Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941–1945

by Andrew Roberts

"Masterly. . . . A triumph of vivid description, telling anecdotes, and informed analysis.”
—The New York Review of Books

"Britain's finest contemporary military historian."
— The Economist

An epic joint biography of four titanic figures—a President, a Prime Minister, and two Generals—who shaped the grand strategy of the Allies during World War II.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Biography, War, Military History, Military Fiction

738 pages, Kindle Edition

First published May 5, 2008

About the author

Dr Andrew Roberts, who was born in 1963, took a first class honours degree in Modern History at Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge, from where he is an honorary senior scholar and a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). He has written or edited twelve books, and appears regularly on radio and television around the world. Based in New York, he is an accomplished public speaker, and is represented by HarperCollins Speakers’ Bureau (See Speaking Engagements and Speaking Testimonials). He has recently lectured at Yale, Princeton and Stanford Universities and at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Reviews

[Geevee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Another review and rating lost by Goodreads. I read this in c2015.
Overall, it was a good analysis of the allied leaders and commanders who created and led the strategy, campaigns, and battles to victory over Germany and Japan.
As with all Andrew Roberts' books, this one is well-written, structured, and argued.

[Anthony · Rating 3 out of 5]

Grand Designs

Andrew Roberts is a first class historian, I have simply loved all of his books and share a common interest in periods from the Napoleonic Wars to the World Wars. I also really appreciate what he does for history, saving it from its political wash. However, his Masters and Commanders just didn’t hit the mark for me. It’s not a bad book, but very average and in some places boring. The premise of this book is that Roberts wants to tell the reader how the Second World War was won from the grand strategy developed by the four key personalities in the United Kingdom and United States: Winston Spencer Churchill, Sir Alan Brooke, Franklin D Roosevelt and George Marshall.

The book adds little to what we already know of strategy of the allies, the conflict between the US and UK of when and where to open a second front, how to keep Stalin happy and on side and arguments over the merits of an African campaign. Where it does become interesting is through the us of many private diaries written, illegally by those involved at the top in this decision making. I say illegally as all had agreed not to write down what had been discussed for security reasons. It seems most ignored this rule. Roberts has a mesmerising amount of knowledge and is a great storyteller, so this is presented very well in places. What Roberts shows is that personality still mattered at the top. Marshall was almost estranged from the others, not wanting to become personal with any. Alan Brooke was worked to death by Churchill, getting away through ornithology. FDR the only one with no military training, but very politically astute, it seems Marshall has a hard time understanding FDR in places. But whatever these differences, all were exceptional men who got the job done.

They were crucially able to agree to a Germany first policy. Britain would provide a base to launch the invasion of Europe, Stalin was wearing the Nazis down in the east, where Germany was ultimately defeated. Both sides made sacrifices whilst also mildly mistrusting their ally. Marshall forever believing the British just wanted their Empire back, Brooke noting the lack of strategic sense from the Americans. Both seemed to have pushed against each other from time to time. Maybe to test the resolve of the other. WSC and FDR definitely got on the best and were needed when Brooke or Marshall would not comprise. This partnership worked well and led to key campaigns of the war, such as the invasion of Italy and the push for Normandy in 1944. Hindsight judges the what ifs and the successes or failures of a campaign. But it appears they did an exceptional job. Of course there was luck involved in this too, but they got the big questions right. For example, going into the Mediterranean before Normandy was right. They were not ready before 1944. An open forum was key to push away the really bad ideas, something that couldn’t be done in the Axis Powers. Marshall and Brooke sacrificed key commands and glory on the battlefield to fulfil these roles and as Roberts observed each man filled a role that worked for the allies. All had good and bad ideas, but together they mostly picked the right choices.

As I said above, Masters and Commanders is not a bad book. It just would not be my first choice Roberts book or book on the Second World War. It is perhaps something for the more serious reader to delve into, but he has written far superior books and there are much better books on the subject matter. Maybe he gets too bogged down in anecdotes in places or there is too much detail on how they ironed out their approach to winning the war. I may well have to read this one again in the future to re-assess it.

[Betsy · Rating 3 out of 5]

May 8, 1945, was VE-Day and the end of the long nightmare that Britain had been fighting against Germany since 1939. Although the war would go on against Japan until August, the great partnership between Britain and the U.S. had helped to bring victory to the Allies with much of the actual fighting and casualties lost by the third member of the coalition, the USSR.

This book deals with the grand strategy of Britain and America as created by Churchill, Brooke, Roosevelt and Marshall. Although GERMANY FIRST became the policy, it was a point of contention after Pearl Harbor in 1941 when many Americans, including King, wanted to concentrate on the Pacific. Fortunately, Roosevelt was more inclined to see Germany as the real danger. That policy was only one of many that these four men wrangled about during the war years. North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and above all the timing for the cross-channel invasion of France consumed much of the goodwill of the Allies as Britain and the U.S. tried to find ways to aid Russia and win the war.

The shifting of power in 1943 resulted in America becoming the 'senior' partner and dominating decision making. This book presents a detailed look at the crucial decisions and the men who made them. It was frequently slow-going, but informative. The author adds his own view of what drove each man to take the positions they did. He had the help of the diaries and papers of many, especially the British, to help him. Ironically, Andrew Roberts continually mentioned that they were not supposed to keep diaries, however, I suspect historians (including Roberts) are grateful that they did.

[Jeremy · Rating 5 out of 5]

After a slow start, I can now rate Masters and Commanders as one of the most insightful, well-researched, and meaningful accounts of the Western European and Mediterranean theaters of the Second World War. One of the most standout qualities of Roberts’s book is that the tactical events and descriptions of actual battles are almost an afterthought. The North African landings of Operation Torch and the Normandy invasion of Operation Overlord garnered about a paragraph each of actual description. Rather than rehash the events of these campaigns, Roberts instead chose to focus his analysis on the behind-the-scenes elements of Allied grand strategy through the eyes, experiences, and interactions of political leaders Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill and their respective Chiefs of Staff, George C. Marshall and Sir Alan Brooke.

Much of this well-researched work focuses on the various wartime conferences that occurred between the Allied leaders between 1941 and 1945, with the Potsdam conference at the conclusion of the war being noticeably absent. This omission is understandable given that Roosevelt was dead at the time of Potsdam and Churchill was replaced by Clement Attlee as Prime Minister midway through the conference.

Roberts’s analysis is enlightening, especially in the shift of influence throughout the four years of war represented in the book. Early on, it was the cautious approach of the British, and their influence on President Roosevelt, that prevented the impetuous Americans from launching a premature invasion of fortress Europe that would have doubtless cost many lives and resulted in a potential failure that could have resulted in an Axis victory in Europe. In late 1943, British caution gave way to American demands for action, which resulted in the successful invasion of the French coast and, arguably, a more rapid close to the European conflict.

I felt that Roberts did an admirable job of refraining from editorializing on behalf of any particular side or individual. Sir Alan Brooke certainly has the lion’s share of the treatment, but he is not portrayed as unassailable, especially in the closing chapters of the book. Marshall’s influence is well-documented, but his demand for action early on in the campaign is rightly questioned. Roberts does an excellent job of characterizing the boundless energy of Churchill, whose strategic vision was not always right, but whose personality carried the United Kingdom through its darkest hours. Roosevelt is addressed least but is arguably the most powerful figure in the narrative, as it was his responsibility to harness and unleash the seemingly endless manpower, economy, and production of the United States following her entry into the conflict in December of 1941.

Although it was a somewhat laborious read at times, I was impressed with the quality of research and the arguments presented in Masters and Commanders, and I recommend it to anyone with an interest in the strategy of the Western Allies during World War II. I intend to read Roberts’s follow-up, The Storm of War, in the near future for its evaluation not of the question of how the Allies won World War II in Europe, but how the Wehrmacht, one of the most powerful and well-equipped military forces in history, managed to lose it.

[Bill · Rating 2 out of 5]

This ought to have been subtitled: "How General Marshall prevented Roosevelt, Churchill, and Brooke from making things much, much worse". This was not the author's intent, as his primary aim seems to have been to raise Brooke's reputation, but time and time again in this narrative, Marshall either keeps nonsense from happening, or he is the goad which drives action which needs to be taken. At the same time, Roosevelt is little more than a cipher, with his actions and motivations given far less room than any of the other three figures upon whom this book is focused.

All in all, this is a useful and interesting account of the tensions, motivations, and inner workings of those at the highest levels of decision-making for the western allies.

[L Greyfort · Rating 3 out of 5]

As has been noted elswehere, it would be difficult to find a more thorough and detailed account of the very intricate workings of the Allied leadership during WWII -- sometimes day-by-day, even hour-by hour. From the mutual overall goals through the rivalry between the allied armed forces, right through to the personal obsessions of the various leaders, and the jockeying for postion between generals, it's all in there, discussed in detailed, professionally historical tones. Which can get a little heavy sometimes, but, it's all in there.

What's NOT in there -- and which would be monumentally helpful -- is some organizational charts, showing how the various committees and bureaucracies fit together. In lieu of that, a simple list of the various players' names with their titles and affiliations would be of great help. Unless one has the foresight to start a running list of one's own, there are just so many of them, one cracks one's brain trying to keep track of them.

[TheF7Pawn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well-researched, detailed, and elegantly written, Masters and Commanders, is a virtual treatise on senior leadership during wartime. Roberts uses the backdrop of the seven major WWII conferences to craft sharp portraits of his four protagonists: FDR, Marshall, Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Taken as whole, this is a fascinating glimpse of coalition strategy-making at the highest level. Roberts uses primary sources, usually the diaries of his subjects or those in their immediate circle, to inform his lively narrative. He is scrupulously fair to them all, often using their own descriptions of events or people and, when warranted, contradicting them if other evidence compelled a reassessment.

To say the relationship was not always convivial would be a considerable understatement and Roberts does his best work in describing, analyzing, and rendering judgment on those topics upon which the two great allies bickered. In the end however, as one of the participants noted, “we fought as brothers” and never lost sight of the main objective of defeating the Axis powers. As Churchill wryly noted, “The only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them.”

This book is not for everyone; some might be put off by the idea of reading a book about strategy conferences. But if you’re interested in the details of these great meetings, how leadership was used to shape their outcomes, and how they influenced the course of the war, this work is indispensable.

[M Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very thoroughly researched and entertainingly written, Andrew Roberts presents a detailed look into how the two Western democracies formulated the grand strategy that guided the prosecution of the war. He does not exclude China and the Soviet Union in his narrative but the majority of the book is devoted to Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, George Marshall and Alan Brooke (the Masters and Commanders) with an emphasis on the two Brits. Roberts is British and his point of view for this book is decidedly British. He makes that very clear in the preface to the book. Of the four principles of his story only Brooke maintained a diary during the war but Roberts’ narrative is informed by the diaries and verbatim notes written by those present during the meetings and conferences they attended. Even though Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Eisenhower and War Secretary Stimson maintained diaries the reader will learn much more about the British side of things. Other persons intimately connected with directing the war effort also contribute to the story. I was very excited to get a British point of view as my experience has been primarily with American authors and the American side of things.

As with many authors the emphasis is on the war with Germany. Some space is made for issues around keeping China supplied, liberating British Asian colonies, the role the Royal Navy will play in the Pacific after the defeat of Germany and the amount of war effort that will be devoted to the Pacific war, the majority of the book is devoted to American and British cooperation in defeating Germany and the arguments about how best to do that. As the last line of the introduction makes clear: “This then is the story of how the four Masters and Commanders of the Western Allies fought each other over how best to fight Adolf Hitler.”

And there was a lot of fighting and arguing. The early years of America’s involvement in the war saw nothing but squabbles, some very heated, over where America’s newly forming army would engage the Wehrmacht. It is well known that in first months of America’s involvement in the war General Marshall insisted on Europe while the British favored N. Africa. It all revolved around the question of how best to engage the German Army so as to provide the most help to the Soviets. The struggle to persuade Marshall to change his mind on invading Europe in 1942 and to convince him that N Africa was the best choice for the US Army’s first engagement with Germany takes up a large part of the opening year of the war and the opening chapters of the book. We all know that Roosevelt was the decider there. Roberts really does a wonderful job investigating and describing the conferences and meetings that decided the strategy for the war with Germany. Using private diaries and notes of War Cabinet meeting that violated strict rules prohibiting such things, Roberts presents a fascinating narrative of how the Masters and Commanders devised the Western Allied strategy that resulted in victory in Europe. I really did enjoy this book, it covers much more than the strategy meetings, conferences, disagreements and the compromises, also covering the creation of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and how those bodies functioned. I couldn’t give it less than 5 stars even though I have some gripes with some of the author’s opinions.

I was disappointed that Roberts seems to place so much reliance on the work of Trevor Dupuy, his work has been largely discredited. There is a large body of much more recent work that Roberts could have investigated but it is clear that he is using Dupuy to support his personal feelings and biases.

I largely agree with Roberts’ assessment of the successes and mistakes of the grand strategy hammered out by the Masters and Commanders with the exception of Operation Dragoon. While it is true that the Germans decided not to contest the landing, began an immediate retreat and Dragoon did not draw German Divisions from Normandy, that does not mean it was a failure or a wasted effort. Yes, the French Riviera is a long way from Paris (as Roberts points out) but the Dragoon forces were not headed to Paris. The Allies needed to get two armies into France to extend the front to the Swiss border and the Channel ports and beaches were crowded with supplies, reinforcements and replacements for the 21st and 12th Army Groups. The 6th Army Group moved into France quickly and they were supplied entirely through Marseille and Toulon. Roberts does touch on the difficulty in moving infantry and armor divisions into Europe then ignores the success of the 6th Army Group in doing just that. He gives a very weak criticism of that operation that I interpreted to mean that he just did not like the operation. He indicates that it took resources from Italian operations after he criticizes the effort made in advancing to Rome. It all seemed very wishy-washy.

While Roberts points out certain mistakes in strategy that I largely agree with he completely overlooks Operation Market Garden. That was a disappointment. I would think Winston and Brookie would have had some very interesting comments about the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division, a waste of manpower the British could not afford. Newly promoted Field Marshal Montgomery’s single thrust to jump the lower Rheine and attack the Ruhr was a massive failure and I have always suspected that is why Eisenhower would no longer entertain any notions of another single thrust into Germany commanded by Monty or anyone else.

My last gripe is prompted by this quote from page 297. “In divisional terms, the US Army had 37 trained divisions at the time of Pearl Harbor, 73 by Operation Torch, 120 by the summer of 1943 and 200 by D-Day.” It is well known that the US Army produced only 90 divisions during the entire war and the 2nd Cavalry Division was deactivated after landing in N Africa in May of 1944. So the US had only 89 divisions to fight the war against Germany and Japan. That’s it! No more. And some did not see combat. All the numbers in that quote are wrong. The paragraph that quote comes from contains only one citation that is associated with the number he gives for the divisions of the British Commonwealth. How is it possible for a man who has spent so much time researching and writing about World War II to not have heard of the “90 division gamble?” Where could he have possibly come up with those numbers? 37 trained divisions by Pearl Harbor – 200 by D-Day! It must have been in his notes without a citation and he just went with it. Roberts does list “Command Decisions” edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield in the bibliography so he really has no excuse. This is especially true since he explains that the US was not prepared to engage a large portion of the Wehrmacht in 1942. In chapter 6 he discusses Marshall’s visit to London in April 1942 and on page 144 he quotes Brooke describing what took place during one of the meetings: “Marshall ‘gave us a long talk on his views concerning the desirability of starting [the] western front next September and [stated] that the USA forces would take part. However the total force which they could transport by then only consisted of 2 ½ divisions!! No very great contribution.’” So only 2 ½ divisions ready to engage Germany in September 1942. Not 37 that were supposedly ready by Pearl Harbor and certainly not the 73 he says were ready by Torch (November 1942). Roberts in fact spends quite a bit of time explaining that the US was very unprepared for major combat in 1942 so how in the world could he have written that nonsense about the number of trained divisions available at different points in the war on page 297? I just can’t let it go. I must remind myself that it has nothing to do with the development of strategy, he was trying to make a point about the phenomenal mobilization of US military and industry.

I would like to end this long review by saying that I do not think my gripes take away from the overall enjoyment of Roberts’ narrative. Even with that last one that still takes up space in my head he has produced a wonderful book examining how the Allies developed their strategy to deal with Hitler that is both incredibly informative and delightfully entertaining. I do not feel that he was biased against Roosevelt or Marshall. Each of the four gets a fair share of criticism and praise as well as many other Allied generals who come into the story. Some of the minor characters in the story do get more criticism than praise but I agreed with Roberts’ characterizations, or the quotes from some of the diaries about them, for the most part. I particularly enjoyed this one: “…Alexander [General Sir Harold Alexander] taking over as supreme commander in the Mediterranean, ‘a post for which he is totally unfitted’ in Cunningham’s [Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham – ABC] view, because he was ‘completely stupid’” (p. 530)

I would enthusiastically recommend this book to anyone interested in Allied grand strategy in World War II. It is a big story that Andrew Roberts is telling and I think that overall he has done a superlative job.

[Emily · Rating 4 out of 5]

War narratives have a tendency to turn glowing, sometimes even sentimental: high prose about titanic struggles, gleaming machinery, dramatic speeches and heroism transcending ordinary humanity. Masters and Commanders is distinctly anything but.

Here, you'll find no grand dramatic prose, or even much battle talk at all: the culminating event of the narrative - D-Day -happens so suddenly and with hardly any description at all.

Instead, Roberts does something entirely different: he tells the story of the bureaucracy of war, and of the personalities and relationships that drove the machine of modern warfare forward. He uses the lens of four men as the skeleton for this story: the "Masters", Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the Commanders, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke, and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. He traces the thinking and the strategizing and the collaboration - and contention (much, much contention down the road) that defined the Allied Strategy in the west, beginning with Churchill's choice of Sir Alan Brooke for CIGS, and ending, more or less, with D-Day and the death of FDR.

Andrew Roberts is a master British historian; his biography of Churchill rises to resounding heights, and contains all the drama and glamor and sentimentality that this book eschews. He knows his source material well, and one of his strengths here is his analysis of some new sources - diaries, meeting notes, letters, memoirs, all qualified and presented with context.

He proposes several interesting theses:

1 - That democracies, because they require compromise and persuasion, wage better strategic wars than autocracies. Perhaps so. His comparison with Hitler's Germany, which faltered in the end due to poor strategic choices, falls a little flat because so little seems dedicated to it, but his conclusion feels valid and presents an intriguing point - that it's precisely the wrangling, the discussions, the endless conferences, that make for sound strategy.

2. Particular to this situation: that FDR was the great strategist of World War II - not, as is sometimes assumed, Churchill.

3. That "the British started to get strategy wrong, and the Americans started to get it right…in the "fortnight after Tuesday 19 October 1943, when Churchill successfully persuaded Brooke to join him in attempting to postpone Overlord". In essence, this marked the great turning point of the Anglo-American relationship, too: when American military might began to outweigh Britain's, both in terms of men and matériel.

Roberts is a thoughtful, considered historian, with a great understanding of his characters, and a thorough comfort with his source material - in his hands, the firsthand accounts are done incredible justice, well-used but never over-trusted, and never overincorporated, which makes the passages he selects a delight to read. All his characters jump to life, except, strangely enough, for Roosevelt.

Overall, I thought some of Roberts's theses ran a little thin, although his mark of the turning point from British to American supremacy rang true. The overall theme instead is what it took to run and win a modern world war - not the glamor, but the mundane bureaucracy, the humanity that oversees the great moving pieces of history: the arguments and the exhausting conferences, the memos and the squabbles over word choices, the drudgery and the personality clashes, the give-and-take, the groupthink and the compromises that drove great, blood-filled strategy. Churchill liked to wear bright dressing gowns and kept his commanders up into the wee hours of the morning. Brooke, dour and acerbic in his diary, was a passionate ornithologist and a masterful field commander, distinguished by his management of his corps's the Dunkirk retreat. He was one of the few commanders who could effectively stand up to Winston Churchill - one of his great contributions to the war effort, and he - like Marshall - gave up the opportunity to command a great army in the field in order to maintain the much less exalted role of keeping the war effort bureaucratically on track.

Masters and Commanders wasn't a fast read, or even a page-turner, but this is an interesting, well-told story. Its strengths and fascinations are quiet: the characters, the relationships, the negotiations, the recognition of great events parceled out into the day-by-day - D-Day, won by memos and sleepless late nights, roundtable conversations and meeting dynamics, earnest men (mostly men, of course) trying to drive victory via committees and paperwork.

[R · Rating 5 out of 5]

Andrew Roberts (AR) writes not in a series of facts, but a coherent story that links hard evidence with balanced judgments on the four commanders’ decisions; the masters (Roosevelt (FR) and WC) and commanders (General Marshal & Sir Alan Brooke (SCC’s hero)). Furthermore, AR does not get caught up in the home counties nostalgia of Churchill’s (WC) bulldog spirit. Instead, he focuses on his fiery intellect, that was both genuine and calculating, well meaning, and self-serving. Below are some of my thoughts on the excellent observations AR makes.

1. Like a scene from Blackadder, the 4 commanders kept a diary that provides an excellent insight into how they all viewed each other; FR first thought WC a drunk fool, Brooke thought Marshal an unintelligent man incapable of strategic thinking, Marshal saw Brooke as dull and uninspiring. 3 of the 4 all overcame personal suffering; FR contracting polio and being disabled, WC - Gallipoli and losing his father, Brooke; his wife dying from a car crash. All 4 were masters of people and persuasion, like Marshal knowing that to get FR to agree to his point of view, he would stand over FR to look imposing. All 4 were excellent delegators, in particular Brooke who trusted his military chief’s advice. WC was the best liar and knew how to get his way over Brooke and Marshal, such as saying some military plans in Whitehall were only temporary, knowing full well when something in Whitehall is temporality adopted it is hard to replace it.

2. The WC and Brooke relationship is probably the most fascinating. WC hired Brooke because he was no yes man, and would provide a “foil to my genius”. Brooke always put his professional judgement ahead of his own personal ambitions and paid the price for it when he was not made Allied Supreme Commander (Eisenhower was chosen). Brooke also knew not to fight WC on small issues, but instead let them get slowly forgotten. Enormous arguments did erupt, like when Brookes refused to allow a British invasion in the Mediterranean after victory in North Africa and was rude to Churchill in front of Cabinet. Brooke said after “I love him, but the day I agree with him when I don’t is the day I must resign as I am no good to him”. These words were passed onto WC, who burst into tears and said “dear Brookie”.

3. Holistically Britain’s role in WW2 could be described as follows. In 1940, Britain really was the last country defending democracy, and without Britain defending itself, WW2 may never have been won. But as soon as America provided the money, munitions, and men, decision making power was increasingly held in Washington, particularly after 1943’s Yalta Conference. It is telling that WC wrote 201 more letters than FR, and that FR quickly identified that WC was desperate to maintain the British Empire and wanted to use American troops defend Britain and attack Europe, while allowing British Troops to fight in Indian/SE Asia to preserve the empire post WW2.

4. Conclusion:
British history/and this book admits to forgetting the importance of Russia (80% of Germany’s troops were lost fighting Russia) and that without Russia, the war could have lasted a lot longer. Brits romanticise about the special relationship with the US, but WW2 showed huge ideologic differences between the country’s decision making; the US preferring centralised decision making (presidential), while the UK used democratic decision making with lots of committees, something that is still true today. When Britain started declining in importance for FR is hard to tell, but FR appeared to conclude that Russia was the US’s main priority after WW2.

There is however a wider point that underpins what WW2 was fought for. Hitler used an autocratic system of decision making, overruling his commanders and making decisions that protected his pride and prestige with the German people. By 1943, most German commanders knew the war would be lost, and saw the decision to invade Stalingrad as fateful. WC on the other hand, despite frustrations, knew that the democratic way of running wars would prevail and never once overruled a commander to get his way, showing that he had learnt the lessons of Gallipoli. It is upon that point that WW2 was won by the Allies, led by the most influential of the 4, FR, but allowed to happen by the brilliance of WC in 1941 and bravery of Russia in 1942.

[Anthony Ragan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A history of World War II as seen from the highest levels, the interactions of FDR, General Marshall, Winston Churchill, and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Here, the meetings, conferences, and telegrams through which grand strategy was made take center stage, while campaigns and battles are in the background. Rather than being dry, as one might fear, the four top leaders of the Allied cause are humanized (and perhaps torn down just a bit) by frequent references to the diaries kept by many of the principals and their deputies, many of which have come to light only in recent years. (And, on the British side, were illegal to be even kept.) Most striking is that, behind the (partial) mythology of allies united in a grand cause, there was a reality of mutual suspicion, annoyance, and bickering that frequently had to be settled by "air clearing sessions." That it held together at all was due, in Roberts' telling, to the perspicacity and self-sacrifice of the four men at the top. Highly recommended for those seeking a view of World War II from another angle than the usual.

Note: This book also gave me a greater appreciation of Canada's contribution to the Allied cause and, especially, Britain's survival. It's almost an insult they weren't included in these top-level military and political strategy.

[Gerry · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is how the alliance of Great Britain and America conducted the grand strategy of World War II. The four major players are Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and Brooke. If they don't already know it, readers will learn that this wasn't the easiest of alliances, as both countries had their own agendas and concerns, which they pushed through a series of high-level conferences. For me, the book was a pleasant read, and chock-full of stuff I didn't know before. For the first part of the war, the British, with more experience of the Germans' ability, dominated with a cautious strategy of war on the peripherals instead of with what may have been a failed attack across the Channel. Later, when America's production and numbers became great, the Americans dominated, focusing on Overlord and Anvil-Dragoon. While all four men fought vigorously for their views and with each other (not always along national lines), they supported each other once a decision was made. The author agrees with their decisions and credits each of the four with their contributions to victory. I found it to be, for all its size, an easy read, although it wasn't always easy to keep track of the lesser players. General (later Field Marshal) Brooke finally gets some recognition on this side of the pond for his ability and influence, much of it tested in keeping his boss's wilder ideas in check.

[pierre bovington · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best reads of WW2 I have ever read. Allow me to qualify my opinion, just a little. Mum was French, my father met her shortly after the war in Paris. Les Anglais, as the Brits were known, could not buy their own drinks in France, that has since changed!
I spent my holidays touring the battlefields of Normandy. Dad had 2 older brothers who served with Montgomery, they would not hear a word against the General.
As a keen student of this part of history, I grew up reading Liddle Hart, Lucas Philips, Winston S Churchill, Stephen Ambrose and any book I could get my hands on.
Andrew Roberts is well up in the list. His attention to detail, writing skills, most of all, he brings a human touch to history.

[Matthew Dambro · Rating 5 out of 5]

A truly magisterial work on the strategy of the West during the Second World War. Roberts research is impeccable, using unpublished sources and illegal diaries kept by many of the participants. His analysis of the four men and the mix of political and military objectives is nothing short of brilliant.

[Wayne Hastings · Rating 5 out of 5]

I so enjoyed this book. The author takes you behind the scenes of the impossible task of pulling together an alliance with leadership dominated by two powerfully charismatic political leaders and two brilliant, but often in disagreement, soldiers.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Andrew Roberts, a British historian and journalist, has written many books (sixteen are cited in Wikipedia), several on military leadership. This book assesses the U. S. and British leaders in World War II. The primary subjects are the two political leaders—Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt—and the two military leaders—Sir Alan Brooke for Britain and George Marshall for the U.S. The influence of secondary leaders is not neglected, but it is used primarily to reflect their relationships with the top men.

Of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, Churchill (descended from the First Duke of Marlborough) was by far the most experienced in foreign and military affairs: graduate of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, an officer in Africa before and during the Boer War, twice First Lord of the Admiralty, he considered himself an adept military strategist (though he had several major “setbacks:” in WWI he was the architect of the Dardanelles debacle, a major Ottomon victory and a painful British loss; in WWII he was the architect of the 1940 counterattack in Norway, another failed venture). Roberts notes Eisenhower’s comment that there are two professions in which amateurs think themselves professionals: military strategy and prostitution.

While Churchill considered himself a military strategist, the military men thought him a micromanager with more imagination than judgment. As Prime Minister he had his finger in every pie, even acting as his own Minister of Defence. He was vain, rude, and gloriously confrontational—he loved to poke at people—but his pugnacious style ferreted out those who could stand fast against him. To his great credit, Churchill didn’t want adoration—his self appreciation was enough; wanted antogonists to argue fiercely with him so that ideas could be more clearly evaluated.

And he found Alan Brooke, a scion of the Ulster Brookes who had fought with the British for as long as the Churchills. With a public persona of severity, rudeness, ill temper, and singlemindedness, Brooke was privately a warm man with an easy sense of humor and a thick hide. While he detested Churchill’s ways of approaching issues and his micromanagement, Brooke understood that the bluster was to survived and perhaps even enjoyed, rather than a cause for outrage and resignation. As Chief of the Imperial General Staff Brooke stood up to Churchill and was willing to, and adept at, channeling Churchill’s strategic imaginings into promising military channels. Just one example is Brooke’s ability to forestall Churchill’s injudicious plan to invade Norway (Operation Ajax) to open up a northern route to Germany; Ajax was proposed after the failed 1940 counterattack mentioned above.

Roosevelt was as egocentric as Churchill but better understood his military limits. He knew that his stint as Assistant Secretary of the Navy did not make him a military strategist and, though often willing to promote grand schemes, he more easily bent to the will of his chief military advisor, George Marshall. Brooke considered Marshall an adept at organization but a dim bulb on strategy. The Roosevelt-Marshall push for a Second Front in the form of Operations Roundup to set a large force in France and move to Germany, and Operation Sledgehammer to place a smaller force to fight on a western front and draw German troops to away from Russia). To do this in 1942 was anathema to Brooke and Churchill, who thought that several important conditions were lacking—the U.S. Army was ill-prepared, there was inadequate air cover, there were too few landing boats, the Battle of the Atlantic had not been resolved, Germany has not been weakened enough on the Russian front, and Marshall had no plans for action after the proposed landing in France. It sounds to me that there were some dim bulbs in America. Not until June of 1944—when the Soviet Union had weakened Germany and the U.S. military had grown from 200,000 to 8 million men—was the U.S. prepared and able to invade Europe in Operation Overlord nee Roundup/Sledgehammer.

Roosevelt was a better politician than Churchill, who had a way of irritating people so that he invited opposition (his farsighted awareness of Germany’s militarization under Hitler is an example). Roosevelt sensed when the U.S. could openly support Britain through Lend-Lease, and he openly advocated entering the war only after Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s declaration of war on America had handicapped the America Firsters and Republicans. Even so, his political errors could be significant—as when he thought he could “handle” Stalin through personal charm and conciliation, leaving the Soviet Union with a greater postwar East European presence than might have otherwise existed.

George Marshall, the only non-aristocrat in the group—was quiet, unassuming and charming in a profession where those were lost arts. Marshall had such presence that a room hushed when he entered, even if Roosevelt was in the room. He was a gentleman, devoid of the overarching ego of a Roosevelt, Churchill, or Brooke but firm in his own views. Brooke’s view of him is supported by Andrews: he was not the sharpest tool in the military strategy room, but he was central to reorganizing the U.S. military command structure in positive ways. This might be one of the few instances in which changes in an organization chart had powerful and lasting effects.

When Marshall became Army Chief of Staff in 1939, on the day Hitler invaded Poland, the U.S. military command was a near-shambles with each service branch operating independently and pursuing its own agenda. Among Marshall’s contributions was to encourage and build on Naval Chief William Leahy’s proposal to create a Joint Chiefs of Staff (Leahy’s role is not acknowledged by Andrews). The system of separate and independent service branches was replaced by a structure with the three Chiefs of Staff (Admiral King—Navy, General Marshall—Army, and General Arnold—Army Air Forces) joined by Leahy as chairman. This mimicked the Imperial General Staff structure. It also became the model for the joint American and British command structure—the Combined Chiefs of Staff—that thrashed out the differences between the two countries on matters of strategy and responsibility.

Marshall also was adept at choosing the right theater and field commanders for the Army efforts. He recognized that Eisenhower was the right man to command the European Theater because he was more politician than fighter—a balance despised by people like Patton and Montgomery but absolutely necessary to keep the Allies on task.

Finally, Marshall oversaw the growth of the U.S. Army from 200,000 men in 1939 to over 8 million in 1945, a forty-fold increase that demanded great expansion of facilities, training, and munitions. It was the American ability to do this at a time when other Allied nations were strapped that was the most significant factor in defeating the Axis powers.

Much of the book focuses on the debate over strategy in 1942. All felt that something had to be done to draw German forces away from the Eastern Front and to ante up on assurances to Stalin that there would be a Second Front that year. But what to do? The British, remembering the bloody stalemate in France, wanted to bleed Germany slowly by creating multiple fronts before a major invasion of France established the Second Front. The Americans wanted the direct approach of invading France in 1942 and driving toward Germany. In the end the British strategy won out--in 1942's Operation Torch the Allies took North Africa, then moved on to Sicily (Operation Husky) and Italy. Churchill was, typically, all over the map--he singlehandedly pushed for an action in Norway (Operation Jupiter nee Ajax), and after Italy he wanted to move into the Balkan states rather than into France and Germany. He had no takers among the Allies, and Stalin, of course, was opposed because he wanted a Western Front to divert German resources from Russia and he had his own plans for the Balkans.

As time passed and American military power increased, Brooke and Churchill found that the Americans came to dominate strategy decisions, though not without constant "discussion" with Britain.
These complex negotiations bordered on farce as each party tried to lobby the others through side deals and posturing--one almost sees them rotating around bedrooms to whisper in opponents' ears. Once a settlement was thought agreed to, the parties would shift positions and it would start again. In the end, everyone won at least something: Churchill was the man out on Norway and on the Balkans but he and Brooke won on North Africa and Italy, Roosevelt and Marshall were men out on an early French Invasion, France, but they redirected energies to France after Italy. If a successful negotiation is when everyone feels disappointment then the Combined Chiefs conferences were successful.

Andrews draws on a variety of sources, most prominently the writings of the protagonists and their subordinates but also some new internet sources. Diaries were generally forbidden in the military but, fortunately, this prohibition was honored in the breach and everyone kept a daily record of activities, debates, and decisions. The characters of the Big Four are painstakingly drawn out and what emerges is a core of leaders that, though different in almost every respect, and able to fight like siblings after a reading of the will, developed a common respect and admiration for each other and learned to handle the human foibles and appreciate the strengths of their counterparts.

There are hundreds (thousands?) of books on all aspects of World War II, and nothing new is likely to emerge 70 or more years after the war’s end. Current books (this one is 2008) will differ in packaging and interpretation of raw materials, and this is what Roberts’ does so successfully. Yes, there is a British perspective, but it adds to the richness of our (American) understanding of the events, and who knows, it might even have merit.

I’d guess that all WWII nonfiction spends some time talking about the four central characters in Roberts’ book. But this book, with its focus on the high command of the Allies, makes those four figures both human in their petty rancor and infighting, and majestic in their inexorable push to formulate and accomplish a common goal. This book is a deeply researched, extremely well written, and an entertaining insight into one of the most significant international efforts of the twentieth century.

The book leaves one wondering what the course of the war might have been if different names had topped the leadership. I am very grateful that Alan Brooke was in the mix.

[Preliminary Review--Subject to Amendment]

[Lewi · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my favorite books, which took me about two months to read (roughly two hours per day), is a captivating exploration of history. While some might find it dull due to its focus on chronological meetings and conferences among political leaders and high-ranking military officers, I found it thoroughly engaging.

The author masterfully presents the material, making the book a joy to read. It offers a fascinating glimpse into the minds behind the strategies and decisions that shaped critical battles in the European theater. The historical figures portrayed are revealed as deeply human, grappling with ego, emotions, biases, and flaws. Yet, despite these imperfections, they ultimately united to fulfill their duties with unwavering commitment.

As a fan of World War II history, I’ve read many books on the subject, but most focus solely on battles. This book stands out by illuminating the challenging decisions made behind closed doors. I’m grateful the author crafted this work, ensuring the contributions of these individuals to the most devastating war in modern history are not forgotten.

[Dan Cohen · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good account of the trials and tribulations of the political and military leaders of the US and UK during the second world war, with the focus on the military leads - Marshall and Alanbrooke respectively. By this account, both seem to have achieved a huge amount in the face of near overwhelming difficulties, not least being the differences between them.

The theme that crops up constantly is the suspicion both sides had of each other (especially the suspicion the Americans had of the British) about war aims and how these were to be achieved. It's all solid material although I did tire of it towards the end. Another minor quibble is that the focus on the war in the west seems a bit arbitrary as the fact of the war in the east seems to have played such a large factor in the arguments over the war in the west. I'm not really sure that the two can be separated in a book about the overall political and military leaders.

Nevertheless, this is a good read and I'd recommend this book to anyone interested in the strategy and course of the war.

[Graeme Shimmin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Masters and Commanders is the story of how British and US leaders set the overall Anglo-American strategy of the Second World War.

I found the book fascinating for most of it's 600 pages. It's a long and very detailed book, but written in a gripping style.

The Anglo-American disagreements were between a Clausewitzian head on attack on Germany (largely favoured by the US) and a more Sun Tzu style whittling down (largely favoured by the British).

Churchill is seen as the core of the alliance and as a very human figure - massively energetic, hugely charming, a genius, but harebrained, stubborn, emotional and sometimes a bully - although much is made of the fact that he never overruled his commanders.

Brooke, the British chief of staff comes over as the tough-guy Churchill needed to keep him on track. The fact that Brooke kept a diary means his views on strategy are clearly understood as well as his views on the other characters (none of whom, in his opinion, really 'get it', his exasperation with almost everyone comes over well).

President Roosevelt is portrayed as the swing vote with little understanding of military strategy, though a political genius. Everyone tries to keep Churchill away from him, afraid of his persuasiveness.

American chief of staff General Marshall comes across as a tough-minded and professional soldier as well as an old-school gentleman, not perhaps a strategic genius, but a genius as an organiser.

American Admiral King is cast almost as the villain - an unpleasant man, who no one on either side likes and who is constantly upsetting the apple cart. Many of the other Americans are accused of an irrational hatred and suspicion of the British. The British are shown as at least up to 1943 as being better organised. After that, the Americans catch up and then take over - to the chagrin of some of the British.

The participants are mostly exhausted and sick of each other by the end and relationships have become strained to say the least - the victory celebration where Churchill offers Brooke champagne and a short speech of thanks and appreciation and gets nothing in return was almost heartbreaking - but disagreements were brushed over in the flush of victory and the participant's postwar memoirs are also shown to be uniformly self-serving and bowdlerised.

The author also makes the case that both the Americans and the British fell into group-think, but were forced to justify themselves to the other nation. In the end that made the allies' strategy better - the British-style 'peripheral' strategy was right in 1942 and 1943, but by 1944 the time had come for the American-style 'frontal assault'.

The book did get a bit samey (another conference, more arguing) and it petered out a bit towards the end, but I guess that's a consequence of the fact that it's real history, not a novel.

Overall a fascinating study for anyone interested in grand strategy.

[Paul Mamani · Rating 5 out of 5]

A richly detailed examination of the military and civilian leaders of Britain and America during World War II.

Just before Franklin Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, when Nazi Germany had all but collapsed, U.S. military commander George C. Marshall wrote, “Our greatest triumph really lies in the fact that we achieved the impossible, Allied military unity of action.” Schooled in the wars of the 19th century and the trenches of WWI, Marshall shared military background but little else with his British counterpart, Alan Brooke. In 1942, the American newcomers to the European theater found that, even after defeats nearly every time British forces met German ones on the ground, the British general staff was not inclined to have former colonials in command. Fantastic rows ensued as both the British and the American armies aligned command structures closely enough to cooperate in battle. It cost the British leadership considerable effort to convince American counterparts that the war in North Africa was not a sideshow, while the Americans believed that the British were “viscerally opposed to any cross-Channel operation ever taking place,” all the way up to D-Day and the Normandy landings. Even very late in the war, Roberts (A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900, 2007, etc.) notes, those leaders sharply disagreed on matters of both strategy and tactics. Yet amazingly, Marshall, Churchill, Roosevelt and Brooke developed an effective partnership in the West. Historians disinclined to the Great Man school of historical writing may object to the notion, but clearly powerful personalities and no small degree of luck were involved. Roberts’s narrative sometimes reads like an exercise in game theory, with each player trying to secure maximum advantage without ending the game or, worse, losing all. His book will be of value to students not just of military history, but also diplomacy, business and other endeavors requiring negotiation.

[Cristine · Rating 3 out of 5]

A look at the discussions between Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Brooke and how they shaped the outcome of the war in Europe. Not a book about the battles, but the decisions that set conditions for the fighting. Lots of insight and some interesting analysis by the author. The drama and squabbling between the senior officials is well documented and supports the final conclusion that the fact that the allies could come to consensus was a minor miracles. Some of the personal stories about the main characters bring them to life and makes the store readable.

On the downside, while there are some interesting conclusions from a historical perspective, at times they go too far, e.g., the suggestion that Roosevelt and Dill were casualties of the war is dramatic speculation, not medical fact. Additionally there are some stories that don't really fit or have relevance that come across in a gossipy way. This is especially troubling with minor characters who don't have a place in the rest of the story such as a Marshall aide's homosexuality and the implied infidelity of a British aide evidenced by underwear shopping. The sole purpose of including Wedemeyer, the architect of the US strategy, appears to be included simply to call him an anglophobe. This is even listed under his picture in the photo sections. The color of the characters adds value to the book, but not all are relevant to the book.

Masters and Commanders is a readable, interesting approach to World War II strategy. It is a fairly easy read and is a good supplement to other WWII literature.

[Bill · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good and thorough examination of the interactions between the 4 principals architects of the Western Allies' grand strategy during WWII. Roosevelt and Churchill (the Masters), Marshall and Brooke (the Commanders) all are depicted vividly, as well as the constantly changing interpersonal dynamics that determined which strategies were followed.

It's fascinating to follow the complicated, multi-year dance between the four, all extremely strong personalities with their own views on how best to win the wars against Germany and Japan. Each knew he needed the support of at least 2 of the others to get his way on a particular issue. Roosevelt, the canny politician, was the only one to never have the other three united against him.

This book, and all accounts of these events, suffer from a major hole in the record - Roosevelt's perspective. Churchill, Brooke and Marshall all got to tell their sides of the story after the war was over, but of course due to his untimely death Roosevelt never got the chance.

This is especially unfortunate, because as Roberts states in the book's conclusion: "Of the four Masters and Commanders...the man who most influenced the course of the war was...Franklin Delano Roosevelt." He was "the ultimate arbiter between the competing strategies of Marshall, Churchill and Brooke." What a loss to history that we never got to hear FDR's perspective on these years.

[PyranopterinMo · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book explains the evolution of the U.S. and G. B. grand strategy in WW2. The four key players are Marshall and Brooke, the chiefs of staff and Roosevelt and Churchill, the elected leaders. Roberts relies on a lot more than the official record and various post war autobiographical books and interviews and goes to some length to correct the record. In addition to a careful analysis he reviewed a number of diaries that were kept often against regulation by secondary members of the various meetings that decided policy. Some of these were not published or published in edited form or a decade or more after the war. This is especially helpful when both sides officially tried to minimize the intensity of a dispute. The book is very balanced on the disputes between the two members of the alliance.
This book is not a vivid description of various battles or a long essay on mistakes and criticism of leaders. The overall tone is very positive and most of the serious mistakes were not carried out due to the give and take process.
I don't entirely agree with it but its aimed at a large multinational audience and takes a diplomatic position between sides.

[Ronald Golden · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have read many books about World War II and several specifically about the people who played key roles in its prosecution, specifically Churchill, Marshall and Eisenhower. This particular book delves into the dynamic of how the four primary decision makers, Roosevelt, Marshall, Churchill and Brook, interacted and how this interaction played into their decisions. This was really an interesting look into the "war behind the war." I knew that there had to be a lot of friction between these players but I had no idea to what extent it existed. It is remarkable and to their credit that these men where able to successfully conduct the strategy that won World War II considering the differences in opinion and ideas that they had. I found it particularly interesting to read about how the shift of power occurred between Great Britain and the United States as the war progressed. It also reaffirmed by belief in the two great men of the 20th Century, Winston Churchill and George Marshall. Anyone who is interested in World War II will find this book a great read.

[Charlie Shaw · Rating 2 out of 5]

For those lovers of American Military History out there this is a must read. Most know about the greatest assembled armada in modern times - the D day invasion of June 6, 1944.
What most don't know are the stories behind the stories. From the Dunkirk salvage of the British army to the German capitulation there are 6 years of hard, bitterly contested, ego-contentious choices made by the British and American leaders to finally win the war.
This anthology gives every one's opinion of what should be done and when. The contentious egos of both American and British commanders and de =facto leaders of each side wage war between themselves to see who goes where and what should be done.
This is a hard read and I found myself wanting to stop and put it down and walk away. It is a meticulously crafted, blow by blow account of every decision made by the combined staffs and alludes to the egos involved in the who should lead and where we should go.

[Jesse Barnes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Lots of interesting material in here. Unfortunately it was presented in a difficult to read style; for example every paragraph seemed to have at least one (often distracting) quote from a primary source, and the author often went out of his way to qualify somewhat straightforward statements with provisos and obvious caveats. I vastly prefer David McCullough's style, which is heavily based on primary material but very readable, quoting only particularly poignant or expressive source material from diary entries or elsewhere, and avoiding excessive qualifications on conclusions drawn by the author based on copious evidence.



That said, I'd definitely recommend it to people who have already read WWII histories or biographies related to the subjects and want to learn more (the amount of information combed to write this book is truly awe inspiring).

[Andrew Pratley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Marvelous piece of work by Andrew Roberts. I did the subject of this book this at University. I had a whole course on it. The difference between doing it then & reading this book is that the story & characters are brought to life if you read this book rather than take the course I did. I wish we had been able to read this book back in my University days.
The four principal actors in this story Churchill, Brooke, Roosevelt & Marshall are all quite different characters. Each with their evident strengths & obvious weaknesses. All worked under immense stress for years at a time. Often they disagreed. However, almost miraculously, they collective got the big decisions right. This has to be to their great credit.
If you want understand why democracies are better at fighting wars than dictatorships then read this book.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A few years ago Hal Brands, of Johns Hopkins and the American Enterprise Institute, published a monograph titled “What Good is Grand Strategy.” The provocative title notwithstanding, Brands makes the point that a government reaching a grand strategy—to pull together competing tradeoffs encompassing every aspect of national power and political will—is immensely challenging; for two nations—one a global empire, the other an unassailable continental power, one descending on the ebb, the other not yet at flood tide—to agree, over months and years of internal battles, to reach a united grand strategy that permitted victory in history’s fiercest conflict, is unimaginable. But it happened.

How that happened is Roberts’ challenge in Masters and Commanders, and he certainly accomplishes it. It would be an overstretch to say that Churchill’s profile of Admiral John Jellicoe extends to any one of the title foursome—that he could lose the war in an afternoon—but it is a thought provoking question to consider. To swap out Roosevelt or Churchill at various points in the political nature of the Second World War would likely have been disastrous: for Roosevelt, that time lay before Pearl Harbor as he quietly marshaled industry to prepare for global conflict; for Churchill, it is in the obvious dark days between the Fall of France, the Blitz, and Barbarossa.

Likewise, for the Commanders, Marshall and Brooke, while less famous than Eisenhower and Montgomery, were instrumental in organizing for victory, pushing back against the mistakes of their political masters or the combined faults of the other nation’s strategies, and in generally ensuring that the combined thinking of their staffs were pointed in one direction: victory in the shortest, least costly order.

But at the same time, the industrial, technological, and materiel weight of Britain and the United States would have in time buried the strength of Germany—especially considering the enormous loss of life and equipment on the Eastern Front. What differentiated these four men? First, their personal camaraderie was immense, even as they fiercely battled at the conference table and in letter. Lesser men would have permitted shouting matches about strategy to have poisoned their ability to work together or shattered their confidence to pieces. Not these men. Second, their absolute commitment to not bucking the authority of those who got them into their positions ensured that they did not overstretch their limits. For the Masters, this was the voters, for the Commanders, it was the Masters, as well the unified positions of their military peers (i.e. they did not betray the confidence of their peers in their deliberations with their political Masters). This meant that Roosevelt had to commit American troops to fighting Germans earlier than preferred in order to maintain political goodwill at home. It also meant that when Churchill came up with a poor strategic idea, the unity that Brook and his peers on the Chiefs of Staff Committee mutually agreed to stopped him from picking one off and seeking to shift the battle against the others. Finally, it was the ability of the Americans and Britains to understand in time when they respectively had the upper-hand. The Americans acquiesced to the British up until they were delivering the preponderance of men, industry, and materiel; at which point the British began to lose strategic negotiations or chose to not pick the fight at all. Fighting a losing battle is a mistake that Hitler made again and again; not so for the Anglo-American alliance.

Some have critiqued Roberts’ account as being too fixated on personalities and their individual battles. What of the political dynamics in Washington? What of the industrial and financial capabilities? These cannot be ignored, but neither should they be overstated. As previously stated, those factors would have in time likely delivered victory, but as different men would have also delivered victory—but it may have been a different victory. It may have been the detonation of an atomic weapon over Frankfurt or the Russians becoming masters of Continental Europe. The personalities involved had personalities. They were products of their military educations, their experience—or lack thereof—on the battlefield. Brook’s irascible nature mattered because it meant he failed to see certain possibilities even while holding back other poor options presented to him by Churchill. Marshall’s uprightness meant that he did not undercut Roosevelt and never entered into a political or overly personal relationship with him, and it meant that he never permitted an undermining of Eisenhower, even as enemies abounded. He stuck to his guns, even as he was a gentleman. It was the personalities of these men that enabled to them reach by hammer and tong strategic decisions that positively shaped how Britain and America fought a global war. Lessons abound, but one that cannot be countenanced is that personalities do not matter.

One critique that I will countenance is that Roberts is a bit repetitive, in both his description of the players involved and the patterns of their interactions and debates. On the other hand, he is extremely balanced. Each of the title foursome comes under fire for their failings, even as the countless secondary or tertiary characters are thoughtfully appraised. I would quibble with his descriptions of some (Eisenhower, King), but he shows no animus in how he presents four years of wartime strategic decision making. It is at times a master class in how soldiers and statesmen seek primacy in wartime, and a worthwhile contribution to Second World War scholarship.

[Brad Butler]

Andrew Roberts is one of my favorite historians and writers. I have practically his entire collection of books and am never ceased to be amazed at how he brings new perspectives and material to stories, such as Churchill and Napoleon, that have been written about many times. His style of writing is something to savor and enjoy on so many different levels.

[Grindy Stone · Rating 4 out of 5]

Deep dive into the relationships between FDR, Churchill, George Marshall and Alan Brooke as they strategized their ways to victory in Europe during WW2. Roberts is a guru on the subject, and no Allied meeting during the war escapes his notice.