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Religion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity
To understand the nature of religious belief, we must look at how our minds process the world of imagination and make-believe.
We often assume that religious beliefs are no different in kind from ordinary factual beliefs—that believing in the existence of God or of supernatural entities that hear our prayers is akin to believing that May comes before June. Neil Van Leeuwen shows that, in fact, these two forms of belief are strikingly different. Our brains do not process religious beliefs like they do beliefs concerning mundane reality; instead, empirical findings show that religious beliefs function like the imaginings that guide make-believe play.
Van Leeuwen argues that religious belief—which he terms religious “credence”—is best understood as a form of imagination that people use to define the identity of their group and express the values they hold sacred. When a person pretends, they navigate the world by consulting two the first represents mundane reality, and the second superimposes the features of the imagined world atop the first. Drawing on psychological, linguistic, and anthropological evidence, Van Leeuwen posits that religious communities operate in much the same way, consulting a factual-belief map that represents ordinary objects and events and a religious-credence map that accords these objects and events imagined sacred and supernatural significance.
It is hardly controversial to suggest that religion has a social function, but Religion as Make-Believe breaks new ground by theorizing the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Once we recognize that our minds process factual and religious beliefs in fundamentally different ways, we can gain deeper understanding of the complex individual and group psychology of religious faith.
We often assume that religious beliefs are no different in kind from ordinary factual beliefs—that believing in the existence of God or of supernatural entities that hear our prayers is akin to believing that May comes before June. Neil Van Leeuwen shows that, in fact, these two forms of belief are strikingly different. Our brains do not process religious beliefs like they do beliefs concerning mundane reality; instead, empirical findings show that religious beliefs function like the imaginings that guide make-believe play.
Van Leeuwen argues that religious belief—which he terms religious “credence”—is best understood as a form of imagination that people use to define the identity of their group and express the values they hold sacred. When a person pretends, they navigate the world by consulting two the first represents mundane reality, and the second superimposes the features of the imagined world atop the first. Drawing on psychological, linguistic, and anthropological evidence, Van Leeuwen posits that religious communities operate in much the same way, consulting a factual-belief map that represents ordinary objects and events and a religious-credence map that accords these objects and events imagined sacred and supernatural significance.
It is hardly controversial to suggest that religion has a social function, but Religion as Make-Believe breaks new ground by theorizing the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Once we recognize that our minds process factual and religious beliefs in fundamentally different ways, we can gain deeper understanding of the complex individual and group psychology of religious faith.
312 pages, Kindle Edition
Published November 21, 2023
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January 23, 2025
Talking about this book with people I know in real life goes something like this:
“What are you reading?”
“Oh it’s a book about religion and how when we say we believe something we actually are referring to a complicated 2 map cognitive structure that accounts for our belief in the reality of the world around us and religious credences which form the basis for group identities and so forth and so on. It’s really good but I don’t recommend reading it.”
Then they usually just nod politely and say it sounds interesting in a perfunctory way and I go about my day but internally an consumed by self analyzing my belief system and the world around me until I go crazy.
Anyways!
“What are you reading?”
“Oh it’s a book about religion and how when we say we believe something we actually are referring to a complicated 2 map cognitive structure that accounts for our belief in the reality of the world around us and religious credences which form the basis for group identities and so forth and so on. It’s really good but I don’t recommend reading it.”
Then they usually just nod politely and say it sounds interesting in a perfunctory way and I go about my day but internally an consumed by self analyzing my belief system and the world around me until I go crazy.
Anyways!
September 23, 2024
tl;dr—This was a paradigm-defining read. I want everyone to read it so that we’ll all share the same lexicon. But since it’s a bit dry, academic, and a very niche topic, I’ll forgive you if you don’t.
In presenting his two-map theory of religion in which the predicate of “belief” is bifurcated into two different word senses—the cognitive attitude of “factual belief” and the cognitive attitude of “religious credence”— Van Leeuwen paints a detailed, nuanced, and compelling picture of the cognitive science of religion that explains many aspects of my own lived experience better than I could myself.
The title is, you could say, a bit provocative—unnecessarily (and unfortunately) so. I have always felt like new atheism (the perspective advocated by the Richard Dawkins-es and Sam Harris-es of the world) focuses on attacking a strawman of religion. Since Van Leeuwen agrees, and argues that “The God Delusion” is not a delusion, I think many believers could (and should) perceive him as an “ally”-of-sorts; his solution to the “problem of religious rationality” enables him to conclude that
This, in other words, expresses precisely what any Christian child in sunday school could tell you—faith doesn’t require evidence, it is the “assurance about what we do not see” (Heb 11:1). That conclusion might not be new or profound, but the theory from which it proceeds is brilliant (and also leads to many insights that are novel). My point being that Van Leeuwen essentially provides a defense of the rationality of religion, and I find it ironic that people of faith will likely be turned off by the title.
Major takeaways:
- To “believe” is not what you “think”—there’s a distinction between religious credence and factual belief
- Factual belief is involuntary, while religious credence is voluntary
- Factual beliefs govern inferences in all situations and over all classes of cognitive attitudes
- Religious credence is not vulnerable to evidence, while factual belief is
- Most people are subconsciously aware of this distinction—religious people most of all
- Often, statements such as “I believe/don’t believe in global warming” are much more likely to express attitudes that are closer to religious credence than factual belief
- Cognitive psychology can be much more interesting than I realized
Other thoughts of my own:
- One of the most personally impactful books I’ve ever read.
- I believe one of the reasons Daniel Kahneman elected to name his categories of thought “System 1” and “System 2” was to emphasize how equally important they are for different things in the reader’s mind. He avoided bias by not naming them. Van Leeuwen was writing to an academic audience of philosophers and psychologists, so I understand why he stuck with the terms he did. But I would love to see a version of this theory pitched to various religious communities that described it in terms of “Attitude 1 & 2” rather than “factual belief” and “religious credence”
- On a similar note, I think a book on the sacralizing role of 2nd-order cognitive attitudes would do really well
- I want to read more of Van Leeuwen’s previous work on self-deception
- This book was remarkably well-organized and surprisingly engaging
- I think that cognitive tension arises when moral and social value is placed on factual beliefs, since they are not directly under our control
If you’ve read this far and find the ideas interesting, I’d definitely recommend searching for podcasts that have interviewed Van Leeuwen or reviewed the book. That’s how I first heard of it, and I feel like I got the most important concepts just from that 45-minute interview.
In presenting his two-map theory of religion in which the predicate of “belief” is bifurcated into two different word senses—the cognitive attitude of “factual belief” and the cognitive attitude of “religious credence”— Van Leeuwen paints a detailed, nuanced, and compelling picture of the cognitive science of religion that explains many aspects of my own lived experience better than I could myself.
The title is, you could say, a bit provocative—unnecessarily (and unfortunately) so. I have always felt like new atheism (the perspective advocated by the Richard Dawkins-es and Sam Harris-es of the world) focuses on attacking a strawman of religion. Since Van Leeuwen agrees, and argues that “The God Delusion” is not a delusion, I think many believers could (and should) perceive him as an “ally”-of-sorts; his solution to the “problem of religious rationality” enables him to conclude that
the rationality of an agent in relation to her everyday factual beliefs does not imply that the contents of her religious “beliefs” can be expected to rationally cohere with her evidence or be internally coherent at all.
This, in other words, expresses precisely what any Christian child in sunday school could tell you—faith doesn’t require evidence, it is the “assurance about what we do not see” (Heb 11:1). That conclusion might not be new or profound, but the theory from which it proceeds is brilliant (and also leads to many insights that are novel). My point being that Van Leeuwen essentially provides a defense of the rationality of religion, and I find it ironic that people of faith will likely be turned off by the title.
Major takeaways:
- To “believe” is not what you “think”—there’s a distinction between religious credence and factual belief
- Factual belief is involuntary, while religious credence is voluntary
- Factual beliefs govern inferences in all situations and over all classes of cognitive attitudes
- Religious credence is not vulnerable to evidence, while factual belief is
- Most people are subconsciously aware of this distinction—religious people most of all
- Often, statements such as “I believe/don’t believe in global warming” are much more likely to express attitudes that are closer to religious credence than factual belief
- Cognitive psychology can be much more interesting than I realized
Other thoughts of my own:
- One of the most personally impactful books I’ve ever read.
- I believe one of the reasons Daniel Kahneman elected to name his categories of thought “System 1” and “System 2” was to emphasize how equally important they are for different things in the reader’s mind. He avoided bias by not naming them. Van Leeuwen was writing to an academic audience of philosophers and psychologists, so I understand why he stuck with the terms he did. But I would love to see a version of this theory pitched to various religious communities that described it in terms of “Attitude 1 & 2” rather than “factual belief” and “religious credence”
- On a similar note, I think a book on the sacralizing role of 2nd-order cognitive attitudes would do really well
- I want to read more of Van Leeuwen’s previous work on self-deception
- This book was remarkably well-organized and surprisingly engaging
- I think that cognitive tension arises when moral and social value is placed on factual beliefs, since they are not directly under our control
If you’ve read this far and find the ideas interesting, I’d definitely recommend searching for podcasts that have interviewed Van Leeuwen or reviewed the book. That’s how I first heard of it, and I feel like I got the most important concepts just from that 45-minute interview.
March 25, 2025
I typically cast a five star vote for non-fiction books which alter, physically or mentally, in some fundamental way, the direction of my life. It might be an idea I once held has dissolved, or some long held spell has been broken. Religion as Make Believe—while not an easy book to follow along at times—is just that, a radically new way of looking at the world. It is a remarkably interesting idea which I frankly, would never have thought needed to be explored, or could be, in such a way.
Religion as Make Believe is, very sharply, a theory about why religious people can hold two seemingly contradictory ideas in their heads at once—not why, but how. To use the Whale example Van Leeuwen frequently leans on, why is it that someone can understand the scientific factual basis of eukaryotic cell biology operating inside of a Whale, but also, believe quite earnestly, that Jonah, from the biblical story, could live in one. Put simply, why can religious people both know facts about the world—why a chair they sit on doesn’t collapse—but also imagine the entire universe could be created in 6 days. The answer, Leeuwen says, is a dual map theory of belief.
The book outlines how this theory works and it is brilliant, detailed, and while at times complicated to follow along, it is considerably well thought out. It explains how this dual map theory works across cultures, and delves into a whole range of aspects of belief—not why religious people believe what they do, but how. It is a book about cognitive mechanics and about community, told in well considered logical steps. It’s difficult to read—I want to be clear about that—but brilliant all the same.
Religion as Make Believe is, very sharply, a theory about why religious people can hold two seemingly contradictory ideas in their heads at once—not why, but how. To use the Whale example Van Leeuwen frequently leans on, why is it that someone can understand the scientific factual basis of eukaryotic cell biology operating inside of a Whale, but also, believe quite earnestly, that Jonah, from the biblical story, could live in one. Put simply, why can religious people both know facts about the world—why a chair they sit on doesn’t collapse—but also imagine the entire universe could be created in 6 days. The answer, Leeuwen says, is a dual map theory of belief.
The book outlines how this theory works and it is brilliant, detailed, and while at times complicated to follow along, it is considerably well thought out. It explains how this dual map theory works across cultures, and delves into a whole range of aspects of belief—not why religious people believe what they do, but how. It is a book about cognitive mechanics and about community, told in well considered logical steps. It’s difficult to read—I want to be clear about that—but brilliant all the same.
May 23, 2024
Holy shit
August 4, 2024
For someone who has struggled long and hard both to believe, and later, to discard the faith I enjoyed for most of my life, this book was deeply illuminating. Van Leeuwen has given me some categories that allow me to work through what I was doing when I was a Christian leader, and what I am doing now that I have mostly discarded the ideas and practices of my earlier faith. The title of the book is a bit deceptive. Van Leeuwen does not argue that religion is make-belief, but rather, that make-belief (say of a drama, or of kids in a playground) is a good analogy for describing how we can hold religious beliefs in a world where they don't actually make sense in the way that gravity or the necessity of eating make sense (mundane reality, he calls it. What Van Leeuwen actually calls religious belief is "religious credence.") It isn't an easy read. I'm going to have to go back to page one later this month and read it again. But fascinating, and touching on something I've been wrestling with for a long time.
March 14, 2025
This was the most thought-provoking book I’ve come across in ages.
I got the sense that, according to Leeuwen, there are two categories of beliefs. One type happens to us and is tied to our perception of lived reality—we do not choose these beliefs, nor can we change them by an act of will. The second category is make-believe—where we pretend and engage in play, imagination, and exercise choice over what we “believe.” People relate differently to these different type of beliefs.
He points out how make-believe is influenced and shaped by how we think things are. While pretending allows for imagination, there tend to be boundaries and rules. For example, if we imagine someone falling into a river and climbing out, we are likely to also imagine them being wet—because we know that is the natural consequence of falling into water.
Make-believe is usually something done for a time; after engaging in it, we return to normal. Most often, when caught up in play, we can still snap out of it or check our phone. Many seem to be able to fully enter a role and act as if it is reality all while knowing it is make-believe. Even little children, despite behaving as if their make-believe world is real, show awareness that it is pretend. Play is remarkably important for children—it helps them learn to navigate the “real world.” Make-believe and play are often social activities that lead to valuable learning experiences.
Recognizing these two categories reveals that, regardless of the actual truth-value of religious claims, religion functions for most people as a form of make-believe. I have long known that if I “truly believed” that God was always with me—omnipotent, completely good, deeply loving, desiring a close relationship with me, and placing obligations upon me—then it would affect my life more than it has. Often, in my most fervent evangelical days, I would forget about God and go about my day without giving Him much thought. When I thought about it, God often seemed distant and unreal. I struggled with the hiddenness of God for so many years, for it would feel like make-believe, but it was like everyone else pretended it was not make-believe.
Religious Action & The Absence of God
In Christian circles, we talked about moving beliefs from “head knowledge” to “heart knowledge” and “practicing the presence of God.” And doing away with the sacred and secular split. For the true believers, we were so bothered by all the nominal Christians, but then uncomfortable with ourselves, since we were the ultimate hypocrites—inconsistently living out what we believed—this would lead people like me to become all the more desperate for God to fill me with power, the will and ability to be and do—which only amplified how non-existent God seemed—how I was dependent upon a mere figment of my imagination and I guess I wasn’t very good with make-believe, I couldn’t confabulate and code switch like others. Those set aside times left me flat.
Theology
How on earth are we to figure out what God is like? Supposing there truly is a theistic deity, we cannot see or have direct experience with God, and whatever sources we have are all subject to interpretation. Thus it does all function like make-believe. The Calvinists could construct a deity resembling an all-powerful Stalin, Mao, or Hitler—one to be revered for His absolute and arbitrary power. Meanwhile, Open Theists, like myself, attempted to explain away their proof texts and emphasize a relational and loving deity. In the absence of concrete knowledge and due to the diversity of scripture, we argue over different interpretations
I recall noticing how Christian teachers would talk about the “father heart of God” and how our relationships with our earthly fathers could shape our beliefs, and even distort our concept of God. But I protested—if we had a concrete experience of God as a good father, wouldn’t that override our daddy issues? Disappointing friendships with others do not impact my beliefs about my best friend.
Religious Experience
There was a period in my Christian life when I experienced incredible joy and hope during worship. I’d be in the back of the room, spinning around, smiling so much that my cheeks hurt. And yet, in my heart, it still felt like I was here, imprisoned, while the reality of God was out there—something was still holding me back. Oddly, even in these moments of euphoria, I sensed an element of make-believe. It was like a newlywed called into military service and stationed on the other side of the world. He cannot see, hear, or touch his wife, but he can imagine her presence—perhaps even enter a meditative state where he envisions her with him, feeling enraptured and loved. But… she is not actually there.
Implications for the Religious People
It is interesting how many of Jesus’ parables depict the Lord as being away—like a nobleman traveling to a distant country to receive his kingship. Jesus seemed more interested in what people would do in the meantime. Fascinatingly, this suggests that our experience of God will often feel as if He does not exist. In this absence, we have greater freedom to decide what we believe about the one who is supposedly gone. Even if there really is a God who will return to judge the living and the dead, in the meantime, for most people, His absence makes it indistinguishable from make-believe.
Maybe it would be helpful if Christians could acknowledge this. Some of us, like me, experienced a lot of cognitive dissonance. While participating in something that had all the characteristics of make-believe, we were expected to profess that we truly believed it. We had to pretend that the game was not a game. When our faith felt weak, we assumed the problem was us—that we simply weren’t devout enough. We pretended we were not pretending to believe that God regularly answers prayers, heals the sick, and performs miracles.
For me, my experience of reality led to a radical deconstruction. Religion needed to align with how things actually seemed. This led me to affirm a necessary ground of all being—the God of the philosophers—a being either unable or unwilling to interact in our world.
Trust
I have believed in a mix of faith and reason—we are to seek a reasonable faith (think of anyone deciding to marry someone, hopefully they have reasons, yet to make this commitment is to move beyond and take a step of faith, since we cannot know the future). I have been against, Fideism—a blind faith—believing because it is absurd. Thus, my religious beliefs have been in continual flux throughout my life. Leeuwen’s research demonstrates many religious people do hold religious belief as blind faith—it is a completely different category and needn't overlap with facts.
Leeuwen discusses how most people use the word belief for religious matters and think of fact-based beliefs. I am clearly not among the majority, for I have long recognized that I believe things like the contents of my fridge or scientific facts. I have factual beliefs about geography—like Egypt being in North East Africa—and relational facts, I accept my friend’s favorite band based wholly on trust. I’ve noticed that most of what I believe is based on trust. There is very little I can personally verify. The strength of my beliefs depends on my assumptions about authority. If I come to question an authority’s reliability, biases, or potential for deception, my childlike trust shatters.
Leeuwen doesn’t include the role of trust in his evaluation of religious belief, and at the end he critiques another philosopher who does. For me, it is a really important component. Consider children who trust their parents and believe in Santa Claus. While it functions as make-believe, their childlike trust makes it more than that. I think the same is true for many Christians—they trust in the authority of scripture or tradition. Just as I accept that Berlin is in Germany without personally verifying it, some Catholics believe the bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ simply because their religious authorities say so. This trust in authority is combined with a belief that God is powerful and can interact in our world (it is not a closed system). Not being a philosophical naturalist, it is not beyond their plausibility structure.
Again to use Santa Claus, I know of parents who DO NOT hide the fact that they are pretending Santa Claus exists, and it remains magical for the kids, even though parents make it clear that it is make-believe, but other parents work hard to make sure their kids really do think Santa is real—they too experienced the magic, though possibly it is a greater blow when they learn they were lied to.
We have some Christians who speak like it is all make-believe (blind faith) and hold these “beliefs” regardless of the evidence. But other Christians truly believe it (just like they believe scientific claims about the natural world), as long as they maintain their child-like trust in the authorities. After my easy trust was undermined, my religious beliefs have often been undermined and reshaped by my perception of reality. If I think I have a beer in my fridge and I open it and there is none, I adjust my belief, likewise, I was taught that the bible presented a just and loving God, but then I realized it depicts a tribal warrior deity ordering genocide for an offense 400 years old, forcing me to adjust my belief—since there are moral realities.
I am continuing to wrestle with this—here are some additional frames.
D&D
I think Leeuwen thinks many religious people are like D&D participants, it remains a game—they join up with others, code shift, and role-play the game, but once they leave and go on with their ordinary lives. There are two maps; the real world and the fantasy world, and part of the joy of the fantasy world is pretending it is real for a time and allowing the imagination to roam more freely. Many would not be okay with D&D people who take it all a little too seriously, those who continue to role-play outside of the prescribed setting. It is okay to make it part of one’s identity and to sing D & D praises and to be drawn to others who play D & D—but there are lines.
But this all seems different from those who accept something on trust. For them, they do believe something beyond verification because they trust others. It “functions” as make-believe, but is still different.
Trueman Show
Think of the Truman show, early on, because of trust, Truman truly believed his experience, while everyone else was simply part of the set. For them, they entered reality for a time, then went home. For Trueman, initially, it was lived—completely real, through and through. The actors would be deeply disconcerted if anyone spoke as if it was pretend. Leeuwen seems to be suggesting that for most religious people, rather than Truman (when he had childlike faith), people are actually like the actors in the set, it is all compartmentalized, they come and roleplay, and then leave—going back to their real reality. Religion as make-believe seems to suggest that all religious people are part of the set—knowing full well it is make-believe. However, I know a lot of people are very much like Truman at the start of the show—they simply trust others, and while it lasts (it is a fragile belief) they believe what they are told. For these people, a shattering of trust, will more likely lead them to leave the game.
Global Warming
There are many facts that are well beyond our personal ability to verify. These are taken on the trust in authorities. Now, take global warming, beliefs in anthropogenic climate change are supposed to affect behavior, according to the alarmist, the end of the world is nay—and everyone must take the most drastic action to avoid imminent extinction. Ah… but notice… while believers think this is so, it only occasionally impacts their life. They need to join up with others to make believe—to join protest, to rage and scream and throw soup on oil paintings. They need to read books to remind them and join communities to make it an ever-present reality in their mind. Even then, it will separate like oil and water. Oh, and for the truest believers, oh the hatred they will feel for all the lukewarm people, all the hypocrites—those flying in their private jets to tell the people to recycle and save the planet.
World Hunger
Or we can take things like world hunger. We can believe there are starving people in Africa, but it is hard to remember this; only occasionally does it force us to act, as if we saw it in person. We have an abstract belief, but it is not a felt reality for most. Some people go to events that will make it a reality—stir shame and guilt and inspire them to open their pocketbooks and give until it hurts.
Woke
I do think wokeness has all the components of religion, but as the fascinating book We Have Never Been Woke expresses, there is widespread hypocrisy among the woke. Few actually live as if their rhetoric is reality, but instead, they use virtue signals when it is easy and join up with others to rage, cancel, and do the work. In a sense they “believe” a trans woman is a woman, but this is an group identity belief, it is the new creedal map they have been given, they must profess this—yet… Or they believe that there is no such thing as merit and everything—all outcomes are wholly the result of systemic racism, but they also must live in the real world. Woke provides identity, sin, guilt, shame, an enemy, utopian hopes, purpose, and a reason to hate and rage and act, but woke is supposed to be praxis, people are supposed to do the work 24/7, to continually recognize their privilege and how they oppress others, to make EVERYTHING about race, to view every interaction through a critical lens, to give all their money and time to the antiracist causes, to do the work (a life long call) until they die—antiracist activism non-stop, day and night. Some succeed (until they have a mental breakdown), they are the Saints of woke, and oh the contempt for white liberals who talk the talk but fail to walk the walk! But most woke people pretend they are not pretending—they create the illusion that they are as zealous as the rest—but ultimately, they are hypocrites.
Healthy Living
Think about exercise and diet, most of us believe these are important, but for many of us, we only act and live like these are important occasionally. For some, it is like we need to join up with others, and we can “make believe” and “pretend” like these are super important. What I am trying to get at, is that there are reality/factual beliefs that often are not felt, that are hard to keep in mind and do not carry the weight as the immediate feels, sights, desires, and thoughts. We must then do something to make these beliefs come to the surface—to inspire action.
So, to conclude on the first part of his book, there are ways that religion is very much like make-believe. But I think it is important to notice that possibly we relate differently to the category of beliefs that are beyond our ability to verify. Some of these things, like beliefs on what contributes to healthy living, world hunger, poverty, and scientific and environmental issues, could be highly relevant to us and our world. This is one type of belief,, but the more pressing and present reality is how we feel, the tyranny of the urgent, responsibilities and relational concerns, needs and desires. Only a handful of people become activists for various causes, and these true believers are tempted to feel contempt for all the lukewarm people who don’t seem to care. So, communities make belief relevant for a time; people get together (and what they do is similar to pretending and playing make-believe) and act as if what they think is true actually is true. It is compartmentalized—it tends to have little impact on most of their actions. Because it is mostly based on trust, activists parrot the creeds
I got the sense that, according to Leeuwen, there are two categories of beliefs. One type happens to us and is tied to our perception of lived reality—we do not choose these beliefs, nor can we change them by an act of will. The second category is make-believe—where we pretend and engage in play, imagination, and exercise choice over what we “believe.” People relate differently to these different type of beliefs.
He points out how make-believe is influenced and shaped by how we think things are. While pretending allows for imagination, there tend to be boundaries and rules. For example, if we imagine someone falling into a river and climbing out, we are likely to also imagine them being wet—because we know that is the natural consequence of falling into water.
Make-believe is usually something done for a time; after engaging in it, we return to normal. Most often, when caught up in play, we can still snap out of it or check our phone. Many seem to be able to fully enter a role and act as if it is reality all while knowing it is make-believe. Even little children, despite behaving as if their make-believe world is real, show awareness that it is pretend. Play is remarkably important for children—it helps them learn to navigate the “real world.” Make-believe and play are often social activities that lead to valuable learning experiences.
Recognizing these two categories reveals that, regardless of the actual truth-value of religious claims, religion functions for most people as a form of make-believe. I have long known that if I “truly believed” that God was always with me—omnipotent, completely good, deeply loving, desiring a close relationship with me, and placing obligations upon me—then it would affect my life more than it has. Often, in my most fervent evangelical days, I would forget about God and go about my day without giving Him much thought. When I thought about it, God often seemed distant and unreal. I struggled with the hiddenness of God for so many years, for it would feel like make-believe, but it was like everyone else pretended it was not make-believe.
Religious Action & The Absence of God
In Christian circles, we talked about moving beliefs from “head knowledge” to “heart knowledge” and “practicing the presence of God.” And doing away with the sacred and secular split. For the true believers, we were so bothered by all the nominal Christians, but then uncomfortable with ourselves, since we were the ultimate hypocrites—inconsistently living out what we believed—this would lead people like me to become all the more desperate for God to fill me with power, the will and ability to be and do—which only amplified how non-existent God seemed—how I was dependent upon a mere figment of my imagination and I guess I wasn’t very good with make-believe, I couldn’t confabulate and code switch like others. Those set aside times left me flat.
Theology
How on earth are we to figure out what God is like? Supposing there truly is a theistic deity, we cannot see or have direct experience with God, and whatever sources we have are all subject to interpretation. Thus it does all function like make-believe. The Calvinists could construct a deity resembling an all-powerful Stalin, Mao, or Hitler—one to be revered for His absolute and arbitrary power. Meanwhile, Open Theists, like myself, attempted to explain away their proof texts and emphasize a relational and loving deity. In the absence of concrete knowledge and due to the diversity of scripture, we argue over different interpretations
I recall noticing how Christian teachers would talk about the “father heart of God” and how our relationships with our earthly fathers could shape our beliefs, and even distort our concept of God. But I protested—if we had a concrete experience of God as a good father, wouldn’t that override our daddy issues? Disappointing friendships with others do not impact my beliefs about my best friend.
Religious Experience
There was a period in my Christian life when I experienced incredible joy and hope during worship. I’d be in the back of the room, spinning around, smiling so much that my cheeks hurt. And yet, in my heart, it still felt like I was here, imprisoned, while the reality of God was out there—something was still holding me back. Oddly, even in these moments of euphoria, I sensed an element of make-believe. It was like a newlywed called into military service and stationed on the other side of the world. He cannot see, hear, or touch his wife, but he can imagine her presence—perhaps even enter a meditative state where he envisions her with him, feeling enraptured and loved. But… she is not actually there.
Implications for the Religious People
It is interesting how many of Jesus’ parables depict the Lord as being away—like a nobleman traveling to a distant country to receive his kingship. Jesus seemed more interested in what people would do in the meantime. Fascinatingly, this suggests that our experience of God will often feel as if He does not exist. In this absence, we have greater freedom to decide what we believe about the one who is supposedly gone. Even if there really is a God who will return to judge the living and the dead, in the meantime, for most people, His absence makes it indistinguishable from make-believe.
Maybe it would be helpful if Christians could acknowledge this. Some of us, like me, experienced a lot of cognitive dissonance. While participating in something that had all the characteristics of make-believe, we were expected to profess that we truly believed it. We had to pretend that the game was not a game. When our faith felt weak, we assumed the problem was us—that we simply weren’t devout enough. We pretended we were not pretending to believe that God regularly answers prayers, heals the sick, and performs miracles.
For me, my experience of reality led to a radical deconstruction. Religion needed to align with how things actually seemed. This led me to affirm a necessary ground of all being—the God of the philosophers—a being either unable or unwilling to interact in our world.
Trust
I have believed in a mix of faith and reason—we are to seek a reasonable faith (think of anyone deciding to marry someone, hopefully they have reasons, yet to make this commitment is to move beyond and take a step of faith, since we cannot know the future). I have been against, Fideism—a blind faith—believing because it is absurd. Thus, my religious beliefs have been in continual flux throughout my life. Leeuwen’s research demonstrates many religious people do hold religious belief as blind faith—it is a completely different category and needn't overlap with facts.
Leeuwen discusses how most people use the word belief for religious matters and think of fact-based beliefs. I am clearly not among the majority, for I have long recognized that I believe things like the contents of my fridge or scientific facts. I have factual beliefs about geography—like Egypt being in North East Africa—and relational facts, I accept my friend’s favorite band based wholly on trust. I’ve noticed that most of what I believe is based on trust. There is very little I can personally verify. The strength of my beliefs depends on my assumptions about authority. If I come to question an authority’s reliability, biases, or potential for deception, my childlike trust shatters.
Leeuwen doesn’t include the role of trust in his evaluation of religious belief, and at the end he critiques another philosopher who does. For me, it is a really important component. Consider children who trust their parents and believe in Santa Claus. While it functions as make-believe, their childlike trust makes it more than that. I think the same is true for many Christians—they trust in the authority of scripture or tradition. Just as I accept that Berlin is in Germany without personally verifying it, some Catholics believe the bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ simply because their religious authorities say so. This trust in authority is combined with a belief that God is powerful and can interact in our world (it is not a closed system). Not being a philosophical naturalist, it is not beyond their plausibility structure.
Again to use Santa Claus, I know of parents who DO NOT hide the fact that they are pretending Santa Claus exists, and it remains magical for the kids, even though parents make it clear that it is make-believe, but other parents work hard to make sure their kids really do think Santa is real—they too experienced the magic, though possibly it is a greater blow when they learn they were lied to.
We have some Christians who speak like it is all make-believe (blind faith) and hold these “beliefs” regardless of the evidence. But other Christians truly believe it (just like they believe scientific claims about the natural world), as long as they maintain their child-like trust in the authorities. After my easy trust was undermined, my religious beliefs have often been undermined and reshaped by my perception of reality. If I think I have a beer in my fridge and I open it and there is none, I adjust my belief, likewise, I was taught that the bible presented a just and loving God, but then I realized it depicts a tribal warrior deity ordering genocide for an offense 400 years old, forcing me to adjust my belief—since there are moral realities.
I am continuing to wrestle with this—here are some additional frames.
D&D
I think Leeuwen thinks many religious people are like D&D participants, it remains a game—they join up with others, code shift, and role-play the game, but once they leave and go on with their ordinary lives. There are two maps; the real world and the fantasy world, and part of the joy of the fantasy world is pretending it is real for a time and allowing the imagination to roam more freely. Many would not be okay with D&D people who take it all a little too seriously, those who continue to role-play outside of the prescribed setting. It is okay to make it part of one’s identity and to sing D & D praises and to be drawn to others who play D & D—but there are lines.
But this all seems different from those who accept something on trust. For them, they do believe something beyond verification because they trust others. It “functions” as make-believe, but is still different.
Trueman Show
Think of the Truman show, early on, because of trust, Truman truly believed his experience, while everyone else was simply part of the set. For them, they entered reality for a time, then went home. For Trueman, initially, it was lived—completely real, through and through. The actors would be deeply disconcerted if anyone spoke as if it was pretend. Leeuwen seems to be suggesting that for most religious people, rather than Truman (when he had childlike faith), people are actually like the actors in the set, it is all compartmentalized, they come and roleplay, and then leave—going back to their real reality. Religion as make-believe seems to suggest that all religious people are part of the set—knowing full well it is make-believe. However, I know a lot of people are very much like Truman at the start of the show—they simply trust others, and while it lasts (it is a fragile belief) they believe what they are told. For these people, a shattering of trust, will more likely lead them to leave the game.
Global Warming
There are many facts that are well beyond our personal ability to verify. These are taken on the trust in authorities. Now, take global warming, beliefs in anthropogenic climate change are supposed to affect behavior, according to the alarmist, the end of the world is nay—and everyone must take the most drastic action to avoid imminent extinction. Ah… but notice… while believers think this is so, it only occasionally impacts their life. They need to join up with others to make believe—to join protest, to rage and scream and throw soup on oil paintings. They need to read books to remind them and join communities to make it an ever-present reality in their mind. Even then, it will separate like oil and water. Oh, and for the truest believers, oh the hatred they will feel for all the lukewarm people, all the hypocrites—those flying in their private jets to tell the people to recycle and save the planet.
World Hunger
Or we can take things like world hunger. We can believe there are starving people in Africa, but it is hard to remember this; only occasionally does it force us to act, as if we saw it in person. We have an abstract belief, but it is not a felt reality for most. Some people go to events that will make it a reality—stir shame and guilt and inspire them to open their pocketbooks and give until it hurts.
Woke
I do think wokeness has all the components of religion, but as the fascinating book We Have Never Been Woke expresses, there is widespread hypocrisy among the woke. Few actually live as if their rhetoric is reality, but instead, they use virtue signals when it is easy and join up with others to rage, cancel, and do the work. In a sense they “believe” a trans woman is a woman, but this is an group identity belief, it is the new creedal map they have been given, they must profess this—yet… Or they believe that there is no such thing as merit and everything—all outcomes are wholly the result of systemic racism, but they also must live in the real world. Woke provides identity, sin, guilt, shame, an enemy, utopian hopes, purpose, and a reason to hate and rage and act, but woke is supposed to be praxis, people are supposed to do the work 24/7, to continually recognize their privilege and how they oppress others, to make EVERYTHING about race, to view every interaction through a critical lens, to give all their money and time to the antiracist causes, to do the work (a life long call) until they die—antiracist activism non-stop, day and night. Some succeed (until they have a mental breakdown), they are the Saints of woke, and oh the contempt for white liberals who talk the talk but fail to walk the walk! But most woke people pretend they are not pretending—they create the illusion that they are as zealous as the rest—but ultimately, they are hypocrites.
Healthy Living
Think about exercise and diet, most of us believe these are important, but for many of us, we only act and live like these are important occasionally. For some, it is like we need to join up with others, and we can “make believe” and “pretend” like these are super important. What I am trying to get at, is that there are reality/factual beliefs that often are not felt, that are hard to keep in mind and do not carry the weight as the immediate feels, sights, desires, and thoughts. We must then do something to make these beliefs come to the surface—to inspire action.
So, to conclude on the first part of his book, there are ways that religion is very much like make-believe. But I think it is important to notice that possibly we relate differently to the category of beliefs that are beyond our ability to verify. Some of these things, like beliefs on what contributes to healthy living, world hunger, poverty, and scientific and environmental issues, could be highly relevant to us and our world. This is one type of belief,, but the more pressing and present reality is how we feel, the tyranny of the urgent, responsibilities and relational concerns, needs and desires. Only a handful of people become activists for various causes, and these true believers are tempted to feel contempt for all the lukewarm people who don’t seem to care. So, communities make belief relevant for a time; people get together (and what they do is similar to pretending and playing make-believe) and act as if what they think is true actually is true. It is compartmentalized—it tends to have little impact on most of their actions. Because it is mostly based on trust, activists parrot the creeds
October 20, 2025
While the title of the book is provocative and could easily lead one to assume that the author will be unsympathetic to the religious — along the lines of books like The God Delusion — Van Leeuwen’s treatment of religiosity is far more nuanced than the title might imply. Religious belief, he argues, is not the result of delusion, irrationality, gullibility, or confusion about factual truth; it’s a separate cognitive attitude from factual belief that serves a different psychosocial process — namely, group identity.
Van Leeuwen proposes a 2-map cognitive structure, in which religious credence is layered on top of and shaped by our base factual beliefs, in the same way that imaginative play depends on our core understanding of the factual world in order to have coherent meaning. It is possible, then, for religious beliefs to directly contradict with our factual knowledge without this being a cognitive error or evidence of irrationality; unlike factual belief, religious credence is not subject to evidential vulnerability and automatically and involuntarily extinguished by observed contradictions, in much the same way that an actor assuming a role onstage or a child pretending their doll is a real baby are not pulled out of those imaginings by the observation that they are not, in fact, a prince of Denmark whose father has just been murdered or by the fact that the doll can only move or cry when the child controls their movements and provides their voice.
Religion as Make-Believe opens with a parable of children on a playground forming a distinct group with rules and expectations about how and where they play with certain toys, and over the course of the book Van Leeuwen advances the argument that religious credence plays much the same social purpose — the profession of certain religious beliefs and the performance of behavior that accords with those beliefs is central to group formation and group identity. This ties directly to the idea of sacralization — something being considered holy or sacred is not caused by anything inherent to the object/place/idea itself, as what is holy/sacred varies wildly between groups, but rather is sacralized by the group’s valuing of that thing. Religious credence, then, is voluntary in a way that factual belief is not; it is something one does in order to form and maintain group identity, serving as a sort of social litmus test or signaling behavior of group allegiance.
Interestingly, Van Leeuwen argues that most people are consciously or subconsciously aware of the difference between their religious credences and their factual beliefs, to more or less degree. Evidence put forth in support of this claim is ample and convincing — from the fact that what is prayed for by people who creed that god is omnipotent is more likely to align with what is known to be factually possible and that goal-directed action usually still accompanies prayer, to the devoutly religious who will admit that factually believing what they creed is difficult and requires work and faith.
Self-deception about the differences between the first and second map — the attempt to convince oneself, often because of guilt, that one does factually believe what they religiously creed — is problematic for a variety of reasons, but not limited to religion; similar cognitive attitudes to religious credence shape our participation in political and ideological groups, as well.
Overall, this is a well-researched and well-structured argument, and its implications for not only religiosity but ideology and group identity at large are manifold. I would recommend this book to both theists and atheists alike, in order to better understand not only HOW religious belief persists in the spite of contrary evidence, but WHY it does and how these beliefs have contributed to the continuation of our cultures and our species.
Van Leeuwen proposes a 2-map cognitive structure, in which religious credence is layered on top of and shaped by our base factual beliefs, in the same way that imaginative play depends on our core understanding of the factual world in order to have coherent meaning. It is possible, then, for religious beliefs to directly contradict with our factual knowledge without this being a cognitive error or evidence of irrationality; unlike factual belief, religious credence is not subject to evidential vulnerability and automatically and involuntarily extinguished by observed contradictions, in much the same way that an actor assuming a role onstage or a child pretending their doll is a real baby are not pulled out of those imaginings by the observation that they are not, in fact, a prince of Denmark whose father has just been murdered or by the fact that the doll can only move or cry when the child controls their movements and provides their voice.
Religion as Make-Believe opens with a parable of children on a playground forming a distinct group with rules and expectations about how and where they play with certain toys, and over the course of the book Van Leeuwen advances the argument that religious credence plays much the same social purpose — the profession of certain religious beliefs and the performance of behavior that accords with those beliefs is central to group formation and group identity. This ties directly to the idea of sacralization — something being considered holy or sacred is not caused by anything inherent to the object/place/idea itself, as what is holy/sacred varies wildly between groups, but rather is sacralized by the group’s valuing of that thing. Religious credence, then, is voluntary in a way that factual belief is not; it is something one does in order to form and maintain group identity, serving as a sort of social litmus test or signaling behavior of group allegiance.
Interestingly, Van Leeuwen argues that most people are consciously or subconsciously aware of the difference between their religious credences and their factual beliefs, to more or less degree. Evidence put forth in support of this claim is ample and convincing — from the fact that what is prayed for by people who creed that god is omnipotent is more likely to align with what is known to be factually possible and that goal-directed action usually still accompanies prayer, to the devoutly religious who will admit that factually believing what they creed is difficult and requires work and faith.
Self-deception about the differences between the first and second map — the attempt to convince oneself, often because of guilt, that one does factually believe what they religiously creed — is problematic for a variety of reasons, but not limited to religion; similar cognitive attitudes to religious credence shape our participation in political and ideological groups, as well.
Overall, this is a well-researched and well-structured argument, and its implications for not only religiosity but ideology and group identity at large are manifold. I would recommend this book to both theists and atheists alike, in order to better understand not only HOW religious belief persists in the spite of contrary evidence, but WHY it does and how these beliefs have contributed to the continuation of our cultures and our species.
August 15, 2025
this book… what a crazy concept. what crazy argumentative grounds this book stands on. so much i disagree with, yet so much that is fascinating. logically and perhaps intellectually this book was especially challenging for me, as i think it tackles ideas from a more philosophical and theoretical standpoint as opposed to anthropological, which made it hard for me to understand. the two-map cognitive structure though? absolute gas absolute heat. where the book lacks is where i really enjoyed class discussions abt it - exploring what a religion is, how beliefs are constructed and what they have to do with our identity, etc. 3 stars because it was hard to read and i dont think i could do that again but do still recommend.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 7, 2024
This book was so impressively argued and quite literally astounding at points in the way it explains the difference between factual belief and religious belief. Dense but deserves to be carefully read and contemplated. Quite a powerful theoretical exploration with hugely explanatory potential.
October 24, 2025
'Religion as Make-Believe' explores how people can simultaneously believe in science and religion, and it does so through an incredible analogy involving children playing with dolls. Children create elaborate storylines for their dolls, controlling their fates and projecting their emotions into these imagined worlds. When a child is angry with a friend, for example, the doll representing that friend might start fighting with another doll. Leeuwen explains how this kind of play helps children process real-life emotions and experiences - it gives them a way to navigate anger, frustration, and understanding when they don’t yet have the words for it.
The author then compares this to religion: the way people can be fully immersed in belief systems that shape their emotional and moral worlds, while still operating in the “real” one. He cites a study where a teacher pretended to bake cookies out of playdough and then bit into one. The kids were horrified, because they knew the playdough cookies weren’t actually real cookies, illustrating how children can be deeply engaged in fiction or imagination while still maintaining an awareness of what’s real.
From there, van Leeuwen introduces what he calls a two-map cognitive structure — a framework for how the human mind can run two “representational maps” at once.
• The first map represents everyday, physical reality: the world governed by physics, biology, and ordinary cause-and-effect.
• The second map represents the imagined or symbolic world - the world of gods, miracles, and divine meaning.
When children play with dolls, they’re operating both maps simultaneously: they know the doll is plastic and silent (first map), yet they act as if it’s a living character with thoughts and feelings (second map). The same cognitive structure, he argues, underlies religious practice - people can live within an empirical reality and still participate in a religious one that operates on different terms.
Two key features sustain this dual structure: nonconfusion and continual reality tracking.
• Nonconfusion means keeping the two maps distinct - knowing that the Play-Doh isn’t really a cookie, or that the doll isn’t truly alive, even while emotionally engaging with it. In religious terms, this explains how believers can experience profound emotional and moral truth in scripture or ritual without (necessarily) confusing it with physical reality.
• Continual reality tracking means that even during imagination or faith, people never lose their grip on real-world facts. Children still track time, space, and material properties when playing; similarly, religious practitioners continue to navigate the empirical world - holding jobs, following scientific reasoning, recognising cause and effect - while also participating in symbolic, spiritual practices.
Together, these features explain how human beings can hold scientific knowledge and religious conviction side by side. Religion, in this account, isn’t about literal truth in the empirical sense; it’s about the imaginative construction of meaning and moral orientation. People don’t confuse their faith-world with the physical world - they move between them fluidly, using each for different purposes: one to understand how the world works, and the other to understand why it matters.
The author then compares this to religion: the way people can be fully immersed in belief systems that shape their emotional and moral worlds, while still operating in the “real” one. He cites a study where a teacher pretended to bake cookies out of playdough and then bit into one. The kids were horrified, because they knew the playdough cookies weren’t actually real cookies, illustrating how children can be deeply engaged in fiction or imagination while still maintaining an awareness of what’s real.
From there, van Leeuwen introduces what he calls a two-map cognitive structure — a framework for how the human mind can run two “representational maps” at once.
• The first map represents everyday, physical reality: the world governed by physics, biology, and ordinary cause-and-effect.
• The second map represents the imagined or symbolic world - the world of gods, miracles, and divine meaning.
When children play with dolls, they’re operating both maps simultaneously: they know the doll is plastic and silent (first map), yet they act as if it’s a living character with thoughts and feelings (second map). The same cognitive structure, he argues, underlies religious practice - people can live within an empirical reality and still participate in a religious one that operates on different terms.
Two key features sustain this dual structure: nonconfusion and continual reality tracking.
• Nonconfusion means keeping the two maps distinct - knowing that the Play-Doh isn’t really a cookie, or that the doll isn’t truly alive, even while emotionally engaging with it. In religious terms, this explains how believers can experience profound emotional and moral truth in scripture or ritual without (necessarily) confusing it with physical reality.
• Continual reality tracking means that even during imagination or faith, people never lose their grip on real-world facts. Children still track time, space, and material properties when playing; similarly, religious practitioners continue to navigate the empirical world - holding jobs, following scientific reasoning, recognising cause and effect - while also participating in symbolic, spiritual practices.
Together, these features explain how human beings can hold scientific knowledge and religious conviction side by side. Religion, in this account, isn’t about literal truth in the empirical sense; it’s about the imaginative construction of meaning and moral orientation. People don’t confuse their faith-world with the physical world - they move between them fluidly, using each for different purposes: one to understand how the world works, and the other to understand why it matters.
July 9, 2024
Neil Van Leeuwen has masterfully created a clinic to understand the distinct cognitive attitudes that span a spectrum from the involuntarily factual, evidentially vulnerable cognitive governance of actions, and no compartmentalization to the religious and ideological credences that are voluntarily believed, evidentially invulnerable, compartmentalized with limited cognitive governance, and drive make-believe actions.
From a child's playground make-believe to adult cosplay to political performance and religious rituals, rational human beings depend on a two-map system with a foundational layer of facts and an understanding of causality. The second layer of the system for rational agents is composed of the secondary cognitive attitudes developed from assumptions, perceptions, and a constitution that can appraise actions fairly and impartially. A distorted secondary layer of the attitudes in our human cognitive mapping threatens our capacity for judgment and moral integrity.
"Groupiness" has at its core the psychological pressure to belong and feel less than adequate in belonging without embracing a self-deceptive need to form factual beliefs from imaginings. A religion or ideology that pressures belief is pernicious, engendering ethical harm in service of epistemic irrationality.
My takeaway is to invest time and resources only with others, where the features and properties that unite are based on causality and form a "natural kind," not distorted secondary attitudes. Seek to be with other agents where cognition is vulnerable to new evidence, and morally right actions come from agents with a constitution that can appraise utilitarian and sacred value systems fairly and impartially.
Review Essay: July/August 2024 Foreign Affairs
Shadi Hamid reviews "The Divine Economy: How Religions Compete for Wealth, Power, and People."
Pascal's Wager: Pascal posited that it was in one's self-interest to find a way to believe in God even if God might not exist ... what is less well quoted is Pascal's confession that this internal forced belief will "make you more stupid."
Humans are meaning makers who seek and are products of an enchanted world.
Humans are social animals, and religions provide a community in a way that secular ideologies can only struggle to replicate.
From a child's playground make-believe to adult cosplay to political performance and religious rituals, rational human beings depend on a two-map system with a foundational layer of facts and an understanding of causality. The second layer of the system for rational agents is composed of the secondary cognitive attitudes developed from assumptions, perceptions, and a constitution that can appraise actions fairly and impartially. A distorted secondary layer of the attitudes in our human cognitive mapping threatens our capacity for judgment and moral integrity.
"Groupiness" has at its core the psychological pressure to belong and feel less than adequate in belonging without embracing a self-deceptive need to form factual beliefs from imaginings. A religion or ideology that pressures belief is pernicious, engendering ethical harm in service of epistemic irrationality.
My takeaway is to invest time and resources only with others, where the features and properties that unite are based on causality and form a "natural kind," not distorted secondary attitudes. Seek to be with other agents where cognition is vulnerable to new evidence, and morally right actions come from agents with a constitution that can appraise utilitarian and sacred value systems fairly and impartially.
Review Essay: July/August 2024 Foreign Affairs
Shadi Hamid reviews "The Divine Economy: How Religions Compete for Wealth, Power, and People."
Pascal's Wager: Pascal posited that it was in one's self-interest to find a way to believe in God even if God might not exist ... what is less well quoted is Pascal's confession that this internal forced belief will "make you more stupid."
Humans are meaning makers who seek and are products of an enchanted world.
Humans are social animals, and religions provide a community in a way that secular ideologies can only struggle to replicate.
December 22, 2024
I highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the study of religion. Van Leeuwen is writing within the sub-discipline of philosophy of religion. He uses research from neurosciences to examine a two layer cognitive map for belief: one is factual belief and the second is religious creedance. The title comes from the analogy that he uses comparing religious creedance with play (i.e., make believe). While he uses this analogy, he is not saying that religions are fantasies. He is talking more about the way in which cognitive attitudes work, that is the manner a person perceives their belief.
Much of the discussion focuses on ways to understand the differences between factual belief and religious creedance. His argument is very convincing. It provides an excellent way towards better understanding the concept of belief, and especially religious belief, which poses more problems academically than many people realize.
Much of the discussion focuses on ways to understand the differences between factual belief and religious creedance. His argument is very convincing. It provides an excellent way towards better understanding the concept of belief, and especially religious belief, which poses more problems academically than many people realize.
January 10, 2024
I'm liking this book. Two thoughts recently:
First, some 'spiritual' yoga classes function as religion/make-believe to the extent they mark the end of class and have people return to 'normal', rather than encourage them to go out into the world with a different energy/outlook.
Second, a line of question: in what ways can meditation/yoga change one's outlook in permanent (non make-believe) ways.
First, some 'spiritual' yoga classes function as religion/make-believe to the extent they mark the end of class and have people return to 'normal', rather than encourage them to go out into the world with a different energy/outlook.
Second, a line of question: in what ways can meditation/yoga change one's outlook in permanent (non make-believe) ways.
September 25, 2024
Clickbait title aside, it was a very thought provoking explanation of how different types of beliefs (factual and attitudinal) are formed. It’s an academic, fairly dry read but logically laid out in a proof type format that made it easy to follow and digest. Really helped me better understand the “why” behind many belief systems, both religious and non-religious.
December 31, 2024
Well researched and highly technical in its explanation, which I suspect will turn people off, yet this approach is required to tackle sacred beliefs and bringing a weight to Van Leeuwen's compelling two-map mental model: factual beliefs and religious credence, and how this seemingly paradoxical system can coexist in a single individual.
April 14, 2025
"The sacred is not that which is loved by the gods. Rather, the sacred is that which is loved in a certain way by us; that is, what makes something sacred is that creatures like us hold sacralizing attitudes toward it. And our representation of deities' attitudes toward that which we hold sacred provide us with an imaginative scheme for categorizing entries and events as having sacred status."
December 24, 2023
It’s an extraordinarily dense book, but there is no doubting Van Leeuwen’s scholarship whether you agree with him or not.
What made it interesting for me was the number of times it clarified a thought mechanism that happens in the background.
What made it interesting for me was the number of times it clarified a thought mechanism that happens in the background.
June 22, 2024
Technical jargon and academic tone mean it will be boring and dry for most general interest readers. But the ideas conveyed seem to me (a non-academic) careful, persuasive, detailed, interesting, useful, and sound.
Read
July 25, 2024Think the book would have benefited from contrasting simple and complex beliefs (and how they are interconnected), rather than religious vs. factual
March 26, 2025
I'm not an expert but I found it very persuasive.
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