The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

by Terence Cuneo

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true.In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moralfacts highly attractive.

Genres: Philosophy

271 pages, Kindle Edition

First published September 6, 2007

Reviews

[Alan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Aims to convince the reader that moral facts exist, but ended up convincing me that neither moral nor epistemic facts exist.

That said, I'm a layperson and not a scholar of philosophy, so much of the book went over my head. Therefore I'm rating it 3 stars as a neutral rating, since I don't feel qualified to assess it academically.

[Matej · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very thoroughly argued book, probably on its way to becoming a classic. I have two observations:

1) Cuneo's argument against epistemological expressivism seems a little weak, because it consists to a large extent in pointing out that this position means our ordinary epistemic discourse is in error as it misapplies epistemic concepts. Avoiding the consequence that everyday epistemic discourse is in error is, according to Cuneo, a major motivation for expressivism, and so failure in this objective should count against expressivism. It is unclear to me though, that the expressivists would accept Cuneo's broadening of the category of unacceptable errors to include more than strict falsity. Arguably, it is the point of expressivism, that our epistemic discourse is indeed mistaken, but importantly not false. Admittedly though, I might need to reread this part of the book to understand Cuneo's argument better.

2) Although Cuneo claims that his argument will work for many different types of moral realism, and does not specifically depend on any particular formulation thereof, nor does it favour any particular theory of normative ethics, it appears to me, that some crucial steps in his argument for the Parity Premise work more smoothly if one endorses virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Whether these parts of the argument can work even if one does not wish to subscribe to these views I am not best placed to judge.

[Rachael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cuneo's argument is that there is a parity between epistemic norms and moral ones. If there are no moral facts, he argues, there are no epistemic normative facts either. He then argues that there are epistemic normative facts, so there are moral facts and therefore moral realism is true. The defense of the premises turns around using the non realist moral arguments again epistemic normative facts by converting them to that purpose. Cuneo shows that nihilism about epistemic normative facts makes it impossible to act as a rational agent at all, and therefore error theory about moral facts won't work either. He then shows that expressivist theories fail to retain our common understanding about what we are doing when invoking facts about epistemic norms without lapsing into nihilism or realism. I found his discussions about traditional and non traditional expressivisms, the former the more familiar emotivism or prescriptivism and the latter quasi-realist positions helpful. The last argument he tackles is reductionism where he demonstrates that reductionist pictures of epistemic normative facts fail to preserve either internal or external justification as they only allow for hypothetical reasons, so that unless someone's belief comes by way of their desires and goals they fail to be justified.

In his discussion about the symmetry between epistemic and moral normative facts he points out that many epistemic failings are also moral ones, ones that turn on dishonesty or being unjustly biased etc are both moral and epistemic failings. Therefore if moral facts are too 'objectionable' by having a weird ontology or having categorical application, then so are epistemic ones, and then the alternatives fall prey to his analysis I described above. He also points out that, re Gibbard et al, the worry that moral reasons have to be about endorsement are misplaced, they merely give merit to endorsement, not endorsement itself.

[Lewis Whelan · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting and troublesome argument for moral realism. Put simply, moral and epistemic properties exhibit categorical normativity. So if moral properties don't exist on that basis, then neither do epistemic properties. But we know that epistemic properties must exist, because we make *true* epistemic claims. Therefore nihilism with respect to moral properties is false. Such is the argument of the book. Nicely written, clearly argued, and there are some really interesting examples which Cuneo uses to test even the most stalwart of nihilistic intuitions. Of interest to metaethicists and others with a stake in the useless but intriguing arguments of analytic philosophy.

[Michael Fitzpatrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very good argument, and well stated, but the book is a perfect example of how analytic writing has gotten so pedantic that the writing gets in the way. It's a difficult read, and could have been stated much simpler, shorter and clearer. That being said, the case for moral realism grows. I hope to see more from Cuneo in the future. Epistemic nihilists and moral anti-realists, beware!