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The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century
As the Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Frank McKenzie oversaw some of the most important — and controversial operations in modern U.S. military history. He had direct operational responsibility for the strikes on Qassem Soleimani and two successive leaders of ISIS, the many months of deterrence operations against Iran and its proxies, and the methodical drawdown in Iraq. He directed the noncombatant evacuation operation in Afghanistan, and our final withdrawal from that tortured country.
The Melting Point has three themes. The first one is the importance of the primacy of civilian control of the military. It has become a widely perceived truth that this control has been eroded over the past few years. General McKenzie doesn’t believe that to be the case, and he speaks with some authority on the matter arguing that the civ-mil relationship isn’t perfect or frictionless, but it doesn’t have to be, and probably shouldn’t be. It is, however, more durable than many believe, and is supported and embraced by the military to a degree that some critics do not choose to recognize.
The second theme is the uniqueness of being a combatant commander. Combatant commanders participate in the development of policy, although as junior partners. They are also responsible for the execution of policy once civilian leaders have formulated their decision, a unique position, and very different than the role of a service chief, or even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. None of these officers are in the chain of command, and they have no ultimate, mortal responsibility or authority for execution. Only the combatant commander stands astride the boundary of decision-making and execution.
Finally, the third theme that McKenzie argues is that leaders matter, and the decisions they make have a profound effect on what happens on the battlefield. McKenzie provides an honest assessment of his time in command—describing decisions that were sound, as well as some outcomes he wishes were different. He offers a vivid portrait of leadership in action in one of the most volatile regions of the world.
The Melting Point has three themes. The first one is the importance of the primacy of civilian control of the military. It has become a widely perceived truth that this control has been eroded over the past few years. General McKenzie doesn’t believe that to be the case, and he speaks with some authority on the matter arguing that the civ-mil relationship isn’t perfect or frictionless, but it doesn’t have to be, and probably shouldn’t be. It is, however, more durable than many believe, and is supported and embraced by the military to a degree that some critics do not choose to recognize.
The second theme is the uniqueness of being a combatant commander. Combatant commanders participate in the development of policy, although as junior partners. They are also responsible for the execution of policy once civilian leaders have formulated their decision, a unique position, and very different than the role of a service chief, or even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. None of these officers are in the chain of command, and they have no ultimate, mortal responsibility or authority for execution. Only the combatant commander stands astride the boundary of decision-making and execution.
Finally, the third theme that McKenzie argues is that leaders matter, and the decisions they make have a profound effect on what happens on the battlefield. McKenzie provides an honest assessment of his time in command—describing decisions that were sound, as well as some outcomes he wishes were different. He offers a vivid portrait of leadership in action in one of the most volatile regions of the world.
360 pages, Hardcover
Published May 28, 2024
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292 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
October 8, 2024
A good book about recent military history. Learned about the author on the Fox News Channel.
February 8, 2025
This book is marketed as a “lessons in command” book but it is a really a memoir of McKenzie’s time as the Commander of US Central Command that explains his decisions and style of command. While General Mckenzie does impart lessons, they are not necessarily the basis of his book.
Mckenzie’s tenure was not a time of clear cut warfighting or diplomacy. His main focus was on deterring any Iranian coordinated provocations, however three notable events took place under his command, The elimination of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the elimination of Qasem Suleimani, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Mckenzie takes a critical eye towards all involved in these operations including himself. He carefully details the “friction” that occurs within senior military and civilian leadership but also notes that this is the way it must be, He does not appear to push off blame where it is not due but also accepts his own errors, particularly for the civilian deaths that occurred in a drone strike in Kabul during the Afghan withdrawal.
While plenty of military leaders write memoirs of their times, Mackenzie’s book is recommended as an invaluable look into the controversial operations of the times.
Mckenzie’s tenure was not a time of clear cut warfighting or diplomacy. His main focus was on deterring any Iranian coordinated provocations, however three notable events took place under his command, The elimination of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the elimination of Qasem Suleimani, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Mckenzie takes a critical eye towards all involved in these operations including himself. He carefully details the “friction” that occurs within senior military and civilian leadership but also notes that this is the way it must be, He does not appear to push off blame where it is not due but also accepts his own errors, particularly for the civilian deaths that occurred in a drone strike in Kabul during the Afghan withdrawal.
While plenty of military leaders write memoirs of their times, Mackenzie’s book is recommended as an invaluable look into the controversial operations of the times.
September 30, 2025
Best book on the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan that I’ve read thus far. Came across to me as distinctly apolitical and adequately critical of the author’s own actions as well as those of others. Good leadership takes interspersed as well and some that are noteworthy for contradicting the norm.
March 6, 2025
Melting Point: A Tactical Commander Lost in Strategic Role
General Kenneth McKenzie approaches one of the most geopolitically significant military commands—the leadership of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—with the mindset of an aggressive, young battalion commander rather than that of a strategic leader. Given this, his failure to think beyond his own parochial interests and immediate tactical concerns should not come as a surprise. Even the forewords by fellow Marines General John Kelly and Secretary of Defense James Mattis offer only faint praise for their protégé, likely a recognition of his significant shortcomings as a commander.
McKenzie is studious in naming subordinates and giving credit to those who worked under him—an admirable leadership quality. He also has a penchant for describing picturesque surroundings—whether it’s the Citadel’s campus, views from White House rooms, or the arrangement of books and monitors in his office. However, these details contribute little to an understanding of the actual strategic objectives and U.S. interests in the CENTCOM region.
What’s more troubling is McKenzie’s lack of engagement with key figures beyond the U.S. military. He rarely mentions his allied and coalition counterparts, despite their significant force contributions. He spends almost no time discussing the State Department, intelligence services, or other U.S. government agencies, all of whom play critical roles in achieving national goals.
A Near-Obsessive Focus on Iran
One of McKenzie’s most glaring faults is his laser-like focus on conflict with Iran, which comes at the exclusion of broader strategic considerations. Major geopolitical events that any competent strategic leader would have taken into account—including the U.S. withdrawal from Syria and the abandonment of Kurdish allies, Trump’s first impeachment, and the COVID-19 pandemic—are barely acknowledged.
Instead, McKenzie fixates on the reduction of forces within his command, writing:
“This made the GFMP obsolete at the moment of publication, and it necessitated the endless series of force adjustments that we were now wading through. In this sense, the implementation of our guiding strategic document in the department was not aligned against the highest-level objectives of the United States.”
Yet, only briefly and towards the end of the book does McKenzie even briefly sketch a small portion of what those ‘highest-level objectives’ actually were. The only consistent objective he appears to have is deterring and confronting Iran—a goal he pursues without clear definition or recognition of broader U.S. interests.
Even when McKenzie acknowledges that the Trump administration failed to consider the likely consequences of Soleimani’s assassination, he admits that he did nothing to prepare U.S. forces for what he feared might happen:
• No major force repositioning in the region.
• No large-scale defense exercises to refocus a force structured for counter-ISIS and counter-Taliban operations.
• Not even basic increases in force protection on U.S. bases before the Soleimani strike.
This raises a fundamental question: Was McKenzie simply inept in his defensive preparations, or was he actively seeking a pretext for escalation?
A Lack of Strategic Thinking on Soleimani’s Assassination
McKenzie’s approach to the Soleimani strike also reflects a stunning lack of strategic foresight. He dismisses any alternative methods of eliminating Soleimani—such as covert, non-attributable operations—that could have achieved the same result without provoking a direct Iranian response.
He writes:
“In conversations with commanders in Iraq, I approved dispersing our personnel, aircraft, and other high-value equipment. In taking actions like this, there was a fine line between doing it too early, thus giving the Iranians the opportunity to revisit our dispositions and refine their targeting, or waiting too long, where we could be struck before moving anything.”
But what McKenzie fails to mention is that the U.S. had received intelligence—directly from Arab intermediaries—about exactly which bases Iran planned to target in retaliation. This was not the brilliant strategic balancing act he makes it out to be—it was a reactive response, made possible only because Iran deliberately signaled its intent to avoid further escalation.
McKenzie’s reluctance to acknowledge these diplomatic realities is telling. Senior military officers—including those in his own command—and even members of the Trump administration saw his push for a major confrontation with Iran as out of step with U.S. interests.
Yet, McKenzie persisted in seeing strategic force reductions as a sign of weakness, writing:
“We knew that our reduced posture in the spring of 2019 was an inducement for Iranian aggression.”
This outdated, siege-mentality alienated him from other senior leaders. His dismissal of the Korean model—where rotational U.S. forces deter North Korea with a smaller permanent presence—further illustrates his failure to adapt:
“We discussed a theory that proposed that we could withdraw forces from CENTCOM and then rapidly reinforce should the situation dictate. I didn’t believe this was a tenable proposition for two reasons: First, the withdrawal of forces would both convince our partners and friends in the region that we would not stand with them, and it would accelerate Iranian hegemonic ambition.”
McKenzie clung to an outdated belief that deterrence required a massive, permanent U.S. presence, rather than developing a strategy to empower regional allies and partners to take on greater responsibility.
Failure to Build Regional Partnerships
One of McKenzie’s most significant failures as a commander was his inability to cultivate and leverage regional partnerships. Rather than strengthening alliances that could have helped offset U.S. force reductions, McKenzie operated as if CENTCOM’s success depended solely on American troops.
For example, in an email exchange with the Saudi Air Force chief of staff, rather than reassuring Saudi leadership about continued U.S. support, McKenzie amplified their fears about U.S. withdrawals. This was not the behavior of a strategic leader focused on stability—it was a four-star general deliberately stoking tensions with an ally.
Had McKenzie invested in strengthening a regional defense framework, he could have significantly enhanced CENTCOM’s deterrence posture. The Gulf Arab states collectively had 36 Patriot missile systems—which could have tripled his missile defense capabilities—yet he made no effort to coordinate their activation before the Soleimani strike. As a result, when Iranian missiles came in, none of those systems were operational.
Instead of leveraging regional forces to maintain deterrence while U.S. assets were redeployed to focus on great power competition, McKenzie viewed any reduction of American boots on the ground as a strategic failure. This rigidity prevented him from adopting the successful rotational force model used in Korea, where deterrence is maintained without a permanent, heavy U.S. footprint.
McKenzie’s failure to develop relationships with key regional leaders also hindered CENTCOM’s ability to respond to crises. Unlike successful combatant commanders who prioritized personal diplomacy with foreign counterparts, McKenzie treated allied relationships as secondary concerns. His engagement with Iraq, the UAE, and Afghanistan was superficial at best, and this neglect undermined U.S. influence in the region.
McKenzie's Role in the Disastrous U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan
General McKenzie’s failure to cultivate strong relationships with Afghan counterparts contributed directly to the chaos and disorder of the U.S. withdrawal in two critical ways.
1. Lack of Personal Engagement with Afghan Leaders – Regular, daily contact with Afghan government and military leaders could have improved morale and provided McKenzie and his staff with vital intelligence that was not available through formal reporting channels. Instead, McKenzie’s distance from key Afghan officials left him with an incomplete and reactive understanding of the unfolding crisis.
2. No Informal Influence Over Afghan Forces – As the civilian Afghan government collapsed, a commander with stronger personal ties to Afghan military leaders could have provided informal direction to Afghan security forces, at least in Kabul and its surroundings. This might have stabilized the situation long enough to prevent the rapid disintegration of Afghan defenses that worsened the evacuation effort.
McKenzie himself acknowledges the effectiveness of Afghan special operations forces which he leveraged AFTER the government’s collapse:
“We were in the process of bringing in about 1,200 Afghan National Strike Unit (NSU) personnel aboard HKIA, elite Afghan commandos who had been thoroughly vetted. Over the years, they had proved to be very effective in combat operations, and we had come to depend upon them.”
However, his failure to establish deeper ties with Afghan leadership before the crisis meant that even the most capable Afghan units lacked centralized coordination during the collapse. Had McKenzie prioritized relationship-building throughout his tenure, the disorder of Kabul’s fall might have been significantly reduced.
This failure was not limited to Afghanistan’s military leadership—McKenzie’s neglect of coalition force coordination played a key role in the confusion at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). Turkish security forces, designated as responsible for securing the airport, were a crucial part of the CENTCOM plan. However, McKenzie and his subordinates failed to maintain regular, persistent contact with Turkish forces, leading to a total collapse of coordination when it mattered most. As a result, American forces were caught off guard when Turkish contractors unexpectedly abandoned their posts, leaving the Kabul airport vulnerable and contributing to the chaos of the evacuation.
McKenzie’s inability—or unwillingness—to integrate and leverage regional forces was one of the defining failures of his tenure as commander generally and the Afghan withdrawal particularly. His approach was emblematic of a broader issue throughout his tenure: a narrow focus on organic U.S. military assets, rather than diplomatic engagement and force-multiplying alliances.
While the State Department and Intelligence Community also bear responsibility for failing to anticipate the rapid Afghan collapse, McKenzie’s lack of engagement with both Afghan and coalition forces meant that CENTCOM was not positioned to mitigate the inevitable disorder. His limited understanding of Afghanistan’s military and political reality ultimately deprived the U.S. of strategic options when it mattered most.
A Commander Out of Step with U.S. Priorities
McKenzie openly resented the U.S. military’s strategic shift away from the Middle East toward great power competition in the Pacific, writing:
“I was particularly disappointed in my own service, which seemed intent on shaking the dust of CENTCOM off its boots while looking wholly toward the Pacific.”
Rather than accepting reality and adjusting his leadership approach, McKenzie continued to push for more resources even as it became clear that the U.S. was reducing its footprint in the region.
McKenzie also failed to recognize that long-term U.S. interests required a sustainable approach to the Middle East—not one driven by outdated notions of deterrence through massive troop deployments. This was evident in his dismissal of rotational force models, writing:
“We discussed a theory that proposed that we could withdraw forces from CENTCOM and then rapidly reinforce should the situation dictate. I didn’t believe this was a tenable proposition for two reasons: First, the withdrawal of forces would both convince our partners and friends in the region that we would not stand with them, and it would accelerate Iranian hegemonic ambition.”
This rigid, outdated mindset led him to cling to the idea of a permanent U.S. military presence, rather than exploring how to build stronger regional coalitions to share the security burden.
Had McKenzie been a more adaptable leader, he would have worked to forge stronger security agreements with regional partners—such as joint air defense networks, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and expanded joint training exercises. Instead, he ignored these opportunities, choosing instead to complain about force reductions rather than developing creative solutions to maintain deterrence.
Conclusion: A Tactical Commander, Not a Strategic Leader
Ultimately, Melting Point reveals that McKenzie was ill-suited for his role. He was obsessed with Iran, dismissive of shifting U.S. priorities, and incapable of forging lasting regional partnerships. His failure to develop a long-term strategic vision left CENTCOM reactive, rather than proactive, and his poor decision-making during key events like the Soleimani strike and the Afghan withdrawal had lasting consequences.
McKenzie may have been a capable battlefield commander, but he was never the strategic leader that CENTCOM needed.
General Kenneth McKenzie approaches one of the most geopolitically significant military commands—the leadership of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—with the mindset of an aggressive, young battalion commander rather than that of a strategic leader. Given this, his failure to think beyond his own parochial interests and immediate tactical concerns should not come as a surprise. Even the forewords by fellow Marines General John Kelly and Secretary of Defense James Mattis offer only faint praise for their protégé, likely a recognition of his significant shortcomings as a commander.
McKenzie is studious in naming subordinates and giving credit to those who worked under him—an admirable leadership quality. He also has a penchant for describing picturesque surroundings—whether it’s the Citadel’s campus, views from White House rooms, or the arrangement of books and monitors in his office. However, these details contribute little to an understanding of the actual strategic objectives and U.S. interests in the CENTCOM region.
What’s more troubling is McKenzie’s lack of engagement with key figures beyond the U.S. military. He rarely mentions his allied and coalition counterparts, despite their significant force contributions. He spends almost no time discussing the State Department, intelligence services, or other U.S. government agencies, all of whom play critical roles in achieving national goals.
A Near-Obsessive Focus on Iran
One of McKenzie’s most glaring faults is his laser-like focus on conflict with Iran, which comes at the exclusion of broader strategic considerations. Major geopolitical events that any competent strategic leader would have taken into account—including the U.S. withdrawal from Syria and the abandonment of Kurdish allies, Trump’s first impeachment, and the COVID-19 pandemic—are barely acknowledged.
Instead, McKenzie fixates on the reduction of forces within his command, writing:
“This made the GFMP obsolete at the moment of publication, and it necessitated the endless series of force adjustments that we were now wading through. In this sense, the implementation of our guiding strategic document in the department was not aligned against the highest-level objectives of the United States.”
Yet, only briefly and towards the end of the book does McKenzie even briefly sketch a small portion of what those ‘highest-level objectives’ actually were. The only consistent objective he appears to have is deterring and confronting Iran—a goal he pursues without clear definition or recognition of broader U.S. interests.
Even when McKenzie acknowledges that the Trump administration failed to consider the likely consequences of Soleimani’s assassination, he admits that he did nothing to prepare U.S. forces for what he feared might happen:
• No major force repositioning in the region.
• No large-scale defense exercises to refocus a force structured for counter-ISIS and counter-Taliban operations.
• Not even basic increases in force protection on U.S. bases before the Soleimani strike.
This raises a fundamental question: Was McKenzie simply inept in his defensive preparations, or was he actively seeking a pretext for escalation?
A Lack of Strategic Thinking on Soleimani’s Assassination
McKenzie’s approach to the Soleimani strike also reflects a stunning lack of strategic foresight. He dismisses any alternative methods of eliminating Soleimani—such as covert, non-attributable operations—that could have achieved the same result without provoking a direct Iranian response.
He writes:
“In conversations with commanders in Iraq, I approved dispersing our personnel, aircraft, and other high-value equipment. In taking actions like this, there was a fine line between doing it too early, thus giving the Iranians the opportunity to revisit our dispositions and refine their targeting, or waiting too long, where we could be struck before moving anything.”
But what McKenzie fails to mention is that the U.S. had received intelligence—directly from Arab intermediaries—about exactly which bases Iran planned to target in retaliation. This was not the brilliant strategic balancing act he makes it out to be—it was a reactive response, made possible only because Iran deliberately signaled its intent to avoid further escalation.
McKenzie’s reluctance to acknowledge these diplomatic realities is telling. Senior military officers—including those in his own command—and even members of the Trump administration saw his push for a major confrontation with Iran as out of step with U.S. interests.
Yet, McKenzie persisted in seeing strategic force reductions as a sign of weakness, writing:
“We knew that our reduced posture in the spring of 2019 was an inducement for Iranian aggression.”
This outdated, siege-mentality alienated him from other senior leaders. His dismissal of the Korean model—where rotational U.S. forces deter North Korea with a smaller permanent presence—further illustrates his failure to adapt:
“We discussed a theory that proposed that we could withdraw forces from CENTCOM and then rapidly reinforce should the situation dictate. I didn’t believe this was a tenable proposition for two reasons: First, the withdrawal of forces would both convince our partners and friends in the region that we would not stand with them, and it would accelerate Iranian hegemonic ambition.”
McKenzie clung to an outdated belief that deterrence required a massive, permanent U.S. presence, rather than developing a strategy to empower regional allies and partners to take on greater responsibility.
Failure to Build Regional Partnerships
One of McKenzie’s most significant failures as a commander was his inability to cultivate and leverage regional partnerships. Rather than strengthening alliances that could have helped offset U.S. force reductions, McKenzie operated as if CENTCOM’s success depended solely on American troops.
For example, in an email exchange with the Saudi Air Force chief of staff, rather than reassuring Saudi leadership about continued U.S. support, McKenzie amplified their fears about U.S. withdrawals. This was not the behavior of a strategic leader focused on stability—it was a four-star general deliberately stoking tensions with an ally.
Had McKenzie invested in strengthening a regional defense framework, he could have significantly enhanced CENTCOM’s deterrence posture. The Gulf Arab states collectively had 36 Patriot missile systems—which could have tripled his missile defense capabilities—yet he made no effort to coordinate their activation before the Soleimani strike. As a result, when Iranian missiles came in, none of those systems were operational.
Instead of leveraging regional forces to maintain deterrence while U.S. assets were redeployed to focus on great power competition, McKenzie viewed any reduction of American boots on the ground as a strategic failure. This rigidity prevented him from adopting the successful rotational force model used in Korea, where deterrence is maintained without a permanent, heavy U.S. footprint.
McKenzie’s failure to develop relationships with key regional leaders also hindered CENTCOM’s ability to respond to crises. Unlike successful combatant commanders who prioritized personal diplomacy with foreign counterparts, McKenzie treated allied relationships as secondary concerns. His engagement with Iraq, the UAE, and Afghanistan was superficial at best, and this neglect undermined U.S. influence in the region.
McKenzie's Role in the Disastrous U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan
General McKenzie’s failure to cultivate strong relationships with Afghan counterparts contributed directly to the chaos and disorder of the U.S. withdrawal in two critical ways.
1. Lack of Personal Engagement with Afghan Leaders – Regular, daily contact with Afghan government and military leaders could have improved morale and provided McKenzie and his staff with vital intelligence that was not available through formal reporting channels. Instead, McKenzie’s distance from key Afghan officials left him with an incomplete and reactive understanding of the unfolding crisis.
2. No Informal Influence Over Afghan Forces – As the civilian Afghan government collapsed, a commander with stronger personal ties to Afghan military leaders could have provided informal direction to Afghan security forces, at least in Kabul and its surroundings. This might have stabilized the situation long enough to prevent the rapid disintegration of Afghan defenses that worsened the evacuation effort.
McKenzie himself acknowledges the effectiveness of Afghan special operations forces which he leveraged AFTER the government’s collapse:
“We were in the process of bringing in about 1,200 Afghan National Strike Unit (NSU) personnel aboard HKIA, elite Afghan commandos who had been thoroughly vetted. Over the years, they had proved to be very effective in combat operations, and we had come to depend upon them.”
However, his failure to establish deeper ties with Afghan leadership before the crisis meant that even the most capable Afghan units lacked centralized coordination during the collapse. Had McKenzie prioritized relationship-building throughout his tenure, the disorder of Kabul’s fall might have been significantly reduced.
This failure was not limited to Afghanistan’s military leadership—McKenzie’s neglect of coalition force coordination played a key role in the confusion at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). Turkish security forces, designated as responsible for securing the airport, were a crucial part of the CENTCOM plan. However, McKenzie and his subordinates failed to maintain regular, persistent contact with Turkish forces, leading to a total collapse of coordination when it mattered most. As a result, American forces were caught off guard when Turkish contractors unexpectedly abandoned their posts, leaving the Kabul airport vulnerable and contributing to the chaos of the evacuation.
McKenzie’s inability—or unwillingness—to integrate and leverage regional forces was one of the defining failures of his tenure as commander generally and the Afghan withdrawal particularly. His approach was emblematic of a broader issue throughout his tenure: a narrow focus on organic U.S. military assets, rather than diplomatic engagement and force-multiplying alliances.
While the State Department and Intelligence Community also bear responsibility for failing to anticipate the rapid Afghan collapse, McKenzie’s lack of engagement with both Afghan and coalition forces meant that CENTCOM was not positioned to mitigate the inevitable disorder. His limited understanding of Afghanistan’s military and political reality ultimately deprived the U.S. of strategic options when it mattered most.
A Commander Out of Step with U.S. Priorities
McKenzie openly resented the U.S. military’s strategic shift away from the Middle East toward great power competition in the Pacific, writing:
“I was particularly disappointed in my own service, which seemed intent on shaking the dust of CENTCOM off its boots while looking wholly toward the Pacific.”
Rather than accepting reality and adjusting his leadership approach, McKenzie continued to push for more resources even as it became clear that the U.S. was reducing its footprint in the region.
McKenzie also failed to recognize that long-term U.S. interests required a sustainable approach to the Middle East—not one driven by outdated notions of deterrence through massive troop deployments. This was evident in his dismissal of rotational force models, writing:
“We discussed a theory that proposed that we could withdraw forces from CENTCOM and then rapidly reinforce should the situation dictate. I didn’t believe this was a tenable proposition for two reasons: First, the withdrawal of forces would both convince our partners and friends in the region that we would not stand with them, and it would accelerate Iranian hegemonic ambition.”
This rigid, outdated mindset led him to cling to the idea of a permanent U.S. military presence, rather than exploring how to build stronger regional coalitions to share the security burden.
Had McKenzie been a more adaptable leader, he would have worked to forge stronger security agreements with regional partners—such as joint air defense networks, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and expanded joint training exercises. Instead, he ignored these opportunities, choosing instead to complain about force reductions rather than developing creative solutions to maintain deterrence.
Conclusion: A Tactical Commander, Not a Strategic Leader
Ultimately, Melting Point reveals that McKenzie was ill-suited for his role. He was obsessed with Iran, dismissive of shifting U.S. priorities, and incapable of forging lasting regional partnerships. His failure to develop a long-term strategic vision left CENTCOM reactive, rather than proactive, and his poor decision-making during key events like the Soleimani strike and the Afghan withdrawal had lasting consequences.
McKenzie may have been a capable battlefield commander, but he was never the strategic leader that CENTCOM needed.
November 9, 2025
Much will be written about Afghanistan. This personal account of the end game decisions and actions is informative and instructive.
The chapter titled Accountability provides a clear description of reasons (not all of them) the Mission there was doomed to fail. Without meaning to sound presumptuous critiquing a General who led the theater, I think he gets a lot right.
His short term forecasts are less accurate. Writing on Syria, he states Bashar al-Assad “won the Syrian civil war” and is “going to around for a while.”
More important, he forecasts that a strike - by third party or the US - on Iranian nuclear facilities would lead to an “inevitable theater war.” Time may prove this an accurate forecast but as of late 2025 the results of successful third party and US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program have not had that effect.
Aside from these observations the final chapter provides a worthy summary of the structure and roles of the Department of War and the nature of warfare today - not in the future - notably the roles of space and cyber.
The chapter titled Accountability provides a clear description of reasons (not all of them) the Mission there was doomed to fail. Without meaning to sound presumptuous critiquing a General who led the theater, I think he gets a lot right.
His short term forecasts are less accurate. Writing on Syria, he states Bashar al-Assad “won the Syrian civil war” and is “going to around for a while.”
More important, he forecasts that a strike - by third party or the US - on Iranian nuclear facilities would lead to an “inevitable theater war.” Time may prove this an accurate forecast but as of late 2025 the results of successful third party and US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program have not had that effect.
Aside from these observations the final chapter provides a worthy summary of the structure and roles of the Department of War and the nature of warfare today - not in the future - notably the roles of space and cyber.
July 20, 2025
I am not military or ex-military. I don't study military either. so why read this book? The middle East conflicts which are never resolved and the insight into our military that is a constant presence there. I was amazed at the amount of inter-country dialogue that occurs and very keen to be on the inside of THE COMMANDER to hear his determination to not kill innocents and to hear from him the militaries position as it relates to the civilian oversight (President) that is a tried and true leadership over the military. Striking to hear of the militaries regard (need) for civilian oversight and the tremendous demands placed on the head of the military to carry out directed orders. This book has given me increased respect for our system of governance as well as for our soldiers in uniform. Just writing this review makes me increase my rating. I can worry less about the middle East, but take in also the inevitably of continued and even more fierce fighting in the region.
August 31, 2024
This book succeeds as a memoir on leadership and military strategy under uncertainty. In particular, McKenzie’s evaluation of Afghanistan policy was both cogent and personally moving. He argues that national and defense civilian leaders bear most of the responsibility for the disastrous execution of the Afghanistan withdrawal, a case he argues very convincingly.
Nevertheless, the book fails as a broader blueprint for how to make policy because it does not define vital US interests in different theaters nor does it grapple with the tradeoffs between them (whether McKenzie does this by design or not is unclear.) This shortcoming is particularly apparent when he discusses Iran policy.
Nevertheless, the book fails as a broader blueprint for how to make policy because it does not define vital US interests in different theaters nor does it grapple with the tradeoffs between them (whether McKenzie does this by design or not is unclear.) This shortcoming is particularly apparent when he discusses Iran policy.
January 29, 2025
The thoughts are well thought out and logical presented. This is a very interesting perspective from a level of the military that few have any real knowledge of and far fewer have worked at. The General covers some recent very impactful momentous events, including the American exit from Afghanistan. I found this very insightful and educational. Though some of his predictions on "the next war" have already been seen to be slightly off, make appear to be right on and he gives much to think about there. I highly recommend for any military leader and anyone wanting a perspective of the Middle East outside of media/politically-spun stories.
August 15, 2024
General McKenzie was in charge of U S. Central Command during a period of great drama, so his tenure is worthy of a memoir. I felt in some way that he wanted to write it to clear his name with respect to the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Although he says at the beginning of the book that he will admit his mistakes, he took no blame for the disastrous withdrawal. Maybe he was right about it all.
It was written clearly and was well organized, without a lot of needless fluff. I understood the military jargon, but I was not sure if a more casual reader would catch it all.
It was written clearly and was well organized, without a lot of needless fluff. I understood the military jargon, but I was not sure if a more casual reader would catch it all.
June 6, 2025
Excellent book by an incredible intellectual military leader. I bought and read the book after hearing General Kenneth Mc Kenzie speak at the Union League of Philadelphia.
For those that have not served in the military, it can be a hard slog to get through the book with all its military jargon but for those with fortitude, it is totally worth it.
His emphasis throughout the book on the importance of civilian control over the military and why was thought provoking and explains why military oriented dictatorships eventually crumble.
For those that have not served in the military, it can be a hard slog to get through the book with all its military jargon but for those with fortitude, it is totally worth it.
His emphasis throughout the book on the importance of civilian control over the military and why was thought provoking and explains why military oriented dictatorships eventually crumble.
March 25, 2025
Well written and illuminating look at high level command in the US military. Gen (ret) McKenzie provides useful insights into civil-military relations, senior executive leadership, and the geopolitical challenges of the Middle East.
Highly recommend this book for those who will serve as senior leaders or advisors dealing with issues of national security as well as those interested in better understanding the US withdrawal from Afghanistan or the killing of Solemani.
Highly recommend this book for those who will serve as senior leaders or advisors dealing with issues of national security as well as those interested in better understanding the US withdrawal from Afghanistan or the killing of Solemani.
September 30, 2024
The beginning of the book struck me as a little technical, this being a high-level command narrative. But I came to appreciate the level of detail and the uniquely expert but not political perspective on many of the most dramatic events of the recent past: from 9/11 to the evacuation at the end of US operations in Afghanistan.
January 16, 2025
Candid; Worthy; Insightful
Instant Classic on senior Theater level command in the American military. Must read if you are interested or care about the tensions between national security objectives and strategies, civilian control of the military, and this eventful period at the close of the Afghan campaign. Great work!
Instant Classic on senior Theater level command in the American military. Must read if you are interested or care about the tensions between national security objectives and strategies, civilian control of the military, and this eventful period at the close of the Afghan campaign. Great work!
July 5, 2024
Highly recommend this book… even though it’s not on audio. McKenzie walks readers through his first-hand knowledge of killing Baghdadi and Soleman, as well as the Afghanistan withdrawal… along with other key moments in Middle East history from his time as the CENTCOM commander (2019-2022).
December 26, 2024
Look at a long career by an honorable Marine who served his country well and left many disgruntled feelings, at least as many as a Marine can have. A well-written, balanced look at a successful career officer. It's well worth the read.
November 26, 2025
Excellent insight to inner workings of a combatant command and civ-mil relationships. Helpful insights and lessons for planners and staff workers. Definitely worth the read for military staff professionals.
June 28, 2025
Good read.
November 30, 2025
The utility of this book is not in the insight to operations in the middle east, rather the discussion about the civilian military relationship in policy and strategy. Very insightful.
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