I came across this book through a strange circumstance. The brother of Adam Apuzzo was our contractor for a bathroom remodel, and in the course of talking to him, he mentioned his brother, a Pulitzer Prize winning investigative reporter, had co-written a bok about one aspect of the aftermath of 9-11. He was it was pretty interesting, and I said I’d read it, without having tooo many any expectations.
To my surprise, it was fascinating. Apuzzo and Goldman interweave the activities of the New York City Police Department’s anti-terrorism unit and an actual terrorist plot to blow up a portion of the New York subway system. Ironically, the anti-terrorism unit completely miss this plot, and it is the FBI which manages to foil it, and even then a good deal of luck is involved.
What explains this intelligence failure on the part of the NYPD? It had a budget of millions and innumerable operatives whose sole purpose was to be one step ahead of any terrorists and pre-empt any strikes they might have been planning. Unlike the FBI, CIA, and other federal intelligence agencies which have independent oversight, not to mention congressional scrutiny, the NYPD had carte blanche as to what it wanted to do with no external oversight of any kind. There were some legal and constitutional questions at first about its activities, but after the trauma of 9-11 which after all occurred in New York, the police dept. received judicial permission to essentially do whatever it felt was necessary to prevent another attack.
But what was the best method to foil and interrupt terrorist plots? Mostly, it was a technique of “raking the coals,” sending out undercover agents and informants to hang out in mostly Muslim neighborhoods, in mosques, bars, restaurants, barbershops, anywhere that people gathered and take down names of anyone who expressed any kind of anti-American, or anti-Israel sentiments. Extensive files were compiled and this surveillance went on for years.
Was it effective? Did this type of “raking” (a lot of dead leads, or “cold coals” to be sure, but the logic was that if just one good lead (a “live coal”) turned up, it would have all been worthwhile. No such leads ever turned up, but the fall-back logic was that potential terrorists know they’re being watched, and so they didn’t plan anything. Besides, there were no more “attacks” in NYC, so the program must have worked. The reality was, though, that Muslims and other minorities were effectively isolated, and their alienation from the main stream society might well have made them more resentful and angry.
Interwoven with this description of the NYPD tactics is a running narrative which creates suspense about the serious subway bombing terrorist plot, hatched by several young Aghans, one living in Denver. The FBI was mostly responsible for foiling this plot, and only at the very end, did the NYPD get involved. As you might expect,t here was considerable friction between the two agencies.
In an epilogue, , the Boston Marathon bombings come up, and the NYPD, along with Mayor Blomburg, were quick to point out that if Boston had had such a program as New York had, this tragedy could have been averted. Of course, they failed to mention that their own program not only failed to find any terrorists, but was a non factor in uncovering a plot that was being hatched under their watch. When these reporters asked city officials about the surveillance of mosques and Islamic locations, officials simply refused to admit that they existed, called Apuzzo and Goldman’s information “fiction.”
The book concentrates on New York City, but raises issues, even more pressing now with the Snowden revelations about the NSA universal gathering of phone records, about the extent to which Americans are willing to tolerate intrusive and secretive domestic spying, all in the name of “security,” which in this case was not even effective.
The book, I think, is a warning which amplifies a beginning epigraph from Voltaire, “Beware the words, INTERNAL SECURITY, for they are the eternal cry of the oppressor.”