"I hate the Balkans. I hate Europe. But we have nowhere to go."
Published first in 1992, in the midst of the Yugoslav breakup wars, with a large afterworded added in 1996, The Fall of Yugoslavia is a war correspondant's memoirs, across Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and North Macedonia, in a very short time frame of 1990 to 1992, with the afterword covering 1992 to 1996.
This book is not an history book or an academic reference. It was written as a primary source and that heavily influences the way you should read it. Misha Glenny will report testimonials, make comments, and give his own impression without historical hindsight. While he does give context and a good explanation of how we "got there", he does not source it explicitly, and remains at the level of well-meaning journalist - not an historian. As the book was written in the heat of the moment, Glenny frequently engages in speculation, lays blame, gives praises. Depressingly, in many cases, history would prove him right; in others, he would be rebutted.
The book's structure can be confusing, as different chapters narrate different regions of Yugoslavia and different war theatres, sometimes in a way that is confusing chronologically, as Glenny frequently uses flashbacks as a litterary device. Glenny describes the reality of war in sometimes banal and boring ways: many times, he describes the (frightening) experience of having to through a checkpoint, or the brutality of soldiers, or the despondancy of civilians. This works well as a book of testimonials; it does impact the structure, with a heavy use of superlatives to qualify the various Yugoslav commanders or massacres. Glenny blames all Yugoslavs (except Macedonians) equally, which raises eyebrows when international tribunals have laid the blame on Serbian and (to a lesser extent) Croatian commanders, and much less on Bosnians, which have been qualified as victims.
The first chapter of the book serves as background for the catalyst of the war: the "Serbian question" in Croatia; it offers us a tour of Knin, capital of the Serbian Krajina. Glenny explains how people who had, seemingly, lived together for decades could turn on themselves: the fear of Ustashas on one hand, and of Chetniks on the other. Glenny firmly qualifies the conflict not as a religious one, not as an ideological one, but rather as a territorial one: the Serbs hold a large chunk of Croatia and don't want to give it to Croats. The Serbs were, by the statute of Yugoslavia, intentionally weakened as a community, but where nevertheless immensely powerful in a nominally Croat polity. This was the recipe for disaster.
The second chapter covers the internal dissent to the Milosevic presidency of RS Serbia. It is perhaps a lesser known aspect of those wars. It highlights what Glenny sees as the major contradiction of the nationalistic wars: the total lack of unity, even within the nationalistic sides. Many Serbians in Serbia proper did not care about Kosovo, and much less the Krajina, but rather about their own lives and freedom. Krajina Serbs did not care about Kosovo Serbs... Glenny is rather prescient about the ethnic tensions in the Albanian-populated Kosovo, mythologised by the Serbs as a holy land. Written in 1992, the book seems to correctly predict the Kosovo war, although Glenny feels the need to say that: "The Serbian authorities in Kosovo are in absolute control of Kosov and therefore have no motivation for provoking an armed conflict there." Hindsight would prove him right: when Albanian partisans took control of a seizable fraction of the province, Milosevic had no choice but provoke war.
The chapter attempts to give us a portrait of Slobodan Milosevic. It lacks historical hindsight to do so effectively. All that it can say is that Milosevic was an opportunist: he used Serbian nationalism to get elected, to gain power, and when it became inconvient, would abandon separatists. One interesting anecdote: when Glenny offered to interview him in Serbo-Croatian, Milosevic became suspicious, and asked to be talked to in English.
The third and fourth chapter describes the outbreak of the war proper, with the failures of negociations, showing the deep resentment within the Yugoslav republic, and culminating with the secession of Slovenia, and then Croatia. Here, Glenny takes sides: although, he argues, Slovenia had reasonable grounds for independance (being by far the most prosperous state of the Union, ethnically homegenous, and feeling no kinship with the rest of the Federation), he quickly points out that the Serbian hinterland served as a useful outlet for Slovenian goods, making their claim of being overexploited by the rest of the union hypocritical. Worse, the secession of Slovenia - and the short ten day war that followed, interrupted by heavy diplomatic pressure from the EU and Germany - proved one thing: the idea of Yugoslavia as an entity was dead. Any war would be a war of conquest by a Serb-led state against Croats, Moslems, or Albanians; any pretense of ideological justification, or of "Yugoslavism" died when Milosevic and Kadijevic (Yugoslavia federal president) got rid of Slovenia. Here, Glenny describes the chaotic nature of the conflict, its sometimes improvised character, with Serb irregulars and Croat policemen fighting in small towns, villages, while the JNA (Yugoslav Army), officially a neutral arbiter, aids the Serbs in estblashing a parastate. The war in Croatia was a brutal affair of brother against brother, of peace militants being assassinated. But it would pale in comparison of what followed.
The fifth and the sixth (last) chapter cover the epicentre of the Yugoslav wars: Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia is described in vivid detail in the fifth chapter as the "Paradise of the Damned": an example of somewhat succesful Yugoslav identity, a deeply mulicultural region, with a vibrant culture, and rich history; Glenny explains the peculliar case of the "Moslem" identity, neither Serb nor Croat, but defined almost entirely by religion. The multiculturalism of Bosnia made its beauty during peace. It would cause bloodshed and suffering during the war. Bosnia was, Glenny argues, of vital interest for both Belgrade (as it held most of the heavy weapon industry of Yugoslavia, and a seizable Serb community) and Zagreb (to link up its territory, and for the Croat community). Glenny places a lot of blame on Germany: he insists its policy of recognising Slovenia and Croatia, but not Bosnia, gave free reign for both states to try to partition it, leaving the Moslem Bosnian community with nobody to protect it, and no choice but declare independance - causing the outbreak of the war.
The complexity of the Bosnian wars is staggering. Croats fought Serbs; Croats fought other Croats; Moslems fought Serbs, with Croat assistance; except when Moslems fought Croats, and the Serbs stood by and watch. Glenny argues that ideological purity and nationalist ideas quickly faded as it became a power struggle between captains and statelets. Zagreb and Belgrade had, as it turned out, not an absolute control over their own armies.
Glenny makes the (in my opinion, regrettable) choice of carefully "both-siding" the war when a clear victim emerges: the Bosnian Moslems. Seen by Serbs as vanguards of a Caliphate, dropped by their Croat allies for nationalistic reasons, the Bosnians were the ones victims of a genocide, they were the ones put in camps. Glenny also points out the very milquetoast support of the international community for them, even though public opinion in the Middle East and the USA were strongly in favour. The chapter - "Beyond Hades" - is a rather depressing read, written very close to the publication of the book. It lists atrocities, it highlights the highly chaotic and irregular warfare in Bosnia, the beginning of the siege in Sarajevo - but it lacks perspective. Here, more than elsewhere in the book, the weaknesses of a journalist's memoir is shown.
A first, short, conclusion acts a summary of the book and a pathetic cry for despair at the senseless war. Glenny compares the situation with Nagorny-Karabath, with Moldova's Transnistria.
In a more elaborate afterword written in 1996, Glenny describes the outbreak of the Bosnian-Croat open war, with the tragic shelling of Mostar, and how a peace was negociated. Here again, Glenny distributes blame: in his analysis, the international commmunity decided to abandon the Moslem community to support the Croats, with the heavy lobbying of the Germans. This, in his opinion, killed all hope of a unity Bosnian state, and created a 'federation' of Bosnians and Croats, freezing the problem in place.
Moreover, the clear favouritism of the international community for the Croats, as well as Milosevic' increasingly untenable position, resulting in the complete ethnic cleansing of the Serbian Krajina, much less known than other in the West. It included many civilians which were not at all part of the war. In total, 450 000 Serbs left Croatia, ending a multi-secular presence. The isolation of Serbia on the international stage also forced Milosevic to cut ties with the statelet of Republika Srspka - under blockade, under bombs, the Pale government was forced to delegate its power to Milosevic and sign the Dayton agreements.
Glenny titles this chapter "Return to Purgatory", and makes his opinion clear: Dayton does not solve the problems of Bosnia, it merely freezes them in place. He argues that the NATO bombing specifically left out Banja Luka and other RS key areas to force Bosnian Moslems to accept it as an entity. He points out how a state with two independant armies is an absurdity (the RS independant army was merged into the federal one in 2006). While his prediction that armed conflict would return did not occur, he correctly pointed out the unworkability of the de facto partition: today, the Republika Srspka seeks to completly withdraw from the Federation.
Glenny does mention Srebrenica, but lacks the evidence to properly qualify it as it was - a genocide. In other strange case of speculation, he spends a lot of time to discuss the fate of the Macedonian Albanian, fearing an open war. As it happened, Albanian in Macedonia did clash with the state, but the real war was fought in Kosovo. I suspect that Milosevic newfound popularity at the time - for having dropped the RS - led Glenny to believe the danger would not come from Serbia.
Glenny's book tells a very vivid story, sometimes lacking hindsight, sometimes making the wrong calls, but also very prescient in most of its analysis. It goes to great lengths to point out what a waste the wars were. But in some way, it gives the wrong impression of pre-war Yugoslavia as a lost paradise, which it certainly was, compared to the war-torn rump states that came after. But it also neglects some of the bad aspect of Titoist federation, in particular in Kosovo. It briefly alludes to the economic crisis prior to the war, but without fully committing to it.
I recommend the book as a way to learn about the topic. But it certainly cannot be a full academic reference.