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The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05
The Russo-Japanese War was fought in the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Straits of Tsushima that divide Japan from Korea, and in the mountains of Manchuria, borrowed without permission from China. It was the first war to be fought with modern weapons.
The Japanese had fought the Chinese at sea in 1894 and had gained a foothold in Manchuria by taking control of Port Authur. In 1895, however, Japan was forced to abandon its claims by the Russian fleet's presence in the Straits of Tsushima. Tsar Nicholas had obtained a window to the East for his empire and Japan had been humiliated. Tensions between the two countries would rise inexorably over the next decade.
Around the world, no one doubted that little Japan would be no match for the mighty armies of Tsar Nicholas II. Yet Russia was in an advanced state of decay, the government corrupt and its troops inept and demoralized. Japan, meanwhile, was emerging from centuries of feudal isolation and becoming an industrial power, led by zealous nationalist warlords keen to lead the Orient to victory over the oppressive West. From the opening surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Authur in 1904, the Japanese out-fought and out-thought the Russians.
This is a definitive account of one of the pivotal conflicts of the twentieth century whose impact was felt around the world.
The Japanese had fought the Chinese at sea in 1894 and had gained a foothold in Manchuria by taking control of Port Authur. In 1895, however, Japan was forced to abandon its claims by the Russian fleet's presence in the Straits of Tsushima. Tsar Nicholas had obtained a window to the East for his empire and Japan had been humiliated. Tensions between the two countries would rise inexorably over the next decade.
Around the world, no one doubted that little Japan would be no match for the mighty armies of Tsar Nicholas II. Yet Russia was in an advanced state of decay, the government corrupt and its troops inept and demoralized. Japan, meanwhile, was emerging from centuries of feudal isolation and becoming an industrial power, led by zealous nationalist warlords keen to lead the Orient to victory over the oppressive West. From the opening surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Authur in 1904, the Japanese out-fought and out-thought the Russians.
This is a definitive account of one of the pivotal conflicts of the twentieth century whose impact was felt around the world.
628 pages, Paperback
First published July 1, 1974
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
April 20, 2025
Denis and Peggy Warner's The Tide at Sunrise is the definitive account of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), where Japan stunned the world by defeating Imperial Russia's massive military and asserting its supremacy in East Asia. The Warners place the conflict firmly in a larger context of imperialism in Asia, which reduced China to an enfeebled vassal state and left various Western powers scrambling for territory and influence. Japan, only recently "opened" to the world and united under Emperor Meiji, sought its place in the sun by defeating China, helping suppress the Boxer Rebellion and reducing Korea to a vassal state, bringing its expansion into conflict with Tsar Nicholas, who saw Manchuria as his own domain. Far from a minor skirmish, the Warners demonstrate that the war was a massive clash of empires, with some of the largest battles in history (the decisive Battle of Mukden might have been the largest, in terms of men engaged, prior to World War I) across China, Korea and Siberia. The locus of fighting came at Port Arthur, ineptly defended by General Stoessel (who quarreled with subordinates and defied orders from superiors) but equally ineptly assaulted by General Nogi, whose profligate frontal assaults against entrenched machine guns set a precedent for the boneheaded generalship of the Great War. Nonetheless, the better-organized and disciplined Japanese easily prevailed in set-piece battles, while their navy dealt the Russian fleet a series of humiliating blows. The war climaxed on land in Mukden, where a large Russian army was routed by Prince Oyama (Japan's finest general of the conflict), and at sea in the Tsushima Straits, where a ramshackle Russian Baltic Fleet, having endured a harrowing round-the-world voyage, was annihilated by Admiral Togo. The Warners expertly chronicle both military and political impacts: Japan could not longer be considered a second-rate power after vanquishing the Tsar, but their poor performance at the peace conference (where the Tsar's minister Count Witte outmaneuvered them) left their leaders resentful and eager for further conquest, while other powers grew suspicious and resentful of their ambitions. And Russia, after being humiliated by an Asian nation they'd dismissed as "monkeys," experienced its first burst of revolutionary activity that culminated, a decade later, in Red October and the murder of the Romanovs. A remarkable book about a conflict often relegated to the margins in the West, but immeasurably important in Asia and the Pacific.
August 4, 2024
I would think this is the definitive account of the conflict between Russia and Japan, fought over Korea and northern China from 1904 to 1905.It is certainly well-written and well-researched. It's a story of clashing imperialisms at a time when empires were being built around the world, with the British Empire the biggest of them all ( and the United States having gained Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, to become one of the newer members of the club ).
The authors show the development of the Russian Empire toward the East putting them on a collision course with an expanding Japanese Empire. The authors show how Japan emerged from feudalism to rapidly industrialize in a fifty-year period. Japan wanted to dominate the Korean Peninsula and gain greater influence in China and they saw Russia as a growing threat to their ambitions. On the other hand, Russia did not see the Japanese as a real threat and felt they could be easily pushed aside, Russia's first major mistake. In the war that followed, the Japanese proved to be better organized, supplied, and, generally, better led, and very importantly, the Japanese soldiers were much better motivated. Japan amazed the world with a series of victories over its bigger and more powerful enemy.
Japan capped its victories with a stunning victory at sea with the Japanese fleet under Togo crushing the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima, perhaps the most complete major naval victory in history. However, Japan had stretched itself to the limit of its resources to achieve its victories, while Russia was still mobilizing its vast manpower reserves and sending reinforcements via the Trans-Siberian Railway to the front in northern China ( Manchuria). But the Tsar had troubles, too, as revolution was brewing at home, with outright rebellion in occupied Poland.
It was in the interests of both empires to negotiate a peace, and I thought this was the most interesting part of the book, as President Theodore Roosevelt mediated between Japan and Russia, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
An amazing period of history which only pointed the way to even greater conflicts---Japan becoming set on a course of imperialism which would finally lead to war with the United States and Russia all too soon to go to war in Europe and undergo revolution, civil war, and the rise of Communism....
The authors show the development of the Russian Empire toward the East putting them on a collision course with an expanding Japanese Empire. The authors show how Japan emerged from feudalism to rapidly industrialize in a fifty-year period. Japan wanted to dominate the Korean Peninsula and gain greater influence in China and they saw Russia as a growing threat to their ambitions. On the other hand, Russia did not see the Japanese as a real threat and felt they could be easily pushed aside, Russia's first major mistake. In the war that followed, the Japanese proved to be better organized, supplied, and, generally, better led, and very importantly, the Japanese soldiers were much better motivated. Japan amazed the world with a series of victories over its bigger and more powerful enemy.
Japan capped its victories with a stunning victory at sea with the Japanese fleet under Togo crushing the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima, perhaps the most complete major naval victory in history. However, Japan had stretched itself to the limit of its resources to achieve its victories, while Russia was still mobilizing its vast manpower reserves and sending reinforcements via the Trans-Siberian Railway to the front in northern China ( Manchuria). But the Tsar had troubles, too, as revolution was brewing at home, with outright rebellion in occupied Poland.
It was in the interests of both empires to negotiate a peace, and I thought this was the most interesting part of the book, as President Theodore Roosevelt mediated between Japan and Russia, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
An amazing period of history which only pointed the way to even greater conflicts---Japan becoming set on a course of imperialism which would finally lead to war with the United States and Russia all too soon to go to war in Europe and undergo revolution, civil war, and the rise of Communism....
June 24, 2020
This is an exceptionally well written, very detailed, book on a war that set the stage for the entirety of the 20th century.
The Russo-Japanese War was the point of terminal decline for the Russian Empire. Before the war, Russia was expanding, and while she lagged behind the rest of the European Powers in terms of technology and industrial capacity, she seemed to be thriving. Despite some definite signs of growing internal fissures, Russia was expanding into the Asian-Pacific region, and was spreading her culture into that part of the world.
Defeat at the hands of the Japanese, however, set St. Petersburg down the road towards blood soaked annihilation and cultural genocide at the hands of the Bolsheviks.
It's not all that far fetched to say that, without defeat in this war, there may have never been a Russian Civil War, as Russia may have been too focused on the East to stand as Serbia's backer against Vienna-Budapest. What blew up into a global conflagration, with Russian involvement, could have remained at most a Balkan conflict.
Without Russian involvement in the Great War, her Army wouldn't have been routinely thrashed at the hands of the Germans, the Abwehr might never have inserted Lenin back into St. Petersburg as an agent provacoteuer, there might never have been the 1917 Revolution following military defeat at the hands of Imperial Germany.
There may never have been the Russian Civil War, and the formation of the Soviet Union.
There may never have been the Counterrevolution of the National Socialist Party in Germany, no WW2, no Cold War. The list goes on.
The Russo-Japanese War defined the 20th Century, and so much of what happened in that awful century, centred on and revolved around Russia.
This book delves deep into the formulation of this avoidable war. Long chapters detail the Russian turn to the east, the Japanese expansions, the turmoil in Korea that saw the Qing, the Russians, and the Japanese all vie for hegemony of the Korean peninsula. And especially it looks at the Russian colonial presence in Manchuria, specifically the Russian colony at Port Arthur.
To be honest, the authors seemed to be fairly critical of pre-Soviet Russian culture. Snide comments on the militaries and the Czar's blind faith in the Orthodox Church to protect them in the face of bad decision making (as an Orthodox Christian myself, yes, I can attest that this is a phenomenon still at play in the Church, and it is absolutely dangerous in a leader of a government or military organization; yes, have faith, but don't be weak or a fool) often times reads as mockery of antebellum Russian culture and society.
That said, Czar Nicholas II does come in for some valid criticism. As the Great War and subsequent Revolution would prove, he was a poor leader.
Saint Nicholas II was, sadly, weak, indecisive, and unlearned in the affairs of strategy, military history, or of genuine leadership. All of these traits were fully on display in the lead up to the Russo-Japanese War. Nicholas's weakness as a leader, allowed him to be strung along by horrendous advisors, who often thought of their own aggrandizement rather than their Empire's.
By contrast, while the Japanese leadership was more contentious (as the 1920's would fully bear out), they were far more decisive, and far better able to cohere to a coherent strategic policy, and once it blew up into open conflict, show aggressive, unflinching action in the face of uncertainty to turn doubt into victory.
In terms of narrating the war itself, the book is far better at narrating the Naval aspect of the war as opposed to the ground fighting. The Naval actions outside Port Arthur, the Yellow Sea, and of course the famous clash at Tsushima are far better written than the battles of Liaoyang, Port Arthur, or Mukden. If the book lacks tactical details for the huge land battles, it makes up for it with astute analysis.
The Russians, simply put, fought this war incredibly poorly.
If individual units and commanders did exceptionally well on the battlefield, their efforts and sacrifices were nulled and voided by incompetent leadership at the Army level. At the Battle of Liaoyang, for example, any kind of offensive spirit on the part of General Kuropatkin would have spelt doom for the Japanese.
Instead, as was so often the case in this conflict, the Russians were passive, allowing outnumbered Japanese forces, willing to show aggression and absorb losses to masque their overall weaknesses, to take the initiative and dictate the terms of battle.
More than once, what should have been a clear cut Russian success, turned into a rout. If Russian leadership was passive, weak, and ineffective, from the Czar on down, Japanese leadership was aggressive to a fault.
Japanese losses were horrendous in their victories. Although they ultimately triumphed, this penchant for near suicidal bravery in the face of fixed defenses would, ultimately, infect the overall military culture of Japan, leading to disastrous results in the second half of WW2.
The book also showcases how at one and the same time, the Japanese managed to control world opinion and the perceptions of the war as it unfolded in their favor, but also how naive they were in the face of the Great Power politicking during the peace negotiations.
Japan's ultimate strategic goals were denied by foreign interference in the peace talks. And this caused the Japanese to learn all the wrong lessons, and to seek brute force as the main arbiter of state to state differences, as well as the means by which to achieve advantage.
And that would ultimately lead to the events of WW2 in Asia.
All in all this is an excellent book on a largely forgotten conflict that is key to understanding the unfolding of the 20th century.
Very highly recommended.
The Russo-Japanese War was the point of terminal decline for the Russian Empire. Before the war, Russia was expanding, and while she lagged behind the rest of the European Powers in terms of technology and industrial capacity, she seemed to be thriving. Despite some definite signs of growing internal fissures, Russia was expanding into the Asian-Pacific region, and was spreading her culture into that part of the world.
Defeat at the hands of the Japanese, however, set St. Petersburg down the road towards blood soaked annihilation and cultural genocide at the hands of the Bolsheviks.
It's not all that far fetched to say that, without defeat in this war, there may have never been a Russian Civil War, as Russia may have been too focused on the East to stand as Serbia's backer against Vienna-Budapest. What blew up into a global conflagration, with Russian involvement, could have remained at most a Balkan conflict.
Without Russian involvement in the Great War, her Army wouldn't have been routinely thrashed at the hands of the Germans, the Abwehr might never have inserted Lenin back into St. Petersburg as an agent provacoteuer, there might never have been the 1917 Revolution following military defeat at the hands of Imperial Germany.
There may never have been the Russian Civil War, and the formation of the Soviet Union.
There may never have been the Counterrevolution of the National Socialist Party in Germany, no WW2, no Cold War. The list goes on.
The Russo-Japanese War defined the 20th Century, and so much of what happened in that awful century, centred on and revolved around Russia.
This book delves deep into the formulation of this avoidable war. Long chapters detail the Russian turn to the east, the Japanese expansions, the turmoil in Korea that saw the Qing, the Russians, and the Japanese all vie for hegemony of the Korean peninsula. And especially it looks at the Russian colonial presence in Manchuria, specifically the Russian colony at Port Arthur.
To be honest, the authors seemed to be fairly critical of pre-Soviet Russian culture. Snide comments on the militaries and the Czar's blind faith in the Orthodox Church to protect them in the face of bad decision making (as an Orthodox Christian myself, yes, I can attest that this is a phenomenon still at play in the Church, and it is absolutely dangerous in a leader of a government or military organization; yes, have faith, but don't be weak or a fool) often times reads as mockery of antebellum Russian culture and society.
That said, Czar Nicholas II does come in for some valid criticism. As the Great War and subsequent Revolution would prove, he was a poor leader.
Saint Nicholas II was, sadly, weak, indecisive, and unlearned in the affairs of strategy, military history, or of genuine leadership. All of these traits were fully on display in the lead up to the Russo-Japanese War. Nicholas's weakness as a leader, allowed him to be strung along by horrendous advisors, who often thought of their own aggrandizement rather than their Empire's.
By contrast, while the Japanese leadership was more contentious (as the 1920's would fully bear out), they were far more decisive, and far better able to cohere to a coherent strategic policy, and once it blew up into open conflict, show aggressive, unflinching action in the face of uncertainty to turn doubt into victory.
In terms of narrating the war itself, the book is far better at narrating the Naval aspect of the war as opposed to the ground fighting. The Naval actions outside Port Arthur, the Yellow Sea, and of course the famous clash at Tsushima are far better written than the battles of Liaoyang, Port Arthur, or Mukden. If the book lacks tactical details for the huge land battles, it makes up for it with astute analysis.
The Russians, simply put, fought this war incredibly poorly.
If individual units and commanders did exceptionally well on the battlefield, their efforts and sacrifices were nulled and voided by incompetent leadership at the Army level. At the Battle of Liaoyang, for example, any kind of offensive spirit on the part of General Kuropatkin would have spelt doom for the Japanese.
Instead, as was so often the case in this conflict, the Russians were passive, allowing outnumbered Japanese forces, willing to show aggression and absorb losses to masque their overall weaknesses, to take the initiative and dictate the terms of battle.
More than once, what should have been a clear cut Russian success, turned into a rout. If Russian leadership was passive, weak, and ineffective, from the Czar on down, Japanese leadership was aggressive to a fault.
Japanese losses were horrendous in their victories. Although they ultimately triumphed, this penchant for near suicidal bravery in the face of fixed defenses would, ultimately, infect the overall military culture of Japan, leading to disastrous results in the second half of WW2.
The book also showcases how at one and the same time, the Japanese managed to control world opinion and the perceptions of the war as it unfolded in their favor, but also how naive they were in the face of the Great Power politicking during the peace negotiations.
Japan's ultimate strategic goals were denied by foreign interference in the peace talks. And this caused the Japanese to learn all the wrong lessons, and to seek brute force as the main arbiter of state to state differences, as well as the means by which to achieve advantage.
And that would ultimately lead to the events of WW2 in Asia.
All in all this is an excellent book on a largely forgotten conflict that is key to understanding the unfolding of the 20th century.
Very highly recommended.
June 22, 2017
This book encompasses more than its title suggests. In fact, the first hundred to two hundred pages are spent establishing the history that brought the war about, and the last chapter is spent speculating on the decades thereafter.
So, what actually is the book, then? I would call it something of a prelude to World War One, something of a commentary on borderline theocratic nationalism, and a study on what happens when two nations with very similar military doctrine go to war.
There are very few examples of cunning or tactical genius to be seen in the Russo-Japanese War. Russia's command structure was incompetent and timid while simultaneously overemphasizing courage and heroics, and the only officers with any sense were called cowards for their lack of reliance on miraculous heroics.
Port Arthur itself, the centerpiece around which the war was fought- was a veritable fortress that could have been held indefinitely by anyone who took advantage of the natural and man-made defenses that surrounded it. However, instead of spending the war's preceding years building Port Arthur into the stronghold it could have been, Russia spent its time shipping alcohol across the trans-siberian railway and stationing there what were basically conscripts while Japan was engaging in gunboat-diplomacy with Korea, intending to use Inchon as a staging ground for their troop landings.
That isn't to say the Japanese were much better. The suicidal Nogi, general of the Japanese Third Army- used brute force, or "human bullets" as they called it, as his go-to strategy. He was known even in Japan as an ineffective officer, as displayed by his previous exploits in the Sino-Japanese war. He himself did not want to take command of the Third Army, and after the war he killed himself out of shame.
However, if there was a strategically minded individual among the Japanese command, it was Admiral Togo, who distinguished himself by launching "the first Pearl Harbor," in which Japanese torpedo boats and destroyers attacked the moored Russian fleet at Port Arthur. Partially by his command and partially by the Russians' badly trained, badly led Navy, the Japanese fleet dominated the seas and crippled Russia's fleets.
All this to say, this book was well researched, gripping to read, and it shined a whole lot of light on a lesser talked about part of World War One's conception. The war was brief, but it was, in its day- the largest armed conflict ever fought by mankind. It was all fought around one tiny port on the southern shores of Manchuria, west of Korea, by men who didn't understand their enemy or themselves.
So, what actually is the book, then? I would call it something of a prelude to World War One, something of a commentary on borderline theocratic nationalism, and a study on what happens when two nations with very similar military doctrine go to war.
There are very few examples of cunning or tactical genius to be seen in the Russo-Japanese War. Russia's command structure was incompetent and timid while simultaneously overemphasizing courage and heroics, and the only officers with any sense were called cowards for their lack of reliance on miraculous heroics.
Port Arthur itself, the centerpiece around which the war was fought- was a veritable fortress that could have been held indefinitely by anyone who took advantage of the natural and man-made defenses that surrounded it. However, instead of spending the war's preceding years building Port Arthur into the stronghold it could have been, Russia spent its time shipping alcohol across the trans-siberian railway and stationing there what were basically conscripts while Japan was engaging in gunboat-diplomacy with Korea, intending to use Inchon as a staging ground for their troop landings.
That isn't to say the Japanese were much better. The suicidal Nogi, general of the Japanese Third Army- used brute force, or "human bullets" as they called it, as his go-to strategy. He was known even in Japan as an ineffective officer, as displayed by his previous exploits in the Sino-Japanese war. He himself did not want to take command of the Third Army, and after the war he killed himself out of shame.
However, if there was a strategically minded individual among the Japanese command, it was Admiral Togo, who distinguished himself by launching "the first Pearl Harbor," in which Japanese torpedo boats and destroyers attacked the moored Russian fleet at Port Arthur. Partially by his command and partially by the Russians' badly trained, badly led Navy, the Japanese fleet dominated the seas and crippled Russia's fleets.
All this to say, this book was well researched, gripping to read, and it shined a whole lot of light on a lesser talked about part of World War One's conception. The war was brief, but it was, in its day- the largest armed conflict ever fought by mankind. It was all fought around one tiny port on the southern shores of Manchuria, west of Korea, by men who didn't understand their enemy or themselves.
July 11, 2017
The Tide at Sunrise could quite possibly be the definitive account of the Russo-Japanese War written in the English language. The book was meticulously researched and very well written. It is also extremely thorough. In addition to detailed accounts of the various battles, the book includes insightful portraits of the various generals and other key players as well as excellent commentary on the political and cultural context of the war. While the book does include a handful of maps, they are few and far between and often lack the desired level of detail. With battles taking place in unfamiliar locations with difficult to pronounce names, better maps would have significantly enhanced my ability to follow and visualize the actions of the opposing armies and navies. First published in 1974 (shortly after Nixon’s visit to China), the concluding chapter includes some dated Cold War era commentary and speculation on the future of the region that hasn’t aged well. Those minor faults aside, this was a great account of a war that deserves more attention than it currently receives in Western professional military education circles. While a relatively short war, it had global ramifications that I failed to truly appreciate until reading this book (details below in my summary).
Book Summary:
The Russo-Japanese War was the first war that saw coal-powered, armored battleships with 12” guns meet in equal combat (Japan used them in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894). Modern mines and torpedoes played a significant role in the naval battles. The land actions involved unprecedented numbers of soldiers (the Battle of Liaoyang was second only to the Battle of Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War in terms of the numbers of men up to that point) (x).
Background and Context
Following the opening up of Japan in 1854 from its feudal isolation, the country made enormous industrial leaps forward (23). In 1894, Japan plunged into war with China over Korea in a full-fledged dress rehearsal for the Russo-Japanese War (50). The victorious Japanese gained control of Korea, Formosa, and the Liaotung Peninsula. Under pressure and threats from Russia, France, and Germany, Japan abandoned its claim to the Liaotung peninsula (54-55). Instead of using the indemnity paid by China to build railroads in Korea and Manchuria as planned, they built battleships (55).
Tsar Nicholas II faced his first international crisis over Japan’s intention to seize the Liaotung Peninsula. Russia desperately desired a year-round warm-water port in the Far East. When the Japanese walked back their claim, Nicholas began to see the Far East as the means to satisfy his ambitions of larger empire (69). In 1903 Russia formed its naval general staff to develop contingency plans for war…much too late for the war about to erupt in 1904. The Russian navy conscripted peasants from all over the country, including inland areas were most had never even seen a ship. The training for these unqualified seamen was abysmal (77).
Korea ranked high on the list of reasons why Japan went to war with Russia (81). Korea was a potential location for the warm-water port the Russians coveted. Japan considered Korea a dagger pointed at their heart should it fall into hostile hands (82). Russian investment and the offer of protection to the Korean King (the Japanese had murdered the queen in their effort to secure their rule) stripped Japan of their Korean protectorate (96).
In China, the Boxer Rebellion erupted in 1899. Russia, Germany, France, Japan, Britain, and the United States collaborated to end the Rebellion. While there was no shortage of international squabbling, America’s stand on the Open Door Policy prevented any land grab in China (125). When Russia eventually “leased” Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula, Japan and Great Britain became allies in the Far East over shared concern of Russian expansionist tendencies (127-130). Japan, once again stripped of their gains in the Sino-Japanese War moved ever closer to war.
On the eve of the war, the people with direct access to the Tsar were largely ignorant of the situation in the Far East or Japan’s intentions or capabilities (158). The Russians, lacking reliable intelligence, underestimated the numbers of men Japan could put in the field. Additionally, they believed a Russian soldier was equal to three Japanese soldiers (159). In reality, the Russian soldiers were hungry peasants fighting far from home with little support while the Japanese, who believed there was a very real threat to their homeland, mobilized their entire society and were willing to die for their Emperor in the struggle ahead (176). To complicate matters for the Russians, they had a horrendous logistical challenges moving supplies along the Trans-Siberian railway that was susceptible to backups, breakdown, and guerilla attacks (168). The Japanese had their own logistical challenges but developed better plans to address them. In order to speed the landing of Japanese troops closer to the action, they planned to seize the Port of Chemulpo (Inchon) in the first days of the war, thereby avoiding the long march up the Korean Peninsula from Pusan (169).
The Outbreak of War and the first “Pearl Harbor”
Unable to reconcile competing interests in Manchuria and Korea, Japan had decided to go to war. Russian soldiers and sailors viewed service in the Far East as exile. Drunkenness was rampant (10). The Russians in Port Arthur scarcely considered the Japanese to be people and did not expect them to start the war (11). Tsar Nicholas likewise did not believe the upstart Japanese would initiate a war. Despite rising tensions with Japan, the sailors in Port Arthur failed to take seriously orders to deploy mines or set up torpedo nets (14). Unable to blockade both Vladivostok and Port Arthur, Togo desired to deliver a severe blow to the Russians before they had time to prepare (18). Just before Midnight on February 8th 1904, ten small Japanese destroyers snuck into Port Arthur and hit 3 Russian ships using torpedoes. While not the decisive blow he desired, it did put the Russians on the defensive for the rest of the war and foreshadowed the attack on Pearl Harbor 37 years later (20). That same evening, the Japanese surrounded Chemulpo (Inchon) where two Russian ships were at harbor. After a failed attempt to break out of Chemulpo Harbor, the Russians scuttled their two ships (193-194). The Russians at Port Arthur were unaware of the attack on Chemulpo as the Koreans had cut the undersea cable between the two locations on February 7th (197). The declaration of war followed this surprise attack. While the surprise attack on Port Arthur was inconclusive, it greatly dispirited the Russians. Securing access to Chemulpo Harbor provided huge strategic and logistical benefits including the freedom to use the Western approaches to Korea instead of relying on Pusan as a beachhead (249).
Panic in Port Arthur led many of the Chinese laborers (who hauled the coal to boats and houses) to flee eliminating any semblance of efficiency (211). Under lackluster leadership, the Russian navy in Port Arthur grew complacent and failed to go out and engage the Japanese Navy. The Tsar dispatched Vice Admiral Makarov, one of Russia’s most respected naval officers, to Port Arthur to turn the situation around. His presence quickly restored the confidence and morale of the Russian Navy. Drawn out of Port Arthur by small Japanese force, Makrov eventually realized he was being lured out from the protection of the fort to be ambushed by a larger Japanese naval force. Speeding back to the harbor before the trap could be sprung, his battleship Petropavlovsk hit a mine, killing Makarov and the other 635 sailors on board. The battleship was replaceable, Makarov was not. In his absence, a “risk nothing” policy would prevail. Makarov’s death would leave the Russian Navy headless and drifting for the remainder of the war.
A month into the war, the Japanese determined that blockading Port Arthur alone would be insufficient. While the Japanese pressed on towards the Yalu River, the Japanese Second Army would be landed in the vicinity of Dalny (further up the Liaoyang Peninsula) to cut off Port Arthur’s land communications (251). The Russian command was divided on how to proceed. Kuropatkin desired to delay large battles until he had numerical superiority. His subordinate in the field Alexiev, was more optimistic and wanted to hit the Japanese at their beachheads or stop them at the Yalu (252). Kuropatkin, with limited mobility and mediocre/defiant subordinates like Alexiev, was in a tight spot. In hindsight his strategy should have been employed. The mountain passes near the Yalu were ideal for ambushes and holding actions which would give him time to muster a superior force before conducting any decisive engagements (253).
The first real land battle of the war occurred in April on the Yalu River (258). In every respect the Japanese out-generaled and out-performed their Russian counterparts. Japanese soldiers disguised themselves as Korean fisherman and collected valuable intelligence on the disposition of Russian forces. The Japanese capacity for camouflage and deception extended beyond gathering intelligence. The building of a decoy bridge in full view of the Russians became a great distraction, enabling them to build 9 smaller bridges that could be carried into position across narrower streams (259). While the Russians were blazing away at the decoy bridge, the Japanese secretly moved their secret weapon into position—4.7 inch howitzers acquired in absolute secrecy. Not in their worst nightmares did the Russians expect to encounter them on the Yalu (260). The Russians, who had taken no precautions to conceal their guns were inviting destruction. At 10 A.M., 72 guns and 20 howitzers opened fire on the Russian positions. The Russians did not know what hit them (262). Meanwhile, 8 miles upstream the Japanese were moving into position to flank the Russian left. General Zasulitch, disdainful of the Japanese, refused to retreat or draw on his reserves. While not a very great battle, it was decisive in the eyes of world opinion. In victory, Japan established itself as a significant military power. More importantly, it established Japan’s credit rating, opening the door to financial backing and war loans from the British (268).
Two months into the war, food prices in Port Arthur had soared. However, in stereotypical Russian fashion, there were virtually unlimited amounts of Vodka available while the railroad remained open. There were literally mountains of vodka cases piling up while food was running low (270). As can be imagined, military discipline remained low in such an environment. Unwilling to take risks, the Russian Navy procrastinated while the Japanese Second Army moved ashore and established a beachhead on the Liaoyang Peninsula (279). Ironically, one of Russia’s small victories came about by accident. Against orders, one Russian mine layer moved out beyond their normal 10 miles limit and deployed some mines. Shortly afterwards, two Japanese battleships (a third of Admiral Togo’s capital ships) would strike the mines. The Battleship Hatsuse would sink to the bottom. That same day, in heavy fog, two cruisers and two gunboats collided killing hundreds of Japanese sailors (281-282).
Lack of initiative and indecision in in the Battle of Te-Li-Ssu would demoralize the Russian forces sent to relieve the pressure on Port Arthur. By May the war began to have a serious impact on Russia’s economy as trade took a backseat to war supplies on the Trans-Siberian Railroad (316-317). All the dangers Kuropatkin envisaged if he failed to concentrate his forces had come to pass. By responding to Alexiev’s pressures, he had scattered his forces over a wide area and been defeated in a succession of actions (319). The Russian Navy was not fairing any better. With Port Arthur subjected to daily bombardment and the fleet pinned down and unable to effectively respond, the Tsar ordered Admiral Vitgeft to move the fleet to Vladivostok (325). The fleet made a run for it but was turned back with several ships damaged by the Japanese Navy.
The Japanese, began their ground assault on Port Arthur on August 19th. Despite non-existent morale, rampant drunkenness, and being cut off from resupply or reinforcements, the Russians would put up a hell of a fight. In the following four and a half months, both sides would lose more than 100,000 men killed before the Japanese finally controlled Port Arthur (346). Back in St. Petersburg, the notoriously Anti-Semitic Minister of the Interior, Plehve was assassinated by a bomb thrown under his carriage. This was only the most obvious sign of growing tensions and protests breaking out across the Russian Empire (353). Back in the field, Kuropatkin let his most promising chance for victory slip through his fingers as his subordinates once again waivered in carrying out his orders. Lacking trust in his subordinates and fearing his lines of communication to Mukden in danger of being cut, Kuropatkin retreated (372-373). With their forces divided between the siege of Port Arthur and the battle at Liaoyang, the Japanese failed to achieve decisive victory at either (384). With Russian winter approaching, troops began to die from the cold. Supply problems persisted. What the Russians lacked in morale, training, equipment, food, and medicine they made up for in alcohol, sex, and religious fervor (390).
A familiar pattern continued to repeat itself. Following the loss of 41,351 casualties (10,959 killed) in the battle of Sha-Ho, the Tsar moved to resolve the command situation in the Far East. The Tsar relieved Alexiev and entrusted Kuropatkin with full control of the Army (400-401). On November 14th, the Japanese raised a second loan of 12 million pounds in London and New York (401). In a foolhardy effort to relieve Port Arthur, the Tsar determined to send his Baltic fleet around the Africa and into the Pacific. Many of the ships in this Armada were in disrepair. In route, the fleet in a fit of paranoia attacked British fishing trawlers that they had mistaken for Japanese torpedo boats bringing the UK and Russia to the brink of war (414). The Baltic fleet was in for a rough journey. Denied entry into many neutral ports to load coal, the ships were often overloaded with coal in every nook and cranny in order to make it to the next coaling station. Many of the ships broke down at the most inopportune times. The crew, mostly unmotivated conscripts, were often mutinous and belligerent. Discipline during exercises and target practice was virtually non-existent. The Baltic Fleet’s moral plummeted further when news of Port Arthur’s surrender reached them (481).
The Japanese had captured Hill 206 outside Port Arthur at great loss of life. From its peak, they could see the entire harbor. The guns placed atop its peak bombarded the town and the fleet mercilessly. The ships that tried to escape were either sunk or captured (436). Realizing the utter futility of further resistance, General Stoessel surrendered the Port in December 1904. The logistical situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate. The Tsar needed 900 locomotives to maintain the Russian Army in the field….he had fewer than 300 (450). Meanwhile tensions were rising closer to home. Japan’s European intelligence coordinator Colonel Akashi was knee deep in revolutionary intrigue. Revolutionaries in Russia (including Lenin), Poland, Lithuania, and Finland all met with Akashi in their struggles against the Tsar (451). Things reached a boiling point when Russian guards opened fire on unarmed demonstrators led by a Russian priest. Anywhere between 200-300 people were killed on “Bloody Sunday” in what many considered the opening salvo in the Russian revolution (455). On February 8th the procurator-general of Finland was assassinated. 8 days later the brother-in-law of the Tsar was blown up in a bombing (459). With growing unrest at home Kuropatkin continued the thankless task of waging war in the Far East. With the fall of Port Arthur, he was no longer being dragged into battles he wished to avoid and had greater freedom to maneuver and choose the time and place for action (459).
Unfortunately, morale remained low and his army overly cautious. Consequently, at the battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin allowed his force to be attacked on two sides without any coherent counterattack (474). The Japanese hoped to surround the Russian Army and bring about a second Sedan. Despite winning the battle, the Japanese failed to exploit their advantage allowing the Russians to escape (479). Meanwhile the Baltic fleet continued their hellish journey across the Pacific. Their fleet had begun to rot during their prolonged stop in the aptly named Hellville, on the northern tip of Madagascar. The crews working to scrape the barnacles off the ships had the added challenge of fighting off numerous sharks attracted by the rotten meat being dumped overboard daily. On the arduous journey across the Indian Ocean many sailors committed suicide. As they approached the Straits of Tsushima, the Japanese Navy executed their plan of attack. The battleships and cruisers battled for five hours. After they retired, the torpedo boats moved in for their three hour attack (513). Russian return fire was largely ineffective. Togo continued to attack even after the white flag had been raised on the Russian flagship (516). Of the 12 Russian ships that made up the Battle Line, 8 were sunk and 4 captured. 4 Cruisers were also sunk, 1 scuttled, and 3 interned at Manila. More than 4,800 Russian were killed. Japanese ships suffered some damage but only three torpedo boats were lost and 110 killed (519). To strengthen their hand for the negotiated peace, the Japanese invaded and captured Sakhalin Island (527).
Treaty of Portsmouth
With rebellion brewing at home for Russia and Japan exhausted and laden with debt, both sides agreed to peace talks. Despite the setbacks, Russia’s army continued to grow while Japan had maxed out their pool of available manpower (529). The Japanese hoped to end the conflict without being further bogged down in Siberia or Manchuria (524). President Roosevelt, partial to Japan throughout the war but beginning to fear Japanese expansion should Russia collapse agreed to mediate the talks (525). While Russia was willing to evacuate Manchuria and cede Korea, the Tsar absolutely refused to pay any financial indemnity or cede all of Sakhalin (which controlled entry to Vladivostok). The blatant refusal to pay an indemnity (which the indebted Japanese sorely needed) almost led to the collapse of peace talks. Japan was unlikely to secure another loan and was now seriously outnumbers on the continent. As a last second compromise, the Japanese removed their demand for an indemnity and kept the lower half of Sakhalin Island (533). The peace treaty raised howls of protests back in Japan as the people felt they had been cheated of their just spoils. The people directed their anger at the government generally and the United States in particular. Given their precarious financial situation and being now seriously outnumbered on the mainland, the treaty results were probably the best they could realistically expect. The Russian negotiator Witte returned home to a hero’s welcome, winning a victory for the nation despite its army and navy’s inability to win (538). The Japanese victory over a European power rippled across Asia fueling Nationalist movements in India, Indochina, and the Philippines (541).
Book Summary:
The Russo-Japanese War was the first war that saw coal-powered, armored battleships with 12” guns meet in equal combat (Japan used them in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894). Modern mines and torpedoes played a significant role in the naval battles. The land actions involved unprecedented numbers of soldiers (the Battle of Liaoyang was second only to the Battle of Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War in terms of the numbers of men up to that point) (x).
Background and Context
Following the opening up of Japan in 1854 from its feudal isolation, the country made enormous industrial leaps forward (23). In 1894, Japan plunged into war with China over Korea in a full-fledged dress rehearsal for the Russo-Japanese War (50). The victorious Japanese gained control of Korea, Formosa, and the Liaotung Peninsula. Under pressure and threats from Russia, France, and Germany, Japan abandoned its claim to the Liaotung peninsula (54-55). Instead of using the indemnity paid by China to build railroads in Korea and Manchuria as planned, they built battleships (55).
Tsar Nicholas II faced his first international crisis over Japan’s intention to seize the Liaotung Peninsula. Russia desperately desired a year-round warm-water port in the Far East. When the Japanese walked back their claim, Nicholas began to see the Far East as the means to satisfy his ambitions of larger empire (69). In 1903 Russia formed its naval general staff to develop contingency plans for war…much too late for the war about to erupt in 1904. The Russian navy conscripted peasants from all over the country, including inland areas were most had never even seen a ship. The training for these unqualified seamen was abysmal (77).
Korea ranked high on the list of reasons why Japan went to war with Russia (81). Korea was a potential location for the warm-water port the Russians coveted. Japan considered Korea a dagger pointed at their heart should it fall into hostile hands (82). Russian investment and the offer of protection to the Korean King (the Japanese had murdered the queen in their effort to secure their rule) stripped Japan of their Korean protectorate (96).
In China, the Boxer Rebellion erupted in 1899. Russia, Germany, France, Japan, Britain, and the United States collaborated to end the Rebellion. While there was no shortage of international squabbling, America’s stand on the Open Door Policy prevented any land grab in China (125). When Russia eventually “leased” Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula, Japan and Great Britain became allies in the Far East over shared concern of Russian expansionist tendencies (127-130). Japan, once again stripped of their gains in the Sino-Japanese War moved ever closer to war.
On the eve of the war, the people with direct access to the Tsar were largely ignorant of the situation in the Far East or Japan’s intentions or capabilities (158). The Russians, lacking reliable intelligence, underestimated the numbers of men Japan could put in the field. Additionally, they believed a Russian soldier was equal to three Japanese soldiers (159). In reality, the Russian soldiers were hungry peasants fighting far from home with little support while the Japanese, who believed there was a very real threat to their homeland, mobilized their entire society and were willing to die for their Emperor in the struggle ahead (176). To complicate matters for the Russians, they had a horrendous logistical challenges moving supplies along the Trans-Siberian railway that was susceptible to backups, breakdown, and guerilla attacks (168). The Japanese had their own logistical challenges but developed better plans to address them. In order to speed the landing of Japanese troops closer to the action, they planned to seize the Port of Chemulpo (Inchon) in the first days of the war, thereby avoiding the long march up the Korean Peninsula from Pusan (169).
The Outbreak of War and the first “Pearl Harbor”
Unable to reconcile competing interests in Manchuria and Korea, Japan had decided to go to war. Russian soldiers and sailors viewed service in the Far East as exile. Drunkenness was rampant (10). The Russians in Port Arthur scarcely considered the Japanese to be people and did not expect them to start the war (11). Tsar Nicholas likewise did not believe the upstart Japanese would initiate a war. Despite rising tensions with Japan, the sailors in Port Arthur failed to take seriously orders to deploy mines or set up torpedo nets (14). Unable to blockade both Vladivostok and Port Arthur, Togo desired to deliver a severe blow to the Russians before they had time to prepare (18). Just before Midnight on February 8th 1904, ten small Japanese destroyers snuck into Port Arthur and hit 3 Russian ships using torpedoes. While not the decisive blow he desired, it did put the Russians on the defensive for the rest of the war and foreshadowed the attack on Pearl Harbor 37 years later (20). That same evening, the Japanese surrounded Chemulpo (Inchon) where two Russian ships were at harbor. After a failed attempt to break out of Chemulpo Harbor, the Russians scuttled their two ships (193-194). The Russians at Port Arthur were unaware of the attack on Chemulpo as the Koreans had cut the undersea cable between the two locations on February 7th (197). The declaration of war followed this surprise attack. While the surprise attack on Port Arthur was inconclusive, it greatly dispirited the Russians. Securing access to Chemulpo Harbor provided huge strategic and logistical benefits including the freedom to use the Western approaches to Korea instead of relying on Pusan as a beachhead (249).
Panic in Port Arthur led many of the Chinese laborers (who hauled the coal to boats and houses) to flee eliminating any semblance of efficiency (211). Under lackluster leadership, the Russian navy in Port Arthur grew complacent and failed to go out and engage the Japanese Navy. The Tsar dispatched Vice Admiral Makarov, one of Russia’s most respected naval officers, to Port Arthur to turn the situation around. His presence quickly restored the confidence and morale of the Russian Navy. Drawn out of Port Arthur by small Japanese force, Makrov eventually realized he was being lured out from the protection of the fort to be ambushed by a larger Japanese naval force. Speeding back to the harbor before the trap could be sprung, his battleship Petropavlovsk hit a mine, killing Makarov and the other 635 sailors on board. The battleship was replaceable, Makarov was not. In his absence, a “risk nothing” policy would prevail. Makarov’s death would leave the Russian Navy headless and drifting for the remainder of the war.
A month into the war, the Japanese determined that blockading Port Arthur alone would be insufficient. While the Japanese pressed on towards the Yalu River, the Japanese Second Army would be landed in the vicinity of Dalny (further up the Liaoyang Peninsula) to cut off Port Arthur’s land communications (251). The Russian command was divided on how to proceed. Kuropatkin desired to delay large battles until he had numerical superiority. His subordinate in the field Alexiev, was more optimistic and wanted to hit the Japanese at their beachheads or stop them at the Yalu (252). Kuropatkin, with limited mobility and mediocre/defiant subordinates like Alexiev, was in a tight spot. In hindsight his strategy should have been employed. The mountain passes near the Yalu were ideal for ambushes and holding actions which would give him time to muster a superior force before conducting any decisive engagements (253).
The first real land battle of the war occurred in April on the Yalu River (258). In every respect the Japanese out-generaled and out-performed their Russian counterparts. Japanese soldiers disguised themselves as Korean fisherman and collected valuable intelligence on the disposition of Russian forces. The Japanese capacity for camouflage and deception extended beyond gathering intelligence. The building of a decoy bridge in full view of the Russians became a great distraction, enabling them to build 9 smaller bridges that could be carried into position across narrower streams (259). While the Russians were blazing away at the decoy bridge, the Japanese secretly moved their secret weapon into position—4.7 inch howitzers acquired in absolute secrecy. Not in their worst nightmares did the Russians expect to encounter them on the Yalu (260). The Russians, who had taken no precautions to conceal their guns were inviting destruction. At 10 A.M., 72 guns and 20 howitzers opened fire on the Russian positions. The Russians did not know what hit them (262). Meanwhile, 8 miles upstream the Japanese were moving into position to flank the Russian left. General Zasulitch, disdainful of the Japanese, refused to retreat or draw on his reserves. While not a very great battle, it was decisive in the eyes of world opinion. In victory, Japan established itself as a significant military power. More importantly, it established Japan’s credit rating, opening the door to financial backing and war loans from the British (268).
Two months into the war, food prices in Port Arthur had soared. However, in stereotypical Russian fashion, there were virtually unlimited amounts of Vodka available while the railroad remained open. There were literally mountains of vodka cases piling up while food was running low (270). As can be imagined, military discipline remained low in such an environment. Unwilling to take risks, the Russian Navy procrastinated while the Japanese Second Army moved ashore and established a beachhead on the Liaoyang Peninsula (279). Ironically, one of Russia’s small victories came about by accident. Against orders, one Russian mine layer moved out beyond their normal 10 miles limit and deployed some mines. Shortly afterwards, two Japanese battleships (a third of Admiral Togo’s capital ships) would strike the mines. The Battleship Hatsuse would sink to the bottom. That same day, in heavy fog, two cruisers and two gunboats collided killing hundreds of Japanese sailors (281-282).
Lack of initiative and indecision in in the Battle of Te-Li-Ssu would demoralize the Russian forces sent to relieve the pressure on Port Arthur. By May the war began to have a serious impact on Russia’s economy as trade took a backseat to war supplies on the Trans-Siberian Railroad (316-317). All the dangers Kuropatkin envisaged if he failed to concentrate his forces had come to pass. By responding to Alexiev’s pressures, he had scattered his forces over a wide area and been defeated in a succession of actions (319). The Russian Navy was not fairing any better. With Port Arthur subjected to daily bombardment and the fleet pinned down and unable to effectively respond, the Tsar ordered Admiral Vitgeft to move the fleet to Vladivostok (325). The fleet made a run for it but was turned back with several ships damaged by the Japanese Navy.
The Japanese, began their ground assault on Port Arthur on August 19th. Despite non-existent morale, rampant drunkenness, and being cut off from resupply or reinforcements, the Russians would put up a hell of a fight. In the following four and a half months, both sides would lose more than 100,000 men killed before the Japanese finally controlled Port Arthur (346). Back in St. Petersburg, the notoriously Anti-Semitic Minister of the Interior, Plehve was assassinated by a bomb thrown under his carriage. This was only the most obvious sign of growing tensions and protests breaking out across the Russian Empire (353). Back in the field, Kuropatkin let his most promising chance for victory slip through his fingers as his subordinates once again waivered in carrying out his orders. Lacking trust in his subordinates and fearing his lines of communication to Mukden in danger of being cut, Kuropatkin retreated (372-373). With their forces divided between the siege of Port Arthur and the battle at Liaoyang, the Japanese failed to achieve decisive victory at either (384). With Russian winter approaching, troops began to die from the cold. Supply problems persisted. What the Russians lacked in morale, training, equipment, food, and medicine they made up for in alcohol, sex, and religious fervor (390).
A familiar pattern continued to repeat itself. Following the loss of 41,351 casualties (10,959 killed) in the battle of Sha-Ho, the Tsar moved to resolve the command situation in the Far East. The Tsar relieved Alexiev and entrusted Kuropatkin with full control of the Army (400-401). On November 14th, the Japanese raised a second loan of 12 million pounds in London and New York (401). In a foolhardy effort to relieve Port Arthur, the Tsar determined to send his Baltic fleet around the Africa and into the Pacific. Many of the ships in this Armada were in disrepair. In route, the fleet in a fit of paranoia attacked British fishing trawlers that they had mistaken for Japanese torpedo boats bringing the UK and Russia to the brink of war (414). The Baltic fleet was in for a rough journey. Denied entry into many neutral ports to load coal, the ships were often overloaded with coal in every nook and cranny in order to make it to the next coaling station. Many of the ships broke down at the most inopportune times. The crew, mostly unmotivated conscripts, were often mutinous and belligerent. Discipline during exercises and target practice was virtually non-existent. The Baltic Fleet’s moral plummeted further when news of Port Arthur’s surrender reached them (481).
The Japanese had captured Hill 206 outside Port Arthur at great loss of life. From its peak, they could see the entire harbor. The guns placed atop its peak bombarded the town and the fleet mercilessly. The ships that tried to escape were either sunk or captured (436). Realizing the utter futility of further resistance, General Stoessel surrendered the Port in December 1904. The logistical situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate. The Tsar needed 900 locomotives to maintain the Russian Army in the field….he had fewer than 300 (450). Meanwhile tensions were rising closer to home. Japan’s European intelligence coordinator Colonel Akashi was knee deep in revolutionary intrigue. Revolutionaries in Russia (including Lenin), Poland, Lithuania, and Finland all met with Akashi in their struggles against the Tsar (451). Things reached a boiling point when Russian guards opened fire on unarmed demonstrators led by a Russian priest. Anywhere between 200-300 people were killed on “Bloody Sunday” in what many considered the opening salvo in the Russian revolution (455). On February 8th the procurator-general of Finland was assassinated. 8 days later the brother-in-law of the Tsar was blown up in a bombing (459). With growing unrest at home Kuropatkin continued the thankless task of waging war in the Far East. With the fall of Port Arthur, he was no longer being dragged into battles he wished to avoid and had greater freedom to maneuver and choose the time and place for action (459).
Unfortunately, morale remained low and his army overly cautious. Consequently, at the battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin allowed his force to be attacked on two sides without any coherent counterattack (474). The Japanese hoped to surround the Russian Army and bring about a second Sedan. Despite winning the battle, the Japanese failed to exploit their advantage allowing the Russians to escape (479). Meanwhile the Baltic fleet continued their hellish journey across the Pacific. Their fleet had begun to rot during their prolonged stop in the aptly named Hellville, on the northern tip of Madagascar. The crews working to scrape the barnacles off the ships had the added challenge of fighting off numerous sharks attracted by the rotten meat being dumped overboard daily. On the arduous journey across the Indian Ocean many sailors committed suicide. As they approached the Straits of Tsushima, the Japanese Navy executed their plan of attack. The battleships and cruisers battled for five hours. After they retired, the torpedo boats moved in for their three hour attack (513). Russian return fire was largely ineffective. Togo continued to attack even after the white flag had been raised on the Russian flagship (516). Of the 12 Russian ships that made up the Battle Line, 8 were sunk and 4 captured. 4 Cruisers were also sunk, 1 scuttled, and 3 interned at Manila. More than 4,800 Russian were killed. Japanese ships suffered some damage but only three torpedo boats were lost and 110 killed (519). To strengthen their hand for the negotiated peace, the Japanese invaded and captured Sakhalin Island (527).
Treaty of Portsmouth
With rebellion brewing at home for Russia and Japan exhausted and laden with debt, both sides agreed to peace talks. Despite the setbacks, Russia’s army continued to grow while Japan had maxed out their pool of available manpower (529). The Japanese hoped to end the conflict without being further bogged down in Siberia or Manchuria (524). President Roosevelt, partial to Japan throughout the war but beginning to fear Japanese expansion should Russia collapse agreed to mediate the talks (525). While Russia was willing to evacuate Manchuria and cede Korea, the Tsar absolutely refused to pay any financial indemnity or cede all of Sakhalin (which controlled entry to Vladivostok). The blatant refusal to pay an indemnity (which the indebted Japanese sorely needed) almost led to the collapse of peace talks. Japan was unlikely to secure another loan and was now seriously outnumbers on the continent. As a last second compromise, the Japanese removed their demand for an indemnity and kept the lower half of Sakhalin Island (533). The peace treaty raised howls of protests back in Japan as the people felt they had been cheated of their just spoils. The people directed their anger at the government generally and the United States in particular. Given their precarious financial situation and being now seriously outnumbered on the mainland, the treaty results were probably the best they could realistically expect. The Russian negotiator Witte returned home to a hero’s welcome, winning a victory for the nation despite its army and navy’s inability to win (538). The Japanese victory over a European power rippled across Asia fueling Nationalist movements in India, Indochina, and the Philippines (541).
December 28, 2023
The Warners crafted a wonderful book about this conflict between Japan and Russia, with the interests of a number of other major powers superimposed. I don't recall ever hearing much about this war except in passing in a high school class, which is rather sad since I credit the Warners' well-informed opinion that the outcome of this war - the repeated slight to Japan (reminiscent of the Sino-Japanese war) and the humiliation of Russia - ultimately lead to a newfound Japanese hostility towards America and England. The Warners show the tragedy and waste (Port Arthur, Kuropatkin's withdrawals, Makarov's death and the subsequent impotence of the Russian Pacific Squadron) not only for their own sake, but to establish the Great War's inevitability and the chaotic collapse of tsarist Russia. Nobody ever told the Russian people what they were fighting for, and the Japanese were again expected to settle for less than what they felt they'd earned. The energetic agent Akashi dashed across Europe, driving on the Russian revolution. Many of the officers were called to serve in high office despite known failings. The competent were constrained by confused orders and logistical failures. I felt particularly for Engineer Politovski in the Baltic squadron whose vast responsibility to maintain the fleet on its suicidal, months-long journey was rewarded only with his forlorn hope of seeing his wife once again. Nogi's shame, Kamimura's unrecognized effort, the arbitrary cruelty of Stoessel, the suffering of those in the sacked cities - all are alive in the Warners' account. It's a classic story of hubris and triumph, epic in scale with tragedy to rival the Greek masters. It makes one sorry for those wounded and dead, angry with those who sent them to die or did the killing, and mistrustful of authority in general. It's a story about war, after all.
May 22, 2018
I knew very little about this war before I read this book.
November 15, 2012
This was an extremely well-written and fascinating look at the Russo-Japanese War. The writing style flows very well and it reads almost as if it were a novel. The authors did a good job in fleshing out the main historical figures, such as Togo and Kuropatkin, and this worked well in keeping my interest (beyond the fact that this was a required book). Most importantly, the authors effectively examine all three levels of war (tactical, operational, strategic) and provide linkages at all stages of their analysis; this is important in order to understand the effects of this limited war in the larger geostrategic arena. The narrative clearly described the contrasting methods of the employment of the instruments of national power, and when you look for it, chapters 1 & 2 of Clausewitz jump out while reading. My only quibble is that this is clearly a post-mortem of the war. Two good companions to this work would be Fuller's "Strategy and Power in Russia" and Evans and Peattie's "Kaigun..." on the strategy of the Japanese imperial navy.
March 23, 2024
It is an excellent detailed recount of a very bloody war. Some times referred to as WW0, it is essentially part II of the Sino-Japanese war. The Japanese angry at the final results of the Sino Japanese war that Russia captured all the gains the Japanese should have won prepares the nation for war from 1895 onward. Russia eventually encroached on manuchuria and even Korea to Japan's dislike.
Japan launches an eventually surprise attack at Port Arhur, similar to the one at Pearl Harbor. Japan dominates Russia through the war both on land and sea. Winning every single battle in a completely dominating fashion even though they were out numbered and out gunned in the majority of these fights. The Industrial Revolution once again brings new ways to kill the human species here. Through the new machine guns, seige guns, land mines, barb wire, and top of the line navy boats. You would think I just described scenes out of WWI, but this war was truly a preview.
Again, during the Portsmouth talks negotiated by US President TR, Japan gets the short end of the talks. They get Russia out of Korea, Manchua, and get half an island but fail to get any payment. Russia was threatening to walk away from talks with their army fully replaced with reinforcements and ready to fight, Japan was placed in a perilous position. Japan signed the peace treaty with it's own nation in disgust from going into debt and not being paid by the Russians. They looked for a scape goat and naturally the Americans were the best scapegoat possible. This would lead to further tensions between the two countries naturally leading to WWII.
I found the most fascinating part of the book to be Akashi Motojiro. He helped spur the revolution in Russia as a secret agent. He would help provide the revolutionist in Poland in other places with weapons from different parts of Europe. This would lead to various leaders of Russia being assainated.
Edit: I should add that the author adds glimpses of Tsar Nicholas with errie foreshadowing. The birth of his son during the war was just sad for me to know what happens to him in a little over 10 years.
Book: 5 stars
Japan launches an eventually surprise attack at Port Arhur, similar to the one at Pearl Harbor. Japan dominates Russia through the war both on land and sea. Winning every single battle in a completely dominating fashion even though they were out numbered and out gunned in the majority of these fights. The Industrial Revolution once again brings new ways to kill the human species here. Through the new machine guns, seige guns, land mines, barb wire, and top of the line navy boats. You would think I just described scenes out of WWI, but this war was truly a preview.
Again, during the Portsmouth talks negotiated by US President TR, Japan gets the short end of the talks. They get Russia out of Korea, Manchua, and get half an island but fail to get any payment. Russia was threatening to walk away from talks with their army fully replaced with reinforcements and ready to fight, Japan was placed in a perilous position. Japan signed the peace treaty with it's own nation in disgust from going into debt and not being paid by the Russians. They looked for a scape goat and naturally the Americans were the best scapegoat possible. This would lead to further tensions between the two countries naturally leading to WWII.
I found the most fascinating part of the book to be Akashi Motojiro. He helped spur the revolution in Russia as a secret agent. He would help provide the revolutionist in Poland in other places with weapons from different parts of Europe. This would lead to various leaders of Russia being assainated.
Edit: I should add that the author adds glimpses of Tsar Nicholas with errie foreshadowing. The birth of his son during the war was just sad for me to know what happens to him in a little over 10 years.
Book: 5 stars
May 25, 2021
Incredibly detailed history of this largely forgotten (at least in the U.S.) conflict that had such a significant impact on the world. The research is phenomenally thorough and the history exceptionally well written. With all the detail, the reader must have stamina/patience or, to move things along, a talent for skimming without losing the significance and drama of the events. A quibble: the last chapter was a recapitulation of great-power relations in the decades after the Russo-Japanese War. I think it would have been more useful to provide less narrative and more focus on the war's meaning for the futures of the great powers.
October 17, 2025
Fantastic history book on the Russo-Japanese War. The book is well written with engaging and imaginative language. The first-hand accounts that were gathered by the authors credit the amount of effort and depth put into this work. The book is also not heavy-handed politically in any direction and does not prescribe much bias on "conclusions" about the effects of the war. This book is great for anyone who wants to understand the background of the geopolitics of the war and the cast of people involved. Importantly, the author understands that history is made by people much more than just forces randomly acting in the world.
December 7, 2024
Old, but interesting read (for a book club) on the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. It really does a good job of setting the stage for the conflict, gives great detail on the armies, leaders, and battles themselves, and then goves an interesting commentary in its impact on the history of the region. What I found really interesting was its discussion of the relationships and possible future relationships of Russia, Japan, China, and the US. Since it was written in 1972, having the benefit of hindsight, I can see how hard it is for historians to predict the future.
July 15, 2018
Well written account of the Russo-Japanese War. Lot of background leading up to the war. Fairly detailed descriptions of each battle and tactics used. While good discussion of the political Homefront in Russia, surprisingly very little of the same in Japan.
February 21, 2018
The Tide at Sunrise is an excellent single-volume survey of the Russo-Japanese War.
July 3, 2018
Excellent history.
December 30, 2025
Solid and complete history of an often overlooked conflict
December 1, 2015
Seeing the silent classic "Battleship Potemkin" as a youngster, I recently decided to do a little research on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905. Denis Warner, considered an authority on Asian affairs of the twentieth century, with his wife, Peggy, also a journalist, co-authored the book.
Thirty-seven years before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese executed a sneak attack on the Russian Navy, while it was anchored in Port Arthur at the southern tip of China's Liaodong Peninsula, without warning or a declaration of war. The two events are eerily similar in many ways, even the flagship of the attacking Japanese naval forces at both Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor, flew the very same battle flag.
It seems that the causes of this war, one of the first true modern wars, were the root causes for the later World Wars, Korean War and Viet Nam War.
It is amazing to me, that the US could be caught completely unaware at Pearl Harbor, when the sneak attack on Port Arthur was relatively recent in the timeline of world events, especially regarding Imperial Japan in Eastern Asia and the Pacific within the first half of the twentieth century.
Also amazing, is the fact that the land battle at Mukden, Manchuria, consisted of the largest array of opposing armies ever put together, second only to the battle of Sedan during the Franco-Prussian War, three decades earlier.
A great deal of research was obviously put into the production of this interesting and informative history!
I couldn't put it down until the very end.
Thirty-seven years before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese executed a sneak attack on the Russian Navy, while it was anchored in Port Arthur at the southern tip of China's Liaodong Peninsula, without warning or a declaration of war. The two events are eerily similar in many ways, even the flagship of the attacking Japanese naval forces at both Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor, flew the very same battle flag.
It seems that the causes of this war, one of the first true modern wars, were the root causes for the later World Wars, Korean War and Viet Nam War.
It is amazing to me, that the US could be caught completely unaware at Pearl Harbor, when the sneak attack on Port Arthur was relatively recent in the timeline of world events, especially regarding Imperial Japan in Eastern Asia and the Pacific within the first half of the twentieth century.
Also amazing, is the fact that the land battle at Mukden, Manchuria, consisted of the largest array of opposing armies ever put together, second only to the battle of Sedan during the Franco-Prussian War, three decades earlier.
A great deal of research was obviously put into the production of this interesting and informative history!
I couldn't put it down until the very end.
June 28, 2016
Bear in mind this is my first reading of a book about the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Good read. One item I didn't like was that there were too many comparisons to events in future wars, such as comparing the initial Port Arthur attack to Pearl Harbor in 1941 or references to Douglas MacArthur's role during the Korean War or devoting essentially an entire chapter to post World War II Soviet Union and communist China.
The narratives of the various land battles left something to be desired. By comparison, I found the descriptions of the various naval battles to be quite interesting. There was considerable detail about the politics at the time but I found the economics to be dry. There were scant little production numbers for either side, especially for the Japanese.
The book could have used some strategic maps, especially since some of the places mentioned have had their names changed over the years. Some of the places named I had no idea where they were on a map and having one would have put various situations in perspective. On the other hand, there are several tactical and operational maps that are quite good.
The biggest surprises for me was given the Japanese reputation for brutality in the Second World War and to a lesser extent the Russians, there is no indication of such crimes during this war, despite some horrific and bloody battles.
I plan on reading another book on this war in the future and may revisit this review at some point.
The narratives of the various land battles left something to be desired. By comparison, I found the descriptions of the various naval battles to be quite interesting. There was considerable detail about the politics at the time but I found the economics to be dry. There were scant little production numbers for either side, especially for the Japanese.
The book could have used some strategic maps, especially since some of the places mentioned have had their names changed over the years. Some of the places named I had no idea where they were on a map and having one would have put various situations in perspective. On the other hand, there are several tactical and operational maps that are quite good.
The biggest surprises for me was given the Japanese reputation for brutality in the Second World War and to a lesser extent the Russians, there is no indication of such crimes during this war, despite some horrific and bloody battles.
I plan on reading another book on this war in the future and may revisit this review at some point.
April 12, 2011
Begins with the surprise attack on the Russian ships at Port Arthur, then goes back to discuss, using a parallel, overlapping structure, the roads that led to war. Nice discussions of the politics, especially in Russia and Japan but also in China and, to a lesser extent, Korea. Good, well-written history of the military and naval actions in the war, with a chapter on the long-term implications. The writing is clear and easy to follow, but the book could use a lot more maps. Specifically, a map of the region (China, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan) would be nice, along with more spatially and temporally detailed maps of the battles.
July 14, 2015
Mainly a military history this book explains an epic change of Asian understandings with the first major war won by an Asian power against a European one in modern times. My previous understanding was that Japan won decisive naval victories but the result wasn't so obvious at the start and this book grasps interesting trends in Russian and Japanese military organization to provide rich contextual background to the decisions and why they were made throughout the war. Very heavy history but of huge importance particularly due to the weight of created propaganda and as a study of decisions made by honour rather than practicality.
December 14, 2012
This is about as thorough as it gets. At times there's a bit more detail than I really wanted but overall a pretty easy read. Study the Russo-Japanese War for a great example of how to effectively integrate the elements of national power in pursuit of a coherent strategy, and how to plan war termination (hint: begin before the war starts). The Japanese got this one exactly right, and then amazingly got it exactly wrong just a few decades later.
November 24, 2010
First time I've read anything about the 1904/1905 Russian Japanese War. I never realized how much the events of the 20th century were influenced by this and the Asian conflicts of the 19th century (Boxer Rebellion, Sino-Japanese War).
June 11, 2016
A very long, very detailed account of a very short war - but this readable, fast-paced narrative describes how much was packed into this relatively forgotten conflict, one which had major consequences that have carried through to the present era.
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