Meaning in Life and Why It Matters

The University Center for Human Values Series

by Susan R. Wolf, Stephen Macedo (Contributor), John Koethe (Contributor)

Most people, including philosophers, tend to classify human motives as falling into one of two categories: the egoistic or the altruistic, the self-interested or the moral. According to Susan Wolf, however, much of what motivates us does not comfortably fit into this scheme. Often we act neither for our own sake nor out of duty or an impersonal concern for the world. Rather, we act out of love for objects that we rightly perceive as worthy of love--and it is these actions that give meaning to our lives. Wolf makes a compelling case that, along with happiness and morality, this kind of meaningfulness constitutes a distinctive dimension of a good life. Written in a lively and engaging style, and full of provocative examples, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters is a profound and original reflection on a subject of permanent human concern.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Psychology, School, College, Education, Essays

162 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2010

About the author

Susan R. Wolf (born 1952) is a moral philosopher and philosopher of action who is the Edna J. Koury Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Wolf earned a BA from Yale University in philosophy and mathematics and a PhD in philosophy from Princeton University with a dissertation directed by Thomas Nagel.

Before taking up her current position at North Carolina, Wolf taught at Harvard University, the University of Maryland, and the Johns Hopkins University.

Wolf was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1999 and of the American Philosophical Society in 2006. She received a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award in the Humanities in 2002.

Her husband, Douglas MacLean, is also a philosopher teaching at UNC-Chapel Hill.

(from Wikipedia)

Reviews

[Makmild · Rating 2 out of 5]

จบสักที ดาวแรกให้กับความพยายามที่อ่านจบ ดาวที่สองให้กับความพยายามของคนแปล

(รีวิว)

ไม่มั่นใจนักว่าหนังสือเล่มนี้เขียนให้ใครอ่าน คนธรรมดาทั่วไป หรือเพื่อนนักวิชาการกันแน่? เพราะมันอ่านยากเสียเหลือเกิน ยากจนสงสัยว่า นี่กูมาหาคำตอบของความหมายของชีวิตหรือมาหาคำตอบว่าหนังสือเล่มนี้อยากพูดเรื่องความหมายของชีวิตว่าอะไรกันแน่นะ ยังไงนะ? อยากอธิบายว่าอะไรนะ ขออีกทีสิ แบบนี้ไปทั้งเล่ม คือพูดแบบนี้เหมือนว่าหนังสือไม่มีอะไร เอ่อ จริงๆ มันมีนะ นี่อ่านไปก็เขียนโน๊ตบ่นไปทั้งเล่มว่า อะไรนะ ทำไมถึงเขียนแบบนี้นะ แต่โดยรวมแล้ว คิดเอาเองว่าซูซานอยากบอกว่าความหมายของชีวิตนี่มีได้หลายพันล้านแบบเลยนะ มันเป็นสิ่งที่สังคมมนุษย์กำหนดร่วมกัน ไม่ใช่สิ่งที่มนุษย์เพียงคนเดียวกำหนดเอาเองว่านี่คือความหมายของชีวิต นอกจากนั้นเรายังต้องหาสิ่งที่เหมาะสมเพื่อเป็นความหมายของชีวิตด้วยนะ พูดงี้ของขึ้นเลยดิ ชีวิตเรากำหนดเองดิวะว่าอะไรเป็นหรือไม่เป็นความหมาย ทำไมสังคมต้องมายุ่งกับชีวิตชั้นด้วยอะ แล้วใครเป็นคนตัดสินเรื่องเหมาะไม่เหมาะ ตอบบบบบบ

แต่ๆ (เออ ใจเย็นๆนะ) สมมตินะว่า สมมติ ความหมายของชีวิตคนๆ นี้คือ การเข็นหินก้อนใหญ่ๆ ขึ้นภูเขาอย่างยากลำบากเพื่อทำมันตกลงมาแล้วเข็นขึ้นไปใหม่ (ใช่ ถ้าคุณคุ้นถูกแล้ว ซิซีฟัสในตำนานกรีกไง) เขาหาความหมายจากการกระทำนี้ได้หรือ แน่นอนว่าได้ ตามที่เราเห็นการตีความหมายใหม่ของซิซีฟัสในหนังสือเล่มต่างๆ หรือถ้าตัวซิซีฟัสพอใจกับชีวิตของตัวเองแล้วเราจะไปบ่นอะไรได้อีก แต่ถ้าถูกถามว่าเราอยากเป็นซิซีฟัสมั้ย ใครจะอยาก แต่แน่นอนว่ามันมีเงื่อนไขชีวิตบางแบบที่เราไม่สามารถหลุดพ้นได้ เหมือนที่ซิซีฟัสเผชิญ การค้นหาความหมายในความยากลำบากนั้นก็อาจเป็นอีกหนึ่งที่มาเติมเต็มชีวิตได้ แต่มันคงไม่ใช่สิ่งที่เหมาะสมในการเลื่อกทำเท่าไร

ประเด็นที่เราเถียงทั้งเล่มคือ "เหมาะสม" และแน่นอนว่าเล่มนี้ก็ไม่ได้ให้คำตอบอะไร 5555555555 ได้แต่ให้เถียงกลับหนังสือหรือเห็นด้วยในบางประเด็นเท่านั้น ซึ่งก็อาจสรุปได้แบบอย่างกำปั้นทุบดินว่า "ความหมายของชีวิตเกิดจากความรักและมีความสัมพันธ์อันดีกับสิ่งที่คู่ควร" ไอ้เวร คู่ควรมาอีกแล้ว แต่นั่นแหละ บางครั้งเราก็เหมารวมไปหน่อยว่าการกระทำทุกอย่างนั้นมีความหมาย ซึ่งเพราะเราไม่อยากไปตัดสินความเป็นปัจเจกของคนอื่น แต่ก็อีกนั่นแหละ ปัจเจกก็ตัดสินกันเองได้ว่าความคู่ควรคืออะไรจากพูดคุยกันอย่างสร้างสรรค์และมึนงง เพราะหากปัจเจกตัดการพูดคุยหารือร่วมกันแล้วจะเกิดสังคมขึ้นมาได้อย่างไร?

เห้อ นี่รีวิวหรือบ่นอะไรนะ

[Maughn Gregory · Rating 5 out of 5]

I wish more philosophers wrote like this: clear, jargon-free, concise and addressed to human experience. I also like the format of a position statement followed by a number of responses, and then a response to the responses. Wolf argues, and I agree, that "meaning" in life is not the same as either morality or self-interest, and that our habit of defining the latter as mutually exclusive makes it hard for us to understand what makes a life meaningful.

[Kin · Rating 4 out of 5]

อ่านง่ายและสนุกมากทีเดียว วูล์ฟพยายามชวนเราคิดว่าอะไรคือสิ่งที่เรียกว่าความหมายของชีวิต โดยการไล่ดูว่าชีวิตที่เรามักคิดว่าไม่มีความหมายประกอบไปด้วยอะไรบ้าง มีใครเสนออะไรไว้แล้วบ้าง แล้วค่อยประกอบกันขึ้นเป็นข้อเสนอของตัวเอง หลักๆ แล้ววูล์ฟเสนอว่า ชีวิตจะมีความหมายก็เมื่อ subjective attraction มาเจอกับ objective attractiveness พูดง่ายๆ คือเมื่อเรารักในสิ่งที่ควรค่าแก่การรัก เมื่อเราเข้าไปผูกพันหรือมีส่วนร่วมกับสิ่งของ กิจกรรม หรือผู้คนที่คู่ควรและเป็นความผูกพันในทางที่ดี

พูดมาแบบนี้บางคนอาจจะมีข้อถกเถียงอยู่เต็มไปหมด เราอ่านเองก็เถียงในใจอยู่ตลอดเล่ม โดยเฉพาะประเด็นเรื่อง subjectivity/objectivity ซึ่งวูล์ฟหาทางออกให้มันได้ดีทีเดียว แต่ความสนุกจริงๆ ของเล่มนี้คือตอนท้ายเล่มจะมีบทวิจารณ์สั้นๆ ของนักวิชาการอีกหลายคนที่ทั้งโต้แย้งและพาข้อเสนอของวูล์ฟไปไกลอีกระดับ ปิดท้ายด้วบทตอบของวูล์ฟเอง

เห็นด้วยไม่เห็นด้วยว่ากันไป แต่อันนี้น่าจะเป็นตัวอย่างของการเขียนงานเชิงปรัชญาที่ดีมากๆ เลย ไล่ลอจิกไปทีละขั้นๆ เหมาะกับการทั้งฝึกอ่านและฝึกเขียน ติดตามฉบับภาษาไทยได้เร็วๆ นี้

[Emre Sevinç · Rating 4 out of 5]

I learned about the author of this book thanks to "Awakening from the Meaning Crisis" lectures by John Vervaeke. The title of the book might mislead some people and make them think that this is some sort of self-help book. It is anything but. On the other hand, it felt like a piece of light reading after I struggled with The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy and Being and Time.

The author tackles a valuable question that I don't see in academic philosophy very frequently. Using a clear, precise and not-dry-at-all philosophical style, she analyzes what makes a long-term activity really meaningful and how to strongly ground this concept as well as why this is worthy of such philosophical effort to begin with. Due to the inevitable psychological factors involved, the author's overall argumentation still seems to be on shaky ground, but the effort is laudable, noteworthy and a very good example of philosophical analysis of a thorny problem.

I mentioned that this philosophical analysis is not dry at all, but what makes this book even more lively and engaging is the section in which some philosophy and psychology professors provide us with criticism of the main arguments. Following this, the author presents her response, enabling the reader to look at the topic from a wide perspective.

I wish the author went into more depth and included other aspects in her analysis, e.g., a historical perspective where she could argue how meaningful activities might have been shaped via evolution, as well as the impact of social incentives on value judgements. Nevertheless, I consider this short book a good starting point that triggers many more questions and paths for questioning.

Was reading this book, thinking about the author's arguments, and being motivated to write this review a meaningful activity? Or, more generally, is reading books and writing public reviews of them a meaningful activity? According to the book's criteria, probably yes. How could we rank such an activity among others? That is a tough question, I guess. Now, it's your turn to think, question, discover!

[Zachary · Rating 4 out of 5]

Susan Wolf offers an insightful account not of the meaning of life, but rather meaning in life, which she formulates in at least three different ways. According to her Fitting Fulfillment View, a life is meaningful “insofar as its subjective attractions are to things or goals that are objectively worthwhile.” She takes this to mean that “one’s life is meaningful insofar as one finds oneself loving things worthy of love and able to do something positive about it.” Finally, “a life is meaningful…insofar as it is actively and lovingly engaged in projects of worth.” In my view, Wolf successfully defends her account of meaningfulness, and I am apt to agree with her assertion that meaningfulness requires the objective component of worth that so many readers—and two of her commentators—will find unappealing. She also responds to plausible objections that the Fitting Fulfillment View is too inclusive with respect to the kinds of projects and activities that are meaningful, too exclusive, and inappropriately elitist when it comes to the arbiters of which projects and activities are in fact meaningful. Once more, I find each of her responses to these objections quite persuasive, not only in the first two chapters in which she presents her view, but especially in the “Response” section of the book, in which she addresses the particular concerns of her commentators, whose criticisms constitute their own intermediate chapter.

Perhaps Wolf’s most helpful contribution is to separate questions of happiness, morality, and meaningfulness. That is, whether I am living a happy life in accordance with what constitutes my self-interest, whether I am living a morally worthy life in accordance with moral values, and whether I am living a meaningful life in accordance with my positive engagement with projects or activities that are subjectively and objectively worthwhile are considerably different questions. Wolf is absolutely right about this. Part of the reason she cares so much about discussing meaningfulness is in order to avoid confusion about why pursuing arduous or non-pleasurable activities still brings fulfillment, and why we sometimes find compelling non-moral reasons to act in ways that are morally impermissible. Meaningfulness is not simply maximizing one’s own self-interest or doing what is morally best. “Recognizing that meaning is desirable in life,” Wolf says, “means recognizing that there is more to life than either of these categories [self-interest and morality], even taken together, suggests.”

Perhaps most importantly, Wolf writes lucidly, intelligently, and compellingly about a topic typically overlooked by academic philosophers, to which they can nevertheless contribute quite a lot. We all, or at least, most of us, deeply care about living meaningful lives, and Wolf helps her readers conceptualize how we might go about locating that meaning in our projects and activities. In this sense, her philosophical enterprise is extremely applicable to our everyday lives, even if she decidedly avoids offering practical advice about how to find or pursue meaningful activities or projects. This is a book that all reflective readers, regardless of their experience in reading or writing philosophy, will no doubt find compelling.

[Sutthikant Kritjanarat · Rating 3 out of 5]

นี่เป็นหนังสือปรัชญาเล่มที่สองล่ะมั้งที่ผมอ่านจบในช่วงนี้ ผมแอบรู้สึกว่ามันอ่านยากเพราะว่าผมไม่สามารถตามทำความเข้าใจเนื้อหาได้ทั้งหมด แต่เพียงการเข้าใจคอนเซ็ปต์บางส่วนก็คงมีประโยชน์แล้ว

หนังสือปรัชญาก็เหมือนหนังสือทำอาหาร มีสูตรมากมายให้เราอ่านในเล่ม เราสามารถหยิบมาทดลองทำบางสูตร และก็ไม่ได้ผิดอะไรที่จะปรับสูตรนั้นให้เข้ากับรสนิยมของเรา

หนังสือเล่มนี้มีโครงสร้างเนื้อหาคือการถกเถียงในหัวข้อ ความหมายของชีวิต หรือถ้าจะให้ผมพูดในความเข้าใจของผม อาจจะเป็นการพูดคุยเรื่องชีวิตที่มีความหมายควรมีองค์ประกอบอะไรบ้าง โดยจะมีผู้เขียน(ซูซาน วูลฟ์)เป็นผู้เสนอแนวคิดหลักๆ มีการให้ข้อวิพากย์วิจารณ์ และเสริมแนวคิด รวมถึงตั้งคำถามโดยนักปรัชญาอีกสี่ท่าน และวูลฟ์จะนำคอมเมนต์เหล่านั้นมาขยายความอีกทีในตอนท้าย

กล่าวโดยสรุปสำหรับผม สิ่งที่วูลฟ์เสนอคือ ชีวิตคุณค่าไม่ได้ขึ้นอยู่กับเพียงการทำเพื่อความสุขหรือการทำเพื่อจริยธรรม แต่เป็นการมีความหมายบนฐานของมุมมองแบบอัตวิสัย(Objective) และวัตถุวิสัย(Subjective) โดยสามารถนำมาตีแผ่เพิ่มเติมได้เป็นว่าชีวิตที่มีความหมายต้องอยู่บนฐานของความรัก ความหลงไหลในกิจกรรมที่ยิ่งใหญ่กว่าตัวเราเอง โดยมีสิ่งที่ประสานสองแนวคิดนี้คือแนวคิดเรื่องการเติมเต็ม

คร่าวๆก็เท่านี้แหละครับ ในหนังสือมีการถกเถียงอะไรมากมายเลย แต่แนวคิดที่ผมชอบอาจจะเป็นแนวคิดของโจนาธาน ไฮนท์ว่าด้วยแนวคิดการผูกชีวิต และจิตวิทยารวงรัง รวมถึงประโยคที่ว่าหน่วยที่เหมาะสมของมนุษย์คือชุมชน หาใช่ปัจเจกไม่

[laura · Rating 3 out of 5]

a good solid read, and, like many published lectures, it has the advantage of greater accessibility than is typical of a book of contemporary philosophy. but it has at its heart a couple of questions that no professional philosopher i know of has ever managed to settle-- particularly questions about the objectivity of value and what role the outcome of a project has in determining the value of having undertaken it. and though it's not her explicit aim, wolf's lectures also helped me to bring into focus certain questions that have been on my mind lately about what the place of moral reasons are within the context of practical reasoning more generally.

[Billie Pritchett · Rating 5 out of 5]

I finished reading Susan Wolf's book Meaning in Life and Why It Matters . It was a short book and really terrific. In the book, Wolf tries to identify what it would mean to say someone has meaning in life. She's not trying to supply what in particular would bring meaning to a person's life but trying to create some general rubric for how to assess whether somebody has a meaningful life.

She talks about how sometimes we act by doing what we want. She refers to it as satisfying our pleasures or doing what we do egoistically but maybe a better way to say it would be to say that for one part of our life, we try to engage our strengths, accomplish what we want to do, and do things that give us pleasure.

There's another realm to trying to leave a pleasurable, engaged life where we accomplish what we want, and that is the realm of morality. Here we act from duty, and here we activate our moral instincts. So when we decide, following Martin Luther King Jr and other civil rights activists, to stand up against injustices, we are doing this because we feel we are obligated to do so as human beings. This realm differs from the first realm because here we don't act from self-interest but we act from duty.

Wolf also identifies a third realm, which overlaps with the first two. Whereas the first realm is about self-interest and the second realm is taking into account the interests of others, the third realm is when we sometimes act out of interest and sometimes for the interests of others. For instance, we act out of self-interest when we do what we love because it makes us just happy to do it. This is accomplishing something because it feels good or we lose time in doing it--it creates flow to our lives. But we can also accomplish something because we intend it to help others, and perhaps we love it in spite of the fact that it's very difficult to do.

We can also see how the overlap works vis-a-vis our relationships. It may be possible to love someone or want to purely out of self-interest, as sad as this may sound. Or maybe it's not so sad. Perhaps you can recall friendships or relationships that you have formed that are unlikely. There have been times when I've known people who became friends only because they were friends with my close friends. But if for some reason I was not with my close friends, the relationship with these new friends dissolved. I don't look forward to these sorts of relationships nor do I try to cultivate them, but they do seem unavoidable. In any case, more likely than not, when all is going well, your relationships are not just about what benefits the relationship provides to you, but what you can do for your friends, partners, and for the relationship itself.

Wolf calls the first realm the realm of self interest, the second realm the realm of duty, and the third realm the realm of love. Perhaps love is a misnomer, perhaps not. Whatever the case, it's clear what the distinctions are. On Wolf's account it is this third realm where a subset of our activities and relationships can help us to have meaningful lives.

According to Wolf, lives are meaningful when the people who live them have both a passion to want to accomplish something, create certain kinds of relationships, or engage in certain activities and the accomplishments, the relationships, or the activities have some objective positive value. The first criterion, then, is that people feel pulled to do what they are doing, and this can range anywhere from forming a coalition to help fight for human rights to taking care of a sick parents to creating works of art. These activities or relationships or accomplishments do not necessarily have to be pleasurable. It can be very taxing, for instance, to raise a child, and most of the time it's not going to be fun or pleasurable or much in your own self-interest to have to take care of the child--but the goal here isn't to act for self-interest alone or even to act for the interest of the child alone but to act from love. And to make that love meaningful you have to first feel drawn to do it, whether you like it or not.

The second criterion for Wolf, then, is that the activity, the relationship, or the accomplishment a person takes part in has some objective positive value. It's not just that we think what we do has some positive value. If we could somehow get outside of our skins, what we're doing would actually have to have value, objectively. We could argue in favor that raising a child is meaningful in this way. If it's a fact that it's important to nurture human life, there's no doubt that raising a child can make a life meaningful. Creating works of art can be meaningful on this account if it has value in the art world.

With these different kinds of cases in view of a person living meaningfully, there might be important tradeoffs to consider. I don't know this to be a fact, but I have seen the film Gandhi (1982) starring Ben Kingsley. Suppose it's true, as in the film, that even though Gandhi was a great civil rights leader and lived a meaningful life on that front, he wasn't much of a husband. We can hold those two thoughts in our head without paradox. Gandhi did meaningful work for civil rights, so in that sense he had a meaningful life. He didn't take care of his wife well, however, so in that sense he was a failure. There's a strong desire--and I feel it too--to paint everyone and everything as black-and-white but the truth is that human beings are flawed in their nature, and can easily succumb to drives and emotions and passions that they have a difficult time reigning in. Same goes for me, and, I would figure, the same goes for you. To say that a life is meaningful is not to say that a life is perfect but to identify the shining moments of a person's life, where their accomplishments or the relationships that they made in some area transcended themselves.

Cross-posted at Si hoc legere scis... under the title "On Susan Wolf's Meaning in Life and Why It Matters."

[Michael Lumsdaine · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was interesting and well written I thought. It's an important topic and good to see that philosophers are interested in it. The format, with the initial essay, response essays, and then a response to the responses seems like a great way to do philosophy. It certainly has affected how I view this and related topics, even if I don't fully agree with Wolf's theory. I've seen Wolf's name in my reading on free will, so I was glad for a chance to read something by her. I was also glad to read some more Jonathan Haidt.

[Brittany · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm giving this book three stars not because it is particularly bad or good one way or another, but because I think I would need to devote more time to this book than I'm willing to to really determine its merit. That said, I appreciated the layout of this book quite a bit (essay, comments, response).

[TamTawan · Rating 2 out of 5]

ศัพท์วิชาการมากมายถ่ายโถมเพียงเพื่อบรรยายคำพูดเรียบง่าย

[Ruman · Rating 3 out of 5]

2.5 stars!

Spoilers


Summary
Factors to Make a Decision:
1) happiness
2) moral obligations
3) meaningfulness - a) subjective attraction (what one wants to do), b) objective attractiveness ("the greater good," worth being passionate about), c) engagement (passionate because of goodness)

Meaningfulness must be entirely separate from pleasure and moral duty.

Meaningfulness is subjective (personal passion) and objective (useful, challenging). The objective value of an activity does not depend on an individual's attitude towards it. "A meaningful life is one that would not be considered pointless from an impartial, external view," (Wolf 42).

Morality does not precede meaning. In order to understand meaningfulness, one needs to accept objective values, otherwise meaningfulness would be based on self interest.

Naturalness does not mean that an act is meaningful. It excludes external views (objective worth). Meaningful activities are risky. Objective values can emerge from communities that align themselves with an activity.

[Vita Pires, Ph.D. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The responses by Arpaly, Haight, Adams etc make this worth the read.

[Alysa! · Rating 4 out of 5]

4/5 ⭐️ It feels unfair to rate a philosophy text based on how much I agree with it, so I’ll just say this: Susan Wolf is such a fresh voice in philosophy. The ideas explored here — namely, the differences between happy, moral and meaningful lives — are thought-provoking yet human. This is a very accessible, very meaningful (*hint hint*) work and I imagine I’ll be returning to it for quite some time. Would recommend for the non-philosophers just as much as the philosophers!

[Annebel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although rationally I agree more on Peter Singers objective naturalist account of utilitarism, I do also really believe intuitionally in Wolf's account of a meaningful life.. Really like the way she tries to unite subjective fulfillment and objective values, although certain point remain vague or ambiguous. For instance her argumentation for the fact that objective values exist. Plus she seems to grant a meaningful life only to people in affluent societies ...

[Teresa Meng · Rating 4 out of 5]

Still digesting her arguments. Might bump up a star later...

[Meg]

I WAS FORCED TO READ THIS. My soul has been drained and now I need a romantasy to make everything better.

[Shannon · Rating 2 out of 5]

this was torture, ngl

[Timothy Lumsdaine · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very solid thesis and explanation. I really am interested by the responses by other authors at the end of the book followed by an answering essay from the author: it is a sort of philosophical call and response, if you will. I’m planning to work my way into more philosophy this summer, and I’d love to find the time to write similar feedback, a synthesis of my questions and counterpoints with the texts message.

[James Henderson · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book presents an argument for the importance of meaning in our lives. That is meaning in the sense that we act out of love for objects that we value. In valuing these objects we identify them as worthy of our love and therefore our attention and concern. This is posed as an alternative to theories that advocate the primacy of egoism or altruism as the motivating force in such choices. I encountered this book while reading Jonathan Haidt's discussion of the moral principles of different people in his interesting book The Righteous Mind. Susan Wolf has succeeded in reflecting on the nature of meaning in life in a way that I found much more satisfying.

Susan Wolf discusses a variety of views about the source of meaning in life. One popular one is the argument that fulfillment from the pursuit of one's passion provides meaning for your life. The author comments that "the view is inadequate . . . If , as the Fulfillment View suggests, the only thing that matters is the subjective quality of one's life, then it shouldn't matter, in our assessments of possible lives, which activities give rise to that quality." (pp 15-16)
This view is rejected as too subjective in that it allows for a multiplicity of questionable paths through life and in doing so does not ensure that one's desires for his life are met in spite of the pursuit of a particular passion.

After discussing other views and returning to the argument for fulfillment through attention to that which one loves or values the author concludes with an extended defense of the need for meaningfulness. Most importantly this requires the identification of "objective values". The book concludes with four commentaries on Wolf's thesis and a response to these commentaries from the author. The result is a thought-provoking and engaging presentation of the nature of and importance for meaningfulness in one's life.

[Arno Mosikyan · Rating 4 out of 5]

QUOTES

Wolf seeks to explicate, defend, and secure the category of meaningfulness as a distinctive dimension of good lives. She distinguishes it from two other categories; namely, happiness, often associated with rational egoism, and morality, often associated with an impartial concern with human wellbeing. Meaningfulness is neither of these, on Wolf’s view, but it is much to be sought for and an essential element of a fully satisfying life.

Wolf argues in her first lecture that meaning in life is best understood in terms of Fitting Fulfillment. According to her, “meaning in life arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness, and one is able to do something about it or with it.” The three crucial elements are subjective attraction, objective worthiness, and active, productive engagement. Human beings long for fulfillment, on Wolf’s view, and we admire people whose lives are lovingly and productively engaged with projects that are worthy of engagement.

Psychology’s second crucial insight for understanding meaning in life, says Haidt, is hive psychology.

According to the conception of meaningfulness I wish to propose, meaning arises from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way.

If we want to live meaningful lives, we cannot try too hard or focus too much on doing so.
This implies that morality is no better suited to serve as an absolute standard for practical reason than self-interest.

The last chapter was on happiness and the meaning of life. In writing that chapter I came across two extraordinarily powerful ideas. The first idea is vital engagement, the second one is hive psychology. I will suggest that these two concepts, taken together, can help solve the problem of objective meaning that Wolf raised in these lectures.

UNQUOTE

[Justus · Rating 3 out of 5]

I first came across Wolf's theories on meaning in life (not the meaning of life) in Todd May's A Significant Life: Human Meaning in a Silent Universe where I wasn't especially convinced by his exposition on them. So I decided to go to the source. I really liked the structure of the book (and wish more non-fiction followed it). Wolf puts out her theory in two (not especially long) chapters. Then there are replies from four other people offering respectful criticism. Then Wolf responds to them in a final chapter.

Overall I really like the tone of Wolf and her contributors. Wolf doesn't push her theory too far -- frequently pointing out the flaws, gaps, and short-comings. The other contributors disagree with her in many ways but without the vitriol that has become all too common in our modern world.

Despite liking the tone & structure, Wolf's core thesis left me unconvinced. On the surface, it has a lot of intuitive appeal. As you dig deeper some many questions come up that you it begins to feel less like "okay, we'll fix one or two small problems but the overall argument is still fine" and more like "jeez, there are so many problems, I'm losing faith in the foundations of this effort".

To some extent, I think Wolf is okay with that. She frequently states that she's trying to start a conversation that barely exists within philosophy about meaning. Even if her theories are ultimately discarded but the conversation moves on, I think she would call that a victory of sorts.

She also frequently states that her real, primary goal isn't to defend this specific definition of meaningfulness in life but simply to show that there is more to life than morality and happiness.

In offering an account of meaning, I have been mainly concerned to bring out and illuminate this dimension of value in a life, distinct as it is from both happiness and morality.

I'm not sure anyone but philosophers really need to be convinced about that, so it isn't something the average reader is going to care about. I'm not sure even philosophers really believe it, so much as distilling human life down to just two things (often in tension) makes certain things easier to write about.

Wolf starts from the common popular claims about "do what you love" (a subjective path to meaning) and "be part of something bigger than yourself" (an objective path to meaning). Instead of taking them separately she combines into a single thing, roughly "do something you love that is bigger than yourself". But that initial, naive statement begins to show all the problems down this path.

There's a lot of current talk about how terrible "do what you love" is as advice. Things like pride, craftsmanship, doing what you're good at...all seem to be more important. In her concluding chapter Wolf realizes this problem.

In my lectures, I used a variety of terms to refer to the subjective dimension of meaningfulness: in addition to fulfillment, I spoke of subjective attraction, of being gripped or excited by one's projects and activities, and of loving them. Though there are connections and overlaps between these psychological conditions, they are hardly synonymous.

Leaving aside the specific word chosen (was Oskar Schindler "fulfilled" or "excited" by activities?) to make matters worse, no one pretends that meaningful activities meet any of those criteria at every moment. There will always be long periods of boredom, disillusion, and so on. So what are we even talking about in the end?

When we turn to the "objective" side, the problems are even more numerous. Wolf is primarily concerned to have some criteria "outside of one's self". But is taking care of a single person somehow clearly better than taking care of one's self? What about taking care of two people? Is there some numerical threshold? What if there are clashes in the definition of value? What if one sub-group says something is valuable and another doesn't (say, white supremacists versus black civil rights advocates)? Wolf also leaves open the possibility that one can believe future generations will see the value, even if current ones don't. But what if you're wrong about that?

[...] the day may come when others will understand and value it. [...] these last examples show that the relation [with something of value] may be indirect, perhaps even metaphorical.

Again, I just feel...what are we even talking about anymore at this point? It is hard to feel much confidence that we are even on the right track with all of this.

Through much of her book I was continually frustrated by her typical philosopher's stance of never getting out in the real world. Get out from behind your desk! Partner with some psychologists of sociologists! Get some grant money! Go interview people about meaningfulness in life! See if any of your theories actually match up with the real world!

So it is little surprise that the reply I found most convincing was the one from non-philosopher Jonathan Haidt who is unconvinced about this quest for "objective value" and thinks that simple "vital engagement" along with "hive psychology" is a better foundation.

Wolf bets everything on the existence, or at least intelligibility, of objective value. I would bet against her.

But I think his best arguments are about hive psychology. So much of western philosophy takes this very atomistic, hyper-rational approach to humanity that is completely at odds with the actual reality of humans as one of the only hyper-social species on the planet. We are more like bees and ants than a troupe of 10 chimpanzees.

But what would happen if we thought that the fundamental unit of society was not the individual but the group?

From this perspective, Haidt argues the "how big question" becomes very relevant and "objective value" becomes less relevant. What matters to meaningfulness in life is being part of a relatively large group -- almost regardless of what their goals are. Of course, that opens up another can of worms. But, going back to Wolf's original goal that meaningfulness is a separate, and distinct, value from morality...there's nothing that says a meaningful life is a good (in the sense of good vs evil) life.

[Nripesh Pradhan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book won't give you the answers that you were looking for, but it will help you refine your questions a bit better.

[Alex Strasser · Rating 5 out of 5]

An amazing book by a very talented philosopher that expanded my mind significantly when it comes to the question of a meaningful life. Beforehand, I thought whenever people talk about meaningfulness in life it is just a vague folk concept people use that has no clear correspondence to reality, and the "meaning in life" plausibly refers to an ill-defined question in the first place. Susan Wolf, on the other hand, defends a clear concept of meaningfulness that is respectable and philosophically robust and fairly plausible. This concept opens up a whole new field of inquiry into the relationship between meaningfulness and morality and how these can coincide, come apart, or overlap. I now find myself very interested in exploring this relationship further, as it is clear there needs to be much more work done on the topic, which has just begun.

Wolf defends an account of meaningfulness in life that says "meaningfulness is a matter of active and loving engagement in projects of worth", and (equivalently) "meaning arises from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way". She paraphrases her view, which she calls the Fitting Fulfillment view, as "meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness", and this view combines the best features of commonly heard advice and explains why these ideas are so widely held: 1) pursue your passions, and 2) be a part of something larger than yourself. So, if someone is deeply fulfilled by pursuing projects that are objectively valuable, then their life is meaningful.

Her view combines subjective feelings of fulfillment with an objective requirement for projects of value, even though she is fairly lenient in what she is willing to grant has objective value. She says that if many communities have valued X over long periods of time, then X plausibly has objective value. But she does give some plausibly meaningless lives, such as a live dedicated to caring for a goldfish, solving sudoku or crossword puzzles, making handwritten copies of War and Peace, or rolling a stone uselessly up a hill.

She at length attempts to delineate meaningfulness from two other categories of value or reasons for action: self-interest and morality. She thinks that someone reasonably may decide to do something that is neither the morally best thing nor what is best for themselves because of a third category of value: meaningfulness. One need not give up their life's worthy projects even if morality demands it. Yet, one also may not be required to maximize their life's meaningfulness either. I find the relationship between morality and meaningfulness quite intriguing, and I have a very strong intuition, or perhaps preference, that morality and meaningfulness are necessarily connected such that choosing the maximally moral life will always be the most meaningful. Her book has given me a new way of thinking about this third category as legitimate, building on Henry Frankfurt's Reasons of Love as a distinct kind of reason for acting distinct from morality, and her view provides a deeper explanation for and defense of Bernard Williams' objections that morality generates "one thought too many" that makes it much more interesting.

Overall, this is an amazing book to consider when thinking about the question of having a meaningful life and what exactly that even means. It is not a practical how to guide, but it does address why it matters to ask the question of what is meaning in life. I think it's much more likely people would not get stuck in a meaningless rat race of collecting possessions, climbing the corporate ladder, etc. if they explicitly pondered at length what makes for a meaningful life in what Wolf writes here. Highly recommend!

[Punyawat Pungphomin · Rating 1 out of 5]

TL;DR: เป็นหนังสือที่เถียงคนเขียนเยอะสุดตั้งแต่อ่านหนังสือมา ซึ่งเป็นเรื่องดี แต่ที่ให้ 1 ดาวเพราะรู้สึกว่าช่องโหว่ในแนวคิดนั้นเยอะเกินไป ที่จะเขียนต่อไปคือช่องโหว่ที่สังเหตเห็นในงานเล่มนี้ (ยอมรับว่าอ่านการบรรยาย 2 ไม่จบ เนื่องจาก เรามีความคิดที่ against ความคิดของผู้เขียนไปแล้ว บวกกับสำนวนการอ่านค่อนข้างเข้าใจยากเลยยอมแพ้ไปก่อน)

1. มีบางจุดที่ไม่เห็นความเชื่อมโยง วูฟกล่าวว่า ชีวิตที่มีความหมายและชีวิตที่ได้ทำสิ่งที่รัก “เกี่ยวข้องกัน” แต่กลับนำมาสู่ข้อสรุปว่า สองสิ่งนี้คือสิ่งเดียวกัน ซึ่งแปลกๆ แต่การตั้งต้นมาว่า ชีวิตที่มีความหมาย = ชีวิตที่ได้ทำสิ่งที่รัก คงไม่ผิดนัก
2. วูฟเสนอว่า การนิยามดังกล่าวทำให้อนุญาติให้มีสถานการณ์ที่ขัดแย้งต่อสามัญสำนึก เช่น ชีวิตของคนที่เสพติดกัญชาทั้งวันทั้งคืน อาจถูกมองว่ามีความหมายเทียบเท่ากับชีวิตของนักวิทยาศาสตร์หรือนักปรัชญา ทั้งที่ในความเป็นจริง เราแทบไม่ยอมรับแบบนั้นโดยสัญชาตญาณ ซึ่งเพื่อแก้ปัญหานี้วุฟเลยเพิ่มคำนิยามว่า ชีวิตที่มีความหมาย = ชีวิตที่ทำในสิ่งที่รักและควรรัก
3. นิยามเช่นนั้น ทำให้เกิดคำถามที่ตามมาว่า จะนำหลักเกณฑ์ใดมาบอกว่าสิ่งใดควรหรือไม่ควรรัก และคำถามที่สำคัญกว่านี้ ใครเป็นคนกำนดเกณฑ์นี้ วูฟตอบทั้งสองคำถามว่า ไม่มีใคร หรือสิ่งใดที่เป็นผู้กำหนดโดยเด็ดขาด ไม่ใช่พระเจ้า ไม่ใช่สังคม ไม่ใช่เจ้าของชีวิตเอง แต่เป็นสิ่งที่มนุษย์ในฐานะสังคมมีแนวโน้มจะ “เห็นพ้องกันโดยสามัญสำนึก”
4. ปัญหาคือ "เห็นพ้องกันโดยสามัญสำนึก" คืออะไรกันแน่ เพราะถ้าเราจะพยายามจะบอกว่าเรารักสิ่งที่ควรรัก โดยสังคมเล็กๆของเรา ก็จะเกิดคำถามว่า ทำไมสังคมนั้นตัดสินใจได้ ซึ่งตามนิยามแล้วมันเกิดขึ้นไม่ได้ สุดท้ายก็จะนำไปสู่ว่ามนุษยชาติเห็นพ้องต้องกันในที่สุดซึ่งก็เป็นสังคมมนุษย์อยู่ดี เช่นนี้แล้วเราจะตัดสินไม่ได้เลยว่าชีวิตใครมีความหมาย แม้แต่ตัวเราเองก็ตาม
5. ปัญหาอีกอย่างหนึ่งก็คือ วูฟสนับสนุนเป็นนัยว่า เรามีสิทธิโดยชอบธรรมที่จะตัดสินความหมายชีวิตของผู้อื่น ซึ่งสิ่งนี้อันตรายต่อจิตใจของมนุษย์เป็นอย่างมาก หากเราเชื่อความหมายชีวิตแบบที่วูฟเชื่อ แม้ว่าเราจะคิดว่าชีวิตเรามีความหมายอย่างไร แต่หากคนอื่นมองว่าเรารักสิ่งที่ไม่ควรรัก ชีวิตเราก็ไม่มีความหมาย มันเป็นการผูกคุณค่าในระดับตัวตนให้ขึ้นอยู่กับคนอื่น เห็นปัญหาไหม? เท่ากับว่า เรื่องความหมายชีวิต จะเกี่ยวพันกับการเป้นที่ยอมรับในสังคมของบุคคลทันที ซึ่งการไม่เป็นที่ยอมรับอาจทำให้เจ้าของชีวิตสูญเสียอัตลักษณ์และความมั่นใจในตัวเองในท้ายที่สุด (สิ่งนี้เป็นข้อกังวล)
6. วูฟอ้างว่าแนวคิดของตน เดินทางสายกลางระหว่าง Subjective กับ Objecive จริงหรือ? การเดินสายกลางควรเป็นการประนีประนอม แต่วูฟกลับเอาทั้งสองอย่างมาเชื่อมด้วยคำว่า "และ" คือต้องมีทั้ง Subjective และ Objective ซึ่งผมมองว่าเป็นการตั้งเงื่อนไขที่เข้มงวดอย่างมาก

สรุปคือ ผมเห็นต่างว่า ไม่ว่าคนนอกจะมองอย่างไร คนที่มีความสามารถที่จะระบุชี้ขาดว่าชีวิตหนึ่งๆมีความหมายไหม คือเจ้าของชีวิตเองเท่านั้น มิเช่นนั้นมันจะไม่ต่างจากการยึดโยงความหมายเข้ากับสังคม ซึ่งเป็นแนวคิดที่ก่อให้เกิดความทุกข์ใจได้ง่ายกว่า

[Dario Vaccaro · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this very short book as part of my journey to become an expert on the philosophical literature on meaning in life. This book is known to be an essential on the topic, as it is the most complete explanation of Wolf’s very influential “attraction to attractiveness” view of meaningfulness.

I found the book good. Wolf has a uniquely down-to-earth writing style, unusual for high-brow analytic philosophers. Her account is also rightly influential, as it nicely synthesizes two standard and simple accounts of meaningfulness. That said, I find some elements of her theory under-developed here. In particular, it seems not fully clear to the author herself how meaningfulness is supposed to enter into an account of well-being. In some places, she speaks of meaningfulness as part of well-being, but in others she says that meaningful activities can go counter to one’s well-being. It is also not entirely clear how moral actions are distinguished from meaningful ones in cases like helping one’s grandparent, or raising a child well (I am not saying that the two notions must be completely distinct; I am saying that Wolf’s writing doesn’t make it too clear how we are to understand the relationship).

As I often do, I really enjoyed one of the lesser known passages of the book, where she argues with Williams that morality is not always the all-things-considered most important consideration in practical evaluations, which her account of meaningfulness buttresses quite well.

If you are interested in standard critical responses to Wolf’s account, you can read T. Metz (2013), “Meaning in Life” and (highly highly recommended!) A. Kauppinen (2011), “Meaningfulness and Time”.

[Alexander Graden Kalamaroff · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wolf asks to us to consider "meaningfulness," as a pursuit separate from both morality and happiness, which is necessary for us to live the good life. I found her argument quite compelling and although the notion of objective value that she argues for is always going to be vague, I found it to be a functionally useful requirement even if I would be satisfied with a broader definition of objective value that Wolf seems to be.

Right now I find so much discussion about life either dominated by the notion of happiness (that we should only do what makes us happy, that happiness is the perennial goal of our individual existences) or the notion of morality (that every action and behavior can be judged morally without any other considerations, that we should dedicate our every waking moment to exemplifying and demanding that others exemplify moral behavior), that I found Wolf's emphasis on meaningfulness to be quite profound.

If we think of these three pursuits--morality, happiness, and meaningfulness--as the intertwined components for the good life, then we are in much more interesting, complicated, and challenging position than if we merely say sheer happiness or pure morality is the sole requirement for the good life. This much more interesting, complicated, and challenging position is preferable.

--Alexander Graden Kalamaroff (June 2020)

[PP]

ขอไม่ให้เรตติ้งเนื่องจากอ่านไม่จบ (น่าจะอ่านไปได้แค่ประมาณร้อยละ ๑๕) ไม่ถนัดสไตล์แบบนี้เลย

หนังสือเล่มนี้เป็นบันทึกการบรรยายเกี่ยวกับหัวข้อตามชื่อหนังสือ ให้แก่ผู้พังซึ่งน่าจะเป็นนักวิชาการปรัชญาโดยส่วนใหญ่ ตามด้วยบทวิจารณ์ของนักวิชากรคนอื่นอีก 4 คน แล้วปิดท้ายด้วยบทความตอบกลับคำวิจารณ์ ในส่วนสไตล์การเขียนก็เป็นลักษณะแบบวิชาการ อ่านยาก

ข้าพเจ้าทึกทักว่าคนที่พยายามหาหนังสือเรื่องความหมายของชีวิตมีสองพวก ได้แก่บุคคลผู้ประสบความทุกข์ในชีวิตและอยากหาทางหลุดพ้น ๑ แลกลุ่มนักวิชาการปรัชญาที่ศึกษาเรื่องนี้เพื่อประโยชน์การศึกษานั้น (per se) อีก ๑ แต่ดูเหมือนว่าหนังสือเล่มนี้จะเน้นไปที่กลุ่มหลัง ส่วนคนกลุ่มแรก (รวมถึงข้าพเจ้า) คงประสบปัญหาว่าลักษณะงานแบบนี้ไม่ให้ความรู้สึกว่ากำลังคุยหรือเยียวยาหรืออะไรทำนองนั้น ซึ่งมักเป็นแรงขับดันลึกๆ ในใจที่หยิบหนังสือทำนองนี้มาอ่านตั้งแต่แรก

(อ่านฉบับภาษาไทย ขุดขึ้นมาจากกองดองหลายปีก่อน)

[Paige · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a much more intensely academic book than I had expected. It’s a work of moral philosophy. It was interesting but I probably wouldn’t read many more books like it. I came out feeling like the category of meaningfulness (as a category of value wholly distinct from pleasure or morality) doesn’t really hold up. I think a more sophisticated version of hedonism accounts for some of the phenomena the author investigates. For example, climbing a mountain is type two fun. And the feeing of meaning or fulfillment is itself a type of hedonic reward. Since I’m also very partial to utilitarianism I was skeptical of the approach.

[Jacob MacDavid · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short Version: In just over 100 pages, we get a layered philosophical conversation, life-affirming glimpses into the human condition, and a (I think) basically right view of the meaning of life.

Longer version: This is one of my all-time favorite philosophy books. It's approachable, even to readers who lack philosophical training. It presents an incredibly plausible, rich, and insightful account of the meaning of life. It includes essays from fellow philosophers and psychologists, objecting to Wolf's view, as well as her responses. Sometimes rigor or carefulness is sacrificed for the sake readability. I think that's a good trade-off, but it is sometimes distracting.