What do you think?
Rate this book
Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862
“The author’s new and important study concentrates on the Fair Oaks part of the battle. His research is thorough, he has walked the ground, and his narrative brings the battle to life.” — Doug Crenshaw, author & historian
The bloody two-day battle was fought on the doorstep of the Confederate capital. It was the first major combat in the Eastern Theater since Bull Run/Manassas almost a year earlier, left more than 11,000 casualties in its wake, and cost the primary Southern field army its commander. The possession of Richmond hung in its balance. Yet, almost nothing has been written about Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. Victor Vignola’s Contrasts in The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862, which focuses primarily on the Fair Oaks portion of the battle, is a major contribution to the historiography of the war.
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan marched his Army of the Potomac up the Virginia Peninsula during the early spring of 1862 and placed his inexperienced IV Corps at the tip of the spear south of the flood-prone Chickahominy River. McClellan’s opponent Joe Johnston took the opportunity to strike and crafted an overly complex attack plan for his Virginia army to crush the exposed corps. A series of bungled marches, piecemeal attacks, and a lack of assertive leadership doomed the Southern plan. One of the wounded late in the day on May 31 was Johnston, whose injury led to the appointment of Robert E. Lee to take his place—a decision that changed the course of the entire Civil War.
Vignola’s use of primary and archival sources, many of which have never been used, helped craft a wholly original tactical and leadership study that directly challenges conventional accounts.
His stunning reassessment has led to renewed interest in Fair Oaks and the acquisition of a significant parcel of land by the American Battlefield Trust. Contrasts in The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862, will be hailed as one of the most important tactical studies ever published.
The bloody two-day battle was fought on the doorstep of the Confederate capital. It was the first major combat in the Eastern Theater since Bull Run/Manassas almost a year earlier, left more than 11,000 casualties in its wake, and cost the primary Southern field army its commander. The possession of Richmond hung in its balance. Yet, almost nothing has been written about Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. Victor Vignola’s Contrasts in The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862, which focuses primarily on the Fair Oaks portion of the battle, is a major contribution to the historiography of the war.
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan marched his Army of the Potomac up the Virginia Peninsula during the early spring of 1862 and placed his inexperienced IV Corps at the tip of the spear south of the flood-prone Chickahominy River. McClellan’s opponent Joe Johnston took the opportunity to strike and crafted an overly complex attack plan for his Virginia army to crush the exposed corps. A series of bungled marches, piecemeal attacks, and a lack of assertive leadership doomed the Southern plan. One of the wounded late in the day on May 31 was Johnston, whose injury led to the appointment of Robert E. Lee to take his place—a decision that changed the course of the entire Civil War.
Vignola’s use of primary and archival sources, many of which have never been used, helped craft a wholly original tactical and leadership study that directly challenges conventional accounts.
His stunning reassessment has led to renewed interest in Fair Oaks and the acquisition of a significant parcel of land by the American Battlefield Trust. Contrasts in The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862, will be hailed as one of the most important tactical studies ever published.
- GenresCivil War
280 pages, Kindle Edition
First published October 30, 2023
10 people are currently reading
19 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
May 17, 2024
While my own research and writing pertains to the Army of Tennessee, I don't think you can be an avid student of the War Between the States without harboring some sort of fondness for the Eastern Theater of operations. The 1862 Peninsula Campaign happens to be one of my favorite campaigns, and oddly enough, the Seven Pines/Fair Oaks offensive by Joe Johnston is my favorite battle of that sprawling campaign. One of my biggest grievances with the historiography of the War was the lack of study done on this particular engagement.
Victor Vignola, through the auspices of Savas Beatie, has written a top notch work on half of the bloody spring encounter before Richmond in 1862. Detailing primarily the fighting at Fair Oaks, Vignola has left it open as a distinct possibility that he will also cover the rest of the battle centered around Seven Pines. As good as this one was, I certainly hope so.
McClellan's slow advance up the Peninsula had seemingly come to fruition by late May, and his posting of a Federal Corps on the western bank of the Chickahominy signaled the opening stages of a future operational movement to invest Richmond, and bring it under direct siege. Johnston saw this clearly and realized that he had little choice but to launch a counteroffensive to drive the Federals back and, ideally, destroy an isolated Federal Corps. Vignola is not one of the historians who looks upon Joe Johnston all that highly, and his analysis seems to bear out his less than stellar grade given to Johnston's Generalship.
Johnston failed to communicate properly with Richmond, either the Confederate War Department, Davis, or Robert E. Lee, who had been hard at work helping to concentrate a very large Rebel army, eventually some 90,000 men, in the Southern national capital. As a consequence, the higher ups who had a need to know, didn't exactly know much of Johnston's intentions, or plans, and so we're not in a position to aid his efforts in their cause. Johnston failed to properly plan the converging movement to contact, allowing a headstrong subordinate, in this case James Longstreet, to disrupt the entire operation, throwing it off kilter.
Vignola is certainly not alone in his criticism of Johnston. Many other historians have trodden this same path before. However, Vignola's arguments are quite cogent, and he showcases them throughout the course of the narrative. The most damning case against Johnston is his handling of the fighting around Fair Oaks itself.
The author makes a very judicious caveat to any of the criticisms that he levels at officers from either side (though he does castigate the Southerners here more than the Northerners, and it is fair, as the Rebel command and control was fairly lacking in this entire operation), and that is that, up to this point, the War was less then a year old. The men in command, most of whom were either junior officers, or even nco's two years prior, were undergoing on the job training. I thought that was a very poignant defense of both his criticisms and the men falling under scrutiny, many of whom, especially on the Rebel side, would mature into highly capable commanders with experience.
For their part, the Federals were aware, once the Chickahominy flooded, just how dire the situation truly was, and between the IV Corps under Erasmus Keyes digging in, and Federal attempts to send aid to the IV Corps via Sumner's II Corps (they were somewhat aware that a Southern operation was under way, if for no other reason than that it seemed fairly obvious at that point, considering the situation), there was a bit of a scurry to set the situation aright. When the Rebels struck, belatedly in the day, on May 31st, they experienced tremendous success around Seven Pines...but none at all around Fair Oaks.
The author spends a couple of chapters briefly detailing the outline of what happened at Seven Pines, and this brief section of the book is quite good. His retelling of the incredible exploits of Micah Jenkins' South Carolinians is outstanding. His handling of the Federals stouthearted defense of Fair Oaks is equally as riveting.
Joe Johnston himself, even later in the day, would arrive and take charge of the northern, or right wing of the Confederate forces, and launch an ill conceived, piecemeal series of assaults against an incredibly strong Federal position around Fair Oaks.
Typically, this segment of the larger battle (Vignola argues, rather well I would say, that this was really two separate battles waged simultaneously) gets largely ignored, mentioned only in passing. Here, it's the meat of the book.
And here we see, through the narrative retelling of the Union Army of the Potomac's best tactical defensive performances of the War, the worth of McClellan's time spent training, and drilling, and training, and drilling some more. Like a well oiled machine the men of the Yankee forces at Fair Oaks, initially badly outnumbered, deployed into an inverted L defensive formation, effecting a crossfire of rifles and artillery, that the obliging assaulting Confederates attempted to seize by storm.
Brigade after Brigade of brave Southerners marched into the hurricane of fire from Yankee musketry and artillery, time after time. The Southern heroism, however, could not pierce the defenses manned by Northern determination and grit, and despite having an opportunity to flank the Yankee position, Johnston made no effort to do so, merely futilely ordering successive assaults against a position that likely could not have been taken unless the Rebels had a plethora of artillery support. And here, they did not.
Vignola repeats several times in this section that Johnston had the opportunity to redeploy his forces in such a manner as to take advantage of the gap existing between the two Yankee Corps, and outflank the Fair Oaks position. Johnston never once makes a tactical reconnaissance to discover this for himself. Instead, he allows himself the luxury of his own assumptions and fixates upon smashing what he perceives to be an isolated Federal position before linking up with D.H.Hill around Seven Pines.
Sumner leading the Federal II Corps to take position around Fair Oaks likely saved the Federals from a hefty defeat at Seven Pines. It ensured that the position at Fair Oaks withstood Johnston's ill advised attacks, and shored up the entirety of the Federal position on the west bank of the Chickahominy. Vignola claims that its Sumner's finest hour, and indeed it was.
Likewise, Sumner's and his subordinates' skillful handling of their units cost Johnston and his forces, and himself, dearly.
Johnston himself was severely wounded by Yankee artillery fire, and he is forced to relinquish command to G.W. Smith, who was subsequently replaced by Robert E. Lee a couple of days later.
The Battle was largely indecisive, tactically. Balanced between a Southern success at Seven Pines, and a Federal one at Fair Oaks. Although it could be argued to be a slight Federal victory, although it would turn into a Southern strategic success, overall. The offensive rattled McClellan, already mentally weakened by his suffering from a resurgence of malaria, and the Confederate counteroffensive all but eliminated all of the Federal initiative for the majority of the remainder of the campaign.
When Lee begins his own offensive, some three and a half weeks later, it is begun with the two armies largely in the same positions as that following Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.
This book was definitely a strategic success for Mr. Vignola, as well, and hopefully, he winds up making a subsequent volume on Seven Pines. It is great to be in a time when the lesser studied aspects and people's, of the War Between the States are finally getting their due. This book is definitely worth your time, highly recommended.
Victor Vignola, through the auspices of Savas Beatie, has written a top notch work on half of the bloody spring encounter before Richmond in 1862. Detailing primarily the fighting at Fair Oaks, Vignola has left it open as a distinct possibility that he will also cover the rest of the battle centered around Seven Pines. As good as this one was, I certainly hope so.
McClellan's slow advance up the Peninsula had seemingly come to fruition by late May, and his posting of a Federal Corps on the western bank of the Chickahominy signaled the opening stages of a future operational movement to invest Richmond, and bring it under direct siege. Johnston saw this clearly and realized that he had little choice but to launch a counteroffensive to drive the Federals back and, ideally, destroy an isolated Federal Corps. Vignola is not one of the historians who looks upon Joe Johnston all that highly, and his analysis seems to bear out his less than stellar grade given to Johnston's Generalship.
Johnston failed to communicate properly with Richmond, either the Confederate War Department, Davis, or Robert E. Lee, who had been hard at work helping to concentrate a very large Rebel army, eventually some 90,000 men, in the Southern national capital. As a consequence, the higher ups who had a need to know, didn't exactly know much of Johnston's intentions, or plans, and so we're not in a position to aid his efforts in their cause. Johnston failed to properly plan the converging movement to contact, allowing a headstrong subordinate, in this case James Longstreet, to disrupt the entire operation, throwing it off kilter.
Vignola is certainly not alone in his criticism of Johnston. Many other historians have trodden this same path before. However, Vignola's arguments are quite cogent, and he showcases them throughout the course of the narrative. The most damning case against Johnston is his handling of the fighting around Fair Oaks itself.
The author makes a very judicious caveat to any of the criticisms that he levels at officers from either side (though he does castigate the Southerners here more than the Northerners, and it is fair, as the Rebel command and control was fairly lacking in this entire operation), and that is that, up to this point, the War was less then a year old. The men in command, most of whom were either junior officers, or even nco's two years prior, were undergoing on the job training. I thought that was a very poignant defense of both his criticisms and the men falling under scrutiny, many of whom, especially on the Rebel side, would mature into highly capable commanders with experience.
For their part, the Federals were aware, once the Chickahominy flooded, just how dire the situation truly was, and between the IV Corps under Erasmus Keyes digging in, and Federal attempts to send aid to the IV Corps via Sumner's II Corps (they were somewhat aware that a Southern operation was under way, if for no other reason than that it seemed fairly obvious at that point, considering the situation), there was a bit of a scurry to set the situation aright. When the Rebels struck, belatedly in the day, on May 31st, they experienced tremendous success around Seven Pines...but none at all around Fair Oaks.
The author spends a couple of chapters briefly detailing the outline of what happened at Seven Pines, and this brief section of the book is quite good. His retelling of the incredible exploits of Micah Jenkins' South Carolinians is outstanding. His handling of the Federals stouthearted defense of Fair Oaks is equally as riveting.
Joe Johnston himself, even later in the day, would arrive and take charge of the northern, or right wing of the Confederate forces, and launch an ill conceived, piecemeal series of assaults against an incredibly strong Federal position around Fair Oaks.
Typically, this segment of the larger battle (Vignola argues, rather well I would say, that this was really two separate battles waged simultaneously) gets largely ignored, mentioned only in passing. Here, it's the meat of the book.
And here we see, through the narrative retelling of the Union Army of the Potomac's best tactical defensive performances of the War, the worth of McClellan's time spent training, and drilling, and training, and drilling some more. Like a well oiled machine the men of the Yankee forces at Fair Oaks, initially badly outnumbered, deployed into an inverted L defensive formation, effecting a crossfire of rifles and artillery, that the obliging assaulting Confederates attempted to seize by storm.
Brigade after Brigade of brave Southerners marched into the hurricane of fire from Yankee musketry and artillery, time after time. The Southern heroism, however, could not pierce the defenses manned by Northern determination and grit, and despite having an opportunity to flank the Yankee position, Johnston made no effort to do so, merely futilely ordering successive assaults against a position that likely could not have been taken unless the Rebels had a plethora of artillery support. And here, they did not.
Vignola repeats several times in this section that Johnston had the opportunity to redeploy his forces in such a manner as to take advantage of the gap existing between the two Yankee Corps, and outflank the Fair Oaks position. Johnston never once makes a tactical reconnaissance to discover this for himself. Instead, he allows himself the luxury of his own assumptions and fixates upon smashing what he perceives to be an isolated Federal position before linking up with D.H.Hill around Seven Pines.
Sumner leading the Federal II Corps to take position around Fair Oaks likely saved the Federals from a hefty defeat at Seven Pines. It ensured that the position at Fair Oaks withstood Johnston's ill advised attacks, and shored up the entirety of the Federal position on the west bank of the Chickahominy. Vignola claims that its Sumner's finest hour, and indeed it was.
Likewise, Sumner's and his subordinates' skillful handling of their units cost Johnston and his forces, and himself, dearly.
Johnston himself was severely wounded by Yankee artillery fire, and he is forced to relinquish command to G.W. Smith, who was subsequently replaced by Robert E. Lee a couple of days later.
The Battle was largely indecisive, tactically. Balanced between a Southern success at Seven Pines, and a Federal one at Fair Oaks. Although it could be argued to be a slight Federal victory, although it would turn into a Southern strategic success, overall. The offensive rattled McClellan, already mentally weakened by his suffering from a resurgence of malaria, and the Confederate counteroffensive all but eliminated all of the Federal initiative for the majority of the remainder of the campaign.
When Lee begins his own offensive, some three and a half weeks later, it is begun with the two armies largely in the same positions as that following Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.
This book was definitely a strategic success for Mr. Vignola, as well, and hopefully, he winds up making a subsequent volume on Seven Pines. It is great to be in a time when the lesser studied aspects and people's, of the War Between the States are finally getting their due. This book is definitely worth your time, highly recommended.
September 27, 2025
This book is an examination of the 1862 Civil War battle usually referred to as Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. The author has an issue with treating the action at Fair Oaks and the action at Seven Pines as one battle. Elements of the Confederate Army commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston and the Union Army commanded by General George B. McClellan opposed each other at both locations on May 31. So, debating whether it was one connected battle or two separate battles is a minor point to me. General Johnston designed his offensive to include both locations. Poor execution of the offensive plan caused the battles to seem disjointed. In the end, the correct name of this battle does not change the result of the events on May 31 and June 1, 1862. The author’s focus on the reason for the result, a Confederate failure to dislodge the Union Army from the outskirts of Richmond, was due to failures of leadership. In particular, the author concedes that General Johnston had a very good plan for the offensive. However, the author lays out a convincing case that Johnston’s overall lack of coordination and clear communication to the various elements of his command led to the failure. Now, if you take a step back, this was the Spring of 1862, just the second year of the Civil War. No one on either side had experience commanding such large armies. Johnston had approximately 87,000 men under his command. McClellan had 110,000 men. Fully understanding the strengths and weaknesses of his subordinate division commanders were also lacking due to just one major battle in the eastern theater prior to this battle. Thus, Johnston had little opportunity to evaluate the ability of his generals prior to this battle. Poor staff work and proper selection of competent staff officers contributed to the poor overall performance of the Confederate Army also. Due to the severe wounds Johnston received during this battle, he was unable to serve again in a commanding general position for many months. General Robert E. Lee replaced Johnston and kept the position of Commanding General of the Army of Northern Virginia for the remainder of the Civil War. But having said that, initially Lee confronted similar problems as Johnston had with subordinate generals, staff, and communications as you would see if you look at the Seven Days battles. Those battles occurred about one month after Lee took command. So, certainly at this time, both armies were going through a process of sorting out organization, staffing and leadership issues. But Johnston was in overall command, so it was his responsibility to adapt and overcome these problems. Ultimate blame for the deficient performance of the Confederate Army does belong to Johnston. In a similar vein, the author places much blame on Confederate General Longstreet for the failure of Johnston’s offensive. The author lays out a convincing case that Longstreet “went rogue” and intentionally did not follow Johnston’s plan. However, as commanding General, it was Johnston’s role to verify that his plan was being followed and make any corrections and adjustments if necessary. Longstreet does deserve some blame here, but once again ultimate blame lies with Johnston.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews