Answering Moral Skepticism

by Shelly Kagan

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview?Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

Genres: Philosophy

406 pages, Kindle Edition

Published September 26, 2023

About the author

Shelly Kagan is Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale. After receiving his B.A. from Wesleyan University in 1976, and his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1982, he taught at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Illinois at Chicago before coming to Yale in 1995. He is the author of the textbook Normative Ethics, which systematically reviews alternative positions concerning the basic rules of morality and their possible foundations, and The Limits of Morality, which challenges two of the most widely shared beliefs about the requirements of morality. He is currently at work on The Geometry of Desert.

Reviews

[Pedro Galvão · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although it is a defense of the objectivity of morality, it works very well, due to its scope and accessibility, as a general introduction to metaethics. Of all the introductions to metaethics I know, this is surely the best: it is neither superficial nor horribly scholastic.

[Michael Godwin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Answering Moral Skepticism is a thoughtful and engaging exploration of one of philosophy's most enduring questions: can there really be objective moral truth? Shelly Kagan tackles difficult issues with impressive clarity, making complex debates about morality accessible without sacrificing philosophical depth.

What I appreciated most was how the book carefully addresses the strongest skeptical arguments instead of dismissing them. Kagan examines questions about moral disagreement, moral knowledge, and the place of ethics in a scientific worldview with a balanced and logical approach that encourages readers to think more critically about their own beliefs.

Overall, this is an excellent read for anyone interested in ethics, metaethics, or contemporary philosophy. Whether you're a student, scholar, or simply curious about the foundations of morality, this book offers a clear, insightful, and rewarding discussion that stays with you long after you've finished reading.

[Dany · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book, a bit long winded, but great for learning

[☺️🧁🥸🙂‍↕️]

DNF at 68% (thank you god)

[Terry · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Answering Moral Skepticism, Kagan presents his case for moral realism. His strategy is to advocate a presumption in favour of moral realism grounded in the evidential value of our moral intuitions (via phenomenal conservativism). From there, Kagan is content with casting doubt on popular skeptical challenges that seek either to undermine phenomenal conservativism directly or the existence of moral facts (qua instantiations of moral properties) more generally. Ultimately, Kagan remains undecided as to which specific version of moral realism is more plausible: reductionism or simple realism.

The book is well-written, engaging, and thought provoking. As others have pointed out, Answering Moral Skepticism functions just as well as a textbook on metaethics as it does a cumulative argument for moral realism. As a fan of Kagan’s work, I would have liked to have seen him engage more fully with the topics he introduces (e.g., exploring specific versions of reductionism, commenting on the contemporary metaethical literature, or presenting a more thorough case for positions he favours, like motive internalism or phenomenal conservativism), though this would have necessarily decreased the book’s accessibility and scope.

Regardless, Answering Moral Skepticism is one of the better textbook-style books on moral philosophy that I’ve read, and I definitely recommend it.