On the 25th of July 1947, Lord Mountbatten addressed the Chamber of Princes (COP) at Delhi in the Council House which was to become the Parliament of India. Mountbatten had already decided the date of India being granted dominion status and the agenda of the meeting was to present options to the Princely states to accede to India or Pakistan. Laying out the foundation of accession he informed that Princely states would have to cede ground on three subjects – defence, foreign affairs, and communication. He asserted that “The States are theoretically free to link their future with whichever Dominion they may care [to]. But when I say that they are at liberty to link up with either of the Dominions, may I point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded. Out of something like 565 States, the vast majority are irretrievably linked . . . with the Dominion of India”.
The book is a remarkable tale of how 562 princely states were strung together to create the map of modern India and the central role of Patel and Menon in achieving this near-impossible task. Zubrzycki begins his tale with the arrival of Mountbatten as the Viceroy in March 1947 and ends with the abolition of titles, privileges, and privy purses in December 1971.
During the British Raj, the Princely states were kept under a tight leash of coercion. Every princely state had a British political representative who assured them of their continued monarchy for the price of their support. This effort was led by Conrad Corfield, the viceroy’s adviser on the princely states who championed the cause of the princes and was often accused by the Congress and others of planning to balkanise India on independence. As he left for England in 1947, his final act of loyalty to the princes was the destruction of thousands of secret files maintained by the British on the often scandalous private lives of India’s potentates. These files were used by the British to blackmail the princes into submission. Meanwhile, the Congress considered the princely states as bastions of debauchery and decay. Nehru termed them as ‘sinks of reaction and incompetence and unrestrained autocratic power, sometimes exercised by vicious and degraded individuals’.
While most states fell in line, others staked a claim for independence or a better deal. Interspersed with anecdotal gems, the trials and tribulations of amalgamating Hyderabad, Kashmir, Junagadh, Travancore, Kashmir, and Alwar are emotively narrated. Zubrzycki paints a vivid picture of how Menon and Patel as a tag team coaxed and coerced the Princely states. Although Patel managed to enshrine the grant of privy purse in the constitution, we find, that guarantees given to the princes were consistently abandoned. Similarly, the states were assured their boundaries would be respected, but beginning with tiny principalities in Odisha, by 1949-50 even major states were erased from the maps via “integration”. In many cases, the states were better ruled before independence. Post-independence, the collapse of the erstwhile governance machinery even drove some states to economic bankruptcy. The constitutional safeguards for granting privy purses to the Princely states were amended under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. In a politically motivated sleight of hand, the bill to derecognise the princes and abolish their privy purse and privileges became law on 28 December 1971. “Patel’s private secretary, V. Shankar, wrote that abolishing the privy purses without compensation was ‘an unprecedented act in the annals of India’s constitutional history . . . The utter impropriety, immorality, unconstitutionality, lack of chivalry . . . and ingratitude of the transaction begs description.” As Indian politicians became the power brokers of a new India, the royals took to politics themselves or supported candidates to retain their regional clout.
Zubrzycki highlights the sharp political and ideological divide between Nehru and Patel as violent fissures of partition swept across the nation. Jawaharlal Nehru declared him a “communalist” and Dethroned chronicles this controversial discourse. For all his immense achievements, Zubrzycki argues that Patel often used the princely states for ulterior motives. For instance, in Punjab, where the Congress decried Sikh princes as relics, Patel looked away as the maharajas armed Sikhs to expel Muslims. The Sardar also turned a blind eye to the communal violence targeting the Meos in Alwar. The annexations of Junagadh and Hyderabad were also followed by communal strife aided by administrative inaction. The reports of communal violence in Hyderabad after the annexation led to Nehru commissioning a confidential report led by Pandit Sunderlal and Qazi Abdulghaffar. The report was so damning that Nehru and Patel together suppressed it. The report was eventually first published as an appendix to A.G. Noorani’s The Destruction of Hyderabad in 2013. However, in fairness, Zubrzycki is not unduly harsh on Patel or Menon or sympathetic to the princes. Another interesting segment in the book is the happenings leading to the integration of Kalat in Pakistan. The state’s quest for sovereignty amongst the allegations of inaction on the Indian side, the validity of treaty obligations, and accusations of cross-border meddling led to the debate on whether Khan signed the Instrument of Accession with Pakistan voluntarily or was forced to at gunpoint.
The journey of the princes in democratic India began with them surrendering their kingdoms for privy purses while retaining limited sovereignty as figureheads of their provinces and eventually ended with them being reduced to ordinary citizens after the amendment of the constitutional provisions. While Menon’s justification for speeding up the process of integration was to avert an escalation of the chaos that had engulfed the subcontinent after the transfer of power. Zubrzycki examines the accession-versus-chaos theory arguing that the theory ignores the sharp reality of small states living in the shadows of large countries with powerful militaries such as India and Pakistan. He postulates that any form of independence would have been short-lived.
The biographers of both Menon and Patel have argued against the theory of them having betrayed the Princely states. Narayani Basu reasons that “It is perfectly true that V.P. and Patel were not above – when neither their powers of persuasion or offers of empty honours worked – engaging in a judicious mix of arm-twisting and veiled threats. But they did not set out to betray the princes. Nor is there the slightest evidence to prove these charges.” However, Zubrzycki informs that that many states were transitioning to modern administrations and were repeatedly promised by Menon that they would stay as separate entities, however, even they were coercively amalgamated into larger states. Interestingly, the problems of integration in Pakistan and the efforts of Jinnah in such a critical nation-building exercise were surprisingly limited.
There are other so-called seminal books on the integration of the princely states such as K.M. Panikkar’s Relations of Indian States with the Government of India (1927) and Menon’s Post-retirement Story of Integration of Indian States (1957). Panikkar was the Dewan of Bikaner and Menon was the right-hand man of Patel so their tales are weighed down by the baggage of justifying the past. Zubrzycki offers a fresh perspective based on multiple first-person accounts, primary sources, and now declassified archives. The tale is skilfully told and is an admirable example of narrative history. A very fine book that should be a worthy read for anyone who wants to engage with the journey of the making of India as a Union of States.