What do you think?
Rate this book
The Soviet-Polish War and its Legacy: Lenin’s Defeat and the Rise of Stalinism
This detailed study traces the history of the Soviet-Polish War (1919-20), the first major international clash between the forces of communism and anti-communism, and the impact this had on Soviet Russia in the years that followed. It reflects upon how the Bolsheviks fought not only to defend the fledgling Soviet state, but also to bring the revolution to Europe. Peter Whitewood shows that while the Red Army's rapid drive to the gates of Warsaw in summer 1920 raised great hopes for world revolution, the subsequent collapse of the offensive had a more striking result. The Soviet military and political leadership drew the mistaken conclusion that they had not been defeated by the Polish Army, but by the forces of the capitalist world – Britain and France – who were perceived as having directed the war behind-the-scenes. They were taken aback by the strength of the forces of counterrevolution and convinced they had been overcome by the capitalist powers. The Soviet-Polish War and its Legacy reveals that – in the aftermath of the catastrophe at Warsaw –Lenin, Stalin and other senior Bolsheviks were convinced that another war against Poland and its capitalist backers was inevitable with this perpetual fear of war shaping the evolution of the early Soviet state. It also further encouraged the creation of a centralised and repressive one-party state and provided a powerful rationale for the breakneck industrialisation of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1920s. The Soviet leadership's central preoccupation in the 1930s was Nazi Germany; this book convincingly argues that Bolshevik perceptions of Poland and the capitalist world in the decade before were given as much significance and were ultimately crucial to the rise of Stalinism.
408 pages, Kindle Edition
First published October 19, 2023
55 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
January 26, 2025
This examination of the Polish-Soviet War follows many of the traditional accounts about Lenin's desire for world revolution, his gamble on taking Warsaw, his hope to join hands with communists in Hungary and Germany, and his commitment to the Marxian ideals of the permanent revolution.
It establishes, of course, that none of this was realised because the Soviets were defeated before Warsaw, and, as Fiddick and others have noted, the Soviet Union was forced to turn in on itself.
That said, I was primarily interested in this work due to my desire to comprehend a sort of synthesis between foreign and domestic policy, and how the one impacted the other. Especially in regards to how foreign policy determined the evolution of the Communist Party and expansion of the Soviet bureaucracy.
Some fascinating insights emerge throughout this work. At the heart of Whitewood's argument is the lingering perception in Soviet circles of the Polish threat. He argues that the threat of capitalist war in the future motivated and propelled the ruthless pace of industrialisation under the Five Year Plans.
But not only this, it was a powerful lever in Stalin's hands that could be used to undermine his political opponents and strengthen his hold on the Party.
Whitewood argues convincingly that Trotsky was seriously handicapped in his struggle with Stalin by essentially conceding Stalin's points about the threats of future war, and about the threat of Poland in particular as a 'gendarme' of France and Britain.
A crucial moment arrived with the return of Pilsudski to power in Warsaw through the coup of 1926. Pilsudski as the champion of Prometheism was seen by the Soviet leadership as their most dangerous enemy, leading to the war scare of 1927 which Stalin exploited to his own advantage to have Trotsky expelled from the Party and his other enemies silenced.
However, Whitewood suggests that this was not just a cynical ploy by the General Secretary, and is willing to grant that Stalin actually believed that war with the West was imminent.
Towards the end of the work Stalin's increasing paranoia comes to the forefront, and it is shown how he used alleged instances of espionage and treason, most particularly the charge that Party members had collaborated with foreign enemies of the Soviet Union, or with Trotsky as their agent.
The Shakhty Trials shed light on this developing process. Whitewood suggests that the OGPU, in order to stay relevant, exaggerated the extent of Polish subversion in Ukraine, arrested mostly innocent men, and raised the concern of fifth columnists to fever pitch.
It did not help that Stalin enforced his ruthless policy of grain requisition to fund industrial expansion, which led to revolts and unrest throughout Ukraine. Suspicion of Poland, and later Germany, resulted in the deportation of ethnic Polish and German populations in the Soviet Union, what we'd now refer to as ethnic cleansing, which was to presage the more radical demographic changes following the Second World War.
This work is an admirable insight into how fear of external enemies can result in despotism at home, it shows the continuing and mostly ignored relevance of Poland in Soviet foreign policy after 1921, and offers perspective on Stalin's later views of Japan and Germany as external threats.
As a brief aside, though it was not addressed in the text, it may also help our understanding of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, if it were true that Stalin regarded Poland as a threat in herself and not just a threat in combination with Germany or Japan.
The liquidation of this threat would naturally be seen as a major foreign policy triumph by the Stalinist leadership, and Stalin's participation in a fourth Polish partition may have had deeper motives than the cynical horse-trading as it is typically depicted.
It establishes, of course, that none of this was realised because the Soviets were defeated before Warsaw, and, as Fiddick and others have noted, the Soviet Union was forced to turn in on itself.
That said, I was primarily interested in this work due to my desire to comprehend a sort of synthesis between foreign and domestic policy, and how the one impacted the other. Especially in regards to how foreign policy determined the evolution of the Communist Party and expansion of the Soviet bureaucracy.
Some fascinating insights emerge throughout this work. At the heart of Whitewood's argument is the lingering perception in Soviet circles of the Polish threat. He argues that the threat of capitalist war in the future motivated and propelled the ruthless pace of industrialisation under the Five Year Plans.
But not only this, it was a powerful lever in Stalin's hands that could be used to undermine his political opponents and strengthen his hold on the Party.
Whitewood argues convincingly that Trotsky was seriously handicapped in his struggle with Stalin by essentially conceding Stalin's points about the threats of future war, and about the threat of Poland in particular as a 'gendarme' of France and Britain.
A crucial moment arrived with the return of Pilsudski to power in Warsaw through the coup of 1926. Pilsudski as the champion of Prometheism was seen by the Soviet leadership as their most dangerous enemy, leading to the war scare of 1927 which Stalin exploited to his own advantage to have Trotsky expelled from the Party and his other enemies silenced.
However, Whitewood suggests that this was not just a cynical ploy by the General Secretary, and is willing to grant that Stalin actually believed that war with the West was imminent.
Towards the end of the work Stalin's increasing paranoia comes to the forefront, and it is shown how he used alleged instances of espionage and treason, most particularly the charge that Party members had collaborated with foreign enemies of the Soviet Union, or with Trotsky as their agent.
The Shakhty Trials shed light on this developing process. Whitewood suggests that the OGPU, in order to stay relevant, exaggerated the extent of Polish subversion in Ukraine, arrested mostly innocent men, and raised the concern of fifth columnists to fever pitch.
It did not help that Stalin enforced his ruthless policy of grain requisition to fund industrial expansion, which led to revolts and unrest throughout Ukraine. Suspicion of Poland, and later Germany, resulted in the deportation of ethnic Polish and German populations in the Soviet Union, what we'd now refer to as ethnic cleansing, which was to presage the more radical demographic changes following the Second World War.
This work is an admirable insight into how fear of external enemies can result in despotism at home, it shows the continuing and mostly ignored relevance of Poland in Soviet foreign policy after 1921, and offers perspective on Stalin's later views of Japan and Germany as external threats.
As a brief aside, though it was not addressed in the text, it may also help our understanding of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, if it were true that Stalin regarded Poland as a threat in herself and not just a threat in combination with Germany or Japan.
The liquidation of this threat would naturally be seen as a major foreign policy triumph by the Stalinist leadership, and Stalin's participation in a fourth Polish partition may have had deeper motives than the cynical horse-trading as it is typically depicted.
Displaying 1 of 1 review