Demystifying Emotions

by Agnes Moors

Demystifying Emotions provides a comprehensive typology of emotion theories in psychology (evolutionary, network, appraisal, goal-directed, psychological constructionist, and social) and philosophy (feeling, judgmental, quasi-judgmental, perceptual, embodied, and motivational) in a systematic manner with the help of tools from philosophy of science, allowing scholars in both fields to understand the commonalities and differences between these theories. Agnes Moors also proposes her own novel, skeptical theory of emotions, called the goal-directed theory, based on the central idea that all kinds of behaviors and feelings are grounded in goal-striving. Whereas most scholars of emotion do not call the notion of emotion itself into question, this review engages in a critical examination of its scientific legitimacy. This book will appeal to readers in psychology, philosophy, and related disciplines who want to gain a deeper understanding of the controversies at play in the emotion domain.

Genres: Psychology

400 pages, Paperback

Published February 8, 2024

Reviews

[Aron · Rating 4 out of 5]

Demystifying Emotions provides a comprehensive overview of current constitutive and mechanistic theories of emotions (i.e. network, appraisal, constructivist theories) as well as it's predecessors (i.e. by Charles Darwin, William James). From the discussion of the evidence on the respective theories, it becomes clear that the evidence is often open to equivocal interpretation, which raises the question of whether these theories are really falsifiable and therefore meet scientific standards.

Moors is skeptical whether emotions can be described in an adequate scientific definition. Her own goal-directed theory explains behavior through a general purpose mechanism that does not distinguish between emotional and non-emotional episodes. It is particularly influenced by instrumental associations and value based strategies to reduce a detected discrepancy between a perceived stimulus and a valued goal. Very promising, however, it is not understandable why valued goals, which create the discrepancy in relation to the actual stimulus, are not also triggered by Pavlovian S-S associations.