The never-before-told story of the epic battle of wills between Andrew Mellon and Winston Churchill, as they debated the repayment of the enormous sums loaned by America to Great Britain during World War I.
Andrew Mellon, one of the most accomplished businessmen of his era, is almost unknown today. To this shy, diffident (but brilliant) man fell the daunting task of collecting the war debts from European governments still devastated by World War I and struggling to recover economically. Dealing with the U.S. Congress and the heads of foreign governments on the world stage became one of the great adventures of his life.
Winston Churchill is one of the best-known figures in history. Mellon vs. Churchill presents Churchill through a different lens, focusing on his service as Chancellor of the Exchequer when Great Britain was the largest debtor to the United States. That he became the most vocal critic of American foreign policy during that time is a scarcely told chapter of economic history—and his long and contentious debate with Mellon has seldom been explored.
Yet, during the five years that Churchill served as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-1929), Mellon was his counterpart at the United States Treasury, and their debate and fierce differences of opinion about the handling of what Churchill called “the monstrous war debts” made frequent headlines on both sides of the Atlantic.
No mention of any of their five meetings are included in the official biographies of either man. Now these confrontations are brought to vivid life in Mellon vs. Churchill , as are many other vignettes from their very public, but largely forgotten, rivalry. Mellon vs. Churchill brings the reader inside the adventurous lives of these two great public figures—men who were not afraid to take huge risks to pursue their grand ambitions.
I think this book is addressing a really important subject, namely war debts between the WWI allies, in particular the US loans to European countries. But I can only give it 1 star because to me it didn't address the totality of the subject. And maybe that wasn't the intent. But frankly, the conflict between Mellon (AW) and Churchill was just not that interesting to me.
So yes, to me, the book clearly came across as supporting the Allies against the money-grubbing capitalist US loan sharks. I mean, come on, who really believed these loans were going to be repaid? Certainly not the British nobility, which so generously led the rube Americans onto the world stage. US loans were just the price of admission! So do you actually expect moi to repay these loans???
The book doesn't really cover the Genesis of the loans, and only mentions 2/3s of the way through that the US taxpayer was told these loans were commercial in nature and would be repaid. Meanwhile, I expect the loans were given to the Allies with a wink and a nod that they wouldn't have to be repaid. Unfortunately for the Allies, Wilson had a stroke, and no one ever bothered to tell the US taxpayer the truth.
So that's the real point of the book, as best I can tell: the real problems in the world are US politicians who just can't seem to clearly articulate all the good that could be done if the US taxpayer could just be convinced to pony up and pay for it! I mean, what's the point of power unless it's exercised?
Never mind that it's people like Churchill who have decided they should be the ones making the Big Important Decisions. If only Peoria could be convinced to pay for it! Sigh.
And you would think, since Churchill so desperately needed the US to support his ideas of How the World Should Be Run, that he would show some deference. He does not. It was his strategy to embarrass the US into doing what he wanted it to do.
The book also takes its sweet time explaining that the US really did attempt to evaluate the Allies' ability to repay the war debts and gave extremely generous repayment terms. We can argue over whether that evaluation was correct (the book ignores that question), but the attempt was made.
The other question the book ignores is whether or not British and French politicians simply found debt repayments a convenient excuse for their own failures to improve their economies after the war. That was my very first suspicion. After all, politicians have always blamed non-voters for their countries' problems.
OK, you know what I think about the book. What did you think?
(Side note: Peter Hitchens points out regularly when discussing the "special relationship" between the US and Great Britian that GB has STILL not repaid its WWI debts).
This was a history of the interactions of Andrew Mellon and Winston Churchill during the 1920s concerning their dueling national policies regarding the relationship between German reparation payments to the victorious allied powers and the payments of allied powers to the US over loans from the US during WW1. The issues in general focused on whether the US should be lenient and even forgiving about allied debt as contrasted with the needs of allies to obtain reparation payments from Germany in order to make their payments to the US. Settlements were reached and some payments made, although the controversy was acrimonious both in public media and in governmental and societal circles. The issue eventually was settled for good - or at least died down - with the advent of the Great Depression, the rise of Hitler, and the eventual coming of WW2. Mellon and Churchill, as their country’s key financial leaders during the controversy were natural focal points of the interactions between Great Britain and the US.
The war debt controversies are well known and well documented, so the book does not break new ground on them. The position of Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer is of some interest, although Churchill’s other actions during this time are arguably as important (for example, the reestablishment of Great Britain on the gold standard - btw at an overvalued level). It is the additional insight and information on Mellon that is more striking to me and his role and importance are arguably underemphasized.
Jill Eicher’s book is well researched and well written and is worth reading, especially if one is interested in post WW1 and pre-depression financial history.
This book was based on a previous article the author wrote; the article would probably have sufficed. The book's length is dragged out, and yet never gets that deep. I didn't learn that much about how international debt actually works, but I certainly learned plenty about Andrew Mellon's art collection.
It's not a terrible book, by any stretch. Churchill's stint as chancellor of the exchequer is an important part of his career that I didn't know much about--and I knew nearly nothing about Mellon. So I did appreciate learning a few things about these (truly) great men. But the book itself could have been better executed.
I didn’t know anything about Mellon, so learning about him was interesting. But I think a long form article would have sufficed here- there’s a definite feeling of padding (does reading about ‘society’ events add anything?). the parallels to the present are interesting. A lot of shouting about Americans being owned repayment when a lot of money had been spent… buying American weapons.
This is an entertaining book that deals with the economic aftermath of WWI. It is centered on the war debt and reparations and whether or not it was better to enforce them or remit them. With two heavyweights like Mellon and Churchill, let the plotting and fireworks begin
The attempt to make the text fit the title feels forced. Also wonder if there wasn’t some extreme slashing of words to keep the book to a reasonable length given its disjointedness and the way it jumps around and leaves points half made and/or seem like non-sequiturs.
The title gives hope for a more intense a different story but in the book several other factors and relationships had even a more deep relation than the one of the two main characters in the title of the book.
A good history of war debt arrangements and the triangle of reparations that ultimately unraveled but not at all about the interactions between Andrew Mellon and Winston Churchill. You find that they barely met or spent any time negotiating face-to-face.