“Examines and analyzes the organizational culture of three armies, those of the United States, Britain, and Israel . . . [an] impressive work.” —H-WarOn today’s complex, fragmented, fast-moving battlefield, where combatants adapt constantly to exploit one another’s weaknesses, there is a demonstrable requirement for military commanders to devolve a high level of autonomy of decision-making and action to leaders on the ground. An effective model for doing this has existed for some time in the form of mission command and has been utilized by the US, Israeli, and British armies—but with mixed success. This book examines in depth the experiences of the armed forces of each of these countries in implementing mission command, and reveals the key factors that have determined the success or failure of the implementation—factors such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the spread of low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war, and differences in how military cultures interpret, articulate, and exercise the command function. With a foreword by H.R. McMaster, Transforming Command has significant implications for both the development of military doctrine and the training and education of tomorrow’s military leaders.“Very well written . . . uses [a] rich array of data and analytical tools to chart out and explain the different trajectories that mission command took in the three countries.” —Armed Forces & Society
This is a phenomenal history of how the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies shifted their command philosophies during the 19th century. The U.S. Marines implemented a Maneuver Warfare philosophy in the 1980's which has Mission Command as one of its key tenants. This was largely due to the obvious failures of using corporate style command structures in Vietnam.
The book begins with an excellent history of codified mission command as it originated in the Prussian Army. It explains the key parts of mission command and why it worked so well. It goes on to document how the U.S., Great Britain, and Israel undertook the task of shifting towards mission command. It finishes with an analysis on how well they have done and their shortfalls.
Highly recommended for any student of command and leadership in war.
This fascinating work examines the state of play after the British, US and Israeli Armies have spent almost 30 years seeking to adopt the system of command, 'Mission Command', employed by the German Army from about 1870 onwards.
Shamir begins with an exploration of the nature and origins of Auftragstaktik in the German Army, before moving on to consider the context for command within his three case study armies, and then assessing the extent to which they have been successful in adopting the new approach borrowed from the Germans.
One of the great strengths of Shamir's account is that he considers command from the perspective of organisational culture, drawing in concepts and models from the extensive literature on this topic from the business world. This underlines that Mission Command is not simply a methodology but is an expression of how an organisation / army perceives the context within which it operates and of the relationship between commanders and commanded. In doing so, he highlights the difficulties inherent in seeking to encourage one culture to behave in ways that are foreign to it. Shamir's extensive interviews with current and recent senior commanders gives the book a freshness and relevance that can be sorely absent from more traditional historical works.
The only real criticism of the book is that there is no bibliography, though the notes are very extensive. This does make tracking down Shamir's sources somewhat laborious.
Finally, Shamir's reliance on my own previous published work on command for his description both of Auftragstaktik and of the British system of command, especially his picking up of my suggestions about the links to organisational culture, of course only serve to make his work that much more welcome to me!
A good book. Compares command experience of German, British,US n Israeli army. The book is useful to decipher best command practices for Armies looking to develop mission command. The author draws heavily from German experience and has cited valuable lessons from Prussian General Staff, their training methodology and war experience. Israeli Army has been cited as true successer of German Army in terms of successfully implementing mission command model to their army. At some place the book becomes excessively theoretical but overall a good read.
If you've ever wondered why your army's doctrine espouses mission command and disciplined initiative within the commander's intent, but your corps commander still wants to know what percentage of your Soldiers' car insurance expires within the next 90 days, then this is the book for you. Should be required reading at Command and General Staff College - possibly via some sort of Brave New World style subliminal messaging. Do not let style and usage errors by a non-native English speaking author deter you from finishing this excellent and well-documented study. Six stars.
A convincing summary of the development of mission command and a description of the organizational culture of the us British and Israeli army is followed by the analysis of the introduction of mission command in the three armies. Easily read the book brings on a couple of very interesting points, including a questioning of the use of modern communication technology. The last chapters are a bit repetitive and cumbersome.
As a serving military officer, I found this book very interesting, easy to read and accurate in both fact and assessment. I would recommend this book to any person of any military, particularly technocrats who believe technology will solve all future military problems.