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"The History of Rome" in Four Volumes #3
The War with Hannibal: The History of Rome from its Foundation Books 21-30
In The War with Hannibal, Livy (59 BC-AD 17) chronicles the events of the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage, until the Battle of Zama in 202 BC. He vividly recreates the immense armies of Hannibal, complete with elephants, crossing the Alps; the panic as they approached the gates of Rome; and the decimation of the Roman army at the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Yet it is also the clash of personalities that fascinates Livy, from great debates in the Senate to the historic meeting between Scipio and Hannibal before the decisive battle. Livy never hesitates to introduce both intense drama and moral lessons into his work, and here he brings a turbulent episode in history powerfully to life.
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First published January 1, 28
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About the author
Livy
3,065 books269 followersTitus Livius (Patavinus) (64 or 59 BC – AD 17)—known as Livy in English, and Tite-Live in French—was a Roman historian who wrote a monumental history of Rome and the Roman people – Ab Urbe Condita Libri (Books from the Foundation of the City) – covering the period from the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional foundation in 753 BC through the reign of Augustus in Livy's own time. He was on familiar terms with the Julio-Claudian dynasty, advising Augustus's grandnephew, the future emperor Claudius, as a young man not long before 14 AD in a letter to take up the writing of history. Livy and Augustus's wife, Livia, were from the same clan in different locations, although not related by blood.
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May 6, 2021"Before the next night they would know whether Rome or Carthage was destined to give laws to the nations, for the prize of victory would be not Italy or Africa but the whole world" (p.659)
Livy's opinion is clear, the second Punic war, fought for seventeen years between Hannibal in the Carthaginian corner and all comers from the Roman corner, is the monumental epic blockbuster of world history. Rome, the scrappy up-comer, only recently come to dominate Italy, versus Carthage, the great Phoenician colony in north Africa whose trade had led it to dominate parts of the western Mediterranean. Both served by their armies of citizen soldiers and allied peoples, both unwilling to be the inferior power in the region.
The sense of drama is ratcheted up in scene after scene starting on the first page with Hannibal as a small boy swearing to grow up to become "the enemy of the Roman people" (p23) with only a few pages later a Roman delegate to the Carthaginian Senate, and I am barely paraphrasing, 'do you want to fight or not, because we don't like standing around talking'.
I can imagine Livy loving cinema but his story is unlikely to make it on to the silver screen in part because the war did go on for seventeen years and also because his story lacks a single point of focus . Hannibal ought to be the natural anti-hero, but we lose sight of him for what feels like years at a time . While on the Roman side the system of annual elections for high office meant that there was a constant turn over of commanders, although there are commanders in particular theatres who manage to stick around for years (the various Scipios in Spain, and later Marcellus in Sicily for instance).
Livy was writing during the reign of the Emperor Augustus, stitching together his account from earlier written sources, aside from Polybius these have not survived and are known only through Livy's occasional references to them. For Livy , writing after a series of civil wars, the war with Hannibal represents the trial of Roman mettle in the face of continuing warfare in Italy and also a moment when the reach of Roman power was to expand into Spain and north Africa. It is something of a moral highpoint in Roman history and so reoccurring themes are the uninterrupted annual elections, strict adherence to the procedures of the Republic, and Roman piety.
Every year has its elections, its signs and portents (rains of stones, visions of rivers of blood, multi-gendered animals being born, temples struck by lightening and one of my favourites - a wolf walking up to a sentry taking his sword and running off with it) all of which have to propitiated with appropriate actions and ceremonies . A prophecy declares that if the Goddess Cybele of Phrygian Pessinos is brought to Rome that the Romans will be able to defeat their enemies. The Goddess was manifest in the form of a smallish stone housed in a temple in a small town in Asia Minor, so a party of Romans set off to fetch it and they succeed in bringing it to Rome, what strikes me as strange is that there is no mention of any protest from the locals who end up loosing their Goddess. Perhaps the Romans made them an offer they couldn't refuse.
Equally the regular succession of elections, portents and propitiation breaks up the flow of the narrative of the war, difficult enough to maintain as it is, since it was being fought in Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Spain, North Africa and in Greece. It was a hard fought war. It was particularly tough on the elephants. Hannibal famously crossed the Alps with elephants in his army but only one seems to have survived past the journey and his first battle in which they were stabbed under their tails (I assume a polite way of saying in their genitals) by the Romans. It was tough on families, the younger Scipio's father and uncle were killed in Spain within a couple of weeks of each other, two of Hannibal's brothers died bringing reinforcements into Italy before they could reach him. The Roman commander facing Hannibal left a skeleton force to face him while marching most of his men 250 miles in seven days to join his fellow consul in northern Italy, fought and defeated Hannibal's brother the following day and then marched back south sending a messenger to Hannibal with his brother's head. In a lighter moment Quintus Fabius Maximus, the great Roman commander who has the fantastic idea of defeating Hannibal by not fighting him but instead blocking him from doing anything, stops an election because the candidates elected aren't in his opinion good enough. The one he found particularly irksome was his son-in-law.
It is a hard war on people generally. Roman censuses show an abrupt drop in population. Populations of towns are massacred, once by the Romans on a precautionary basis . Survivors of battles can expect no gentle treatment either. The Romans were crushingly defeated at Cannae and a number of Romans were taken prisoner. The Senate however refuses to ransom them, which in their eyes would be akin to encouraging failure . Even more Romans managed to escape death at Cannae by either running away or fighting their way out, but there was to be no mercy for them. They were sent to serve in Sicily for the duration of the war (which was to turn out to be fourteen years) rather than demobbed after a few seasons campaigning as was customary. The Senate has a low tolerance for a failure to die for the Fatherland which seemed to be the only acceptable alternative to success.
This is an important part part of Livy's purpose. His history is an unfolding moral lesson in which good and bad are memorialised as an encouragement to others. Fabius is always pious and pays attention to the augers, while Flaminius doesn't and inevitably gets ambushed and killed by Hannibal at Lake Trasimeno . The names of those who betray or aid Rome get to be recorded for posterity as encouragement and warning for the reader. This is history as moral education and entertainment.
An outcome of this is that Livy doesn't appear to discriminate between his sources. In some cases rather than evaluate their claims he just tells both variants which gives some characters multiple deaths or an occasion to cheat death and enjoy life's rich possibilities (at least for a while), so there are all these alternative narratives embedded in his text. As a rule Livy prefers to emphasise that Hannibal has a very big army , while Polybius relying on the evidence of an inscription made by Hannibal stresses his army was generally smaller than the forces Rome had. Again historical accuracy, or analysis that doesn't reflect morality, is not what Livy is interested in, his is a story of right and wrong, the triumph of values. The Carthaginians were oath breakers, the Spanish fickle but capable of some nobility, the Gauls easily led, the Numidians lascivious, plebeian Romans were acceptable provided they listened to patricians and didn't get any ideas of their own while Roman patricians were best (despite any evidence to the contrary).
The virtues of the Roman upper class are exemplified for Livy in the contrasting persons of the aged Fabius and the youthful Scipio. Fabius, the careful commander who salvaged Rome's position after the defeat at Cannae by manoeuvring to limit Hannibal's freedom of action and the long haired, flamboyant Scipio who having defeated the Carthaginians in Spain and won over some of their Spanish and north African supporters, took the war to the gates of Carthage and defeated Hannibal at the battle of Zama in 202 BC which brought the war to an end.
Hannibal's strategy, reading between the lines, was to win over the majority non-Roman population of Italy and he seems to have won the support of about a third of them. Livy states that the plebeians of those places were anti-Roman and their patricians pro-Roman, yet his actual narrative shows that most of the conspiracies to invite in the Carthaginians were led by young aristocrats. These were not just communities that were divided socially, but also by age. Power lay in the hands of the older men of the social elite. One might have to wait half a lifetime or more, unless by some stroke of fortune the senior men of your family died, to get close to the centre of power. The temptation to take advantage of the arrival of Hannibal to drive out the old guard and take charge was clearly too much for some.
The war with Hannibal takes up ten books from an originally 142 book long history of Rome from its foundation to the reign of Augustus. Most of it is now lost apart from books I to X and books XX to XLV. Petrarch was one of the leading figures in the effort to track down manuscripts and establish as complete a text as possible and occasional fragments have turned up from time to time since the middle ages.
It is a lively, engaging story full of authentic bias and prejudice that is intended to leave you in no doubt as to the virtue of Rome's upper classes. Livy's sense for drama has him painting a vivid picture of Rome on the brink of defeat and of the long, slow shift of fortune to eventual victory.
Livy's opinion is clear, the second Punic war, fought for seventeen years between Hannibal in the Carthaginian corner and all comers from the Roman corner, is the monumental epic blockbuster of world history. Rome, the scrappy up-comer, only recently come to dominate Italy, versus Carthage, the great Phoenician colony in north Africa whose trade had led it to dominate parts of the western Mediterranean. Both served by their armies of citizen soldiers and allied peoples, both unwilling to be the inferior power in the region.
The sense of drama is ratcheted up in scene after scene starting on the first page with Hannibal as a small boy swearing to grow up to become "the enemy of the Roman people" (p23) with only a few pages later a Roman delegate to the Carthaginian Senate, and I am barely paraphrasing, 'do you want to fight or not, because we don't like standing around talking'.
I can imagine Livy loving cinema but his story is unlikely to make it on to the silver screen in part because the war did go on for seventeen years and also because his story lacks a single point of focus . Hannibal ought to be the natural anti-hero, but we lose sight of him for what feels like years at a time . While on the Roman side the system of annual elections for high office meant that there was a constant turn over of commanders, although there are commanders in particular theatres who manage to stick around for years (the various Scipios in Spain, and later Marcellus in Sicily for instance).
Livy was writing during the reign of the Emperor Augustus, stitching together his account from earlier written sources, aside from Polybius these have not survived and are known only through Livy's occasional references to them. For Livy , writing after a series of civil wars, the war with Hannibal represents the trial of Roman mettle in the face of continuing warfare in Italy and also a moment when the reach of Roman power was to expand into Spain and north Africa. It is something of a moral highpoint in Roman history and so reoccurring themes are the uninterrupted annual elections, strict adherence to the procedures of the Republic, and Roman piety.
Every year has its elections, its signs and portents (rains of stones, visions of rivers of blood, multi-gendered animals being born, temples struck by lightening and one of my favourites - a wolf walking up to a sentry taking his sword and running off with it) all of which have to propitiated with appropriate actions and ceremonies . A prophecy declares that if the Goddess Cybele of Phrygian Pessinos is brought to Rome that the Romans will be able to defeat their enemies. The Goddess was manifest in the form of a smallish stone housed in a temple in a small town in Asia Minor, so a party of Romans set off to fetch it and they succeed in bringing it to Rome, what strikes me as strange is that there is no mention of any protest from the locals who end up loosing their Goddess. Perhaps the Romans made them an offer they couldn't refuse.
Equally the regular succession of elections, portents and propitiation breaks up the flow of the narrative of the war, difficult enough to maintain as it is, since it was being fought in Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Spain, North Africa and in Greece. It was a hard fought war. It was particularly tough on the elephants. Hannibal famously crossed the Alps with elephants in his army but only one seems to have survived past the journey and his first battle in which they were stabbed under their tails (I assume a polite way of saying in their genitals) by the Romans. It was tough on families, the younger Scipio's father and uncle were killed in Spain within a couple of weeks of each other, two of Hannibal's brothers died bringing reinforcements into Italy before they could reach him. The Roman commander facing Hannibal left a skeleton force to face him while marching most of his men 250 miles in seven days to join his fellow consul in northern Italy, fought and defeated Hannibal's brother the following day and then marched back south sending a messenger to Hannibal with his brother's head. In a lighter moment Quintus Fabius Maximus, the great Roman commander who has the fantastic idea of defeating Hannibal by not fighting him but instead blocking him from doing anything, stops an election because the candidates elected aren't in his opinion good enough. The one he found particularly irksome was his son-in-law.
It is a hard war on people generally. Roman censuses show an abrupt drop in population. Populations of towns are massacred, once by the Romans on a precautionary basis . Survivors of battles can expect no gentle treatment either. The Romans were crushingly defeated at Cannae and a number of Romans were taken prisoner. The Senate however refuses to ransom them, which in their eyes would be akin to encouraging failure . Even more Romans managed to escape death at Cannae by either running away or fighting their way out, but there was to be no mercy for them. They were sent to serve in Sicily for the duration of the war (which was to turn out to be fourteen years) rather than demobbed after a few seasons campaigning as was customary. The Senate has a low tolerance for a failure to die for the Fatherland which seemed to be the only acceptable alternative to success.
This is an important part part of Livy's purpose. His history is an unfolding moral lesson in which good and bad are memorialised as an encouragement to others. Fabius is always pious and pays attention to the augers, while Flaminius doesn't and inevitably gets ambushed and killed by Hannibal at Lake Trasimeno . The names of those who betray or aid Rome get to be recorded for posterity as encouragement and warning for the reader. This is history as moral education and entertainment.
An outcome of this is that Livy doesn't appear to discriminate between his sources. In some cases rather than evaluate their claims he just tells both variants which gives some characters multiple deaths or an occasion to cheat death and enjoy life's rich possibilities (at least for a while), so there are all these alternative narratives embedded in his text. As a rule Livy prefers to emphasise that Hannibal has a very big army , while Polybius relying on the evidence of an inscription made by Hannibal stresses his army was generally smaller than the forces Rome had. Again historical accuracy, or analysis that doesn't reflect morality, is not what Livy is interested in, his is a story of right and wrong, the triumph of values. The Carthaginians were oath breakers, the Spanish fickle but capable of some nobility, the Gauls easily led, the Numidians lascivious, plebeian Romans were acceptable provided they listened to patricians and didn't get any ideas of their own while Roman patricians were best (despite any evidence to the contrary).
The virtues of the Roman upper class are exemplified for Livy in the contrasting persons of the aged Fabius and the youthful Scipio. Fabius, the careful commander who salvaged Rome's position after the defeat at Cannae by manoeuvring to limit Hannibal's freedom of action and the long haired, flamboyant Scipio who having defeated the Carthaginians in Spain and won over some of their Spanish and north African supporters, took the war to the gates of Carthage and defeated Hannibal at the battle of Zama in 202 BC which brought the war to an end.
Hannibal's strategy, reading between the lines, was to win over the majority non-Roman population of Italy and he seems to have won the support of about a third of them. Livy states that the plebeians of those places were anti-Roman and their patricians pro-Roman, yet his actual narrative shows that most of the conspiracies to invite in the Carthaginians were led by young aristocrats. These were not just communities that were divided socially, but also by age. Power lay in the hands of the older men of the social elite. One might have to wait half a lifetime or more, unless by some stroke of fortune the senior men of your family died, to get close to the centre of power. The temptation to take advantage of the arrival of Hannibal to drive out the old guard and take charge was clearly too much for some.
The war with Hannibal takes up ten books from an originally 142 book long history of Rome from its foundation to the reign of Augustus. Most of it is now lost apart from books I to X and books XX to XLV. Petrarch was one of the leading figures in the effort to track down manuscripts and establish as complete a text as possible and occasional fragments have turned up from time to time since the middle ages.
It is a lively, engaging story full of authentic bias and prejudice that is intended to leave you in no doubt as to the virtue of Rome's upper classes. Livy's sense for drama has him painting a vivid picture of Rome on the brink of defeat and of the long, slow shift of fortune to eventual victory.
November 29, 2024
“‘Yes, indeed, the gods do not give everything to the same man. You know how to win a battle, Hannibal; you do not know how to use a victory.’”
These words, attributed to the Numidian army commander Marhabal and supposedly uttered after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae in August 216 BC when the Numidian wanted the victor to tackle Rome immediately, may well show that Rome’s future as a world power, maybe even her survival as an independent state, was hanging by a thread after a series of clashing defeats against an enemy that would simply not stick to the old routines of pitched battle but employ surprising tactics depending on the respective situation. Resorting to these tactics and doing the unexpected have earned Hannibal the reputation of shiftiness and dishonesty in Livy’s eyes but still there are moments when even this extremely pro-Roman historian cannot deny the famous Carthaginian some words of admiration and respect.
Books 21 to 30 of Livy’s opum magnus deal with the Second Punic War from 218 to 201 BC, which started in Spain, where Hannibal sacked the Roman town of Saguntum, and involved the whole of Italy, parts of Gaul, Sicily, Sardinia, Africa and even Macedonia in a maelstrom of slaughter and destruction for nearly two decades. Livy, writing at the time of Augustus, compiled his tale of this gigantic drama from various earlier sources, the best-known – and only one to be still extant – being Polybius, but unlike this rather matter-of-fact Greek historian, he had a clear mission in mind, namely that of showing the extraordinary virtues of true Romans and the destiny of their state to be victorious in the end. Hence, we find observations about the peculiar challenge the Romans found facing them, such as,
as well as passages that praise the Roman fighting spirit and their determination to emerge victorious from this extraordinary struggle for survival, despite all the setbacks and the general hopelessness they had to face,
Livy’s declaration of love to traditional civic Roman virtues, such as the determination to fight to one’s own certain death for Rome rather than cave in when the situation turns hopeless, makes him callous to the suffering of the inhabitants of the countless villages and towns that defected to Hannibal – the most prominent example is Capua, whose population Livy characterizes as deviant, pampered and enamoured with luxury and an easy life – and later had to face Roman wrath, but also to the fate of the surviving Roman soldiers of the battle at Cannae: The senate categorically refused to ransom any Roman prisoners of war, and it did not demobilize those soldiers who fought their way out of the slaughter or simply ran away from it, but sent them to Sicily to do senseless duty there for the remainder of the war, although there were repeated appeals – rather moving ones, in Livy’s words – to allow them to return home again. And yet, it is clear that, in Livy’s opinion, these men deserved no understanding and no lenience.
Interestingly, whenever Romans lose in battle, Livy more often than not uses at least one of three causes to account for such an un-Roman defeat. Reason one are unfavourable weather conditions that impair the Roman fighting efforts. The second cause for Roman defeat is seen in an individual commander’s lack of experience or aptitude – a prime example of this cause is Cannae itself, with the dualism between the circumspect consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who honourably died in battle, and his foolhardy and ambitious colleague Gaius Terentius Varro, who all too readily runs into the trap set by Hannibal. Livy tells us a rather implausible story according to which, when leaving Rome, Paullus was escorted by the leading senators, whereas Varro’s entourage mainly consisted of the common people, and he also has Varro repeatedly rail at Paullus’s admonitions not to underestimate the enemy. A last reason that Livy makes use of in order to account for Roman defeat is an opponent’s underhanded behaviour, and so it should not wonder us too much to find Livy portray Hannibal as duplicitous, deceitful and wantonly cruel. Before the battle of Cannae, for instance, Livy tells us a detail that the more reliable, but less enjoyable Polybius unsurprisingly never mentions, namely that Hannibal sent off 500 Numidian cavalry pretending to be defectors and then attacking the Romans from behind. It seems, however, quite unbelievable that the Romans would have let those 500 Numidians linger in a position from where they could have made the Roman position so vulnerable.
We see – when Roman armies lose a battle, it is like when I miss a bus: The sun was blinding me, so I couldn’t run for the bus properly, the bus driver saw me coming and drove off out of sheer spite, the bus services as such are simply not reliable, but under no circumstances have I left home too late.
Still, Livy is a fascinating writer who brings to life both the multiple struggles and intrigues that were going on in the Punic war and the generals and politicians who were involved in it. Strangely enough, though, Hannibal, who looms large at first, especially in the book which has the Carthaginians cross the Alps, fades more and more into the background after the first third of the book, and when he reappears towards the end, he is only a shadow of himself, being outshone by Scipio Africanus and Masinissa, the wily Numidian prince who first fought on the side of the Carthaginians in Spain and then, by 206 BC, realizing that the tides of war were turning, decided to ally himself with the Romans, who should prove thankful by establishing his power over Numidia eventually. Livy also gives some human interest glimpses, as for example with the very self-same Masinissa, who instantly fell prey to the charms of is vanquished opponent Syphax’s wife Sophoniba, a born Carthaginian. With his typical Roman smugness, Livy says that it was the usual Numidian sensuality that made Masinissa susceptible to the calculating Sophoniba’s seductive powers, but a few paternal words from the youngster Scipio brought Masinissa back to reason, and he ordered Sophoniba to take poison and die, which she, obligingly, did.
Livy’s history is full of such rich and colourful details, and one of my favourite passages was when Publius Cornelius Scipio, after his successes in Spain, where his father and his uncle not only failed bitterly but, like true Romans, paid for their failure with their lives, decided to carry the war to Africa, which seemed a risky enterprise, and how he tried to persuade the senate into backing his plans. It was especially the discussion between Scipio and another Roman commander, namely Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, whose clever and cautious stonewalling tactics made Hannibal’s war efforts fizzle after Cannae, which earned him the name Cunctator, that showed the openness of history that Romans of that day had to face when taking their major strategic decisions. Here, once again, we can admire Livy’s stylistic sway over Polybius, when reading the speeches he puts into Scipio’s and Fabius’s mouths which bristle with clever diplomatic digs at the other man, such as when Scipio, the younger man, remarks,
Isn’t it quite admirable how Scipio here implies that Fabius’s reservations may not be due to factual considerations but simply to the elder colleague’s inclination to begrudge a younger man his share in military glory? Statesmen apparently never change …
Even though Polybius may be a better source as to bare facts, it is Livy whose history of the Second Punic War unfolds the richer canvas when it comes to the sufferings of the common people, the pressure resting on the governments of the fighting states and on the human side of the major agents in that conflict. His words will sometimes shock, often wow, but never ever bore you.
[1] Page references are made with regard to the Oxford World’s Classics edition in the translation by J. C. Yardley.
These words, attributed to the Numidian army commander Marhabal and supposedly uttered after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae in August 216 BC when the Numidian wanted the victor to tackle Rome immediately, may well show that Rome’s future as a world power, maybe even her survival as an independent state, was hanging by a thread after a series of clashing defeats against an enemy that would simply not stick to the old routines of pitched battle but employ surprising tactics depending on the respective situation. Resorting to these tactics and doing the unexpected have earned Hannibal the reputation of shiftiness and dishonesty in Livy’s eyes but still there are moments when even this extremely pro-Roman historian cannot deny the famous Carthaginian some words of admiration and respect.
Books 21 to 30 of Livy’s opum magnus deal with the Second Punic War from 218 to 201 BC, which started in Spain, where Hannibal sacked the Roman town of Saguntum, and involved the whole of Italy, parts of Gaul, Sicily, Sardinia, Africa and even Macedonia in a maelstrom of slaughter and destruction for nearly two decades. Livy, writing at the time of Augustus, compiled his tale of this gigantic drama from various earlier sources, the best-known – and only one to be still extant – being Polybius, but unlike this rather matter-of-fact Greek historian, he had a clear mission in mind, namely that of showing the extraordinary virtues of true Romans and the destiny of their state to be victorious in the end. Hence, we find observations about the peculiar challenge the Romans found facing them, such as,
”They realised that they had never come to grips with a more ruthless and combative foe, and Rome had never been in such a shiftless and enervated condition. […] The Romans would have to fight the whole world, and do so in Italy and before their city walls.” (p.17) [1]
as well as passages that praise the Roman fighting spirit and their determination to emerge victorious from this extraordinary struggle for survival, despite all the setbacks and the general hopelessness they had to face,
”There is surely no other nation that would not have been crushed by such an overwhelming disaster. One might think of comparing the defeat of the Carthaginians in the sea battle off the Aegates Islands [in the first Punic War, T.S.] which crushed their resolve, and made them abandon Sicily and Sardinia and accept tax-paying and tributary status. Or perhaps one might think of the defeat in Africa later sustained by Hannibal himself. These disasters can in no respect be compared with Cannae –– except to say that they were borne with less strength of character than the Romans bore theirs.” (p.123f.)
Livy’s declaration of love to traditional civic Roman virtues, such as the determination to fight to one’s own certain death for Rome rather than cave in when the situation turns hopeless, makes him callous to the suffering of the inhabitants of the countless villages and towns that defected to Hannibal – the most prominent example is Capua, whose population Livy characterizes as deviant, pampered and enamoured with luxury and an easy life – and later had to face Roman wrath, but also to the fate of the surviving Roman soldiers of the battle at Cannae: The senate categorically refused to ransom any Roman prisoners of war, and it did not demobilize those soldiers who fought their way out of the slaughter or simply ran away from it, but sent them to Sicily to do senseless duty there for the remainder of the war, although there were repeated appeals – rather moving ones, in Livy’s words – to allow them to return home again. And yet, it is clear that, in Livy’s opinion, these men deserved no understanding and no lenience.
Interestingly, whenever Romans lose in battle, Livy more often than not uses at least one of three causes to account for such an un-Roman defeat. Reason one are unfavourable weather conditions that impair the Roman fighting efforts. The second cause for Roman defeat is seen in an individual commander’s lack of experience or aptitude – a prime example of this cause is Cannae itself, with the dualism between the circumspect consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who honourably died in battle, and his foolhardy and ambitious colleague Gaius Terentius Varro, who all too readily runs into the trap set by Hannibal. Livy tells us a rather implausible story according to which, when leaving Rome, Paullus was escorted by the leading senators, whereas Varro’s entourage mainly consisted of the common people, and he also has Varro repeatedly rail at Paullus’s admonitions not to underestimate the enemy. A last reason that Livy makes use of in order to account for Roman defeat is an opponent’s underhanded behaviour, and so it should not wonder us too much to find Livy portray Hannibal as duplicitous, deceitful and wantonly cruel. Before the battle of Cannae, for instance, Livy tells us a detail that the more reliable, but less enjoyable Polybius unsurprisingly never mentions, namely that Hannibal sent off 500 Numidian cavalry pretending to be defectors and then attacking the Romans from behind. It seems, however, quite unbelievable that the Romans would have let those 500 Numidians linger in a position from where they could have made the Roman position so vulnerable.
We see – when Roman armies lose a battle, it is like when I miss a bus: The sun was blinding me, so I couldn’t run for the bus properly, the bus driver saw me coming and drove off out of sheer spite, the bus services as such are simply not reliable, but under no circumstances have I left home too late.
Still, Livy is a fascinating writer who brings to life both the multiple struggles and intrigues that were going on in the Punic war and the generals and politicians who were involved in it. Strangely enough, though, Hannibal, who looms large at first, especially in the book which has the Carthaginians cross the Alps, fades more and more into the background after the first third of the book, and when he reappears towards the end, he is only a shadow of himself, being outshone by Scipio Africanus and Masinissa, the wily Numidian prince who first fought on the side of the Carthaginians in Spain and then, by 206 BC, realizing that the tides of war were turning, decided to ally himself with the Romans, who should prove thankful by establishing his power over Numidia eventually. Livy also gives some human interest glimpses, as for example with the very self-same Masinissa, who instantly fell prey to the charms of is vanquished opponent Syphax’s wife Sophoniba, a born Carthaginian. With his typical Roman smugness, Livy says that it was the usual Numidian sensuality that made Masinissa susceptible to the calculating Sophoniba’s seductive powers, but a few paternal words from the youngster Scipio brought Masinissa back to reason, and he ordered Sophoniba to take poison and die, which she, obligingly, did.
Livy’s history is full of such rich and colourful details, and one of my favourite passages was when Publius Cornelius Scipio, after his successes in Spain, where his father and his uncle not only failed bitterly but, like true Romans, paid for their failure with their lives, decided to carry the war to Africa, which seemed a risky enterprise, and how he tried to persuade the senate into backing his plans. It was especially the discussion between Scipio and another Roman commander, namely Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, whose clever and cautious stonewalling tactics made Hannibal’s war efforts fizzle after Cannae, which earned him the name Cunctator, that showed the openness of history that Romans of that day had to face when taking their major strategic decisions. Here, once again, we can admire Livy’s stylistic sway over Polybius, when reading the speeches he puts into Scipio’s and Fabius’s mouths which bristle with clever diplomatic digs at the other man, such as when Scipio, the younger man, remarks,
”’[…] You attitude towards me, and mine towards my juniors, should not be such that we are unwilling to see any citizen achieve success similar to ours. For that would hurt not only those who are the objects of our envy, but the state as well, and almost the entire human race. […]’” (p.506)
Isn’t it quite admirable how Scipio here implies that Fabius’s reservations may not be due to factual considerations but simply to the elder colleague’s inclination to begrudge a younger man his share in military glory? Statesmen apparently never change …
Even though Polybius may be a better source as to bare facts, it is Livy whose history of the Second Punic War unfolds the richer canvas when it comes to the sufferings of the common people, the pressure resting on the governments of the fighting states and on the human side of the major agents in that conflict. His words will sometimes shock, often wow, but never ever bore you.
[1] Page references are made with regard to the Oxford World’s Classics edition in the translation by J. C. Yardley.
August 11, 2014
Scipio vs. Quintus Fabius Maximus = Captain Kirk vs. Captain Picard
May 9, 2018
"the Senate forsaw that if one war had ended, another was just beginning."
Now it's the Greeks' turn.
I think the most impressive thing out of this whole ordeal is the system of alliances Rome had implemented. During all those years of war most italian cities stayed loyal to Rome and actively sent troops and aid (which was part of the deal) and if I'm not mistaken, they had to match the same amount of troops the romans raised. So in every roman defeat, there were dead italian allies, same with each victory.
Another impressive thing would be the amount of half decent officers Rome was able to produce but I guess it's less impressive if you keep in mind how much time they had spent at war against other italians and now foreigners. Rome by that time had become a well (olive) oiled war machine.
As with most Penguin editions, I had issues with the translation ('willy nilly'...), it's too modern and loose for my tastes.
Now it's the Greeks' turn.
I think the most impressive thing out of this whole ordeal is the system of alliances Rome had implemented. During all those years of war most italian cities stayed loyal to Rome and actively sent troops and aid (which was part of the deal) and if I'm not mistaken, they had to match the same amount of troops the romans raised. So in every roman defeat, there were dead italian allies, same with each victory.
Another impressive thing would be the amount of half decent officers Rome was able to produce but I guess it's less impressive if you keep in mind how much time they had spent at war against other italians and now foreigners. Rome by that time had become a well (olive) oiled war machine.
As with most Penguin editions, I had issues with the translation ('willy nilly'...), it's too modern and loose for my tastes.
May 6, 2012
This was absolutely fantastic! It took me a long time to get through it as I had to look up so many locations, names and events throughout the reading to keep up. There was a lot of name dropping in this one, of course the greats like Scipio, Hannibal, and Hasdrubal, but I couldn't even begin to list the countless others here and there mentioned and their subsequent relations to each other and events. I think it would take a very vast study to go through this to that extent. It really was a fascinating war with amazing tactics employed and an absolutely astounding number of people/animals/cities involved. One of these days I might get the courage up to tackle the whole of Livy's works, they always delight.
January 29, 2022
The Second Punic War in a nutshell:
" the greater one was to be told that, although he was himself ensconced before the walls of Rome with an army, Roman soldiers had set off under their banners as reinforcements for the Spanish campaign. The lesser one was learning from a prisoner of war that, at about that time, the land on which he was encamped had, by chance, been sold, but that despite the circumstances, there was no diminution of its price"
I was really impressed by books 21-30. After slogging along through the first ten books this was an amazing experience. Livy, and a lot of other Romans, viewed this period as the zenith of Roman virtue and it shows. No matter what happens, good Roman virtue, and especially good Roman men, hold fast. Scipio is such a fascinating character and his almost Tacitean introduction was perfect (not to mention Livy's obvious fascination of him). These books showed a much more clear style, something that I expect in Classical history, than what happened in the first 10 books. Not only did I enjoy the history itself, but I enjoyed the framing of events, the well crafted speeches (especially Hannibal's resigned speech before Zama), and Livy's commentary. I'll also admit that my enjoyment of this was perhaps aided by this period being more grounded in historicity, or just that I dont really care for the monarchy/early republic. Overall, a solid piece of Roman history
" the greater one was to be told that, although he was himself ensconced before the walls of Rome with an army, Roman soldiers had set off under their banners as reinforcements for the Spanish campaign. The lesser one was learning from a prisoner of war that, at about that time, the land on which he was encamped had, by chance, been sold, but that despite the circumstances, there was no diminution of its price"
I was really impressed by books 21-30. After slogging along through the first ten books this was an amazing experience. Livy, and a lot of other Romans, viewed this period as the zenith of Roman virtue and it shows. No matter what happens, good Roman virtue, and especially good Roman men, hold fast. Scipio is such a fascinating character and his almost Tacitean introduction was perfect (not to mention Livy's obvious fascination of him). These books showed a much more clear style, something that I expect in Classical history, than what happened in the first 10 books. Not only did I enjoy the history itself, but I enjoyed the framing of events, the well crafted speeches (especially Hannibal's resigned speech before Zama), and Livy's commentary. I'll also admit that my enjoyment of this was perhaps aided by this period being more grounded in historicity, or just that I dont really care for the monarchy/early republic. Overall, a solid piece of Roman history
September 6, 2023
For ancient literature, Livy is surprisingly easy and enjoyable.
November 4, 2020
I don’t know how accurate some of this is but I had a good time
May 26, 2013
This is a surprisingly accessible and gripping history of the Second Punic War (218-201 BC). Livy writes as if he had witnessed everything first hand and avoids routinely just listing dates of events, etc. in favor of an almost fictional-feeling story about this crazy war and the mystery that is Hannibal. If you were ever curious as to why people still talk about this person, this is the place to find out why. There's so many interesting things about the guy; he basically inherited a hatred for the Romans and incited a war from the second he had the ability to, then inflicted these catastrophic and clever defeats on this major military power and then fought for another fifteen years before finally being defeated at the cost of countless Roman and Italian lives. It's always confused me as to why he didn't capitalize more on the position Cannae put him in. He still holds a lot of mystery, but it's more fun that way.
That's not to say that this is a light, cheaply dramatized version of this story. You still get all of the information on equipment, tactics, troop numbers, geography, culture, and the background of most of the major players involved in the war. It's just that the author manages to make it actually feel like the crazy, apocalyptic event that it was for both sides. The motivations of the people involved and what their personalities were like are all detailed as well, making the story all the more real feeling. After reading this one I definitely feel like checking out the beginning of Livy's History. The sketchy, legend-filled beginning of Rome seems like an ideal setting for him.
That's not to say that this is a light, cheaply dramatized version of this story. You still get all of the information on equipment, tactics, troop numbers, geography, culture, and the background of most of the major players involved in the war. It's just that the author manages to make it actually feel like the crazy, apocalyptic event that it was for both sides. The motivations of the people involved and what their personalities were like are all detailed as well, making the story all the more real feeling. After reading this one I definitely feel like checking out the beginning of Livy's History. The sketchy, legend-filled beginning of Rome seems like an ideal setting for him.
Read
September 6, 2020Gripping, surprisingly binge-able, with larger-than-life but also deeply human portraits of both the major and minor (and occasionally almost inconsequential) players in the Second Punic War--this was a fun read that has given a huge shot in the arm to my interest in Roman history. I can assure anyone who has gotten the impression that this book is dry and boring that, far from a mere chronicle of the period from 219 to 201 BC, this is really an epic told in prose, or even a proto-historical novel. I would highly recommend it to fans of the classical world's literature and history.
April 8, 2021
Good sketch of the psychology of Hannibal and quite exciting in the run-up and early years, but afterwards a boring sequence of facts.
August 21, 2021
Well, another exciting account by an ancient Roman author. Titus Livius puts together the story of the 2nd Punic War, which begins more or less with Hannibal's famous invasion of Italy over the Alps with his Carthaginian army, elephants and all, and ends with Scipio invading Africa and marching his Roman legions to the walls of Carthage. Lots of people I'd known about only through a tiny bit of cultural osmosis were finally brought to life through Livy's excellent narrative: the aforementioned Hannibal and Scipio, as well as Quintus Fabius.
Finally, the bad taste of Josephus' mind-numbing boringness has been washed from my brain. I'll probably stop procrastinating and read more of the Roman history sitting on my to-read pile.
Finally, the bad taste of Josephus' mind-numbing boringness has been washed from my brain. I'll probably stop procrastinating and read more of the Roman history sitting on my to-read pile.
Read
November 13, 2024FINALLY DONE AHGGHHHH
December 13, 2021
"All over the field Roman soldiers lay dead in their thousands, horse and foot mingled, as the shifting phases of the battle, or the attempt to escape, had brought them together. Here and there wounded men, covered with blood, who had been roused to consciousness by the morning cold, were dispatched by a quick blow as they struggled to rise from amongst the corpses; others were found still alive with the sinews in their thighs and behind their knees sliced through, baring their throats and necks and begging who would to spill what little blood they had left. Some had their heads buried in the ground, having apparently dug themselves holes and by smothering their faces with earth had choked themselves to death. Most strange of all was a Numidian soldier, still living, and lying, with nose and ears horribly lacerated, underneath the body of a Roman who, when his useless hands had no longer been able to grasp his sword, had died in the act of tearing his enemy, in bestial fury, with his teeth." The battle of Cannae was one of the bloodiest and most devastating battles in world history up until the 19th century. As Livy records, "The total number of casualties is said to have been 45,500 infantrymen and 2,700 cavalrymen killed – about equally divided between citizens and allies. Amongst the dead were the consuls’ two quaestors, Lucius Atilius and Lucius Furius Bibaculus, twenty-nine military tribunes, a number of ex-consuls and of men who had the rank of praetor or aedile – amongst them are numbered Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Minucius (who had been master of Horse the previous year and consul some years earlier) – eighty distinguished men who were either members of the Senate, or had held offices which qualified for membership." The battle of Cannae was arguably the lowest point in Rome’s history between its sackings in 387 BC and 410 AD. In books 20-30 of his Histories, Livy tells the story of how Rome was laid low and how it persisted and recovered. "No other nation in the world could have suffered so tremendous a series of disasters, and not been overwhelmed. It was unparalleled in history."
The story starts with the origins of Rome’s greatest enemy, Hannibal Barca. In the aftermath of the First Punic War, "Hannibal’s father Hamilcar, after the campaign in Africa, was about to carry his troops over into Spain, when Hannibal, then about nine years old, begged, with all the childish arts he could muster, to be allowed to accompany him; whereupon Hamilcar, who was preparing to offer sacrifice for a successful outcome, led the boy to the altar and made him solemnly swear, with his hand upon the sacred victim, that as soon as he was old enough he would be the enemy of the Roman people." "Reckless in courting danger, he showed superb tactical ability once it was upon him. Indefatigable both physically and mentally, he could endure with equal ease excessive heat or excessive cold; he ate and drank not to flatter his appetites but only so much as would sustain his bodily strength. His time for waking, like his time for sleeping, was never determined by daylight or darkness: when his work was done, then, and then only, he rested, without need, moreover, of silence or a soft bed to woo sleep to his eyes. Often he was seen lying in his cloak on the bare ground amongst the common soldiers on sentry or picket duty. ... So much for his virtues – and they were great; but no less great were his faults: inhuman cruelty, a more than Punic perfidy, a total disregard of truth, honor, and religion, of the sanctity of an oath and of all that other men hold sacred."
After Hannibal took command of his family’s troops in Africa, he led them on the epic and harrowing trek over the Alps, in which he lost up to 1/3 of his army. In Italy he encountered a Roman state that had grown arrogant in the decades after its first victory over Carthage. Hannibal was a masterful general who understood the psychology of his enemies as well as he understood the layout of his battlefields. He took full advantage of arrogant and reckless Roman generals, who time and again rushed headlong into his traps. At the Battle of the Trebia, Hannibal took advantage of the Roman eagerness to fight by luring them into fighting in unfavorable conditions, and he sent his brother to stage an ambush in their rear, so that he heavily defeated the Romans and gained his way into Italy. After this, Hannibal crossed the Apennines, which actually turned out to be possibly even more difficult than crossing the Alps – this was when Hannibal lost an eye, supposedly from infection due to swampy waters.
The next year, Hannibal followed up his victory at the Trebia with an even more unbelievably successful battle at Lake Trasimene. Hannibal masterfully lured the over-eager consul Flaminius into a trap, in which the Roman army was sandwiched in a long line between Lake Trasimene and Hannibal’s army hidden along the adjacent slopes. A thick mist further blinded the Romans to their trap. When Hannibal signaled his army to attack, "so great was the fury of the struggle, so totally absorbed was every man in its grim immediacy, that no one even noticed the earthquake which ruined large parts of many Italian towns, altered the course of swift rivers, brought the sea flooding into estuaries and started avalanches in the mountains." The devastating Roman defeat at Trasimene shook Rome to its core. In an indication of the strength of Rome’s institutions, Rome's first response was to call an emergency session of the Senate: "The praetors kept the Senate sitting from sunrise to sunset for several days, to debate the question of what leader they could find and what forces they could raise to continue resistance against the victorious enemy." They decided to appoint a dictator, but they hesitated to do so without a consul in the city; in the end they compromised and made Fabius an "acting" dictator. Next they attended to religious matters. They consulted the Sibylline books and corrected prior oversights and mistakes. And finally, "the completion of these religious duties was at once followed by practical measures." Furthermore, surprisingly few of Rome's allies deserted for Hannibal. Livy says, "Not even the panic caused by these depredations, not even the flames of war on every side of them, could move Rome’s allies from their allegiance. And why? – because they were subject to a just and moderate rule, and were willing to obey their betters. That, surely, is the one true bond of loyalty."
As dictator, Fabius implemented his famous "Fabian strategy" of refusing to engage with Hannibal in favor of slowly bleeding him out and waiting for him to make a mistake. This actually occurred when Fabius succeeded in trapping Hannibal in a valley. This could have been the end of the war, except that Hannibal used a brilliant tactic of tying torches to cows' horns and stampeding them towards the Romans to make it seem like he had somehow recruited a legion of demonic cavalry to aid him. The confusion this caused allowed Hannibal and his army to escape.
Fabius is a really interesting character. Hannibal recognized him as Rome's one competent general (until Marcellus and Scipio Africanus came onto the scene) and did everything he could to undermine him, such as ravaging all of the countryside around Fabius's villa but leaving the villa untouched, to make it seem Fabius was in cahoots with him. Fabius's strategy of not engaging with Hannibal was also extremely unpopular at Rome and in his own army. Fabius's Master of Horse, Marcus Minucius, undermined Fabius's authority from within, even disobeying Fabius's orders and engaging with Hannibal while Fabius was away at Rome. Minucius even convinced the Senate to make him "co-dictator" with Fabius. Minucius eventually engaged with Hannibal and would have been defeated but for Fabius swooping in and saving him.
After a few years of the Fabian strategy, Roman arrogance once again had its way, and the consul Varro led a dual-consular army into the battle of Cannae. Hannibal once again executed brilliant tactics at Cannae, arranging his battle line in a wedge formation designed so that the tip of the wedge would collapse inward and eventually form a concave bow, trapping the Romans. Hannibal was confident that his battle-hardened troops would make swift work of the Rome’s green recruits, which they did. The battle was a tragedy and disaster for Rome beyond the horrific condition of the battlefield that I quoted in the first paragraph. Virtually everyone at Rome lost family members: "Families were informed of their personal losses, and the city in consequence was so filled with mourners that the annual festival of Ceres was cancelled. Religion did not allow the rites to be celebrated by people in mourning, and there was no married woman at the time who was not." Furthermore, there was nothing to stop Hannibal from marching on Rome: "Never, without an enemy actually within the gates, had there been such terror and confusion in the city. To write of it is beyond my strength, so I shall not attempt to describe what any words of mine would only make less than the truth." During this time, Hannibal made the one decision that lost him the war – he failed to march on Rome. As his general Maharbal famously told him, "You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory." Livy says of Hannibal’s delay in marching on Rome that "it is generally believed that that day’s delay was the salvation of the City and of the Empire." Rome’s response to the battle of Cannae was classic. Rome refused to ransom the survivors of Cannae, and all soldiers who fled from Cannae were eventually sent to serve in exile in Sicily until the end of the war (which lasted for 13 years, until Scipio Africanus recruited them to fight in Africa).
I think that Hannibal was hoping that in the aftermath of Cannae, all of Italy would come over to his side so that he could raise a vast Italian army and march on Rome. That didn’t really happen. A few cities went over to Hannibal, most notably Tarentum, Capua, and most of Campania. Many Latin and Etruscan allies also wavered. Philip V of Macedonia came out in support of Carthage, and most of Sicily revolted against Roman rule. However, many more cities remained stubbornly loyal to Rome, and Hannibal’s army was not well-suited to sieges. In fact, the years after Cannae are full of failed sieges and reverses for Hannibal. A handful of talented generals finally came onto the stage. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus trained an unprecedented slave army, which won many battles and earned freedom for its slaves (Gracchus was eventually killed in an ambush, supposedly while bathing). Marcus Marcellus spent many campaigns successfully harrying Hannibal. In a memorable siege in which he had to overcome siege engines designed by Archimedes, he also conquered Syracuse, the largest and richest Greek city of its day (Marcellus and his co-consul Crispinus were eventually killed in an ambush staged by Hannibal). The Romans eventually also recaptured Capua. The Romans then defeated one of Hannibal’s brothers after he had crossed the Alps with a second army to reinforce Hannibal. This was the beginning of the end for Hannibal. It didn’t matter how many consuls and famous generals and masses of Roman soldiers he killed. Roman institutions were strong enough to just keep on throwing more soldiers and talented generals at him. Rome could afford many disastrous losses and Hannibal could afford almost none.
Livy admires Hannibal even as he was confined to Bruttium, the toe of Italy’s boot: "I hardly know whether Hannibal was not more wonderful when fortune was against him than in his hours of success. Fighting for thirteen years in enemy territory, far from home, with varying fortunes and an army composed not of native troops but of a hotch-potch of the riff-raff of all nationalities, men who shared neither law nor custom nor language, who differed in manner, in dress, in equipment, who had in common neither the forms of religious observance nor even the gods they served, he yet was able, somehow or other, to weld this motley crowd so firmly together that they never quarrelled amongst themselves nor mutinied against their general, though money to pay them was often lacking and provisions to feed them were often short."
In the meantime, a Roman foil to Hannibal was rising in Spain. Like Hannibal, Publius Cornelius Scipio’s father was killed fighting in Spain. Like Hannibal, Scipio made his name is Spain. He was elected to take over the remnants of his father’s and uncle’s armies after their deaths in a disastrous defeat when he was just 24. He then led an incredible campaign against the Carthaginians. He stormed New Carthage within one day and defeated something like 4 Carthaginian generals in a row, so that in 5 years he had completely driven the Carthaginians out of Spain. After these successes, he fought for and received permission to invade Africa. He then pulled off another succession of incredible victories. He gained the legendary Numidian Masinissa as his ally, defeated Syphax, a powerful Numidian king (I’m unfortunately skimming over a Greek-tragedy-level story involving Syphax, Masinissa, and the Carthaginian noblewoman Sophonisba), and forced the Carthaginians to recall Hannibal from Italy. He then crushed Hannibal at the battle of Zama.
Remarkably, after all of the tragedies and traumas that Hannibal had inflicted on Rome, the Romans let him live. I’m amazed that they didn’t destroy Carthage then and there. They did strip Carthage of all of its territory, take control of its foreign affairs, and force it to pay massive annual indemnities. But seeing as Hannibal had turned every Roman mother into a mourner, that seems like a pretty light price to pay.
The story starts with the origins of Rome’s greatest enemy, Hannibal Barca. In the aftermath of the First Punic War, "Hannibal’s father Hamilcar, after the campaign in Africa, was about to carry his troops over into Spain, when Hannibal, then about nine years old, begged, with all the childish arts he could muster, to be allowed to accompany him; whereupon Hamilcar, who was preparing to offer sacrifice for a successful outcome, led the boy to the altar and made him solemnly swear, with his hand upon the sacred victim, that as soon as he was old enough he would be the enemy of the Roman people." "Reckless in courting danger, he showed superb tactical ability once it was upon him. Indefatigable both physically and mentally, he could endure with equal ease excessive heat or excessive cold; he ate and drank not to flatter his appetites but only so much as would sustain his bodily strength. His time for waking, like his time for sleeping, was never determined by daylight or darkness: when his work was done, then, and then only, he rested, without need, moreover, of silence or a soft bed to woo sleep to his eyes. Often he was seen lying in his cloak on the bare ground amongst the common soldiers on sentry or picket duty. ... So much for his virtues – and they were great; but no less great were his faults: inhuman cruelty, a more than Punic perfidy, a total disregard of truth, honor, and religion, of the sanctity of an oath and of all that other men hold sacred."
After Hannibal took command of his family’s troops in Africa, he led them on the epic and harrowing trek over the Alps, in which he lost up to 1/3 of his army. In Italy he encountered a Roman state that had grown arrogant in the decades after its first victory over Carthage. Hannibal was a masterful general who understood the psychology of his enemies as well as he understood the layout of his battlefields. He took full advantage of arrogant and reckless Roman generals, who time and again rushed headlong into his traps. At the Battle of the Trebia, Hannibal took advantage of the Roman eagerness to fight by luring them into fighting in unfavorable conditions, and he sent his brother to stage an ambush in their rear, so that he heavily defeated the Romans and gained his way into Italy. After this, Hannibal crossed the Apennines, which actually turned out to be possibly even more difficult than crossing the Alps – this was when Hannibal lost an eye, supposedly from infection due to swampy waters.
The next year, Hannibal followed up his victory at the Trebia with an even more unbelievably successful battle at Lake Trasimene. Hannibal masterfully lured the over-eager consul Flaminius into a trap, in which the Roman army was sandwiched in a long line between Lake Trasimene and Hannibal’s army hidden along the adjacent slopes. A thick mist further blinded the Romans to their trap. When Hannibal signaled his army to attack, "so great was the fury of the struggle, so totally absorbed was every man in its grim immediacy, that no one even noticed the earthquake which ruined large parts of many Italian towns, altered the course of swift rivers, brought the sea flooding into estuaries and started avalanches in the mountains." The devastating Roman defeat at Trasimene shook Rome to its core. In an indication of the strength of Rome’s institutions, Rome's first response was to call an emergency session of the Senate: "The praetors kept the Senate sitting from sunrise to sunset for several days, to debate the question of what leader they could find and what forces they could raise to continue resistance against the victorious enemy." They decided to appoint a dictator, but they hesitated to do so without a consul in the city; in the end they compromised and made Fabius an "acting" dictator. Next they attended to religious matters. They consulted the Sibylline books and corrected prior oversights and mistakes. And finally, "the completion of these religious duties was at once followed by practical measures." Furthermore, surprisingly few of Rome's allies deserted for Hannibal. Livy says, "Not even the panic caused by these depredations, not even the flames of war on every side of them, could move Rome’s allies from their allegiance. And why? – because they were subject to a just and moderate rule, and were willing to obey their betters. That, surely, is the one true bond of loyalty."
As dictator, Fabius implemented his famous "Fabian strategy" of refusing to engage with Hannibal in favor of slowly bleeding him out and waiting for him to make a mistake. This actually occurred when Fabius succeeded in trapping Hannibal in a valley. This could have been the end of the war, except that Hannibal used a brilliant tactic of tying torches to cows' horns and stampeding them towards the Romans to make it seem like he had somehow recruited a legion of demonic cavalry to aid him. The confusion this caused allowed Hannibal and his army to escape.
Fabius is a really interesting character. Hannibal recognized him as Rome's one competent general (until Marcellus and Scipio Africanus came onto the scene) and did everything he could to undermine him, such as ravaging all of the countryside around Fabius's villa but leaving the villa untouched, to make it seem Fabius was in cahoots with him. Fabius's strategy of not engaging with Hannibal was also extremely unpopular at Rome and in his own army. Fabius's Master of Horse, Marcus Minucius, undermined Fabius's authority from within, even disobeying Fabius's orders and engaging with Hannibal while Fabius was away at Rome. Minucius even convinced the Senate to make him "co-dictator" with Fabius. Minucius eventually engaged with Hannibal and would have been defeated but for Fabius swooping in and saving him.
After a few years of the Fabian strategy, Roman arrogance once again had its way, and the consul Varro led a dual-consular army into the battle of Cannae. Hannibal once again executed brilliant tactics at Cannae, arranging his battle line in a wedge formation designed so that the tip of the wedge would collapse inward and eventually form a concave bow, trapping the Romans. Hannibal was confident that his battle-hardened troops would make swift work of the Rome’s green recruits, which they did. The battle was a tragedy and disaster for Rome beyond the horrific condition of the battlefield that I quoted in the first paragraph. Virtually everyone at Rome lost family members: "Families were informed of their personal losses, and the city in consequence was so filled with mourners that the annual festival of Ceres was cancelled. Religion did not allow the rites to be celebrated by people in mourning, and there was no married woman at the time who was not." Furthermore, there was nothing to stop Hannibal from marching on Rome: "Never, without an enemy actually within the gates, had there been such terror and confusion in the city. To write of it is beyond my strength, so I shall not attempt to describe what any words of mine would only make less than the truth." During this time, Hannibal made the one decision that lost him the war – he failed to march on Rome. As his general Maharbal famously told him, "You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory." Livy says of Hannibal’s delay in marching on Rome that "it is generally believed that that day’s delay was the salvation of the City and of the Empire." Rome’s response to the battle of Cannae was classic. Rome refused to ransom the survivors of Cannae, and all soldiers who fled from Cannae were eventually sent to serve in exile in Sicily until the end of the war (which lasted for 13 years, until Scipio Africanus recruited them to fight in Africa).
I think that Hannibal was hoping that in the aftermath of Cannae, all of Italy would come over to his side so that he could raise a vast Italian army and march on Rome. That didn’t really happen. A few cities went over to Hannibal, most notably Tarentum, Capua, and most of Campania. Many Latin and Etruscan allies also wavered. Philip V of Macedonia came out in support of Carthage, and most of Sicily revolted against Roman rule. However, many more cities remained stubbornly loyal to Rome, and Hannibal’s army was not well-suited to sieges. In fact, the years after Cannae are full of failed sieges and reverses for Hannibal. A handful of talented generals finally came onto the stage. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus trained an unprecedented slave army, which won many battles and earned freedom for its slaves (Gracchus was eventually killed in an ambush, supposedly while bathing). Marcus Marcellus spent many campaigns successfully harrying Hannibal. In a memorable siege in which he had to overcome siege engines designed by Archimedes, he also conquered Syracuse, the largest and richest Greek city of its day (Marcellus and his co-consul Crispinus were eventually killed in an ambush staged by Hannibal). The Romans eventually also recaptured Capua. The Romans then defeated one of Hannibal’s brothers after he had crossed the Alps with a second army to reinforce Hannibal. This was the beginning of the end for Hannibal. It didn’t matter how many consuls and famous generals and masses of Roman soldiers he killed. Roman institutions were strong enough to just keep on throwing more soldiers and talented generals at him. Rome could afford many disastrous losses and Hannibal could afford almost none.
Livy admires Hannibal even as he was confined to Bruttium, the toe of Italy’s boot: "I hardly know whether Hannibal was not more wonderful when fortune was against him than in his hours of success. Fighting for thirteen years in enemy territory, far from home, with varying fortunes and an army composed not of native troops but of a hotch-potch of the riff-raff of all nationalities, men who shared neither law nor custom nor language, who differed in manner, in dress, in equipment, who had in common neither the forms of religious observance nor even the gods they served, he yet was able, somehow or other, to weld this motley crowd so firmly together that they never quarrelled amongst themselves nor mutinied against their general, though money to pay them was often lacking and provisions to feed them were often short."
In the meantime, a Roman foil to Hannibal was rising in Spain. Like Hannibal, Publius Cornelius Scipio’s father was killed fighting in Spain. Like Hannibal, Scipio made his name is Spain. He was elected to take over the remnants of his father’s and uncle’s armies after their deaths in a disastrous defeat when he was just 24. He then led an incredible campaign against the Carthaginians. He stormed New Carthage within one day and defeated something like 4 Carthaginian generals in a row, so that in 5 years he had completely driven the Carthaginians out of Spain. After these successes, he fought for and received permission to invade Africa. He then pulled off another succession of incredible victories. He gained the legendary Numidian Masinissa as his ally, defeated Syphax, a powerful Numidian king (I’m unfortunately skimming over a Greek-tragedy-level story involving Syphax, Masinissa, and the Carthaginian noblewoman Sophonisba), and forced the Carthaginians to recall Hannibal from Italy. He then crushed Hannibal at the battle of Zama.
Remarkably, after all of the tragedies and traumas that Hannibal had inflicted on Rome, the Romans let him live. I’m amazed that they didn’t destroy Carthage then and there. They did strip Carthage of all of its territory, take control of its foreign affairs, and force it to pay massive annual indemnities. But seeing as Hannibal had turned every Roman mother into a mourner, that seems like a pretty light price to pay.
June 13, 2021
This is actually a re-write of a previous review which, unfortunately, I accidentally deleted today. So, I'm going to try to remember what I said and publish this again.
So, this is the third in the series of Livy's history that I've been working my way through. It is also, easily the most dramatic, and that is saying something!. The action of this part of Livy's history focuses on the 2nd War with Carthage and, above all, Hannibal. Hannibal is the dominating presence in this books. The reasons are, of course, obvious reasons. His nearly successful invasion of Italy makes for good drama as the Romans face disaster after disaster at the hands of this Carthaginian military genius. By themselves, the account of the disasters are tour de force, especially the scene of the mist lifting at the Battle of Lake Trasimene, revealing the destruction of the consular army or the disaster at Cannae.
Nor are the Romans deficient in big characters- Fabius Maximus dominates the early years of the war, but, really, we don't find a match for Hannibal in either drama or military skills until Scipio Africanus appears on the scene. And, of course, the dramatic climax is Hannibal's defeat at the Battle of Zama, which ends the war.
Now, never mind, that the actual history gets a little wonky at times. Never mind, that Livy glosses over the Roman provocations of Carthage. Well, actually, do mind all that, if you want to be a decent historian. This is Livy at his dramatic best, but, don't get swept away. This is part of the Roman historical imagination and it is fascinating as a result, but perhaps more fascianting in what it doesn't say as what it does say.
So, this is the third in the series of Livy's history that I've been working my way through. It is also, easily the most dramatic, and that is saying something!. The action of this part of Livy's history focuses on the 2nd War with Carthage and, above all, Hannibal. Hannibal is the dominating presence in this books. The reasons are, of course, obvious reasons. His nearly successful invasion of Italy makes for good drama as the Romans face disaster after disaster at the hands of this Carthaginian military genius. By themselves, the account of the disasters are tour de force, especially the scene of the mist lifting at the Battle of Lake Trasimene, revealing the destruction of the consular army or the disaster at Cannae.
Nor are the Romans deficient in big characters- Fabius Maximus dominates the early years of the war, but, really, we don't find a match for Hannibal in either drama or military skills until Scipio Africanus appears on the scene. And, of course, the dramatic climax is Hannibal's defeat at the Battle of Zama, which ends the war.
Now, never mind, that the actual history gets a little wonky at times. Never mind, that Livy glosses over the Roman provocations of Carthage. Well, actually, do mind all that, if you want to be a decent historian. This is Livy at his dramatic best, but, don't get swept away. This is part of the Roman historical imagination and it is fascinating as a result, but perhaps more fascianting in what it doesn't say as what it does say.
March 30, 2022
I thought I was done with Livy after books 1-10, but one reviewer's comment about books 21-30 being better than the first ten convinced me to continue (alas, books 11-20 are lost to antiquity). Whereas books 1-10 cover centuries of (partly mythical) history, books 21-30 cover only 18 years - with each year's events being covered in greater depth than anything Livy had previously written.
Livy's portrayal of Hannibal's War draws extensively on Polybius (while barely acknowledging that influence), as well as on Roman historians such as Fabius Pictor (and others, named and unnamed). As opposed to books 1-10, most of the events here are historically accurate, although some episodes may not be, numbers often appear exaggerated, and Livy puts speeches into the mouths of historical figures that may or may not have had any historical basis. In some ways, that makes Livy read like historical fiction, as he tells the dramatic account of how Rome, after many battles and struggles, won the Second Punic War, becoming the dominant power of the Mediterranean.
While I personally find Polybius a more compelling author, most of Polybius' account of the Second Punic War (other than the first two years) has survived only in fragments. For those interested in reading both authors, I highly recommend reading Polybius before Livy 21-30 - Livy tells the fuller story (though sadly we lack his account of the First Punic War) and he tells it with much more of an internal Roman perspective than does Polybius (including by relating discussions in the Senate as well as the speeches of consuls and military leaders). I'm glad I didn't end my reading of Livy with books 1-10 and recommend that anyone who has read those books continue to read books 21-30 as well.
Livy's portrayal of Hannibal's War draws extensively on Polybius (while barely acknowledging that influence), as well as on Roman historians such as Fabius Pictor (and others, named and unnamed). As opposed to books 1-10, most of the events here are historically accurate, although some episodes may not be, numbers often appear exaggerated, and Livy puts speeches into the mouths of historical figures that may or may not have had any historical basis. In some ways, that makes Livy read like historical fiction, as he tells the dramatic account of how Rome, after many battles and struggles, won the Second Punic War, becoming the dominant power of the Mediterranean.
While I personally find Polybius a more compelling author, most of Polybius' account of the Second Punic War (other than the first two years) has survived only in fragments. For those interested in reading both authors, I highly recommend reading Polybius before Livy 21-30 - Livy tells the fuller story (though sadly we lack his account of the First Punic War) and he tells it with much more of an internal Roman perspective than does Polybius (including by relating discussions in the Senate as well as the speeches of consuls and military leaders). I'm glad I didn't end my reading of Livy with books 1-10 and recommend that anyone who has read those books continue to read books 21-30 as well.
February 1, 2021
While there are 100 books from Livy's History that are lost, this is the Magnum Opus of what remains and is likely the central part of his entire work.
Book 21, Chapter 1 opens with a clearly laid out plan and quick preview of the next 10 Books. Any student of Thucydides will immediately see the parallels. Livy is clearly making the 2nd Punic War to be the Roman comparison to the Second Peloponnesian War.
To those who have only heard the popular stories in passing, the Second Punic War is Hannibal going over the Alps with elephants and the Romans eventually defeating him and Scipio Africannus is involved. All of this is true, but in 10 Books Livy fills in the other 16 years of the war.
Livy captures the terror of the early years when the history of Rome laid in the balance and Hannibal was winning the war. He then connects with the controlled elation as the war began to go the other way and points out the scrambles for glory as the war was about to be won and each Consul wanted a piece of Scipio's victory.
The Second Punic War was much like the Second World War in our era, the defining event of the Roman nation for generations if not centuries. Fortunately for us, there were far more sources including even Greek ones as Rome had become a major player in the Western and greater Mediterranean. And Livy uses all these sources at his disposal (especially Polybius) to tell it and define it 200 years after the victory at Zama.
Book 21, Chapter 1 opens with a clearly laid out plan and quick preview of the next 10 Books. Any student of Thucydides will immediately see the parallels. Livy is clearly making the 2nd Punic War to be the Roman comparison to the Second Peloponnesian War.
To those who have only heard the popular stories in passing, the Second Punic War is Hannibal going over the Alps with elephants and the Romans eventually defeating him and Scipio Africannus is involved. All of this is true, but in 10 Books Livy fills in the other 16 years of the war.
Livy captures the terror of the early years when the history of Rome laid in the balance and Hannibal was winning the war. He then connects with the controlled elation as the war began to go the other way and points out the scrambles for glory as the war was about to be won and each Consul wanted a piece of Scipio's victory.
The Second Punic War was much like the Second World War in our era, the defining event of the Roman nation for generations if not centuries. Fortunately for us, there were far more sources including even Greek ones as Rome had become a major player in the Western and greater Mediterranean. And Livy uses all these sources at his disposal (especially Polybius) to tell it and define it 200 years after the victory at Zama.
December 3, 2024
Livy offers dramatic characters, scenes, and narratives, and even gives vim to military details.
December 5, 2022
justice for sophonisba and the elephants
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November 15, 2024I have read too much Livy in too short a time for any sane person.
March 16, 2024
Livy - The War with Hannibal - Penguin Classics (trans. Aubrey de Selincourt)
Like the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian Wars and Alexander’s Wars of Conquest that preceded them, the Punic Wars were one of the most significant events in the Ancient World. These wars were fought for 43 years between 264 and 146 BC, having as a result the destruction of Carthage and the total Roman domination of the Mediterranean. Titus Livy (59 BC – 17 AD), the greatest historian of Roman Republican times, gives us the full account of the Second Punic War (218 – 201 BC) in 10 books, a narrative that feels like a political thriller interspersed with a long series of battles that crisscross various parts of Italy, Spain, Sicily, Greece and North Africa.
The story kicks off with Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who swore by an oath to be Rome’s Nemesis when he was only a boy, his development into the finest warrior Carthage has ever seen, until his relocation to Spain to join his brother Hasdrubal and the subsequent sack of Saguntum (Rome’s ally) in 219 BC, starting the Second Punic War. From here on we are led through a blow-by-blow account of the pillaging of cities, the ravaging of farmlands, the making and breaking of alliances, the building of forts and garrisoning of troops, the sacrifice of victims, the celebrating of games and festivals, and of course, countless vicious conflicts.
Hannibal’s prowess and cunning, along with other notable Carthaginians and their assortment of troops from all corners of the mediterranean, posed a magnanimous threat to the Roman state, and as we read on, we witness their despair at the possibility of losing their lands and country to a barbarian nation. Through this whirlwind of emotions, we then witness the rise of figures such as Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus – who finally managed to restore Rome’s tactical and military supremacy and brought about the much-awaited victory over Carthage. All in all, the book never runs short of epic moments, my favorites being Hannibal’s crossing of the alps with his elephants, the brutal battles of Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae (the worst defeat in Roman history), the political unrest that led to the siege of Syracuse, the slaughter at Astapa, the battle of Metaurus, and the final showdown at Zama.
In 676 pages, The War with Hannibal stands as a testament to the enduring legacy of this pivotal conflict. Its gripping narrative and historical significance make it an essential reading for any Ancient History enthusiast - a sentiment echoed by preeminent figures such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Edward Gibbon, no less. This is Livy at his finest.
Like the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian Wars and Alexander’s Wars of Conquest that preceded them, the Punic Wars were one of the most significant events in the Ancient World. These wars were fought for 43 years between 264 and 146 BC, having as a result the destruction of Carthage and the total Roman domination of the Mediterranean. Titus Livy (59 BC – 17 AD), the greatest historian of Roman Republican times, gives us the full account of the Second Punic War (218 – 201 BC) in 10 books, a narrative that feels like a political thriller interspersed with a long series of battles that crisscross various parts of Italy, Spain, Sicily, Greece and North Africa.
The story kicks off with Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who swore by an oath to be Rome’s Nemesis when he was only a boy, his development into the finest warrior Carthage has ever seen, until his relocation to Spain to join his brother Hasdrubal and the subsequent sack of Saguntum (Rome’s ally) in 219 BC, starting the Second Punic War. From here on we are led through a blow-by-blow account of the pillaging of cities, the ravaging of farmlands, the making and breaking of alliances, the building of forts and garrisoning of troops, the sacrifice of victims, the celebrating of games and festivals, and of course, countless vicious conflicts.
Hannibal’s prowess and cunning, along with other notable Carthaginians and their assortment of troops from all corners of the mediterranean, posed a magnanimous threat to the Roman state, and as we read on, we witness their despair at the possibility of losing their lands and country to a barbarian nation. Through this whirlwind of emotions, we then witness the rise of figures such as Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus – who finally managed to restore Rome’s tactical and military supremacy and brought about the much-awaited victory over Carthage. All in all, the book never runs short of epic moments, my favorites being Hannibal’s crossing of the alps with his elephants, the brutal battles of Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae (the worst defeat in Roman history), the political unrest that led to the siege of Syracuse, the slaughter at Astapa, the battle of Metaurus, and the final showdown at Zama.
In 676 pages, The War with Hannibal stands as a testament to the enduring legacy of this pivotal conflict. Its gripping narrative and historical significance make it an essential reading for any Ancient History enthusiast - a sentiment echoed by preeminent figures such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Edward Gibbon, no less. This is Livy at his finest.
November 28, 2017
Read this using the Loeb Series:
History of Rome,Volume V, Books 21-22 (Loeb Classical Library No. 233) - Read November 21, 2017
History of Rome, Volume VI, Books 23-25 (Loeb Classical Library No. 355) - Read Read May 5, 2017
History of Rome, Volume VII, Books 26-27 (Loeb Classical Library No. 367) - Read April 10, 2017
History of Rome, Volume VIII, Books 28-30 (Loeb Classical Library No. 381) - Read March 27, 2017
May 8, 2020
The first 200 pages of this book are the most engaging, as they include the three famous battles Hannibal is known for. Everything between Cannae and Zama (most of the book) is interesting as these details are more obscure, but it does drag slightly. If you want to get a good idea of what the play-by-play was of the Second Punic War, this is an excellent choice.
May 21, 2020
This is how Western empires are made - using fear or hope.
"The Senate foresaw that if one war had ended, another is just beginning."
"The Senate foresaw that if one war had ended, another is just beginning."
December 4, 2020
Excellent if the translation was a bit dated. Binge read books 21 to 29 in about 3 months and then took over a year to finally read book 30
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March 25, 2022Only read Books 21-22 & 30 (events preluding and of the war itself)
May 8, 2024
Het examenonderwerp Latijn van dit jaar was de epische oorlog tussen de Romeinen en Carthagers, onder leiding van Hannibal, verteld door Livius. Waar de eerste boeken van het werk van Livius nog een mythisch karakter hebben, komt Livius hier met harde gevechten en een duidelijke morele boodschap. Deze is soms op een mooie manier, maar soms ook op een overdreven manier onderdeel geworden van zijn historiografie. Kom je voor een feitelijk, betrouwbaar relaas van de Tweede Punische oorlog? Dan ben je aan het verkeerde adres. Kom je voor een spannend verhaal, gezien door de politieke bril van een Romein ten tijde van Augustus? Dan is Livius je man.
April 11, 2011
There is no better way of learning about Ancient Rome than to go the historians who lived in it. It will be very surprising to those not accustomed to reading ancient authors how approachable Livy's books are. Livy had a knack for telling a good story, and the ancient practice of re-creating, and in some cases, inventing speeches for key characters to deliver at key moments, is surprisingly effective. In fact, there is much wisdom in such a practice, for through such speeches we get the more subjective, emotional reality behind events. We could use some of that in our contemporary historical writing, which tends be very fact-based and yet missing the very important emotional context. Take the Iraqi war, for example. No doubt the history books will be full of data about its causes, but will future readers really understand the emotional context of the US response to 9-11? Would a speech encapsulating the misdirected rage not be helpful in this regard?
Anyway, this book would make a particularly good introduction to the classics, with the grandness of the story being told: This is the one that contains Hannibal's invasion of Italy, crossing the Alps with an international army of mercenaries and a few African elephants. It's a story full of suspense, with the Romans being shoved against the wall of their own home, suffering disaster after disaster, and then overcoming the odds through sheer grit and composure. On the moral side of things, it is difficult not to feel inspired in one personal's life after reading this until the memory of it all fades away--a good reason for getting the prior or next instalment of Livy.
Anyway, this book would make a particularly good introduction to the classics, with the grandness of the story being told: This is the one that contains Hannibal's invasion of Italy, crossing the Alps with an international army of mercenaries and a few African elephants. It's a story full of suspense, with the Romans being shoved against the wall of their own home, suffering disaster after disaster, and then overcoming the odds through sheer grit and composure. On the moral side of things, it is difficult not to feel inspired in one personal's life after reading this until the memory of it all fades away--a good reason for getting the prior or next instalment of Livy.
January 2, 2013
In a word, any 'serious' reader of ancient history needs to read Livy, then you'd understand why he's long been admired and seemed to be praised 'to the skies'. I've never wanted to read him, I thought it's Greek to me. It might be so if we were to read his works in Latin, I mean we can follow his wonderful, unthinkable narrative on various theaters of wars and clashes of the leaders' characters excitedly from this fine translation by Aubrey de Selincourt whose style's formidably second to none. According to Betty Raddice (who edited/ introduced this book as well as translated the last 12 Chapters of Book XXX), de Selincourt would read the original Latin in a junk first, roughly half a page, more or less then translated what he just read into English into a draft. Amazing! Moreover, I'd like to tell my GR readers that de Selincourt was and is definitely one of the great Classic translators of genius since he could equally translated both Greek (e.g. The Histories by Herodotus, etc.) and Latin (e.g. this one, etc.) into English. As for other translators, I think, translating from only one language is just fine and enough, do you think so?
TO CONTINUE
TO CONTINUE
February 19, 2019
Good translation of a history book from 2000 years ago
This is a good translation of a history book that through being a history book written a millennium or two ago is now considered stodgy. It is not.
My purchase dealt with the war with Carthage, which is a fascinating period of history. Livy chronicles the war rather well in a year-by-year fashion. The end of each chapter has a section recounting 'fabulous' things that have happened, rather like the scandal sheets you see by the grocery store checkout lines.
My advice to anyone considering buying this is to keep in mind what all good students of classical literature and history are told from the start: if you hit a difficult part, skip it. You can always go back. Since you are not likely reading this particular book for a grade, it's the best way to be.
Now excuse me: I need to get back to Tiberius Gracchus and his army of misfits that marched into legend for a while...
This is a good translation of a history book that through being a history book written a millennium or two ago is now considered stodgy. It is not.
My purchase dealt with the war with Carthage, which is a fascinating period of history. Livy chronicles the war rather well in a year-by-year fashion. The end of each chapter has a section recounting 'fabulous' things that have happened, rather like the scandal sheets you see by the grocery store checkout lines.
My advice to anyone considering buying this is to keep in mind what all good students of classical literature and history are told from the start: if you hit a difficult part, skip it. You can always go back. Since you are not likely reading this particular book for a grade, it's the best way to be.
Now excuse me: I need to get back to Tiberius Gracchus and his army of misfits that marched into legend for a while...
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