Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I

Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace

by Justus D. Doenecke

“An equally meticulous and lucid account” of the controversy that preceded the United States’ declaration of war in April 1917 (Historynet).When war broke out in Europe in 1914, political leaders in the United States were swayed by popular opinion to remain neutral; yet less than three years later, the nation declared war on Germany. In Nothing Less Than A New History of America’s Entry into World War I, Justus D. Doenecke examines the clash of opinions over the war during this transformative period and offers a fresh perspective on America’s decision to enter World War I.Praise for Nothing Less Than War“Nothing Less Than War combines careful attention to diplomacy with an excellent consideration of politics and public opinion. It is superb in detail, and even scholars well versed in the field will learn things they didn’t know before.” —John Milton Cooper Jr., author of Woodrow A Biography“Nothing Less Than War is a thoughtful look at America’s entry into World War I. Based on impressive research, it carries the reader back to a very different time, reassesses the wide-ranging debate over the war in Europe, and provides a stimulating re-examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Woodrow Wilson’s leadership.”?Charles Neu“Doenecke paints intriguing portraits of leading figures, many now obscure, including Franklin Delano and Theodore Roosevelt and William Jennings Bryan, plus the rich stew of newspapers, magazines, organizations, diplomats, and propagandists who fought over this issue.” —Publisher Weekly (starred review)“Doenecke untangles and clarifies the national debate in great detail in this dense, well-documented study. It will be of great use to serious students and researchers of the Great War.” —Library Journal

Genres: History, Military History, World War I, War, Nonfiction, American History

399 pages, Kindle Edition

First published March 8, 2011

About the author

Justus Drew Doenecke is Professor Emeritus of History at New College of Florida, where he taught from 1969 until his retirement in 2005. Doenecke earned his Ph.D. in history from Princeton University, and served on the faculty of Colgate University (1963-64) and Ohio Wesleyan University (1965-69) before taking up his appointment at New College of Florida.

Reviews

[Dimitri · Rating 3 out of 5]

As an emeritus, Doenecke is erudite. As a diplomatic historian, Doenecke is dry as a crust, be it sprinkled with newspaper headings which often double as a snappy synopsis. He shows the motivations for America's entry that don't make it into the school books - unlike Wilson's idealistic desire to "make the world safe for democracy. Fortunes are made in war, world power is secured at the peace table and ...you can literally sink your own reputation ? The gist of the slide to war certainly seems like a combination of diplomatic gibberish and the U-boat war pissing everybody off.

A more sober Realpolitik assessment was "Whatever the outcome of the European War, we shall have to fight the victor". Yet from the beginning, American antagonism towards Germany was constructed upon a foundation of classic political interests, such as its economic intrusion in strategic Caribbean & Latin markets or its recognition of the Huerta regime in Mexico. On the other hand, even Brave Little Belgium's reputation suffered when the inconclusive 1906 military talks with Henry Wilson were made public by Berlin. The Royal Navy's blockade was - according to the 1909 Declaration of London - illegal & did hurt the US trade in some ways (77% of Germany's cotton came from the South) but why seek trouble when there was no reward? There was no embargo as befitted a strict neutrality. Trade with the Entente made up for the loss of pre-war ties with German industry.

As a newspaper put it perfectly : "Let them shoot! It makes good business for us !" The U.S. Navy League, for example, was vocal in this regard. British sinkings equaled construction opportunities for American wharfs. It also threw its weight behind Teddy Roosevelt's early call for intervention (given time to prepare a powerful military). They were not without less emotional arguments. The peril at sea from an average dozen U-boats went beyond the sentimental value of American lives lost. Half the U.S. export trade was carried by U.K. ships, so the sinkings had a transatlantic economic impact that registered in Washington.

The sinking of the Lusitania on 7 may 1915 is potrayed as the 9/11 of 14-18 but in actuality in only sparked two diplomatic “Lusitania” notes by Wilson that made Germany secretly forbid its U-boats to attack large passenger liners under any flag. The rest of the discussion between him and Foreign Minister von Jagow about rules was little more than wad-throwing. American newspapers cannily summarized the lukewarm German apology to their 125 countrymen perished with the Lusitania under the headline “Sorry, but I’ll do it again”. It put the blame on Britain’s complicated cargo practices. It's not an easy decision to make on the spot for a U-boat captain when the Lusitania carries ammunition or another liner ships mules “from Armenia” to France together with American Negro handlers.

Within month, the U.S. found itself involved in far greater debates. The nation experienced outright sabotage efforts, a major diplomatic proposal to strip belligerent merchant ships of their arms & a full-scale Congressional rebellion over the right of American passengers to travel on [these ships]. The British practice of arming both her merchant and passenger ships to opportunistically hunt U-boats raised new questions within U.S. diplomacy. Could these still travel to America, visit its ports? Were these armaments defensive? Germany refused to distinguish the fine points. Robert.Lansing proposed on 7 january 1916 to see all non-military vessels disarmed in return for scrupulously adhered cruiser rules. Couldn't the ships be given the benefit of the doubt ?

Yes, the State Department's prime legal advisor argued the merits of the honour system in the midst of a world war...His proposal provoked intense debate in Congress. Could the Federal government prohibit U.S. citizens from boarding Britain's armed passenger ships for their own safety? By April 18, Wilson threatened to 'severe diplomatic relations' over the unrestricted U-boats after a new series of sunken spats involving Americans.

German Foreign Minster Van Jagow complied on May 5th with the "Sussex Note" on cruiser rules, but not on humanitarian grounds. Taking on a new enemy was unwise since Germany's military resources were stretched enough between the Verdun deadlock & a perceptible threat on the Somme. The small U-boat fleet (43 strong and 9 under construction), patrolling at 25% capacity, was better off without rules. The Kaiser made a poignant remark about the whole U-boat rules controversy which is often obscured in British & American books: "Sending millions of shells and cartridges to England and her Allies to kill and maim 1000s of German soldiers is not inhuman because profitable". The Sussex pledge was ripe for criticism. It was an either/or stance, harsh on Germany but without a hard word on the British blockade. By its logic, hostilities would break out the moment the benefits to unrestricted submarine warfare became preferable to those of a neutral America.

The States took a cue from Teddy and put up its dukes. The 1st National Defense Act of June '16 was too cautious to satisfy the preparedness lobby, utterly out of touch with the WWI numbers game & even a disappointment to the isolationists. The National Guard, placed under Federal control, showed (only) defects in training & material when they reinforced their brethern in the southern border states after Pancho Villa's raid on the town of Colombus earlier in March.

Curiously enough, the Entente's next step steepened the slope even further. The (first) (modern) blacklisting of firms by Britain & next by her Allies was widened to include US based firms under German management in July '16. It was the rivet that resurrected the US merchant marine from the mists of the Civil War ( an earlier proposal for a state-owned merchant marine had died in a record session of Congress, replete with 10 hour speeches & cozy cots on the floor).

Lansing wrote an insightful diary entry on the way the tide was turning in spite of the blacklist manoeuvre: "When we do go into the war, and we might as well make up our minds that we are going in, we must go in on the side of the Allies, for we are a democracy... we can determine to a large extent who is to be financed ans who is not." True: roughly 30% of British imports came from Neutrals. Among these, 40% of its chemicals & alloys for the production of guns 'n shells came specifically from the U.S.A, while Wall Street had grown into its main creditor. On the other hand, the U.S. also needed imports of the Empire (rubber, tin...) & would hurt its own economy without large profits from weapons traffic and mundane grain trade. With American prosperity a reality, the US had far more to gain materially by acquescence than challenge Britain.

All this economic power could force the blockade. Psychologically, the time wasn't ripe. Episodes like the Easter Rising irked more than just the German-Americans & newspapers had long memories of the Boer War atrocities.

The 1916 presidental election was a close run, with very similar platforms. including a World Court or such, a stronger Navy for global post-war interests & an army that would be nurtured but save its strength at the same time. the Democrats could taut domestic legislation that improved wages. so far, neutrality held without scarcity, so it was hard to find and point blame for either Party. The President possessed the Southern Progressives' usual suspicion of re-armament, discerning jingoes, high finance and heavy industry behind any Crusade. To Wilson, America's mission had centered since 1914 on neutrality & mediation, NOT on preparation for war. For these reasons, Wilson personally disliked the famous "he kept us out of the war" slogan, fully aware of the diplomatic tightrope it concealed. However, since the summer of 1916, it had become clear that nobody in Europe really wanted America to arbiter a peace without reparations. [ I think Theodore N. Kaufman could've scored with the cry "Germany must Perish!" in this climate ] What were Wilson's alternatives ? Should he formulate a peace program, rules for restricted submarine warfare or straightforwardly condemn unrestricted submarine warfare?

He had difficulty striking the right tone for his Peace Note at the end of 1916. His overseas audience was notably cocky. Notwithstanding the Central Powers' territorial gains following the fall of Bukarest, the Entente had turned down a German proposal for negotiations under U.S. auspicion. This aloofness deepened the split between the two American parties over the pros & cons of intervention, but they jointly urged both belligerents to show their true aims; if these weren't "noble enough", the U.S.A. would take sides! As Lansing sold it to the press: we send a peace note but prepare for entry.

This "si vis pacem para bellum" approach caused a short PR panic. But such were the times at the dawn of the war's third year. America simply no longer sounded convincing in its profession of neutral idealism. A final "Peace Without Victory" speech on 25/01/1917 to endorse an international coaltion was dismissed as utopian. A string of sinkings in the first quarter of 1917 was pushing public opinion over the brink; the State Department no longer protested the Royal Navy's blockade & the Federal Reserve resumed the purchase of treasury notes [IOU's].

On February 3rd, unrestricted submarine warfare had resumed.... but since it was each captain's call to throw the rules overboard or not, there are recorded examples of German officers behaving humanely: "You carry food to an enemy of my country & tough I am sorry, it is my duty to sink you." With these words, Captain Rose of U-53 torpedoed an American merchant ship, then rescued the entire crew of his target & dropped them off at Cornwall.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A solid, well-written study of US intervention in the war.

Doenecke provides a clear picture of the people and forces driving both the interventionist and anti-interventionist camps. He provides good analysis of the diplomacy and the domestic politics, and does a great job ramming home the magnitude of Wilson’s problems, such as domestic divisions over which side to support, Americans’ reluctance to take part in European problems, and the war’s effect on the American economy.

Doenecke also covers the problems America had in collecting intelligence on the situation, how Wilson’s policies were often undermined by subordinates like Lansing and House, and the difficulties in responding to both German attacks on commerce and to the Entente’s legally problematic blockade. Doenecke does a good job showing the range of historiography on Wilson’s policies. He himself is critical of the Wilson administration’s amateurish approach and contradictions, while noting that the Germans' judgment was even worse, sometimes spectacularly so. He also notes that Wilson surrounded himself with advisors and appointees who disagreed with him and had their own biases, were fine with sabotaging his position of neutrality, or were simply incompetent (although Doenecke doesn’t really cover why Wilson did so)

The narrative is engaging and readable. There could have been a little more coverage of the German attacks on US merchant shipping, the debates over US preparedness, German espionage, and American relations with the Entente powers once the US entered the war. Also, Doenecke spends much of the book covering previous historiography of US intervention, and covering contemporary debates and views on the subject. There is so much of this that sometimes you’re not really sure how the author himself has interpreted it.

Still, a clear and well-researched work.

[Michael McCluskey · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think there should have been something on George Creel and the Committee on Public Information.

[Alex Habibi · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a really interesting book on Wilson’s diplomacy leading up to America’s entry in the First World War. In popular imagination, the Lusitania’s sinking is portrayed as an event that galvanized public opinion in favor of intervention, but it really just sparked diplomatic protest. It was interesting to see how provincial most Americans were and how they were uninterested in the conflict. I’d recommend this book to anyone interested in the USA and world War 1. Very well researched with a great bibliography.

[Bill V · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was tedious to read. The author has a unique perspective in that the neutral United States contributed to the defeat of the Central Powers by it lopsided trade with the Entente Powers. Without this support by buy goods, the Entente would have lost the war. He also points out the Entente was essentially bankrupt by early 1917 as it had almost no financial credit left with the US. The Germans essentially saved the Allied cause by declaring unlimited submarine warfare and therefore forcing the United States to declare war on it. In essence, Germany snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
Despite these very good points overall I did not enjoy the book.

[Rick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Did Woodrow Wilson make errors in judgment in processing information received from advisors concerning the Great War which was already raging in Europe in 1914? Did he rely on incompetent diplomats and/or incomplete data? This author makes an informed case for believing in these allegations. But there are other viewpoints and many agree that the war was an inevitable result of deterministic factors and tensions. At best there are no simplistic explanations to the causes of the first world war.

[Colin]

This was a very good history of what got the US into WW1.