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Westmoreland's War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam
General William C. Westmoreland has long been derided for his failed strategy of "attrition" in the Vietnam War. Historians have argued that Westmoreland's strategy placed a premium on high "body counts" through a "big unit war" that relied almost solely on search and destroy missions. Many believe the U.S. Army failed in Vietnam because of Westmoreland's misguided and narrow strategyIn a groundbreaking reassessment of American military strategy in Vietnam, Gregory Daddis overturns conventional wisdom and shows how Westmoreland did indeed develop a comprehensive campaign which included counterinsurgency, civic action, and the importance of gaining political support from the South Vietnamese population. Exploring the realities of a large, yet not wholly unconventional environment, Daddis reinterprets the complex political and military battlefields of Vietnam. Without searching for blame, he analyzes how American civil and military leaders developed strategy and how Westmoreland attempted to implement a sweeping strategic vision.Westmoreland's War is a landmark reinterpretation of one of America's most divisive wars, outlining the multiple, interconnected aspects of American military strategy in Vietnam-combat operations, pacification, nation building, and the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Daddis offers a critical reassessment of one of the defining moments in American history.
278 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 15, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
January 29, 2023
In his book, Gregory A. Daddis defends MACV Commander General Westmoreland, who has been blamed for the American failure in the Vietnam conflict. Daddis analyzes the complete strategy of the American government in Vietnam and argues persuasively that it was so flawed that even a good general like Westmoreland could not correct the situation. The author is not discovering America with this work – the topic has been discussed by others – but he presents the information in a way that is concise, clear, and interesting.
I liked that he underscores that the main problem with the war was not even the military strategy – it was the nation-building. The people of South Vietnam, and especially its soldiers, severely lacked ideological training, while the Communists prioritized it, impressing on their soldiers time after time that they were fighting to defeat imperial oppressors and free Vietnam from their rule. In Saigon and Washington, no one thought of giving the South Vietnamese a similarly strong political vision. In the words of writer Ngo Quynh, his country did not move past being "the bastard child of French colonialism and American anti-communism." The people did not have a goal. They were not motivated. They were fighting just to get rid of the Communists. As the author explains, this made Westmoreland and his subordinates' task of winning the war really difficult. Military training simply could not overcome the absence of political purpose.
Another problem arose from the over-confidence of American officials that they could correct the wrongs within the ranks of the South Vietnamese army in a short time, during a war. The ARVN struggled with desertion, nepotism, and pay and promotion injustice – serious issues that were closely linked to the political and social problems of the country in general and that would most likely require great efforts and many years – peaceful years – to be solved. However, the American leaders arrogantly assumed that all they needed to make the ARVN successful was "re-educate" the soldiers and their commanders. It was not surprising that their attempt at re-education did not achieve much. This became a huge problem for Westmoreland and the MACV because the Americans relied on the ARVN to pacify the countryside, especially in the years before the escalation, and the South Vietnamese soldiers were not doing a good job at all. Since pacification was highly important in the Vietnam conflict, which was mostly a guerrilla one, the ARVN's poor performance was hurting the American and South Vietnamese chances of winning.
The scarcity of skilled, knowledgeable advisers further impacted the war effort negatively. According to the author, an "adviser was all at once a military trainer, a political representative, a counselor and administrator, and a funnel through which US funds and support flowed." However, aside from all this, the advisers also had to know Vietnamese and be familiar with the culture, politics, and social norms of the country. Since they almost never were, their efforts to teach English, improve refugee relief, and implement pacification and nation-building programs failed to get support from local commanders, who worried that the presence of their strong allies diminished their own authority, and from the people, who were indifferent and went "along only for cement, roofing, wheat flour, rice, and other gifts from the generous Americans," led to nothing. With a population that refused to actively cooperate, even the American army with its resources, strategy, and technology could not hold ground for long.
As Daddis observes, though, General Westmoreland was not completely blameless. Although he had a good understanding of strategy, he could not convey this understanding in a way that would make sense to the soldiers. The Americans managed to adapt to the battlefield, but they did not learn to translate battlefield success into political progress. They did realize that to win the war they needed more than just to kill the enemy. However, their commanders could not figure out what tactics they needed to break the enemy's will because Westmoreland had not explained to them that he mainly wanted to restore government influence in areas controlled by the Communists.
WESTMORELAND'S WAR is a well-written analysis. While Daddis does not cover much new ground, he has organized his findings and thoughts in a way that is perfect for readers with no time for longer works. This book can also be a great introduction to the topic of American strategy in the earlier years of the Vietnam conflict.
I liked that he underscores that the main problem with the war was not even the military strategy – it was the nation-building. The people of South Vietnam, and especially its soldiers, severely lacked ideological training, while the Communists prioritized it, impressing on their soldiers time after time that they were fighting to defeat imperial oppressors and free Vietnam from their rule. In Saigon and Washington, no one thought of giving the South Vietnamese a similarly strong political vision. In the words of writer Ngo Quynh, his country did not move past being "the bastard child of French colonialism and American anti-communism." The people did not have a goal. They were not motivated. They were fighting just to get rid of the Communists. As the author explains, this made Westmoreland and his subordinates' task of winning the war really difficult. Military training simply could not overcome the absence of political purpose.
Another problem arose from the over-confidence of American officials that they could correct the wrongs within the ranks of the South Vietnamese army in a short time, during a war. The ARVN struggled with desertion, nepotism, and pay and promotion injustice – serious issues that were closely linked to the political and social problems of the country in general and that would most likely require great efforts and many years – peaceful years – to be solved. However, the American leaders arrogantly assumed that all they needed to make the ARVN successful was "re-educate" the soldiers and their commanders. It was not surprising that their attempt at re-education did not achieve much. This became a huge problem for Westmoreland and the MACV because the Americans relied on the ARVN to pacify the countryside, especially in the years before the escalation, and the South Vietnamese soldiers were not doing a good job at all. Since pacification was highly important in the Vietnam conflict, which was mostly a guerrilla one, the ARVN's poor performance was hurting the American and South Vietnamese chances of winning.
The scarcity of skilled, knowledgeable advisers further impacted the war effort negatively. According to the author, an "adviser was all at once a military trainer, a political representative, a counselor and administrator, and a funnel through which US funds and support flowed." However, aside from all this, the advisers also had to know Vietnamese and be familiar with the culture, politics, and social norms of the country. Since they almost never were, their efforts to teach English, improve refugee relief, and implement pacification and nation-building programs failed to get support from local commanders, who worried that the presence of their strong allies diminished their own authority, and from the people, who were indifferent and went "along only for cement, roofing, wheat flour, rice, and other gifts from the generous Americans," led to nothing. With a population that refused to actively cooperate, even the American army with its resources, strategy, and technology could not hold ground for long.
As Daddis observes, though, General Westmoreland was not completely blameless. Although he had a good understanding of strategy, he could not convey this understanding in a way that would make sense to the soldiers. The Americans managed to adapt to the battlefield, but they did not learn to translate battlefield success into political progress. They did realize that to win the war they needed more than just to kill the enemy. However, their commanders could not figure out what tactics they needed to break the enemy's will because Westmoreland had not explained to them that he mainly wanted to restore government influence in areas controlled by the Communists.
WESTMORELAND'S WAR is a well-written analysis. While Daddis does not cover much new ground, he has organized his findings and thoughts in a way that is perfect for readers with no time for longer works. This book can also be a great introduction to the topic of American strategy in the earlier years of the Vietnam conflict.
July 12, 2019
A far better book than Lewis Sorley's Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (the book it attempts to discredit, but still very hit and miss. Daddis' general point is that Westmoreland was a competent general with a decent strategy that could have probably never worked within the incredibly unique set of circumstances that the Vietnam war consisted of. Unfortunately, in an effort to challenge the accepted wisdom of Vietnam histiography, he throws every single counter-argument at the wall and sees what sticks, leaving a decent thesis occasionally buried in very stupid and small points. I finished this book thinking that it would have been far better as an article.
May 27, 2017
Can you have a great plan, massive amounts of resources, good employees working the plan, adequate leadership and analysis of problems as they arise and still fail?
The author answers this question in the affirmative as he reviews the Vietnam conflict and the criticism that Westmoreland was too focused on attrition and his strategy was not flexible enough as a cause of America's failure to achieve a free South Vietnam. His argument seemed fairly compelling as he reviewed the education of American officers and Westmoreland and argues they knew they had to be flexible and that winning the conflict meant a lot more than killing the VC. They made significant efforts to win the population and help South Vietnam build their own nation apart from North Vietnam. These efforts were not successful in the end as the failed to win over the population and help South Vietnam build a stand alone nation. This was not a result of lack of expended effort, treasure, or blood. At the end of the day the cultural divide was stronger than the efforts the military could make to secure victory.
While the author did not try to create any comparisons to the current American conflicts overseas there are some similar efforts going on around the work with America helping in other nations trying to defeat an enemy driven by an evil ideology. Hopefully we have learned some lessons from the past.
The author answers this question in the affirmative as he reviews the Vietnam conflict and the criticism that Westmoreland was too focused on attrition and his strategy was not flexible enough as a cause of America's failure to achieve a free South Vietnam. His argument seemed fairly compelling as he reviewed the education of American officers and Westmoreland and argues they knew they had to be flexible and that winning the conflict meant a lot more than killing the VC. They made significant efforts to win the population and help South Vietnam build their own nation apart from North Vietnam. These efforts were not successful in the end as the failed to win over the population and help South Vietnam build a stand alone nation. This was not a result of lack of expended effort, treasure, or blood. At the end of the day the cultural divide was stronger than the efforts the military could make to secure victory.
While the author did not try to create any comparisons to the current American conflicts overseas there are some similar efforts going on around the work with America helping in other nations trying to defeat an enemy driven by an evil ideology. Hopefully we have learned some lessons from the past.
July 16, 2014
After struggling through the first 56 pages of PhD speak (all very necessary to lay groundwork) the book starts to get interesting. I enjoyed the book immensely. I was happy to be a First Reads lucky winner. It has taken me some time to get through this book with my trusty hi-liter and pencil. I like to look up my own data at times and like to compare the happenings then (lived through it) and now. Not much has changed in 50+ years as far as our war strategies go. We are almost through with two presidents, each serving two terms and really have not accomplished much in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s a good read for the younger generation reader’s so that they can compare war strategies then and now. We still have the political “Armchair Generals” and inept members of the “Fourth Estate” who think they know better than the “Boots on the Ground.”
“WELL DONE” Gregory…you done good.
“WELL DONE” Gregory…you done good.
December 8, 2021
A good book, providing a reappraisal of General William Westmoreland and America’s military strategy in Vietnam. The author, military historian Gregory Daddis, presents a strong argument that Westmoreland and other military leaders correctly understood the nature of the conflict in Vietnam, but could not effectively wield a military solution. Daddis spends much of the book attempting to resurrect Westmoreland’s reputation. He conducts a point by point defense, using a wide array of primary evidence to show that Westmoreland (and the US military in general) had a deeper understanding of their adversary and the situation than is generally acknowledged. Daddis points out the constant tension between community development and security as America’s two military missions in Vietnam, a tension that Westmoreland was unable to adjudicate. The book attempts to refute the idea that Westmoreland’s strategy was wedded to attritional warfare, making a case that his campaign plans sought to achieve security rather than merely depreciate the adversary. Daddis concludes that the military strategy implemented by Westmoreland was sound, but that other factors, namely the timing, North Vietnam’s willpower, and the lack of a cohesive South Vietnamese society worked together to deny Westmoreland victory. A great book to better understand the nuts and bolts of America’s military strategy in Vietnam. Highly recommended for anyone interested in hearing a different perspective on the Vietnam War.
June 14, 2022
Gregory Daddis’ Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam was a superlative work that is a must read for military historians. The author expertly dives into the primary and secondary sources to provide an assessment for the U.S. strategy during the Westmoreland Years (1964-1969) of the Vietnam War. This work highlights that Westmoreland’s strategy was more than the common narrative of attrition and highlights that it is difficult to examine a strategy without looking at what the opponent is simultaneously trying to accomplish. The author elicits a nuanced understanding of both what the U.S. hoped to accomplished with the actions of the North Vietnamese. In the end, with the fervor and dedication of the North Vietnamese it is difficult to image a successful American campaign, regardless of the general in charge and the U.S. strategy employed. The North Vietnamese executed a flexible, adaptive campaign focused on mitigating American strengths while playing against South Vietnamese weaknesses. In the end, it is really hard to impose a system of government upon another country from an external source. This is an absolute most read for Vietnam histories but also those wanting to understand the failures in Afghanistan. As many historians say, history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.
July 20, 2019
Daddis asks the question did Westmoreland lose Vietnam or was the war simply unwinnable with the financial, political and military restricts imposed by Washington, Saigon and Hanoi? Westmoreland has long been a scapegoat for the lose. His reputation was tarnish with the focus on attrition and causalities. Daddis argues that Westmoreland was just a poor communicator, unable to convince his soldiers, the President and the American people that the Vietnam War was always going to be a long complex war.
Why I started this book: I started a Scribd subscription and was thrilled to find several audio versions from my Professional Reading list.
Why I finished it: Interesting book but I don't think that Daddis convinced me... in war you don't get partial credit. Daddis did highlight the importance of managing expectations and made me appreciate Lincoln and Roosevelt for their political skills during their wars.
Why I started this book: I started a Scribd subscription and was thrilled to find several audio versions from my Professional Reading list.
Why I finished it: Interesting book but I don't think that Daddis convinced me... in war you don't get partial credit. Daddis did highlight the importance of managing expectations and made me appreciate Lincoln and Roosevelt for their political skills during their wars.
July 17, 2019
I found WESTMORELAND’S WAR to be a fascinating book. The depth of the research done by scholar Gregory Daddis is amazing. The wide-ranging perspective he brings to the Vietnam War and General Westmoreland’s role in it is unique. It help’s answer a number of questions about why the war was ultimately unwinnable and why Westmoreland has been unfairly blamed for that outcome. It’s neither pro or anti the war, nor pro or anti Westmoreland. Daddis offers a balanced, carefully documented assessment that’s refreshing and thoughtful. If you’re interested in either the history of war and military strategy in general or the Vietnam War or Westmoreland in particular, I highly recommend WESTMORELAND’S WAR. I listened to the Audible edition and enjoyed the narration by Jonathan Yen.
April 15, 2021
At the very least the author has achieved his basic purpose, which is to have produced a credible defense of William Westmoreland's military professionalism. Call this the other side of the coin, after Daddis left behind the idolization that the West Point of his time as a cadet inculcated in regards to Creighton Abrams. That said, the long-term student of America's involvement in Vietnam is not going to find that many deep revelations here. Those folks who want to keep their cynicism nice and shiny might wish to read "The Myths of Tet" by Edwin Moise, a man who has made a career of critiquing the misconceptions and wishful thinking of all the parties to the conflict.
December 11, 2023
I admit that I struggled through this read. I am not an Army guy, so my background to the directives and regulations were limited. However, I do believe the author supports his arguement for Westmoreland and perhaps it was just too easy to "monday quarterback" based on much of the writing of the 1970s-1990s.
November 27, 2019
Interesting posit: should Westmoreland be blamed for the USG failure in Vietnam, when it was almost certainly an un - winnable war? The answer really is, the USG began to lose in Vietnam when France was allowed back into country as a collinizer and support Ho's nationalist asperations.
March 4, 2020
A fascinating account of a pointless war.
August 1, 2021
Well argued
June 25, 2025
"Perhaps it is worth considering the possibility that a flawed grand strategy cannot alwys be rescued by a well-conceived military strategy."
November 2, 2025
Obviously well-researched but surprisingly efficient in its delivery. Makes one dislike Westmoreland slightly less. Perhaps a bit more grace is due towards him. Actually nah.
Read
March 27, 2016A good read. Answers questions to how and why things went wrong.
Early chapters are somewhat slow as far as politics and planning. As I found soon, very interesting chapters which tell what was held back from Congress, joint chiefs of staff, also the general public, during the LBJ administration. What is also conveyed is how General Westmoreland had to deal with policies out of Washington D.C.. One can understand the enormous challenge that faced fighting a war on many fronts. Again, a good book with much information of what really went on from start to finish.
Early chapters are somewhat slow as far as politics and planning. As I found soon, very interesting chapters which tell what was held back from Congress, joint chiefs of staff, also the general public, during the LBJ administration. What is also conveyed is how General Westmoreland had to deal with policies out of Washington D.C.. One can understand the enormous challenge that faced fighting a war on many fronts. Again, a good book with much information of what really went on from start to finish.
October 31, 2016
Interesting take. Though short, probably too long. Daddis repeats himself often. While the author tries to paint Westmoreland as a good general in a bad war, it seems the general was one more flawed part in a system starting with the president. Certainly the author makes his case that Westmoreland is not to blame for the entirety of the war but his argument does not support Westmoreland as a good man in a bad position. At 184 pages it worth the read for those who have read the alternate takes of Sorley, Krepenivich, and Nagl.
July 25, 2015
Review pending
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews