Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007

by Antonio Giustozzi

Since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, the Bush administration has celebrated the imminent demise of the Taliban, with claims of a "moral and psychological defeat" playing a prominent role in the presidential elections of 2004. Some commentators suggested that "reconstruction and development" had won over the Afghan population, despite widespread criticism of the meager distribution of aid and failed attempts at "nation building," not to mention the infamous corruption of Kabul's power-hoarding elites. In March 2006, both Afghan and American officials continued to assert that "the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles." Unfortunately that theory would soon collapse beneath the weight of a series of particularly ferocious clashes, causing the mood in the American media to turn from one of optimism to one of defeatism and impending catastrophe. Suddenly faced with a very sophisticated and creative form of guerilla warfare, the West found itself at a loss to fight an insurgency that bore little resemblance to its former enemy. In the first book ever to be published on the neo-Taliban, Antonio Giustozzi provocatively argues that the appearance of the neo-Taliban should in no way have been a surprise. Beginning in 2003, a growing body of evidence began to surface that cast doubt on the official interpretation of the conflict. With the West cutting corners to maintain peace within the country, which included tolerating Afghanistan's burgeoning opium trade, the Taliban was able to regroup and grow in strength, weapons, and recruits. Giustozzi's book poses a bold challenge to contemporary accounts of the invasion and its aftermath and is an important investigation into the rise and dangerous future of the neo-Taliban.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Terrorism, Islam, Nonfiction, Middle East

224 pages, Hardcover

First published October 26, 2007

Reviews

[Diane · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provides an in-depth study of the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan since 2002. The focus is on explaining how the Taliban were able to regroup after their initial defeat. The author studies the Taliban's ideology and sources of support, but concentrates on the weakness of the Afghan government and its inability to control territory outside the capital.

[Will James]

Understanding the war in Afghanistan is often difficult, and the majority of objective analysis often focuses (with good reason) on the policies and personalities of Western actors (the Bush or Obama Administrations, NATO, European governments etc.) However, viewing the war from the Afghan perspective is less common. Knowledge of Afghan society - not least the methods, motivations, strategies and tactics of the Taliban - stems mainly from journalists inside the country, who face great difficulties in providing a rounded account of the conflict.



That is why Antonio Giustozzi's 'Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop' is such a refreshing read. Taking a strictly academic approach to what he calls the 'Neo-Taliban' he methodically and patiently explains the various developments in what is anything but a static organisation. The evolution of the Neo-Taliban since the swift collapse of their regime in 2001-2 into the lethal insurgency we see today took a great deal of effort, mistakes on the part of the Afghan government and the US-led coalition, and internal developments within the Taliban itself, both ideologically and practically.



The only problem I can find with Giustozzi's book is that it was written for publication in 2007, and the events since then may have superseded some of his arguments, recommendations and analysis since then. But if you want to get an accurate picture of how we got to where we are today in Afghanistan, then starting by reading this book wouldn't be a bad mistake.

[Corto · Rating 5 out of 5]

Concise, well sourced and dense with facts, this is a very good nuts-and-bolts analysis of the war in Afghanistan from 2001-2007. Of special interest is the section analyzing how the Taliban regrouped after the American invasion and implemented their insurgency. This book is very much deeply in the weeds and not light reading. If you want a good, short, big-picture look at the war from '01 to '07, get this from your library and read the 9 page conclusion.

[Philip · Rating 3 out of 5]

A useful and candid look at the emergence of the neo-Taliban in the pre David Petraeus counter-insurgency era. Confusion and a lack of common strategy within NATO and US commanders re-fighting the Tet Offensive.... Nothing surprising about that! Weak on the symbiosis with Pakistan Islamist revival but strong on the kleptocracy forming around Karzai.

[Kellyn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is efficient in its descriptions of the Taliban's organizational structure and development from 2002 to 2007. The laptop part of the title is a bit misleading, as I don't think that word appeared elsewhere in the book. The closest relation to laptops in this book is the discussion of Taliban propaganda, but that comprised maybe two pages. All in all, good book, misleading title.

[Grahambo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well researched, but dull. Good info

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good, but dense. He doesn't really come to any conclusions, its more just a compilation of information rather than an argument.

[Sues57 Schroeder]

I need to read this again, slowly and carefully.