This study of American nation-building exercises in the post-WWII era and the 1990s and 2000s establishes several lessons learned with the intention of informing U.S. policy makers who may undertake a similar effort in the future.
The premise of the book assumes nation-building is the inherent mission of foreign interventions and concludes that to achieve success, one must stay long and commit extensive resources. Stay and spend. That is the most sure fire way to succeed.
The authors even claim “nation-building is the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower.” Our current president, Joe Biden, argues the U.S. achieved its limited objective in Afghanistan of denying terrorists a safe haven in that country. He also asserted our efforts were and are not nation-building.
I am reading this in the same week the Taliban retook control of Afghanistan amid the U.S. military withdrawal after 20 years of effort to … destroy Al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan, remove the repressive Taliban regime, establish a capable Afghan government, foster democracy… The goal of our presence in Afghanistan has not been clear since November 2001 when the Taliban and Al Qaeda fled Afghanistan to neighboring Pakistan.
To foreign entanglements in general, and nation-building exercises specifically, I would add a further lesson learned. At the outset, before committing resources, troops, and energy, identify a clear objective. The means may change but the goal should not. We must recognize the limits of what is achievable and set policies based on that understanding.
This is one of the portfolio of books exploring what it takes to create successful democratic nation-building--From German to Iraq (as the subtitle notes). It is also one of the better volumes among such works.
The RAND report goes into considerable detail, providing an operational definition of democratic nation building by looking at the commonalities in seven such interventions (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan). The report seeks to establish those factors associated with success or failure. Among those linked to success were the use of force "to underpin a process of democratization" (Page 1), occupation, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction. Success is (Page 2) ". . .the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions."
The RAND report suggests a number of prerequisites, including military presence over time by the occupying country, international police presence over time, reducing postconflict combat-related deaths, timing of elections, dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons, initial external assistance, external per capita assistance, external assistance as a meaningful percentage of GDP, and changes in per capita GDP. This obviously entails a commitment to provide substantial resources to the redevelopment effort, to be willing to invest considerable time to nation building, to make sure that appropriate security arrangements are made. In short, the process cannot successfully be done quickly or "on the cheap."
Interesting read. I didn't know a whole lot about the processes behind nation-building going into this book, but I found it easy to follow and understand. Very well written.