Western interpretations of the Cold War--both realist and neoconservative--have erred by exaggerating either the Kremlin's pragmatism or its aggressiveness, argues Vladislav Zubok. Explaining the interests, aspirations, illusions, fears, and misperceptions of the Kremlin leaders and Soviet elites, Zubok offers a Soviet perspective on the greatest standoff of the twentieth century.
Using recently declassified Politburo records, ciphered telegrams, diaries, and taped conversations, among other sources, Zubok explores the origins of the superpowers' confrontation under Stalin, Khrushchev's contradictory and counterproductive attempts to ease tensions, the surprising story of Brezhnev's passion for detente, and Gorbachev's destruction of the Soviet superpower as the by-product of his hasty steps to end the Cold War and to reform the Soviet Union. The first work in English to cover the entire Cold War from the Soviet side, A Failed Empire provides a history different from those written by the Western victors.
<!--copy for pb In this widely praised book, Vladislav Zubok argues that Western interpretations of the Cold War have erred by exaggerating either the Kremlin's pragmatism or its aggressiveness. Explaining the interests, aspirations, illusions, fears, and misperceptions of the Kremlin leaders and Soviet elites, Zubok offers a Soviet perspective on the greatest standoff of the twentieth century. Using recently declassified Politburo records, ciphered telegrams, diaries, and taped conversations, among other sources, Zubok offers the first work in English to cover the entire Cold War from the Soviet side. A Failed Empire provides a history quite different from those written by the Western victors. In a new preface for this edition, the author adds to our understanding of today's events in Russia, including who the new players are and how their policies will affect the state of the world in the twenty-first century. -->
Vladislav M. Zubok (see also: Владислав Зубок) is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of A Failed Empire, Zhivago’s Children, and The Idea of Russia.
I almost gave it four stars because the part on Stalin was hard to follow, yet the rest of the book is impeccable. This is Soviet diplomacy from the top down, discussing the big leaders and their actions. Zubok is essentially a moderate. He emphasizes the importance of both ideology and pragmatism (and how their relative absence with Gorbachev was a disaster for the USSR) and the opinions of elite personalities and those those they governed. By being balanced he makes a strong argument for a kind of reasonable "great man" theory of history that I found compelling.
Most of all, the Russian leaders after Stalin were insecure. They knew the USA had the advantages and tried everything to counter us, from bullying (Khrushchev), to negotiation (Brezhnev), to isolationism (Andropov), and lastly idealized submission (Gorbachev). They all failed.
Lastly, Zubok is right. The USSR is the weirdest great power to have ever existed. Murderous but also inspirational (defeat of Nazis, space race), it was born in a brutal civil war in the midst of a world war, but ended on a whimper when its elites and military could not stomach carrying out another wave of repression.
Lo que nos cuenta. Desde finales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial (con algún vistazo atrás para situar mejor al lector) hasta finales de 1991, repaso de la Guerra Fría, sus razones, sus diferentes escenarios y alcances, pero todo desde el punto de vista de la Unión Soviética y de los individuos que la lideraron, cuyas personalidades marcaron mucho el devenir de los acontecimientos.
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Lo que nos cuenta. Desde finales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial (con algún vistazo atrás para situar mejor al lector) hasta finales de 1991, repaso de la Guerra Fría, sus razones, sus diferentes escenarios y alcances, pero todo desde el punto de vista de la Unión Soviética y de los individuos que la lideraron, cuyas personalidades marcaron mucho el devenir de los acontecimientos.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
This was an absolutely fascinating book, which gives the history of the Cold War from the Soviet perspective. I learned a number of interesting tidbits - Brezhnev was an opiate addict, Stalin was totally nuts (well, guess I already knew that) - as well as looking through a really interesting analysis. The book is focused on the role of the Soviet leaders - Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev - and the impact that their backgrounds and personalities had on their decision making. I am not normally a fan of the 'great man' approach to history, but I do firmly agree with the thesis. I often forget about generational mindsets in looking at history. Being a participant in WWII shaped the attitudes of the leadership of all countries that participated, not just the US.
End notes were fascinating. Main text, rather dry in parts but especially valuable for the post-Stalin leaders. Kind to Brezhnev. As harsh with Gorbachev as some other books I've read lately were fawning toward him. Really curious how that will play out in time.
Biggest criticism is the adulation of Stalin as emperor with no mention in the main text of the many many millions of innocent people Stalin killed. The relevant end notes give dry statistics, but the main text is weirdly laudatory of Stalin's measures (or perhaps for his willingness to murder great swathes of people without a second thought). Also, the only woman mentioned more than in passing is Raisa Gorbachev, who seems to be mentioned -- always as an expert scholar -- in a way meant to undercut Gorbachev's capabilities, as if he was weaker for having an intelligent wife rather than stronger for her aid and participation. It never says that outright, but I don't think I'm wrong in detecting a somewhat snotty undertone when he talks about her. The same tone appears when he discusses Gorbachev's policy of nonviolence.
Which, huh. I'm really not sure what to make of that.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
The Soviet Union was one of the strangest empires that ever existed. It relied on a revolutionary ideology that claimed to banish oppression and exploitation, yet was imposed by force of arms and cunning wherever possible. As Vladislav Zubok's book shows, this ideology was not secondary to the Soviet's oppressive empire, but central even to its own architects and shaped their vision of its work. They looked towards Marxism-Leninism to predict supposed economic disasters in the West, and to guarantee the universality of working class revolutionary. Zubok shows that this modernizing ideology did underpin an empire in the classic sense, one that radiated out from Moscow and by 1970s embraced a good portion of the globe. His work also shows, though, that its rulers were always at war among themselves about what Marxism meant for empire-building.
Zubok's new history, relying on newly open Soviet archives, should bury any lingering notions that the "Cold War" was forced on the Soviet Union by an expansionist and recalcitrant America. From 1945, Stalin moved to claim parts of Turkey (for Soviet Armenia), Northern Iran, and the Sakhalin Islands, not to mention Germany and all of Eastern Europe. He did know tactical retreats however. He withdrew from Manchuria only because he falsely assumed the Chinese communists to whom he gifted it would be under his thumb. He gave up fighting for Greece because he thought it provided little strategic value. Despite future premiers' attempts to convince the West of their good intentions, they all held to a fundamental "revolutionary-imperial paradigm" as Zubok calls it, that demanded expansion. Only Gorbachev, who believed that socialism could win abroad purely by the power of its ideas, dissented from this consensus. Thus, as Zubok said, the empire under Gorbachev committed suicide by failing to use force to sustain itself. Ideas brought the empire about, and also brought about its downfall.
I give this book only 3 stars because it covers a fascinating topic, the Cold War, and tells it from the side of the Soviets, which shows throughout the book that Americans and the United States government stupidly attributed devious motives to the USSR when they weren't actually there, and vice versa. It turns out the Cold War could've been ended, like, 6 different times if the leaders had just been frank with each other or had shared a little faith, but oh well.
However, the writing itself could be a little hard to follow, particularly towards the beginning. Several times I had to go back and re-read a paragraph or a page to make sense of it. Also, the vast majority of topics in the book are merely glossed over, because, as the author writes, they are "beyond the scope" of this book. That's all well and good, but it would've been helpful to have a bit more information at some points. The author seems to do best when he can connect the history of the Cold War to a specific character, such as Stalin, Kruschev, and Gorbachev. The rest of the book is a little disconnected, and left me searching for more information on my own.
A must read for anyone interested in the history of the Soviet empire and its eventual (almost bloodless) fall under Gorbachev. The author presents an inside look at the Soviet side of events and some very interesting re-evaluations of the various leaders (from a Russian perspective). For example, the fact that Brezhnev was a much more grounded and sensible operator than his late drug-addled senile years would imply; that Gorbachev was a wooly idealist who was unfortunately or fortunately almost hopelessly inept at actually running things; that Bush senior was a competent executor of American interests; that Reagan's inner peacemaker/decent human being were far more important in bringing down the Soviet Union than his SDI or military buildup (which the author regards as almost incidental and of little significance in events); that money simply running out had a lot to do with the fall of the Soviet empire in East Europe; that failed ideology led to cynicism and a simultaneous naïve optimism about social democracy in the 1960s generation, and so on. The author has a Russo-centric view and for most Russians the fact that the Soviet experiment failed is not enough reason to accept that the Russian empire (which predated and undergirded the Soviet experiment) and the vast, ambitious and (sometimes at great cost and with great cruelty) expansion of the Russian peoples across Eurasia should also be setback THIS far as a result of that failure. Outsiders may wish to take a more forgiving view of Gorbachev, who managed to let all this happen without bloodshed. Anyway, well worth reading. IN fact, a must read if you are interested in those times and those events.
Имам един списък с книги, които ми се иска да издам някой ден, но за момента не мога по различни причини. “Провалената империя: Съветският съюз от Сталин до Горбачов” на Владислав Зубок бе едно от заглавията в списъка и преди месец с удоволствие я изтрих, след като “Емас” ме изненадаха много приятно с пускането ѝ за панаира на книгата. Изчаках да мине малко данданията около празниците и се зачетох. Книгата е интересна, макар и малко телеграфно написана, а за мое съжаление не бяха много новите неща, които научих. Трябва обаче да се има предвид, че в тази област съм чел доста и това не е мерило – най-малкото “Съвременността. Светът от 20-те до 90-те ” на Пол Джонсън, “Студената война. Нова история” на Джон Луис Гадис, “Стремеж към глобализъм: Американската външна политика” на Стивън Амбруоз, “Седемте вождове” на Дмитрий Волкогонов , пък и си спомням няколко по-колоритни като “Кой и как взриви СССР” на Феликс Горелик и “Предаденият социализъм” на Роджър Киърън и Томас Кени, мемоарите на съветския посланик в САЩ Анатолий Добринин – “Строго секретно” и много други. С две думи – трудно се изненадвам :)
This is a very well written book (that is, good writing, good research, good narrative). As it's written from the Soviet leadership's perspective, I recommend reading it alongside, or after having read other Cold War books, to compare and contrast the perspectives of the two sides. It was most interesting to see how such leaders as Krushchev acted the way they did in order to maintain their leadership within the very often factious Kremlin circle.
I recommend Kissinger's Diplomacy because Kissinger focuses on the perspectives and debates within the leadership circle of the Western allies, thus making it an excellent counterpoint to Zubok's book.
Most people will probably downgrade their opinion of Kruschev and upgrade their opinion of Breznev after reading this analysis of the Soviet attempts to first consolidate their Yalta gains, then (unwisely) attempt to expand elsewhere in unsustainable directions before collapsing under unsustainable defense spending and a lack of general societal consensus.
I think the author gives America just a bit too much of a pass on the initial screw ups that led to the Cold War, though in general I find attempts to place blame on either country a bit odd as we are clearly talking about systemic power pole processes endemic to major powers throughout all of history.
Zubok's Failed Empire finds itself in a fine company of similar works, with no less than two similar works immediately springing to mind, Comrades and The End of the Cold War by the esteemed Robert Service accounting for a similar timeline and events. However, Zubok's work provides insight and analysis not to be found in other works, making it a standout title. The book follows a chronological account of the post WWII USSR and its satellite states and allies in Eastern Europe, the Far East and various outposts in the developing world, along with the dynamics within society. While it may appear like a chronological account, great attention is given to the decision making process, motivations and factors within each decision or misadventure by the Soviet elite. The work is most definitely not a journalistic piece, with analysis of personalities and motivations throughout the book. A key strength is the penultimate chapter detailing Gorbachev's tenure and the ultimately unsuccessful attempts to reform the USSR leading to its eventual collapse. Zubok breaks with the standard narrative of presenting Gorbachev as a hapless victim of History, and provides analysis that postulates Gorbachev's approach to be ultimately naïve, as hoc and ultimately contradictory. Perhaps not a book for diehard defenders of Soviet communism as one is left with little hope that the system could have been saved by the most adept reformer, however one is given a sense of gratitude in the epilogue that force was not used in an attempt to hold the Union together. A more balanced and analytical approach when compared with other works out there, with considerable scholarship not found elsewhere. Perhaps the best overall comprehensive book I have read on the Cold War, strongly recommended for anyone with an interest in modern Russia or International Relations.
I'm going to re-read this. I read it maybe 6 years ago and don't remember a single thing but apparently it was good scholarship and I just didn't notice. Haha
no clue why I’m marking this book as read - just was curious of whether it was on here or not. used this book for my history coursework on the Cold War and the fall of the USSR and this was BY FAR the most helpful interpretation I used so thank u bestie Zubok
This is the second book I picked up on the Soviet / Russia topic and I am not sure what really motivated me.
I guess I was interested in knowing why a great super power ultimately crumbled over the years and I thought that this would make a perfect read. However I soon lost the plot.
Dont get me wrong the book covers the topic in extensive and excrcuiating details; however is set in a thick academic context which makes it unsuitable to a casual reader like me. Looking back it seems that some prior knowledge of the Soviet history would have been helpful in understanding the deep academic research and interpretations. Finally in the audio version the last 45 odd minutes is an epilogue which covers summarizes the entire book for a casual reader. This too hasnt been easy and I am planning to go over this last few minutes several time to get some value out of the time invested.
Overall I would recommend that you pick up this book if you have a genuine interest and some background.
I’d read Zubok’s “Collapse” and enjoyed it. I knew from the title that I wasn’t going to agree with a lot of his takes, but anyone who talks about “Soviet imperialism” but completely writes off the notion of American imperialism is not someone who’s political opinions should be taken seriously. Thought this might get better during the Krushchev years but I was wrong. Blaming a Georgian national for “Russifying the bureaucracy” doesn’t track. Also the USSR gave loans to allies (which reads as imperial subjects, given the writer’s opinion) at less than half the interest rates that western countries did, not to mention the loans were written off or forgiven at significantly higher rates than their capitalist adversaries. This doesn’t exactly scream economic subjugation to me.
Interessant i molt correcte llibre sobre la guerra freda des de la perspectiva soviètica. La perspectiva de l'autor és curiosa, ja que no pot amagar les seves simpaties pel comunisme, de fet, Jhruschov i Gorbatxov són els personatges que surten més mal parats, precisament els dirigents que van fer una política més allunyada de l'estalinisme, que no rep aquí les crítiques que mereixeria. En tot cas, treball ben elaborat, moltes hores de recerca i interessant aproximació al punt de vista del perdedor de la Guerra Freda.
Very well researched, but the writing style is quite dull. There was no effort to keep the reader interested. There was also no continuity - I think a consistent flowing narrative should be part of every book author's vision. Coincidentally I read a New Yorker article on a similar theme just today (http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics...), and probably retained more information from the article than from this entire book. This book cries out for collaboration - Zubok for the research and a real writer for putting it in print.
It was really nice to read a narrative about the USSR that didn’t have an extreme Western bias. It’s a bit long, but it had to cover a whole lot of ground. I can’t wait to read it again & really dive into certain sections.
A good book covering the cold war period from the Soviet side of things, a rather less than common perspective. It is written in quite a dry style, but provides plenty of detail, and is particular good in relation to the Khrushchev and Gorbachev eras.
It was okay. The idea that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire" isn't very convincing, though I did find the personal histories of the Soviet leaders fascinating.
Wow. What a piece of work. This is probably one of my top favorite books I've read on Russia. Such detail, such insight. I'm impressed. I learned so much!!
p136 - "Yet Mao could never forgive Khrushchev for his secret speech denouncing Stalin without consulting the Chinese. He believed that de-Stalinization was a grave error, perhaps even a challenge to his own authority. And Khrushchev's vision of nuclear bipolarity became anathema for Mao, because it relegated China to a secondary position in the pecking order of Great Powers. Mao's hidden animosity became public when the Soviet military asked Beijing to build joint bases for the Soviet navy and submarine fleet in the Pacific. Mao angrily rejected the proposal. On July 31, 1958, Krushchev in deep secrecy flew to Beijing with the aim of soothing the PRC leader. Instead he was subjected to a barrage of insults and humiliating treatment by the host. He was also shocked tp discover a chasm opening between his vision of the nuclear age and Mao's ambitions. Mao did to Khrushchev what Stalin had done to the Americans after Hiroshima: he defied the nuclear factor altogether by describing it as "paper Tiger".
p139 - "Khrushchev.... He wrote that he enjoyed cursing capitalists and imperialists and yet counted every hour he was forced to stay in this wretched capitalist country, and in New York, this lair of the Golden Devil"
p148 - "In a cable written on the night of October 26-27, Fidel Castro advised the Soviet leader to launch a preemptive nuclear attach in case an american invasion or strike on soviet missiles was imminent. At a conference in Havana in 1992, Castro explained his cable as an attempt to prevent a repetittion of the events of the Second World War. When the nazi's had caught the soviets by surprise. Khrushchev however was aghast. Castro had failed to understand the logic of his nuclear brinkmanship."
"Brezhnev once said charm can take you a long way in politics"
p201 - "to every historians despair, Brezhnev recorded only routine and banal events of his private life. One of Brezhnev's war buddies observed Leonid will never grow above his head. Brezhnev was in constant need of psychological support. He complained to his foreign policy assistant that he had never dealt with foreign policy and knew nothing about it."
p222 - "the perception of friendship with the U.s president (nixon) elevated Brezhnev way above his colleagues and rivals, to the historic place that only Stalin had reached before. Detente became Brezzhnev's personal project and he intended to keep it going."
p314 - "being too late, reacting too slowly to events was one of the most characteristic traits of Gorbachev's policies".
One of the leading scholars of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, Zubok has written a thorough and comprehensive work on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The literature on the US’ role in the Cold War is aplenty but there is far fewer literature on the Soviet Union in the Cold War and it shows in how little people know about the workings of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, understanding the USSR’s perspective is just as crucial as understanding the US perspective. Leaders often chart their own strategies and foreign policies but these don’t exist in a vacuum and they need to respond to the other side’s actions as well. Hence, understanding both superpowers’ strategies is crucial. (That being said, one should have a good grasp of Soviet and Cold War history before picking up this book).
While foreign policy and the Cold War was important for American politics, Zubok highlights that foreign policy and the Cold War was an existential issue of security for the USSR, considering the Soviet Union’s geographical land connections to Europe and the threat of encirclement (these issues are valid if one looks at the NATO encirclement of Russia today.) One thing that Zubok could have made clearer about the existential threat to the USSR is that the USSR was an extremely young nation, just decades old at the start of the Cold War, and the nature of its state was unique, exceptional and formed as an experiment. It ran up against another relatively young superpower (the US was only less than 200 years old, much younger than the European empires.) Zubok brings up the idea of ideology as the key component behind the rivalry behind the Cold War but he could have made it clearer that both these young superpowers believed in the exceptionalism of their nations and ideologies, leading to the conflict that dominated the second-half of the 20th century.
Another key contribution that Zubok makes is the role of the Soviet leaders throughout the Cold War. In an undemocratic society, where its leaders last much longer than the US, people have remembered Soviet history by its leaders, like the Stalin era or the Brezhnev era. One may assume that these leaders hold a monopoly of power but the leaders needed to navigate factional politics within the party and the state, building consensus among their peers, if they were to carry out their policies.
One point to note is that Zubok is particularly harsh in his criticism of Gorbachev as a leader of the USSR. While Zubok is correct in portaying Gorbachev as the key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union, he is particularly critical in Gorbachev’s leadership style. I haven’t read Zubok’s later work Collapse on the end of the USSR but its pique enough curiosity to read about it
How I came to this book: Recommended by my Fiancée, my resident Russia expert, after we spotted it on the bookshelf at her cousin’s house.
Zubok does a great job of presenting history as the result of people’s actions in a way that still integrates the broader ideological forces at play. This book takes the reader through the Cold War era and examines the contributions of each successive leader of the USSR to Soviet foreign policy. He paints vivid portraits of each leader which help explain the major events during their time in office. This approach shows the importance of individual decision makers and emphasizes that history was not predetermined. On its own the prologue is fascinating and insightful, a must read today even though it is already out of date just because it puts the current war in Ukraine into context. If there is an overarching thesis it seems to be that the USSR aspired to be an empire more than it ever was, and strategic realities undercut this ambition, but this book is more about details and nuances than any singular argument.
Read this book: for an account of the Cold War decisions made by Soviet leadership through the lens of their personal idiosyncrasies, perceptions, and beliefs.
Don’t read this book: for an intro for this period of history (much knowledge is assumed and facts glossed over) or for a grand sweeping theory of why the USSR collapsed.
Should you read this book? If the topic interests you, sure, it's a pretty solid survey though I don't feel it has much rereading value. Do keep in mind that this is a lot more "a history of Soviet grand strategy in the cold war" rather than a diplomatic history of the USSR though the later is certainly present. I feel as though it should have been more present. The author clearly enjoyed himself plenty talking about the clashes between Molotov and Khrushchev as well as the very emotional decision making involved in starting the Afghan war. The book's greatest strength for me is the fair coverage for Brezhnev. A lot of myths about him are dispelled though the author restrains himself from dipping into the hagiographic literature for Brezhnev that believe it or not, actually exists. One more thing, there's a really bizarre introduction to the book where the author yaps on about post-soviet Russia that's somewhat dated at this point. He doesn't really try to connect it to the rest of the text, he just kind of goes on for a considerable amount of pages and then suddenly "Oh yeah, ww2 was a really painful experience for the Soviets."
Quite a good book, though a strange mix of comprehensiveness in some places and brevity in others. The book is not particularly short (about 340 pages of prose) and the author is drawing on serious academic work and resources. He makes a point to strongly focus on the personal views and impacts that individual leaders had on the course of the Cold War, and this really comes at the exclusion of serious treatment about the specific economic conditions that he admits were vital in shaping the course of the period. He does mention it sometimes, but basically only in mentioning how inefficient Soviet economic systems were as well as the impact of oil prices. I would've hoped for a little more in depth. Similarly there is very little attention paid to the actual domestic events of the USSR's last years. I think more on this would have been warranted for a book specifically about the Soviet perspective. Overall however, it's a very good read on the Soviet viewpoint that is welcome in a field where the focus on America and the West is so deeply ingrained.
至於本書,當初吸引我的是它的封面設計,買回家放了幾年,之前看了HBO拍的車諾比電視劇後,才又想到,翻出來閱讀。弗拉季斯拉夫‧祖博克(Vladislav M. Zubok) 的這本《失敗的帝國》,把重心放在受到意識形態左右與領導人個性影響的外交政策對國家命運走向的討論上。作者也自陳對財政經濟方面的欠缺是本書的不足,就權當是一個角度來看。
"A Failed Empire" is a valuable addition to our understanding of Soviet history and the complexities of state collapse. The book is solid in exploring the internal contradictions and external pressures that undermined the Soviet system. Zubok draws upon recently declassified Politburo records, ciphered telegrams, diaries, and taped conversations to offer a fresh and nuanced understanding of the Cold War. The book expertly analyzes economic stagnation, political paralysis, national conflicts, and ideological fatigue as key internal challenges that weakened the legitimacy and coherence of the Soviet state and provide a more balanced account of the Cold War. It is a must-read for anyone interested in gaining insight into the Soviet perspective during this pivotal era. Review AI-assisted.