Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson—director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks’ Central Command, at the start of the war—details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.
He addresses the persistent trope that “the Army did no planning” for “Phase IV,” revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the “smoking gun” of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.
Table of Contents
1. Cold War, Hot Wars, Peace Dividends 2. Planning the Invasion to D-Day 3. Build up to D-Day 4. Planning While Fighting March 2003 5. April In Iraq 6. Off Ramps and Phase IV 7. Building the Coalition May 2003 8. A Bad Feeling 9. Concluding Thoughts
1. Thank my lucky stars I didn’t become an Army planner. What an awful existence. 2. After reading this book, we should DOGE SAMS and all other field grade and above military PME. It’s clear the ‘experts’ had their plan trumped by politics in 2002… do we expect any different in 2025 and beyond? 3. Perhaps the most unflattering portrayal of our Flag officers I know of. No wonder the war(s) lasted decades.
I’m glad this book exists to show a post-hostilities plan was thought of, and then ignored. Was that plan any good? I have my doubts. The plan was created in a vacuum, and accounted for neither the enemy’s nor our politicians’ votes. That’s the best our SAMS guys could do? These dudes are the Top Gun instructors of planning, our ‘Jedi Knights.’ They must have been the Jedis from the shitty prequel movies.
Also… editor needs some help. The phrases “We continued refining our plan,” and “Iraq was simmering” appear on almost every page. Remove those proven facts and this book shortens by 1/3 without losing any meat.
An important counter to the incorrect myth that there was no stability and transition plan for Iraq. Benson paints a clear picture of strategic incompetence at the national level. Heading to a G-5 or J-5 plans shop? This is worth the read. If not, I'm hesitant to recommend unless you're working on and OIF history project. It is sometimes dry and repetitive. This would have benefitted from a better editor.
Very detailed account of planning that most think didn't occur. Excellent insights by the officer that led the team. Clearly demonstrates how planning has to fight for bandwidth with current operations.
This might not be 5 stars for everyone but if you are a military planner this is a must read. Those readers that enjoy recent military history will also find this account by a planner of the invasion of Iraq fascinating.
Interesting look inside the life of a planner preparing for and engaging in war. His experience highlights the importance of relationships and the challenges of synchronizing actions at echelon. Insightful it at times reads like a “green notebook”.