any cases that required serious military action. For instance, the first crisis it faced that might have necessitated armed response was when, in 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria; the League did nothing. China called for immediate help from the League, but Japan, a permanent member of the Executive Council, vetoed a resolution for a League policy role, demonstrating how easily a single nation could smother the League's minimal enforcement powers. Then, in 1932, a League Commission of Inquiry named Japan the aggressor in Manchuria and demanded that it withdrew its forces; in expression of contempt, Japan quit the League in 1933 and kept its troops in China.

Similar to Wilson's was the fate of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. As early as January 1941, he began outlining his aims for a global peace. He told the cheering Congress, in a rather Wilsonian display of idealism, that there are four essential freedoms: of speech and expression, of religion, from want, and from fear. Those four should become the "basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation," not a distant vision. Drawing conclusions from the ever obscure and controversial Yalta Conference, however, we can infer that Roosevelt actually envisioned a world with four "policemen" – the USA, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China – supervising all other nations. Therefore, his most pressing concern was to secure Stalin’s cooperation on the UN. That was the theme of all his subsequent political, strategic, tactical, and public acts before he died. Despite his efforts and his eagerness to attend the San Fransisco Conference, though, Roosevelt died just thirteen days its opening, without seeing his dream becoming reality.
Nevertheless, the similarities between Roosevelt and Wilson end here due to Harry Truman's adamant resolve to follow in his great predecessor's steps. The new president successfully pushed for the creation of the United Nations, securing a successful end to FDR's presidency. He worked methodically and meticulously alongside the US State Department to ensure the United Nations is designed and formulated in such a manner as to ensure bipartisan support in the Senate and minimal opposition from the Soviet Union.

Schlesinger's key analysis focuses precisely on what the UN meant for the world and for international affairs. His first argument is that the organization was never meant to be simply a "talking shop". Both Roosevelt and Truman were hard-headed realists haunted by Woodrow Wilson's ghost and bent on ensuring that the UN did not meet the same fate as the League of Nations. Secretary of State Edward Stettinus, the chairman of the conference, and Leo Paslovsky, the State Department bureaucrat who had nurtured the idea of UN for years, wanted to create an organization aimed not at governing the world, but at preventing another global war. Therefore, the United Nations was designed to respect state sovereignty until breaches of peace or acts of aggression are committed. If any were committed, the Security Council, comprised of permanent five members (the USA, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China) and of rotating ten, was to take necessary actions, including the application of force, to restore peace. The problem was that acting on obligation required cooperation between the permanent five. However, even the semblance of any such unity, asserts Schlesinger, began to degrade as early as 1945, and completely decayed during the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union vetoed each other's resolutions. In this aspect, the UN never got the chance to exercise the powers it was delegated at San Francisco.
In his overview of the conference, Schlesinger also emphasizes the great achievements possible when US diplomats are focused, patient, and adaptable to the interests of others. These were the characteristics of the Truman administration, when the USA was at its most powerful, establishing the UN, the Marshall Plan, the NATO, and nevertheless, was het tentative with its mantle as a global leader.

Stephen Schlesinger makes his approach to the subject unique by delving into the secret communication between the attending nations, which shines new light on the conference. By 1945, the USA was an ocean away from its inept pre-war intelligence services. The shock of Pearl Harbor convinced Americans that the gathering of intelligence is an essential part of winning a war, and lawyer "Wild Bill" Donovan was commissioned by President Roosevelt to create what later became the CIA. For the task he recruited experienced spy Allen Dulles, the younger brother of the future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The CIA operated successfully throughout the whole war, and the USA emerged from the global conflict as an experienced intelligence gatherer.
Therefore, the US Army Security Agency did a magnificent job at providing the US delegation to San Fransisco with signals intelligence. Their services put the conference in its proper historical perspective: for the first time, the United States was able to take advantage of important technological advances to facilitate the establishment of the peace-making body.
Interesting is also the involvement in the UN creation of Acting Secretary General and suspected communist Albert Hiss, who led the whole conference. As Schlesinger writes, it cannot be dismissed that Hiss, due to his position, could act as a double agent. Any work his did to diminish the legitimacy of the Soviet Union, which included writing a paper that presented reasons why the Soviet republics shouldn't be given a permanent member status, were obviously a part of his act. Yet, Hiss' obscure actions and the lack of evidence against him leave one with plenty food for thought.

While Schlesinger meticulously describes many of the less-known incidents surrounding the UN Charter ratification – the aspirations of small countries, Soviet, or mostly Vyacheslav Molotov's, intransigence, bureaucratic infighting, and ailing Harry Hopkins' last effort to pacify Stalin's grumblings over the UN General Assembly's right to discuss matters – overall his view is too narrow, overly US-focused. The primary issues of the San Fransisco conference, the one's FDR hoped it would solve, were the situation of Poland's government in exile and the admission of Argentina into the organization despite it not having declared war on the Axis prior to the pre-set date for it to be admitted. Unfortunately, the author focuses exclusively on the US side of the proceedings; he fails to show how the other states viewed the UN and leaves behind most, if not all, debates that did not involve the United States. It seemed to me that Schlesinger not only provided singularly the US story of the conference, but also deliberately downgraded the other countries' achievements.
Although the book promises a study of the UN creation, it is more of a study of how the US State Department alone made the UN possible, with all other players presented as impediments in the way the USA had unilaterally paved for the organization. Throughout the whole work, the representatives of other nations are mentioned only within the framework of their opposition or support of US propositions. Rarely does Schlesinger depict the other states' involvement in the negotiations and the drafting of the charter as anything more than a headache for the United States. In general, he simply presents an overview of the San Fransisco Conference and its failures, but remains silent on conclusions and lessons that might be inferred from the legislative reasons and decisions of the delegates. His book lacks critical analysis of what the conference tried to achieve and what it actually achieved. For instance, his analysis of the controversial issue of the establishment of UN Security Council, whose main responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, lacks any insight and details, and thus left me completely unsatisfied.

In summary, Stephen Schlesinger's book. It is a well-written story of the political intrigues and diplomatic drama surrounding the conference, but its exclusive focus on the US delegation's role in the founding of the United Nations betrays its promising title.

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very readable account of the building of the structure of the U.N. at San Francisco in May-June 1945.

The strength of this book is in the presentation of the diverse personalities involved. Truman, Edward Stettinius, Leo Pasvolsky, Arthur Vandenberg (a Republican), Nelson Rockefeller, Vyacheslav Molotov of the Soviet Union and more are introduced. Each was strongly motivated in desiring a U.N. And they wanted it done before the Second World War was over; Roosevelt and Truman learned from the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson who waited until after the Great War was over to begin constructing the League of Nations. Also both Roosevelt and Truman brought Republican involvement in this development and the Republicans participated at San Francisco. There was also a tremendous publicity campaign within the U.S. that brought Americans on board for the U.N. Truman wanted to ensure that there was no apathy in his country about the U.N.

The building of the framework – basically the wording of the U.N. constitution or charter – was largely a U.S. initiative. Roosevelt made sure that Stalin was to be a participant at Yalta. Nevertheless the Soviets were constantly questioning and objecting to various aspects of the U.N. Charter. The writing of the U.N. Charter was done by the Americans. It was begun at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington D.C. In San Francisco all countries participating met to finalize the Charter. It took over two months of haggling to accomplish this. The success can be credited to the American team headed by Edward Stettinius. Sadly Stettinius’s name is not even mentioned in the U.N. building in New York.

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

A mild blend of "Love your leaders" and "X is whatever we tell you it is", and you can replace X with Peace, Butter, anything.

[Francesco · Rating 4 out of 5]

I re-read with great pleasure this unique insightful account of the creation of the United Nations (in the occasion of the UN's 70th anniversary). It is an extremely well researched and detailed account of those days in San Francisco in 1945 when the great Powers of that time - moved by the quest for a peaceful world - agreed to create a new global organization.

[Rebuma Dejene · Rating 5 out of 5]

A seminal book to understand the genesis of the United Nations from a wide array of perspectives, including history, philosophy, foreign policy and geopolitics. It provides a crucial context to understand several previous unsuccessful attempts at designing post war global order since 1648. The book details how the United States emerged as the chief architect of the United Nations and its Charter despite its long history of entrenched isolationism. America’s act of creation under the leadership of Roosevelt was evident in the way his administration skillfully transformed the established domestic political dynamics and successfully navigated the fragile wartime international alliance. The process of its creation reflects the complexity of Wilsonian idealism deeply intertwined with cold realism.

Domestically, the book presents FDR’s role in changing the internal political landscape in the face of significant isolationist traditions of the Senate, Congress and the broader public opinion. Few of the central issues in the debate were over the questions of sovereignty and foreign entanglements. Given the previous failure of the League of Nations, successfully managing the domestic front in forming the UN was a major component of the strategy.
The book explains how the normative values rooted in American political and legal traditions such as human rights, dignity, self-determination rights, sovereignty and preventing wars were integrated in the UN charter. It tells the story of how the post-war global architecture is essentially an extension of the US domestic political dispensation. In a nutshell, this is America’s act of creation as the author compellingly narrates.

One of the most striking similarities lies in the very preamble. The Charter’s very preamble "We the peoples of the United Nations" compared with "We the People of the United States" of the US constitution importantly captures how American values, beliefs and principles of the nation was reflected on the global stage. The author also tells the story of how the post-war global architecture is essentially an extension of the US domestic political dynamics. At the organizational level, the individual rivalries, tensions, feuds and power struggles within the FDR and Truman administration were part and parcel of political drama inside the US foreign policy establishment.

The United Nations emerged from the bargaining, conflicts, and backchannel negotiations among various actors with competing goals and perspectives on the global order.
The chapter on Leo Pasvolsky is both remarkable and insightful in providing his extensive role and contributions as one of the main architects of the UN Charter. However, the story is neither simplistic nor predetermined. There were several and intense behind-the-curtain negotiations, , power struggles and political horse trading that shaped the final outcome that involves the White House, the State Department, the legislative branch, the media and others. This is not to deny or downgrade the role of other key players and actors in shaping the final outcome. However, the author gives significant attention to America’s role in crafting the organization and its structures.

The power dynamics and interactions among several key individuals such as Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull, and Leo Pasvolsky reflects the various interests and factions the within the Roosevelt administration in the creation of the UN. Roosevelt’s role in leading the birth of the UN is also riveting in the face of political divisions, protracted war, physical illness and constrains. The section provides an important lesson in statecraft and diplomacy. He is almost the founding father of the UN at a time the second world is raging and the outcome is still uncertain.
Schlesinger also provides a compelling story on how personal rivalries, political tensions and power struggles between Hull and Welles involving feuds and scandal finally led to the prevailing of the Pasvolsky Proposal for a global governance architecture with voting arrangements, the Veto power, the assembly, judicial machinery, control of arms, trusteeships.

After the unexpected death of FDR, the role of Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and President Harry Truman in finalizing the San Francisco Conference is also widely discussed in the book. Truman’s pragmatic approach maintained a sense of continuity in U.S. foreign policy and FDR’s international vision that led to its success.
At a global level, the UN was struggling to be born in the face of the devastation of WWII and the abysmal failure of the League of Nations while wartime alliances and coalitions were still in the fight against Axis Powers. It is in this broader context that the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and the Yalta agreement between the big four largely determined the main outcomes of the San Francisco Conference in the creation of the United Nations.

The author provides an important account of the early conferences and negotiations that were fraught with tensions arising from varying historical experiences, ideological conflicts, competing national interests, and divergent post-war visions between the US, USSR and Britain. Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt were the three key global sheriffs that crafted the structure of global peace and security and its far-reaching consequences as the victorious powers. Stephen Schlesinger provides a meticulous chronicle of the delicate, lengthy and grueling negotiations over the future of the UN were on the edge of collapse during different phases of the conference on various conflicting and sensitive issues.

One of the major debates was whether the U.N. should focus on global security through a collective framework or regional security arrangements provides an interesting insight into the competing visions of global order. After eight decades, this episode is still relevant in the current debate over globalization and regionalization in international affairs.

What is often neglected in the diplomatic history of the birth of the United Nations is the role of espionage and intelligence operations. And the author gives due emphasis on how US intelligence gathered including through code breaking was an indispensable part of the negotiation process particularly in the San Francisco Conference.
The debates over the membership of Argentina and Poland at the San Francisco Conference also reflected the broader geopolitical tensions of the early period and the emerging geopolitical confrontation between the Soviet Union and the US. The debates over the veto power, regional arrangements, the use of force and the right to self-defense were serious bones of contention among big power and other groups of countries.

As the book details the intricate process of negotiations, there was a time when the entire U.N. Charter and the future of the organization seemed to depend the political will of Joseph Stalin particularly on the issue of Veto Power and sphere of influence. The author notes how Stalin cut the rope that had threatened to strangle the U.N. at its birth. The complex backchannel negotiations largely depended on the personal relationships between Soviet and American leaders and there would have been no United Nations formed at San Francisco without Stalin’s active engagement in the negotiation processes. The story is full of dramatic tensions, political intrigues and Machiavellian scheming.

Schlesinger also sheds light on the debate over the veto power during the San Francisco negotiations as one of the most contentious issues that is both enlightening and broadly reflects the brutal side of power politics. Senator Tom Connally’s theatrical performance in front of all delegations captures the nature of high stakes diplomacy and the ruthless balance of power politics between big powers and smaller nations. What Thucydides said about the realities of politics more than two thousand years ago was still resoundingly true in 1945: the strong take what they want and the weak suffer what they must.

As the establishment of the UN was gradually emerging from intensive negotiations between key wartime allies during the WWII, more fundamental differences over post war order, ideologies and political trajectories were taking root between the West and the USSR. And this book is essential to understand how American diplomacy and political dynamics ultimately created the United Nations in a deeply divided world.

Lastly, it is rather not the purpose of this review to provide a performance appraisal and evaluation of the UN since its creation. As a foundation, one has to first start with how the organization is created and the volatile historical contexts that shaped its founding. And this book provides that necessary comprehensive account of the genesis of this important global authority created for the purpose of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

[Bryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this time of nations drawing back into parochialism and 'America First', I thought I'd read a book about what internationalism really means to the peace and prosperity of the globe. In the late stages of World War II, FDR and then Truman both believed that a world organization could prevent catastrophic wars and gambled that they could convince other nations to go along. By all measures they succeeded by not surrendering to idealism, but hinging its fate on necessity and what was possible. This book is a tribute to their achievement.

[Quincy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent, albeit slightly popularised account of the negotiations in San Francisco that led to the creation of the UN. Strong emphasis on the delegates who unlocked the many obstacles facing the conference. Couple of things I didn't know much about, for example how Latin American intransigence over the inclusion of regionalism in the UN Charter laid the legal groundwork for future regional security organisations (such as NATO)

[Andy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Schlesinger gives us a good overview of the impetus for and process of creating the UN. There are some interesting, provocative events told in this story, but I finished the book thinking the story could (should) have been more interesting. That said, it was a decent, consistent read--a good case study in "getting to yes".

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book takes the reader through the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations (UN) and shows how the organization came into being. This is not meant to serve as a history of the UN and it does not take a position on whether it is good or bad. It merely discusses the differences that the nations had in the big power arena and focuses on a couple of the bigger disputes. The decision to add Belarus and Ukraine to the delegation but not Poland is explored as well as what to do with Argentina. The Truman administration inherited a tough war and an even tougher peace. The United Nations framework was built on the Yalta agreements which Truman was not even at. Sttennius and his state department team would be the real victors with the establishment of the UN despite Truman's desire to install a new secretary of state. The book has several areas where the language is unclear and it is hard to follow the authors point but largely it is well done and good analysis. The author knows his subject well and it is an excellent look at how diplomatic history should be done. If you really want to learn about how the UN was started this is the book to use.

[Terri R · Rating 3 out of 5]

While I did not find the book very well written/edited, it was very interesting subject matter for anyone who needs to understand the history and functioning of the United Nations. Many of the characters at the 1945 conference in San Francisco that negotiated the UN Charter were important later in U.S. and Cold War history. Several future Presidential candidates and Secretaries of State played key roles; even a young JFK was there as a reporter! Having just lived through the UN climate change negotiations in Durban at the end of 2011, I also found the struggles of smaller and larger countries to protect their individual national interests while keeping sight of an important global goal, and the need of the U.S. delegation to plan ahead regarding Congressional action, very relevant to today's multilateral negotiations.

[Jarod · Rating 2 out of 5]

Great account of how negotiation is done and decisions are made. It's a bit difficult to establish the chronology at times, as there is quite a bit of back-and-forth. Also, although the book is not meant to be an evaluation of the UN or its Charter, Schlesinger is unabashedly in love with the UN exactly as it is, and thus belittles its critics then and now without any analysis of their criticisms. I found some of the most powerful moments in the book to be toward the end, as the Charter was being signed and then ratified. Schlesinger places the reader in the moment, and it was an amazing moment.

[Cathy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting to find out what happened in the beginnings of the United Nations, an organization that I've taken for granted until I read this book. A little more detail about the process than I wanted, but still a good read.

[Julian Haigh · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very brief introduction of the UN. But then, it's a rather vacuous entity when it comes down to it anyway - hardly superfluous, but now I'm getting political.

[Xu Chen · Rating 4 out of 5]

May the U.N. guard the peace and humanity for us all from the next tragic world war.